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THE
SOUTHERN QUARTERLY REVIEW.

NEW SERIES.

NOVEMBER, 1856.

VOL. II...No. 1.

ART. I.—SPECULATION AND TRADE.

Manuel du Spéculateur à la Bourse contenant: 1°. Une introduction sur la nature de la spéculation: son rôle dans la production de la Richesse, ses abus, son importance dans l'Economie des sociétés, et son influence sur la destinée des Etats. 2°. Un abrégé des lois et ordonnances qui regissent la Bourse, l'exposé critique et pratique des opérations, les différentes sortes de marchés, et les combinaisons auxquelles elles donnent lieu. 3°. Une notice sur chaque espèce de valeur cotée au parquet, rentes, obligations, Banque de France, crédit foncier et mobilier, chemins de fer, canaux, assurances, &c. Deuxième édition. Revue, corrigée, et augmentée. Paris. Garnier Frères, Libraires-Editeurs. 6 Rue des Saints-Pères, 215 Palais Royal. 1 vol. 12mo.

SPECULATION! It is a fertile and suggestive subject, calculated to attract at once the interest and attention of all. Our lot has been cast in those stirring times when speculation has become almost synonymous with business; when the whole duty of active life seems to be concentrated on the contrivance, realization, and reduplication of rapid profits; when the acquisition of large gains has become to every man almost a necessity, and the sole profession of nearly all, however varied the modes of its accomplishment may be; and when ingenuity, dexterity, and skilful combination, have superseded or outstripped industry in the great transactions of commerce. Speculation! It is the key-note of modern society; the *open sesame* of the chief mysteries of modern trade. It is at once the instrument and the explanation of that feverish avidity for sudden fortune which now rules the world, and of that deepening degradation of the multitude which throws such a sombre hue over the portrait of our present civilization. It is speculation, in its endless diversities, which simultaneously augments the capital of the rich, the acute, the prosperous, and depresses the condition of

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the simple, the unfortunate, and the labouring poor. To it we are indebted for the brilliant return of those flourishing times depicted by the Roman poet:

Creverunt et opes, et opum furiosa cupido :
 Et, quum possideant plurima, plura petunt.
 Quærere, ut absument, absumenta requirere certant:
 Atque ipsæ vitiis sunt alimenta vices.
 Sic quibus intumuit suffusa venter ab unda,
 Quo plus sunt potæ, plus sitiuntur aquæ.
 In pretio pretium nunc est: dat census honores,
 Census amicitias; pauper ubique jacet.*

The political economists could not have described more accurately or scientifically the process of production for the sake of consumption, and consumption for the sake of production, than has here been done by Ovid. The socialists could not have more plainly indicated the consequences of the system which befall the poor, or the causes of their irremediable distress. The speculator on 'change has scarcely delineated more graphically the characteristics of modern brokerage; and we feel well assured that Freedley, in his notable work on the whole art of money making, has not exhibited a keener insight into the shrewd proceedings of the successful adventurer. But a single word sums up the indications of Ovid, the theories of political economy, the complaints of socialism, the investigations of the Parisian "*Spéculateur à la Bourse*," the lessons of Freedley, and the most remarkable phenomena of modern commerce; and that word is Speculation. Surely a term so significant, and a practice so generally diffused, merit the most careful consideration, and will be studied with general and anxious interest.

Such, at least, would be the natural expectation. And yet the experience of the past is contradictory to this anticipation. Speculation has been acquiring its present ascendancy, winning its golden victories, and daily enlarging the circle of its operations, and the numbers of its hosts; but no one, apparently, before the publication of the little volume which supplies us with a text, has deemed the subject worthy of distinct philosophical appreciation. Passing censures and partial elucidations have been abundant, but no methodical study of the great and perplexing enigma had been previously undertaken. Those who had been enrolled in the ranks of speculation were too busily engaged in securing the spoils to discontinue their profitable labours, and reflect upon the character of their operations. The more intelligent might even have been reluctant to reveal the secrets of the game, and might have considered it treachery towards their fellows, disciples, and successors, to betray the machinery of success. Or the same spirit which

* Ovid. *Fasti*, lib. i., vv. 211-218.

rendered every art, trade, and handicraft a mystery in the middle ages, and protected their exercise by oaths, prohibitions, and penalties, might have prevented modern speculators from unveiling to profane eyes the procedure which could remain profitable only so long as it was in some degree a monopoly. While these motives, instinctively obeyed, rather than consciously entertained, may have restrained the revelations of the *élite* of financial operators, those who were the spectators or the victims of the scene were either too solicitous to take part in the fray, or too confused, amazed, and bewildered by the wild and rapid phantasmagoria around them, to interpret, analyze, or understand the concatenation of causes and effects, or the intricate machinery of the lottery, which distributed blanks to themselves, but rich prizes to the favourites of fortune who "guided the whirlwind and directed the storm."

So far, speculation has been an occult science; and it might even have been regarded as the modern contribution to the cycle of the black arts. For a science it has become, in some sort, as it accepts all the doctrines of political economy as the principles of its theoretic constitution; and that it is a mysterious art, producing immense results with small means, or by the application of trivial forces, is rendered manifest by daily experience, if we will only consult experience. Still, neither science nor art was interpreted to the profane multitude. The brilliant operations of the speculator and financier were cunningly and continually devised; astounding gains were suddenly realized by the fortunate directors of the movement; and the public admired in ignorance a proceeding in which it was impossible to discover any increase of values or productions comparable to the profits which had been acquired by the winners of the game.

At length the veil is lifted, and we are presented with an explanation of the processes, the operations, and the machinery of speculation. The separate wheels, and their combination in the machine, their adjustment, their interworking, and their respective revolutions, so far as these are exemplified on the Parisian exchange, are elucidated with ample detail in the interesting and instructive volume before us. The enumeration and interpretation of the formalities and ceremonies which transpire in the intercourse of the bulls and the bears, constitute, however, in our estimation, the least important, though the largest portion of this work. Something of the same sort had been previously attempted in regard to the London exchange, by one Mr. Fenn,* who, in

* *English and Foreign Funds*: A compendium of the English and Foreign Funds, and the principal joint stock companies; forming an epitome of the various objects of investment negotiable in London, with some account of the internal debts and revenues of the foreign States, and tables for calculating the value of the different stocks, &c. Second edition, with additions. By C. FENN, 12mo. Mr. Fenn, we suppose to be a discreet broker, who wrote a book to benefit his business. He promises only fact, and does not profess philosophy, and could not be expected to tell tales out of school.

common with others, anticipated to this extent the idea elaborated in the second and third divisions of the *Spéculateur à la Bourse*. If, in addition to these two productions, we should be favoured with a manual for the guidance of the stranger in Wall street, by a good Samaritan, a *vade mecum* for the uninitiated at the Hague, and a programme of the concert for a looker-on at Vienna, we would possess as complete a literature of the Eleusinian Mysteries of modern trade, as a curious man could desire, or a business man demand.

Two thirds of the present volume are occupied with the elucidation of the routine of the dealings of brokers, stock-brokers, share-brokers, commission merchants, financiers, bankers, and adventurers of all sorts, and describe the ever varying game of hazard played by the Jews and the Gentiles in the Parisian money market. To professional readers, if we may abuse the epithet by such an application, this will be the most interesting part of the treatise. It is almost entirely plain matter of fact and business instruction, though sharp comments are occasionally introduced. If that luminous series of guides, commemorated as desiderata in the preceding paragraph, should ever be satisfactorily compiled, this portion of the *Spéculateur à la Bourse* would reappear in each of them with the appropriate change of names, titles, and headings, and an alteration of the figures. The operations enumerated would be substantially the same, though the counters would be changed. We do not misapprehend either the speculative or practical value of this kind of information: it is a necessary preliminary to any accurate estimation of the effects and tendencies of the general system, besides rendering special services to the incipient Levites of brokerdom; but it is the philosophy of trade, of speculation, and of modern society, so far as these are revealed or exemplified by the operations on 'change, which principally invite our contemplation, and impart to this manual a general interest. Its opening chapters and its "final considerations" are employed in disentangling such philosophical conclusions from the multitude of figures, the variety of operations, and the diversity of French stocks. As these generalizations are applicable and true, independently of the special facts by which they are suggested and illustrated, we shall confine our attention to the principles and results of modern speculation, without annoying our readers, or harassing ourselves by interpreting the particular phases which its procedure assumes in Paris, and which are repeated, with very trivial modifications, at all the centres of commercial or financial activity in the different countries of Christendom. We will not impose on others the necessity of re-learning the French language, in order to comprehend the vocabulary of the *Bourse*, but will dismiss, without notice, the *Agents de Change*, *Courtiers de Commerce*, *Courtiers d'Assurance*, *Courtiers-*

Marrons, Coulissiers, &c., &c., and will not trouble ourselves about the bank of France, the *Comptoire National d'Escompte*, the *Crédit Foncier de France*, the *Société générale de Crédit Mobilier*, the *Société générale de Crédit Maritime*, the *Caisse hypothécaire, &c.*, unless an occasional reference to some of these cabalistic terms should be required for the illustration of the philosophy of the subject.

The *Manuel du Spéculateur à la Bourse* is a remarkable and instructive book, and is well calculated to open the eyes of the public to some of the imminent dangers of our modern social organization. It is full of acute reasoning and profound reflection, and is throughout perspicuous, far beyond what we should have imagined to be the capabilities of the subject. To all its positions we may not assent; but even those which we feel ourselves obliged to repudiate, are rich in suggestions. We cannot concur with the author in anticipating the ultimate solution which he divines with sanguine hope, and which he expects to be evolved by the spontaneous development of existing tendencies. We have no preëstablished theory to support; no new social scheme to propound; and feel very little inclination to claim citizenship in either Icaria or Utopia. But, without yielding an unhesitating faith to the tenets of this volume, we can both admire and profit by its sagacity; and we avail ourselves gratefully of the guidance of the thread which it affords for our use, in penetrating and retracing the intricate labyrinths of modern speculation.

The title of the book is a very inadequate indication of either its spirit or its contents. It is a searching criticism of one of the most obscure and least studied departments of political economy, using this phrase in its largest sense, to denote the practices of commercial enterprise, even more than the theory of wealth. It is a luminous exposition of evils already experienced without being extensively recognized, and of perils impending without having excited any suitable alarm. For it is true now, as it was at the close of ancient civilization, that society is rushing into irretrievable calamities, and is heedlessly regaling itself the while with the supposed felicities of its prosperous situation. *Sardoniciis quodammodo herbis omnem Romanum populum putes "esse saturatum. Moritur, et ridet."**

The book is anonymous. In consequence of its utility, its singularity, its popularity, or its originality—perhaps in consequence of the union of these characteristics—it has advanced in two or three years to the honours of a second edition; yet the name of no author appears on the title-page, nor is there any sign or note to indicate by whom it was composed. We are indebted

* Salvianus. De Gubernat., Dei. lib. vii., c. i., p. 142-3. Ed. Baluzii.

to the publisher, or perhaps only to the Parisian bibliopole, for the assurance that it is one of the latest productions of the celebrated Proudhon. It is not unworthy of his pen, though the ostensible subject may seem a strange text for a philosopher of his eccentric reputation. The piquancy of the style, the precision of the analysis, the cogency of the logic, the ulterior aims intimated, and the occasional extravagances, perfectly accord with the characteristics which distinguish the accredited treatises of that great but paradoxical writer. Nor does the subject appear altogether foreign to his previous career, when we contemplate the method of its treatment, and remember the preëminence which he had already assigned to financial operations in the existing and ultimate organization of society, the part which is performed in the evolution of his social system by his theory of value and of money, the memorable debate which he excited in the National Assembly in 1848, his controversy with M. Bastiat, and the project of the "*Banque du Peuple*," established by P. J. Proudhon *et c^{ie}*.

"Commerce is king." This brief confession of faith constitutes the modern creed, and explains many of the phenomena of modern society. "Commerce is king;" and the murmurs of rebellion are drowned by the loud and unanimous plaudits of the myriads of his liege subjects. (King, he is incontestably *de facto*; king, he is almost universally believed to be *de jure*.) We shall not preach sedition; there is too much wisdom in obedience to the powers that be, when these are universally acknowledged, for us to challenge their legitimacy. But we may, with propriety, and without contemplating any disturbance, examine the attributes, and criticize the actions of the monarch. We may intimate that commerce, like other kings, whose sovereignty is unrestricted, is something of a tyrant in his proceedings, and maintains, at heavy expense, a select court and a favoured aristocracy. We may cautiously follow the footsteps of the speculator on 'change, and inquire into the patents, privileges, and practices of the princes and dignitaries of finance, and discover the manner in which these affect the lieges. We may examine whether it is true in this case, as in regard to other monarchies, that

Quicquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi:

whether the profits of the great brokers are paid by an actual augmentation of the aggregate production, or whether they are liquidated by the increased sufferings and labours of the hard-working mass.

M. Proudhon, "or whoever may be the author of the Manual in our hands, professes to have investigated (without neglecting anything that might be of use to financial gamesters) the causes

and transformations of credit, industry, and property, whereby negotiable values have acquired such a prodigious development as to constitute nothing less than a complete revolution in social economy." *

It is a revolution, however peaceably and silently effected. It is a grand *coup d'état* achieved for the advantage of the reigning dynasty. We will not venture to say that it furthers the permanent interests of commerce or capital, for the declaration would be precipitate, though this appears to be the general belief. But it does enure to the benefit of the present pets of fortune. Instead of simply admiring the change, with the crowd of unreflecting and unsuspecting eulogists, we will endeavour to understand it, and, if possible, to explain its character and auguries.

That all wealth is only transmuted and consolidated labour, and that the amount of labour actually applied is the exact measure of production, are fundamental tenets of political economy, which no one in these days pretends to deny. It is equally confessed that all commerce is the exchange of products, and that products can only be bought with products; and yet, all the great operations of speculation, the whole routine by which immense fortunes are made in a few hours, or days, or weeks, or months, or years, as the case may be, add no additional production of any sort to the values with which they are connected, but only shuffle them, or more frequently the titles to them, from hand to hand. But the winning speculators contrive always to turn up a trump card, and to sweep the stakes from the board. They have studied and mastered one lesson of scripture, and have detected a new sense in the text, "Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow: they toil not, neither do they spin; and yet, I say unto you, that even Solomon, in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these."

During the month of September, 1855, we noticed this statement in the papers:

"GREAT OPERATION.—The most magnificent speculation recorded in modern times, is one recently made by Emile Péreire, President of the *Crédit Mobilier*, of Paris. This distinguished financier entered recently into a negotiation with the gas companies, now supplying Paris with light, purchasing the whole of them for thirty-five million francs, or about seven million dollars. He then procured from the Emperor a concession, or charter, of consolidations, converting the whole into one company. This charter and property he afterwards disposed of to his company (*Crédit*

* *Manuel du Spéculateur à la Bourse. Avis aux Lecteurs.* p. 5. This announcement may probably be ascribed with propriety to MM. Garnier Frères, the publishers, who, throughout their neat, but inaccurately printed edition of the "*Œuvres de Proudhon*," append very piquant, and not always complimentary, remarks to the text.

Mobilier) for the sum of fifty million francs, thus realizing a profit of fifteen million francs, or three million dollars.”*

Who were the beneficiaries in this transaction? Obviously M. Emile Pèrèire and his immediate associates in the enterprise. It is more doubtful, whether the stockholders of the *Crédit Mobilier* gained anything, for we are informed in the next paragraph, that the shares of that company would sink to fifty per cent. below par, if they were not upheld by the financial reputation of M. Emile Pèrèire. Do the citizens of Paris gain anything by the monopoly of gas? It is scarcely to be expected. Is there any addition to the trade or to the aggregate values of France? It is undiscoverable; the natural inference would point to an exactly opposite conclusion. What production? What increase of values has resulted from the operation? There is none apparent. All that is discernible is, that M. Emile Pèrèire, the illustrious Jew, who is becoming a worthy rival of the Rothschilds, has pocketed or distributed the snug profit of \$3,000,000, and that nothing has been added to the quantity, the value, or the accessibility of the gas manufacture. To us this great operation suggests, among other things, the necessity for a new definition, or for a precise limitation, of the meaning of production and value, in the science of political economy. In the sense in which political economy employs these terms, there was neither production nor increase of value, yet all the principal operations of trade in our times partake of the essential character of this financial operation. Financiering has rather a discreditable import in the English language, which is not likely to be obliterated by the recent tendencies of the art.

It is not always the case, however, that the objects of speculation receive no addition of value from the manipulations of the speculators. But in those cases where the smaller fry do add some little productive value to the materials with which they operate, there is such a preposterous disproportion between the productive service rendered and the advanced price claimed, that the increase of the market value cannot be attributed to the addition of labour, or of capital, the representative of labour, but simply to the success of the speculation. In the highest and most profitable form of speculation, however, there is neither augmentation of value, nor the pretence of such augmentation. All that is done is to shuffle the cards, and deal them out; the croupier then counts the losses and gains of those that have taken part in the game. Often there is no exchange of products; no productive service or similitude of service whatever, nothing but a transfer of titles. Even this

* Numerous examples of this same character are given by the *Manuel du Spéculateur*, and they are familiar to all, from their daily occurrence everywhere.

exchange is frequently dispensed with, and the whole operation consists in the payment of forfeitures and the receipt of premiums. Here political economy is completely at fault, and jurisprudence is equally impotent and blind.* Instead of the exchange of values, there is only an interchange of chances and risks. Instead of giving employment to labour, and tending towards new production, the whole transaction is limited to a brief memorandum, and a prompt settlement at the moment of maturity. The substance of the trade embraces no material reality, but the most shadowy and fluctuating contingencies; and the whole force of the machinery is expended in transferring to A, a sum of money previously in the pockets of B. The speculator on 'change offers or accepts a bid for the possibilities of the future; he trades entirely on eventualities; he discounts the fears and hopes of his brethren. But this is not his whole function; and this very important part of his vocation is to influence or control the hopes and the fears of men, so that he may gain, by every revolution of the wheel of fortune. There are laws almost everywhere against lotteries, yet the dealings of the exchange form the grandest of lotteries. In nearly every State, there is legislation against gambling; yet in despite of legislation and law, the dangers of the *faro* bank and of *rouge et noir*, are exceeded by the daily routine in the highest chambers of commerce.

The true nature of speculation, though remaining essentially the same, is disguised when it is concerned about material realities, such as the opening and improvement of mines, with the intention of a sale, at an inordinate advance; the proposals for public contracts, with the design of sub-letting, or underselling at a high profit; the organization of companies, for the sake of the anticipated premiums on the shares; the purchase of invoices with the purpose of reselling, without ever taking possession of the goods invoiced; the engrossing of sugar, cotton, tobacco, wheat, &c. &c., not for use, or immediate delivery to consumers, but with the prospect of selling out wholesale, on a rising market; the buying of lands and town-lots, with the hope or assurance of a suddenly augmented value; these, and a thousand similar examples, which are of daily occurrence, and seem to be in the regular channel of business, are all instances of speculation, and partake in a greater or less degree of its essential characteristics; but these are obscured by their combination, a trifling and partial admixture it may be, with the exchange of material values.

The intrinsic character of commercial speculation is most clearly manifested in those instances where the whole object of

* The violations of law in France by the stock-brokers and others are pointed out in the *Manuel du Spéculateur*, &c. Similar violations occur everywhere.

the trade is limited to the casual variations of price. When the Dutch merchants, and indeed the whole Dutch community, were bitten by the tulip mania, in 1634-1637, and sold and resold, at immense prices, tulip roots which they never owned, and even of whose existence they had frequently no assurance ; or when the *morus multicaulis* fever raged in this country two centuries later, the folly and inanity of pure speculation were very apparent: "During the time of the tulip mania, a speculator often offered and paid large sums for a root, which he never received, and never wished to receive. Another sold roots which he never possessed or delivered. Oft did a nobleman purchase of a chimney-sweep, tulips to the amount of two thousand florins, and sell them at the same time to a farmer ; and neither the nobleman, chimney-sweep, or farmer, had roots in their possession, or wished to possess them."* What was sold and purchased, in each case, was a naked expectation ; and at this game of hazard large sums of money were won and lost, and the whole society was for the time demoralized. This tulip folly appears very ridiculous in modern eyes ; and yet we repeated the same delusion, with equal zest, and a more extended credulity, in regard to the mulberry ; and the same routine is regularly pursued, as an established business, in all the principal cities of the world. The identity between the operations of the Bourse and the transactions in tulips, was recognized by the worthy Herr Beckmann, in the latter part of the last century. "The whole of this trade was a game at hazard, as the Mississippi trade was afterwards, and as stock-jobbing is at present. The only difference between the tulip trade and stock-jobbing is, that at the end of the contract, the price in the latter is determined by the stock exchange ; whereas, in the former it was determined by that at which most bargains were made." A large part of the business—if business it can be called—in which the stock-broker is engaged, consists virtually in betting on the future and contingent prices of the commodities in which he deals, or pretends to deal. In such cases the object of his trade is not the stocks, shares, or other interests which constitute the nominal subject of the bargain, but merely the rise or fall of the price as determined by the increase or diminution of the competition, and the concomitant fluctuation of the opinion, real or pretended, of their value. The intrinsic value of the stocks and shares remains for the most part unchanged during the period of the transaction ; they represent identically the same property, producing exactly the same revenues, at the expiration of the term, that they did at its commencement. Their productive capacity has been neither increased nor dimin-

* Beckmann, Hist. of Inventions, vol. 1, p. 27-8. Ed. Bohn. The whole article on tulips is exceedingly interesting, and merits careful and frequent consideration.

ished ; but the estimate of that capacity in some cases, and the market price in all, vary in consequence of the play of two influences—the law of supply and demand, and the oscillations of fancy. The latter of these considerations, though much the more important, has been entirely excluded from the treatises of political economy, thereby vitiating the science.

The changes in the relation between the supply and the demand, and also in the vibrations of the public pulse, admit of being artificially or artfully produced, and are often simultaneously generated by the same artifice. A panic is occasioned by the rapid dissemination of false intelligence, and the estimation of the stocks, bonds, or shares affected by the rumour is depressed, and thus the holders are tempted to sell out at the first opportunity, whereby the market is overstocked. At the same time other stocks are thus brought into greater demand, are more tenaciously retained, and their price is enhanced. Unfounded reports of an opposite character are also industriously circulated, the newspapers are deceived or bought, the telegraph wires are bribed or falsified, the expectation of a sudden enhancement of value is sedulously implanted, and the desired rise takes place in consequence. For, in this event, holders are anxious to retain their promising stocks, and to purchase more of the same kind, in the confident hope of the premeditated advance, the expectations of all are inflamed, and the supply of the share market, with the particular stocks so carefully manipulated, is reduced nearly to the amount designed to be sold with advantage to the operators in the game.

These changes may be produced by concert between several stockbrokers, or they may be effectuated by the action of one or two large capitalists. The actual value of the funds, stocks, shares, or whatever else may be the nominal element of the trade, undergoes no alteration ; all that can be altered is the accidental or market value. When we speak of the actual value, we mean neither value in use nor value in exchange, so far as the latter is habitually identified with price.* What we mean by actual value, is productive value—capacity to produce other commodities by the exchange of the annual or quarterly returns. This value undergoes no change in the hands of the stockbrokers. Either no such value exists, as in the case of uncertain and contingent railroads ; or it does exist, but is not affected by or during the transactions of the exchange. As has been already remarked, the sole object of the stockbroker is to make a profit by the fluctua-

* See Mill's Political Economy. B. ii, ch. 1, § 2, vol. 1, p. 516. 1st Engl. Ed. The want of definite terms, and even of definite ideas in regard to this branch of inquiry, only reveals the entire absence of any settled doctrine among political economists on the subject of value. This indecision is the capital of the stockbroker.

tions of price dependent on the fluctuations of opinion, and his principal business is to create those fluctuations of sentiment. So purely ideal and intangible are the commodities in which he deals, that language can scarcely apprehend them, and the modern tongues of christendom have been compelled to augment their vocabulary, by the reception of the mystic and metaphorical terms, employed and understood only by those initiated in the arcana of modern commerce.

As the values of the stocks remain virtually the same during the term of the financial operations, the oscillations of their price take place within certain limits, and are very small in comparison with the nominal value of the exchanges. They are also temporary, and the depression of May is counterbalanced by the rise of June. A stockdealer, therefore, who has a more than ordinary command of capital, can at all times purchase stock of a permanently good character with entire impunity. He may have no temptation to do so when the quotations are high ; but when they are either low or moderate, he will have both the inducement and the ability to buy, and will encounter no risk, because, by the terms of the hypothesis, he has the means to pay for the stocks, and can wait till the favorable moment arrives to resell with an assured profit. Possessing ample funds, and sheltered from all risks, the Rothschilds, the Barings, the Hopes, and others of that rich kidney, can operate on 'change with entire confidence and security. The only problem presented for their solution is to select between opposite opportunities, so as to secure the maximum of profit. The profit itself is certain, as the game is at all times in their own hands. They can retain stocks so as to produce a depression in their market value whenever they desire, by suddenly offering them for sale. They can raise their price at will, by a dexterous tenacity, or by buying largely on a falling tide. The waters of the great financial deep move at their bidding, and are subject to their control ; the prosperity of nations and the resources of governments depend, in great measure, upon their operations or their caprice ; and it may have been with the hope of escaping from the fatal coil of their embrace, that Louis Napoleon appealed to the masses of the people for subscriptions to his recent loan. In vain ; for the great capitalist will soon obtain command of this debt, by voluntary assignments or compulsory transfers. It is only a brief respite that can be obtained by such devices. The dragons of finance will proceed with a quiet but certain movement to their destined end, and will fasten on governments, and entwine themselves around states, till they strangle them in their folds. Their course is undeviating, their triumph foreknown.

*Bis medium amplexi, bis collo squamea circum
Terga dati, superant capite, et cervicibus altis.*

But it would lead us too far from our main purpose to investigate the multifarious modes in which the millionaires of the Bourse can always block the game, and ensure advantage to themselves. Certain it is, and it is rendered evident even by our slight analysis, that the exchange is in their hands, that the great prizes in the lottery of fortune are promised beforehand to them, that, if they act with ordinary prudence, they must always be the winners and that they must ultimately realize all the profits of these financial operations, except so much as their indifference or generosity may leave to support the existence and stimulate the hopes of the small fry on which they prey. Nothing but revolution can arrest their conquests, and revolution changes rather the persons than the character of the winners.

The small fry, however, play an important part during the period of their growth. They are the gudgeons which devour each other and the stray members of the community at large, until they are either consumed by the larger fish, or become large fish themselves. Speculation may be the luxury of the wealthy capitalist, but he has and desires no absolute monopoly of the amusement. He finds his own advantage in encouraging a shoal of minnows around him. A large capital may be requisite for the security of the player, but it is not necessary for every participant in the game. Gambling of all sorts is a very democratic occupation; and an adventurer with scanty funds, but sanguine expectations, may share the chances, and is welcome to encounter the risks of the play.

Since the stakes are not usually the capitals nominally exchanged, but only the differences of price at specified terms, the amount of values actually at issue bears only a feeble proportion to the sum ostensibly involved; and with a few thousands, business may be comfortably transacted to the tune of several millions. Nay, a skilful player may continue the game, by allaying suspicion, or producing erroneous impressions in regard to himself, long after all his little capital has been dissipated. If presumptive chances are accepted as the sources of gain, presumptions, natural or suggested, may very well be employed as the principal capital in the trade. Thus shadows fight with shadows, until reality comes with the final day of settlement; and at length the phantasmagoria, which amused, enriched, or impoverished individuals, may ultimately descend as a fearful and tangible visitation upon the nations which have encouraged or tolerated the show. The phantoms, the airy squadrons, the contending hosts, which manœuvred in the clouds of the Jewish heavens, prognosticated and were succeeded by the terrible overthrow of the city of Jerusalem.

Speculation in the funds and in public stocks possesses so many of the essential characteristics of ordinary gambling and horse-jockeying, that it is scarcely necessary to mention that it has

invented similar precautions to guard against the consequences of an imprudent or unfortunate venture. Its acolytes can hedge as well as the votaries of the turf. The numerous and ingenious combinations by which loss may be prevented or diminished, and small gains be secured after large winnings have been frustrated, are very clearly expounded by *Le Spéculateur à la Bourse*.*

Of course, in cases where the profit or loss turns principally upon hazard; where the interest of the game is dependent, not upon the real, but upon the factitious values of the commodities professedly exchanged; and where these values may be readily affected by the artifices of the players, it would be too much to expect at all times either perfect honesty in the transactions, or a very refined sense of integrity among the various performers. A conventional morality will necessarily exist, and this will be usually respected; but that morality will itself have a tendency to introduce and encourage a low grade of principle, which will rapidly infect the whole body of society. It is not of individuals, but of the character and effects of a system, that we speak; and it would be unjust to apply to persons the censures which may be appropriate to practices publicly recognized and admired. But there is only too much justice in the remark, that "Speculation, cultivated for the sake of further speculation, without thought of any increase of production—in fine, *agio* for the sake of *agio* alone—enters into the same category with betting and gambling, not to say with cheating and theft. Speculation, so understood, is nothing more than the art, always contingent, however, of making riches without labour, without capital, without commerce, and without genius; the secret of pocketing the means of the community or of individuals, without rendering any equivalent in exchange; it is the cankerworm of production, the consuming pest of societies and States."† "Speculation then ceases to be a game at which every one has the right to do only what the law does not prohibit, and may simply correct, so far as prudence may permit, the caprices of chance. It involves all the vices of trade—charlatan-ism, fraud, monopoly, forestalling, collusion, deception, false reports, with cheating included."‡ A recent illustration is afforded by the conduct of an acute broker after the fall of the southern part of Sebastopol. The funds in Paris were but little affected by the first intelligence of that event. He circulated the rumour that Gen. Liprandi had surrendered; an instant rise was the consequence, and though it was only of brief duration, it probably

* *Première Partie*. ch. v. pp. 88–111.

† *Le Spéc. à la Bourse*. *Introd.* § ii. p. 11.

‡ *Le Spéc. à la Bourse*. *Introd.* § ii, p. 15. "Chantage" is a neologism inadequately rendered by "false reports."

lasted long enough to ensure a handsome profit to the shrewd operator who had originated it.

This short analysis of the character of the operations in the funds, is sufficient to show the hazards and insecurity to which the prosperity of civilized communities is exposed in consequence of their effects. Large capitals—probably the largest capitals held by individuals—are withdrawn from the slower and less lucrative processes of production, and are employed in what may well be considered as authorized gambling. In addition to this injury to the community, the national revenues and the national capital are rendered fluctuating, uncertain, and insufficient, because their values vary with every turn in the game, and every national loan must offer a premium of some sort to the creditor, which is a loss to the people and an additional tax upon the tax-payer. Moreover, the fortunes and the resources of the State are left completely at the mercy of the financiers on 'change, and governments must be guided by their interests and wishes, not by sound principle, or true policy, or the desires of the people. The consequence is, that an aristocracy of wealth, sometimes real, more frequently imaginary, in these days, virtually controls the civilized world, and the power is the greater and the more pernicious, because it is almost impossible to detect either the measure or the exact mode of its exercise. Still, the inevitable result must be, that the welfare of the people at large, the development of industry, the expansion of a healthy commerce, and all the interests of actual production, must be subordinated to the tricks, the caprices, and the private gains of the barons of the exchange. National ruin is of course the only ultimate solution of this desperate problem; for when the interests of the many are sacrificed to the advantages of the few—when the public weal becomes the privileged plunder of a select class, who use it simply for the increase of their own pecuniary gains, the mainspring of national prosperity is broken, and the whole machinery of society will be arrested.

This fatal tendency will be expedited and intensified by the unavoidable dissemination, through the great body of the community, of the same principles, procedures and aspirations, which characterize the dealings of those who control the general movements of production, and reap the most brilliant profits. Speculation in the funds is an old and familiar practice, although it has been much extended and modified during the last half century, and has acquired in that period an ascendancy which is portentous. But the application of the same spirit to industrial enterprises is of comparatively recent date, and has in great measure, grown out of the introduction of steam, and the vast development of commercial and industrial enterprises consequent thereon. The Russia Company, the Virginia Company, the Turkey Companies, the East India Company, the South Sea Bubble, and the Missis-

sippi scheme, were anticipations of those industrial associations, which now threaten to monopolize the transactions of the world. But the earlier trading associations contemplated actual production as the main source of their expected gains; and the most of them failed, not from any inherent defect in the projects themselves, but from want of confidence on the part of both the public and the shareholders, and the absence of any harmony between them and the sentiments of the contemporary communities. They would all probably have achieved the most dazzling success in our days, because almost every one is infected with the same fever of shareholding and stockdealing, and because associated enterprise is the monomania, and perhaps the necessity of our times. But neither the South Sea device nor John Law's bank was as shadowy and unsubstantial as *La Société du Crédit Mobilier* in France—an institution designed to acquire, by mortgages and purchases, the profitable ownership of the products and machinery of French industry, and to pay for them chiefly by the issue of shares and the speculative profits of the gigantic enterprise. After this prospective result is attained, and the actual ownership is transferred to the society, as it must ultimately be, unless, as is highly probable, some rude jar should produce the explosion of the grand machine, we may ask what will become of the industry and the capital of France; but we shall not attempt to answer a question which should be solved by MM. Isaac et Émile Péreire, the founders of this castle of clouds.*

This society of delusive credit is, however, only one grand exemplification of the disposition now prevalent to transfer to associations all the processes of commercial activity, and to convert all property into scrip and stocks, thus seeking profit not from actual production, but from stock dealing, or the dividends resulting from the enhanced values of the shares in the speculation. For all the incorporated companies of this character, or partaking in only a slight degree of this character, furnish new materials for speculation. In many instances their stocks are regularly transferred and quoted at the Bourse; and when they have not won this high honour, they give rise to similar operations in the private rooms of inferior brokers, or on the streets. In this manner, it has happened that the questionable dealings in the funds are now extended to an

* *Le Spéculateur à la Bourse*. Deuxième section, i. chap. iv., pp. 210–221. “Comme instrument de circulation et d’agiotage, l’organisation de la société générale est une conception de maîtres. * * * Le Crédit mobilier peut faire l’abondance ou la rareté, le vide ou le trop-plein; c’est un gigantesque monopole hors duquel il n’y a point de salut pour le spéculateur. Tout ce qui sera en dehors n’aura plus rien à faire qu’à payer.” p. 215. The fluctuations of the price of shares in this company are enormous. They have risen from 500 francs as high as 1,875 francs. The *New York Express* said, in September 1855, that the stock is prevented solely by the financial reputation of M. Émile Péreire, from selling at 50 per cent. discount.

indefinite number of other stocks—railroad, canal, dock, gas, insurance, land, mining, manufacturing, marine and other companies ; and that the great industrial enterprises of our day are prosecuted less for the actual service which they render to production, than for the incidental gains which they offer to skilful operators by the fluctuations in the nominal value of their stocks. Thus, by a singular development of the much applauded industry of recent years, the fruits of industry are contemned as inadequate to the satisfaction of modern greed, and large profits without labour, and derivable only from the fantasy of the public mind, have become the principal object of desire. It seems almost needless to intimate that the final result of this temper and the practice which ministers to it, must be the stagnation of actual production, and the sudden dissipation of the imaginary values which have inflamed the passions of all. Speculation, even when most successful, trades on fairy gold ; and, though the delusion may be prolonged by the universality of its acceptance, it must be at length dispelled by the stern action of reality.

The mischief apprehended is not confined to national debts and large companies. It is implicated, in a more virulent though less active degree, in the whole system of joint stock association. In almost every combination of this kind speculation and extraordinary gains, without labour, are the object of the original shareholders, and large perquisites and revenues, with little labour, and comparatively little capital of the managers. The whole effort, as the whole tendency, is to contrive gains disproportionate to both the labour and capital employed, and to seek incidental profits at the risk of the public, and the more simple minded of the shareholders. Profit, rather than production, is the aim contemplated. If the nature of things should permit such a system to become universal, production would cease almost entirely, and profit would be impossible. But long before the goal was reached, the profits would be gambling profits, acquired at the expense of the producers.

The establishment and multiplication of these joint stock companies operate unfavourably on those actually engaged in honest and *bona fide* production. The vast capitals, real or nominal, but still efficient, employed by these associations, reduce the proportion of expenses, and diminish the ratio of profit, thereby competing with the individual producer, on terms fatal to his success, and even to his subsistence. This, however, must be the consequence wherever large capitals are brought into competition with small ones, whether the former be held by individuals or corporate bodies. But this inclination of the times to operate on a grand scale—to unite extensive transactions in a single enterprise—cooperates with the avidity for easy and extravagant gains, in repressing the separate exertions of the individual members of the

community; necessitates combinations, associations, and monopolies; and aids in transmuting the industrial system of modern society into a commercial feudalism, and in increasing the range and influence of speculation. "The field of individual energy is daily restricted within narrower limits by the encroachments of association. The transformation is rapid. We are marching towards a vast anonymous incorporation, in which the most potential, like the most humble agents, will be designated simply by a number."* Three associations in France, the banks of France, *La Société du Crédit Foncier* and *La Société du Crédit Mobilier*, threaten to engulf nearly all the property, and to control almost all the industry of the empire. The bank of England is one of the sovereign powers of the British empire; the United States bank at one time threatened to assume the supremacy over the American States; and in New Jersey the governing power resides in a railroad company.

Large capitals, under the superintendence of a few directors, are likely to supply the principal agencies of production. Numerous small capitalists holding the stock, and purchasing the shares of such associations, with the insecure hope of living with permanent comfort on the dividends, will provide these capitals, and cease to depend principally on the fruits of their daily labour or the rewards of their personal assiduity. Outside of these shareholders, are the large capitalists and the speculators, devising gains by the invention of new schemes, the organization of new companies, and by producing and profiting by the rise and fall of stocks of all sorts. Thus the real capital and the actual production of the country are the prey of speculators and capitalists, and the whole social organism is exhausted to furnish the profits of the stock jobbers. Everything in the nature of productive property is on the high road to a transmutation into stocks, and these stocks, as has already been shown, are the materials for transactions which can scarcely be distinguished from open gambling, by the closest scrutiny and the nicest discrimination. Hence the inference flows immediately, that the destiny of the modern system is to convert all industry into a national game of hazard.

It is a melancholy but instructive portraiture of the modern industrial system, which is drawn by *Le Spéculateur à la Bourse*, in his remarks on Association. They afford a profound insight into the diseased constitution of modern societies, and explain the great revolutions which are transpiring before our eyes, with a profound sagacity which is very foreign to the spirit of the daily dissertations in economical pamphlets and commercial journals.

* *Le Spéc. à la Bourse*. Deuxième section. § i, p. 156.

This ingenious speculator thus interprets the tendencies we have been considering :

“In the present state of affairs, association is an instrument of combined action, (*solidarit*), not as this is understood by the visionaries of Utopia, but as it is construed by business men. The shareholder, has in fact, only one right, the right of paying ; and, if the favourable chance occurs, of being paid. The management of the enterprise, the apportionment of salaries, the control of everything which is done with his money, are entirely beyond his jurisdiction. The directors may dispose of his substance, compromise him, ruin him. With all this he has nothing to do. He enjoys the principal share in the risks, the smallest share in the profits. He is bound by engagements which he never contracted, and must discharge debts which he had no part in creating. It must be a very fortunate enterprise, if it has any benefits to bestow upon him. The result of every commercial association is primarily the plunder of the shareholders.”*

“‘Limited partnership is a restricted monarchy,’ says M. Troplong, ‘corporate associations are a true republic.’ Let us add : with the traditional encroachments of the two kinds of government, invasion of the legislative department by the executive, subjection of the elector by the delegate.”

“It would be difficult to say which of the two *regimes* is the worst for the sleeping partner or shareholder. Under the one, as under the other, he is the serf, subject to taxation and imposition without mercy and without compassion. (*Il est la plibe taillable et corveable a merci et misericorde.*)”†

Association is the grand pasture ground of speculation. It furnishes the stocks and shares which the other shuffles and deals. It gathers together the prey for the eagles, and vultures, and harpies, and other rapacious birds to pounce upon. It subjects the associates and their means to the control of the capitalist and speculator. Without its coöperation speculation would soon die out, or shrink to smaller dimensions, for want of sufficient aliment ; with its expansion, which seems to be the destiny of society, speculation admits of indefinite increase until the fatal term is reached, and the spoiler and the victim both decline into a common grave.

National loans and funded debts presented the first pabulum to speculation : national banks succeeded ; then followed Insurance companies ; and more recently Railroad and other joint stock associations have increased indefinitely the encouragement afforded to it. The next step has been to cut up the ownership of mines into scrip, then came the passion for buying and working, or buying, without the intention of working, conjectural mines of all sorts, and in all parts of the world. Now everything which

* Le Spéc. à la Bourse. Deuxième section. § i, p. 157.

† Le Spéc. à la Bourse. Deuxième section. § i, p. 164.

can offer a plausible hope of large contingent profits, and whose development requires a capital larger than the original discoverer or speculating proprietor can command, or is willing to invest in that particular adventure, becomes the subject of a speculation. In consequence, the larger portion of the business talent of the time is employed in discovering novel projects, in acquiring the materials for speculation, and adapting them to the purpose. Then the aid of capitalists and professional adventurers is invoked to give success to the tempting scheme; handbills are struck off, enumerating the unparalleled advantages presented to shareholders; prospectuses are issued; share lists are drawn up; and the influence of a few well known names serves as an inducement to attract the multitude of subscribers, solicitous to secure extraordinary returns for small investments. These subscribers—the ultimate shareholders—are the parties who pay all costs, bear all burthens, sustain all losses, and disburse all profits. The beneficiaries are the original speculators, and the capitalists and adventurers, who participate in the enterprise, with a view to the large intermediate profits of the speculation.

Throughout this whole routine we seek in vain for the evidence of a disposition to secure gradual and steady gains by persistent industry and the steady increase of actual production. The fortunate individual who originates the project makes his purchase, and all his outlays, not for the sake of developing a new industry, or of extending an old one, but with the design of placing the subject of his speculation in a plausible and attractive light; so as to win the confidence of speculators already successful, and capitalists who multiply their capitals by a succession of speculations. To these, he sells out the whole or a part of his interest at a price equally disproportionate to his labours, expenditures, and the intrinsic value of the property, and to the sum which his assignees expect to realize from the further prosecution of the enterprise.

They buy with no intention of continued production, but with the assured expectation of being able to resell, by the influence of their names, and often without any actual outlay of capital, at an enormous enhancement of price, to the numbers who desire to participate in the inordinate profits of the promising undertaking. These, in their turn, are seduced by the hope of larger benefits than regular industry and the ordinary course of production can afford. They buy shares with avidity, under the delusion that the rapid increase in the price affixed to the property has been due to a real augmentation of its intrinsic value, and that a similar progressive advancement of price and profits will continue after they have acquired the ownership. The whole operation was a fantasy; the fever of greed which has penetrated into the public body alone gave practicability to the scheme; the rapid increase of

nominal value was generated solely by the dexterous inflammation of the covetous hopes of the people, and the game is played out as soon as shareholders have been attracted, and have paid for their stock. The last holders of the cards are the losers, and those only gain who have shared in the previous manœuvres. The wasteful expenditure of energy and means, in the development of schemes of this character, and in the unproductive outlays of the shareholders, is ruinous to the national wealth; while the ardour of the industrial classes is paralyzed by their losses, and all exertion is directed more or less zealously in the direction of new gambling speculations to retrieve former disappointments. Thus, actual production becomes the prey of speculation; industry and commerce are subordinated to the fluctuations of hazard; and trade is contaminated by the infection and consequences of this universal spirit of gaming.

“Such is, in general, the perverted speculation of modern times. It multiplies itself under a thousand forms, it fastens on labour, on capital, and on commerce, appropriating to itself the clearest, the surest, the largest returns of all. It apes and dishonours useful speculation, whose generous and modest votaries too often receive, for their sole recompense, wretchedness, whilst the brazen disciples of the other, insulting the morals of the community, swim in honours and opulence.”*

We have not drawn the distinction which is made by *Le Spéculateur à la Bourse*, between useful and abusive speculation. The term is sufficiently familiar in its worse sense; it is not in its better meaning; and this better meaning is more adequately and significantly expressed by invention. The discrimination between the diverse applications of creative genius gives a more complete character to the treatise before us, and adds to its philosophical precision; but if introduced into this essay, it would only have extended our remarks unnecessarily, and produced confusion in the minds of our readers.

The spirit of speculation, which has converted already the pursuit of independence into a game with stocked cards, and bestowed a monopoly of gains upon the dealers, is not limited in its operations to great transactions, and the more obvious modes of sudden acquisition of wealth. It is daily sinking deeper and deeper into the whole system of society, penetrating into the daily routine of production, and circulating through all the veins and arteries of the industrial economy.

Trade is catching, nay, has already caught, the contagion. Manufactures of all sorts are sinking into the same category; even agricultural and mechanic productions are afflicted with the same

* *Le Spécul. à la Bourse*. Introd. § ii, p. 20.

disease. The distemper is universal. Its dissemination is the instrument of its further extension; and the prevalence which it has acquired necessitates its reception, and ensures its growing ascendancy. We are involved in the complicated network of its endless ramifications, and there is no visible mode of extricating any part of the community from its insidious and all-embracing coils. Self-defence, and the urgency of subsistence, compel all parties to unite in the game; and it is impossible to foresee any available plan of escape, or to anticipate any ultimate result but utter ruin and demoralization.

The legitimate purpose of trade is to exchange the productions of different localities, or of different individuals, and to benefit all parts and parties by satisfying their wants with their reciprocal superfluities. This is the service which the trader undertakes to render, and he is entitled to a recompense adequate to his suitable support, and proportionate to the benefits he confers. But the immense development of competition, the influence of large capitals and still larger establishments, the lust of sudden wealth, and the rapacity of speculation, have modified both the purposes of trade and the requirements of the trader. Trade for the sake of trade; commerce, not for public benefit, but for private gain, has become the universal procedure of modern nations. No one is any longer satisfied with profits proportionate to his actual services, or with supplying real wants, but every nerve is strained to improve the opportunities of gain, without any regard to the consequences which may befall the public. Perhaps, to this cause principally may be attributed those financial crises which periodically occur, and inflict such severe losses and such deep distress upon the world. But to this cause unquestionably may be referred many other disastrous phenomena of modern commerce. Excessive imports, excessive exports, and the continual fluctuations of price, may be, in great measure, ascribed this cause. Hence, too, has proceeded the now common practice of forcing both trade and manufactures beyond the natural wants of the consumers; of stimulating artificial demands, and of multiplying unprofitably both production and consumption by the adulteration of commodities of all sorts, and by the incessant flux of fashions. The consequences of this routine, are to occasion a constant repetition of profits in the hands of the gainers, and a continual repetition of losses or unsatisfactory consumption in the hands of the losers; to augment the net profits of the year, and to diminish the well-being of the masses of the community.

This routine, under the impulse of the spirit of trade, which is now predominant, eventuates in the fatal severance of society into two classes, as widely contrasted as the opposite poles of the sphere: the rich, with those becoming rich by means of the speculative activity of the times, and the poor, or those declining into that

category under the operation of the same instrumentality. Insecurity, discord, and ruin, are the inseparable accompaniments of any society thus divided into two conflicting and irreconcilable classes. Moreover, production must ultimately be arrested by the extension of this system; for, independent of the annual waste which it occasions, it must reach speedily the limit when the masses, not of one country, but of the whole commercial world, will be pauperized, and unable to keep up the production, by their purchases to its former magnitude, and when they will be decimated by want and misery, and enfeebled by disease so as to be unable to supply the physical force required for the creation of the raw material. A similar effect may be produced less directly and less extensively, by the failure of the principal alimets of the present rapid production. Steamboats, which constantly explode, and, which must be continually replaced; locomotives, which are smashed by the frequent recurrence of collisions, and under favourable circumstances last only a few years; railroads, which are made only to prove their inability, are promptly abandoned, and those which are used and worn out daily, with the other numerous applications, judicious or injudicious, of iron, must exhaust the apparently exhaustless supplies of this valuable metal. Before this point is reached, however, it is probable that an equivalent effect will result from the exhaustion of the coal, required in enormous quantities in all the mechanic arts, and in all the great factories and modern modes of transportation. The timber, too, may be destroyed, which is almost equally requisite in its numerous uses.

It may appear a distant and improbable danger which is thus apprehended; but it is by no means so remote as is usually supposed. The consumption of coal, iron, and timber, has already excited alarm in Europe, and inspired anxious deliberations and economical precautions to postpone the evil. It is, indeed, a calamity which we can scarcely expect at any time to reach in its extreme form, because an immense rise in the price of all products of coal, iron, and timber, will long precede their actual exhaustion, and generate, in anticipation, all the difficulties and stagnation which would attend their complete destruction. When we point to statistics, to exports, and imports, to the returns of annual production and consumption, and to the aggregate profits of the year, it would be prudent to reflect that our age may possibly be imitating the brief but brilliant career of a spendthrift; that our immense expenditure, productive and unproductive, may be due to our living on our capital, and anticipating the legitimate resources of the future, and not to a permanent and healthy augmentation of our legitimate means. Many industrial enterprises have flourished for a short time, and dazzled by their brilliant success, which have afterwards been discovered to have paid all their large divi-

dends by deductions from the capital stock subscribed. May not the vast augmentation of commerce and manufactures, and their enormous aggregate profits, be in some measure attributable to the adoption of a similar procedure in the general economy of modern industry? It has become a vulgar truism that "time is money:" but, unsatisfied with this oracle of mammon, we strive to convert the future into an actual possession. Speculation regards the hopes and the fears of the coming time as its estate. Trade yields to the spirit of the time; and it spends the promise of the unborn years, in order to add to the profits of the passing moment. This process accumulates evils against the day of evil, and accelerates its advent; while the sun shines brightest in the commercial heavens, a sudden and enduring eclipse will some day come upon it, and clothe the skies in a fatal gloom. The prophetic vision of Ossian, in regard to the central orb of our planetary system, may soon be realized, in its metaphorical adaptation to the course of modern prosperity, and the noonday of production be changed in the twinkling of an eye into the darkness of midnight. These may be imaginations, for every crisis in human affairs calls unforeseen energies into action; but they are imaginations which may well excite apprehension, and suggest reflection, in the midst of the uncertain splendours in which we bask with such listless inattention to their possible result.

These considerations, though directly connected with our main thesis, have seduced us from the straight course of the logical procedure of our argument. To this we must abruptly return. The universality of this spirit of speculation, and the necessities which it imposes upon the present generation, have rendered all productions subservient to hazard; have changed commerce into a gambling operation; have rendered values fluctuating and delusive; and have made the smaller and ordinary transactions of trade capricious and extortionate. The net profit is the guiding star of modern industry, and is the substitute for all other canons of either right or policy. The tendency of this state of things is to social disintegration, because every one is compelled to prey upon all who come within his reach, and to devour each other, like pikes in a fish pond. If, in earlier times, the burthens of subsistence had required the cost to be as nicely calculated in all cases as it must be now, and a clear annual profit to be as certainly contrived, the forests could never have been cleared, the soil could never have been reduced to cultivation, cities would never have been built, nor would civilization have been possible. The lessons of political economy may be true interpretations of the existing order of facts; but in their exclusive adaptation to the daily practices of the world, it is much to be feared that they generate a monomania which must eventually in social suicide.

While the influences, the temptations, and the effects of speculation thus descend from the sublime heights of the financial operations on the exchange, to the smallest trading and manufacturing establishments, every where engrossing the largest profits, without regard to the contingent losses to the public, and diffusing through all the departments of industrial activity the same feverish avidity for sudden and disproportionate gains, they are also manifesting, by the rapid conversion of enterprise into associated adventure, a tendency to counteract the disorganization they have produced. Composition, decomposition, and recomposition is the law of social as of all organic existence; and these processes take place concurrently in the same organism, and become successive only in the transition from one organism to a new organic system. The same agencies which occasion the decay are, at the same time, engaged in attempting to restore a healthy action of the economical functions. This double movement of the forces which determine social change, renders the study of the transformations and other phenomena of society complicated and difficult, and casts uncertainty or obscurity over such investigations. Nevertheless, the duplex character of the mutations simultaneously presented must be recognized, if we would not encounter the risk of entirely misapprehending the truth, in consequence of apprehending it only in part.

The ancient Stoics espoused the doctrine of an intelligent soul of the material universe. The "*Anima Mundi*," according to their philosophy, guided the changes of the seasons, and all the mysterious operations of nature. It thus constituted the Providence of creative action. Wild and dreamy as the theory appears, when restated in the nineteenth century, it was only a coarse and fetichistic anticipation of the preëstablished harmony of Leibnitz. Both doctrines attempt to give a satisfactory expression to the feeling forced upon us by the observance of many of the phenomena of existence. Without assenting in any respect to the fancy of the Stoics, or hypostatizing a mere idea, we detect the semblance of this imaginary soul of the world in the blind instincts, operating like vital forces, which impel the world to the spontaneous and unreflecting adoption of those general practices which extend the benefits or correct the errors, perhaps by the introduction of equal error, of their previous procedure. Thus, it is in obedience to no specific dogma, but simply in compliance with a natural tendency, that the spirit of speculation, after infusing a solvent into society, is now attempting a partial reconstruction, by the extension of the principle of associated or incorporated action to all those forms of industry which admit of concentration and amplification. We have already endeavoured to explain how the universal passion for speculation has combined both projectors and stockholders in the realization of this result; and now recur to the subject solely for

the sake of noting the manner in which the anxiety for social reintegration has manifested itself in a practical form. The effort may be futile—indeed, must be so—until its immediate aims give place to larger and less interested views ; for in the shape in which it now reveals itself, it only enlarges the range of speculation, threatening to embrace all productive activity, and disseminates its temptations and its injuries throughout all the strata of the community. But it indicates a tentative reform, and provokes to more effectual endeavours, which already seek realization.

“The excesses of mercantilism and of speculation ; the continual increase which had passed, so to speak, into a social necessity, of the public and funded debt ; the invasion by chartered companies of the mineral wealth, of the railroads, &c. ; the feudal constitution of industry on the large scale, naturally tended to produce a protestation on the part of the classes affected by these movements, and to suggest projects of reform.”

The *Spéculateur à la Bourse* confines his remarks to France, but they are equally applicable to all other countries where speculation has obtained the ascendancy. It is undeniable at this day that a general system of social reform is almost universally felt to be a necessity. This is no longer the dogma of a heresy, or the watchword of a revolutionary party ; it is the profound conviction of the most reflecting men, the instinctive requirement of the multitude. St. Simonians, and Fourierists, Socialists and Communists, Icarians and Egalitaires, have ceased to be anything more than the extravagant and intemperate manifestations of the common sentiment. The reform itself is acknowledged as a social necessity ; but the grand difficulty remains, which is to determine upon any safe and practicable mode of its effectuation. The existence and prosperity of communities cannot be staked upon the oscillations of the market, and the fluctuations in the value of stocks and shares, resulting from the transactions on the exchange. This becomes the more intolerable when there is an obvious tendency to convert all property into stocks, and to subordinate all industry and production to incorporated companies. Communities cannot submit to witness, with open eyes, the net results of their labours, and the accumulated results of former generations, thrown off, appropriated, and dissipated by the contractions and dilatations which are artificially or artfully produced in the market, for the benefit of the operators behind the scenes. They cannot consent to the continuous disorganization of society, and the constant dislocation of the machinery of industrial action. The world of trade has been thrown off its axis, and it spins round with a giddy motion, which may communicate a delightful intoxication for a time, but the peril of the position must at length be discovered. The discords and dissensions of society will cease to be endurable, and must suggest measures of reunion, or will find for themselves a fatal termination

by successive and ever extending explosions. Certain it is, that the continued amplification of the present commercial procedure must work out its own cure, or provoke the insurgence of the masses, or produce ruin by its own success. The latter is the predominant tendency at present; the world is dying of the triumphs which constitute its proudest boast.

Et perit exemplo postmodo quisque suo.

Some remedy must be found, or society must sink beyond remedy. This is the almost universal admission of the current age. Speculation has seized upon the agencies, the processes, the routine of production; it has established a tyranny over the means of production and the producers themselves, and attracts to itself the greater part of the profits of both, without any proportionate addition of productive value. It has changed the laws and altered the character of trade, and has breathed its own appetencies into the bosoms of the traders. It has deranged or destroyed the natural articulations of society, and has substituted temporary and uncertain links, which derive their whole validity from the universal prevalence of a common delusion. It has perverted all industry, except daily manual labour, so as to render it a gambling operation in its essence, and it has infused the spirit of gambling into all the veins of society. It has made subsistence, and the maintenance or increase of individual prosperity, a continual game of hazard, and has thereby destroyed all tranquillity of mind, and seriously endangered all convictions of moral right. It has introduced discord and disorder into the political system of every community into which its activity has penetrated; and has generated revolutions without definite aim, and insurrections which could only aggravate the miseries of the insurgents. It has infringed upon the prospective resources of future generations, appropriating and squandering the estate designed for posterity, and has augmented, by this invasion, only the private gains of the fortunate few, while enfeebling the public body, and rapidly augmenting the miseries of the many. It is gradually eliminating the middle classes in all countries, and is, at the same time, decimating and depressing the proletariat, and is exhausting the physical as well as the natural capacities of States, while it is bestowing larger gains and more luxurious and selfish gratifications upon the diminishing class, which retains the honours and the chances of the game.

From whatever aspect we contemplate the effects of the modern frenzy of speculation, as exhibited to us in their incipency by contemporaneous facts, we discover only grievous delusions and more grievous impending dangers. They are absolutely fatal to public morals, and will be ultimately even to public decency; they present dangerous seductions also to the private morals of the members of the community. They are utterly antagonistic to poli-

tical order or the permanent prosperity of States, and must prove the ruin of all governments, if not speedily checked. They are consuming the vitals of society, and rendering the continuance of social order an impossibility. They are at variance with any just conception of healthy trade or advancing industry. They undermine the private fortunes of the majority of the people, and threaten to dissipate entirely the resources of the State. They contract the subsistence and annihilate the comforts of the multitude, increasing the competition of labour on the part of starving labourers, adding to their numbers by the rapid degradation of the immediately superiour classes, but menacing a proximate destruction of the population by the consequences of the artificially enhanced wretchedness. All these things are already apparent, and sufficiently demonstrate that the appearance of commercial prosperity, which has occasioned so many hosannahs and such repeated hallelujahs, is delusive, and due only to an immense artificial inflation of both the channels of production and the minds of the observers. An accident, a slight jar, a trivial puncture, may suddenly open an escape for the gas; and then a universal collapse must ensue.

The various partial schemes of correction which are enumerated in the *Spéculateur à la Bourse*, we pass without notice, because they are entirely local in their character and in their aims, being confined to Paris; and because they have been successful in only a few instances and to a very limited extent. Moreover, we have no faith in these semi-socialistic experiments, which attempt to redress present evils by a mere change in the mode of their acceptance, and which seek to cast out devils in the name of Beelzebub, the prince of the devils. The danger of the present menacing system cannot be avoided by any such simple jugglery as the union of capital and labour, of profits and wages, in the same hands by the association of workmen in a common establishment. The remedy, if practicable in itself, does not admit of sufficient generalization. If such extension were attainable, it would defeat its own object, because it would only transfer the injuries of collision and concurrence from individuals to the companies in which they were merged. And if even this danger could be avoided, such guilds or fraternities could not continue to operate harmoniously, because the absence of supervision and restraint, the differences of temperament, the passions and the jealousies of the constituent members, would ultimately eventuate in discord, stagnation, and dissolution.

The experiment was tried under very favourable circumstances before any of the modern theories of communism or socialism were pressed into practical service. The limited advantages, and the uncertain duration of such projects are both exhibited by the brief history of this little effort at associated production. We give the narrative in the words in which it was first presented to our notice.

On the side of Mount Ossa, and overhanging the classic vale of Tempe, there is a small town, called Ampelakia, the city of vines. Its modern fortunes have been remarkable.

“Many of the inhabitants of this secluded spot were formerly Germans, though they wore the Eastern dress. There was a staple manufactory here for dyeing thread of a red colour, which supported and enriched the inhabitants, and gave rise to a very considerable commerce. At the end of the eighteenth century, when Ampelakia was visited by Beaujour, he gave the following account of it: ‘Ampelakia, by its activity, appears rather a borough of Holland than a village of Turkey. This village spreads, by its industry, movement, and life, over the surrounding country, and gives birth to an immense commerce, which unites Germany to Greece by a thousand threads. Its population now (1798) amounts to four thousand, having trebled in fifteen years. In this village are unknown both the vices and cares engendered by idleness; the hearts of the Ampelakiotes are pure, and their faces serene; the slavery which blasts the plains, watered by the Peneus, has never ascended the sides of Pelion (Ossa); and they govern themselves like their ancestors, by their primates and other magistrates. Twice the Mussulmans of Larissa attempted to scale their rocks, and twice were they repulsed by hands which dropped the shuttle to seize the musket. Every arm, even those of the children, is employed in the factories; whilst the men dye the cotton, the women prepare and spin it. There are twenty-four factories, in which, yearly, six thousand one hundred and thirty-eight cwts. of cotton yarn are dyed. This yarn finds its way into Germany, and is disposed of at Buda, Vienna, Leipsic, Dresden, Aupach, Bayreuth. The Ampelakiote merchants had houses of their own in all these places. The competition thus established reduced the common profits; they proposed, therefore, to unite under one central administration. Twenty years ago this plan was suggested, and a few years after it was carried into execution. The lowest shares in this joint stock were 5,000 piastres, (between 600*l.* and 700*l.*) and the highest were restricted to 20,000*l.*, that the capitalist might not swallow up the profits. The workmen subscribed their little profits, and uniting in societies, purchased single shares, and, besides their capital, their labour was reckoned in the general amount. The dividends were at first restricted to ten per cent., and the surplus was applied to augmenting the capital, which, in two years, was raised from 600,000 to 1,000,000 piastres, (120,000*l.*) Three directors, under an assumed firm, managed the affairs of the company; but the signature was also confided to three associates at Vienna, whence the returns were made. These two firms had their correspondents at Pest, Trieste, Leipsic, Salonica, Constantinople, and Smyrna, to receive their own staple, effect the return, and extend the market for the cotton yarn of Greece. An important part of this trust was to circulate the funds realized, from hand to hand, and from place to place, according to their own circumstances, necessities, and the rates of exchange. The greatest harmony long reigned in the association; the directors were disinterested, the correspondents zealous, and the workmen laborious. The company’s profits increased every day, on a capital which had rapidly become immense.’

“Mr. Urquhart, in the ‘Spirit of the East,’ says that, at length, ‘the

infracton of an injudicious by-law gave rise to litigation, by which the community was split into two factions. For several years, at an enormous expense, they went about to Constantinople, Salonica, and Vienna, transporting witnesses, mendicating legal decisions, to reject them when obtained; and the company separated into as many parts as there were associations of workmen in the original form. At this period, the bank of Vienna, where their funds were deposited, broke, and along with this misfortune political events continued to overshadow the fortunes of Ampelakia, where prosperity and even hope were finally extinguished by the commercial revolution produced by the spinning-jennies of England. Turkey now ceased to supply Germany with yarn; she became tributary for this, her staple commodity, to England.' *"

It will be observed that at Ampelakia the principle of arresting the encroachments of speculation, competition, and capital, by the association of the labourers, was only partially applied; but the restriction of the principle was favourable to success, for it permitted the use of an adequate capital, and ensured sufficient superintendence. Moreover, the industry pursued was of a distinct and special character, amounting almost to a monopoly. The market was almost coextensive with the commercial world, and allowed indefinite expansion. Nevertheless, the enterprize was ruined by local discords and the jealousy of the associates; and such, it is to be feared, must always be the fate of similar companies, if their action is not more speedily overwhelmed by the operation of other influences.

These considerations have induced us to reject and pass in silence, the projects of reform mentioned at the close of the volume we are noticing. The remedy required must be more general and durable than any modification of existing plans; it must extend rather to the morals and sentiments of the community than to their routine. We have no suggestions to make on the subject; the solution of the problem remains to be discovered, and the conditions of the problem must first be recognized. It has been with a hope of elucidating the character of the present social difficulty in some of its most urgent aspects, that we have availed ourselves of the opportunity presented by a second edition of *Le Spéculateur à la Bourse*, to present the foregoing reflections and dubitations to the consideration of others.

It is not very many months since the foregoing pages were written, yet the accumulating experience and the rapid movements of the times have supplied additional confirmation to every position assumed, however paradoxical in appearance, or variant from ordinary convictions. We have watched, with anxious scrutiny, the progress of events, not contenting ourselves

* Murray's Handbook for Travellers in Greece, &c. 1854. Pp. 411-12.

with noticing merely the storms which convulse the great deep of modern history, but tracing, with still more cautious interest, those mightier tides which guide the ebb and flow of industry and commerce, and change from age to age the outline of society. At no period has the motion of these vast waters been grander, more portentous, or less readily appreciable than at present; yet at no period has the just estimation of their actual and prospective currents been more essential to the destinies of humanity. It is a great and urgent task to determine the true social condition of the nineteenth century, to discover the tendencies of contemporary civilization, to detect the dangers to be apprehended, and the means of mitigating or averting them, without being deluded into the impracticable extravagances of the various schools of socialism, without being tempted into the blind retrogressive policy of those whose only idea of amelioration is a return to the usages of feudalism and the thirteenth century, and without being guilty of that imprudent temporizing with incipient perils which canonizes the present and leaves time and accident to heal, prevent, or aggravate the imminent calamities of the future.

The rage of speculation, which grows by what it feeds upon, has latterly been supplied with most ample nutriment by the political and commercial oscillations of nations. Peace and war have been staked, like other public stocks at the Bourse; and the settlement of the national discords of the allies and Russia, as well as of Europe and America, has been made subordinate to, and contingent upon, the factitious elevation and depression of public securities. The secrets of cabinets have been betrayed, through the strongly suspected complicity of their members; and the interests of governments and peoples imperilled by the betrayed, in order to supply, or to swell the gains of financiering accomplices. The powers of State, the executive functions of the supreme authority, confided to certain delegated personages for the general welfare of nations, have been abused for the advancement of individual fortunes by the chicanery of operations on 'change. Emperors, and kings, and potentates, have become vain names; cabinets, and governments, and parliaments, are a mere delusion; they have ceased to rule the world; they no longer control, direct, or defend the populations submitted to their care; the power has passed from their hands, the glory has departed from Israel, and the sceptre has been transferred to brokers and stock-jobbers, who anticipate, confirm, compel, or defeat the objects of nations, for the sake of a larger percentage. The offices of government are scarcely sought any longer for the honours they confer, for the opportunities they afford of advancing the general weal, but as convenient positions for enlarged and more assured speculation, and as posts which attract to themselves without effort the currents of gold and silver from all enterprises, as the magnetic rock in the

seas of the east was alleged to draw the nails, and bolts, and iron fastenings from the timbers of every vessel that sailed by it

On prend à toutes mains le siècle où nous sommes ;
Et refuser n'est plus le vice des grand hommes.

The money-changers, who were driven from the Temple, have acquired the sovereignty over the nations ; the issues of peace and war, the fortunes and the lives of thousands, the hopes, the anxieties, and the fears of men, the sustenance of populations, are in the hands of the Jews, and Greeks, and Gentiles, and depend not upon their serious sagacity or the contemplation of the large interests of communities, but on the accidental or premeditated changes of their game of hazard. All the elements of national prosperity and existence are tossed about without solicitude, as merely the counters of speculation :

Si signoreggia al mondo l'avarizia. *

The nineteenth century boasts of its political sagacity, and points with pride to its advancement in political philosophy, and to its practical application of the precepts of political economy, but it is the wisdom handed down from old time that nations flourish only by the general welfare of the masses, and not by the magnitude of the special gains of the few. Yet, how can the multitude prosper, or even survive, under the operation of the complicated financial machinery which grinds them at every turn of its wheels ? It has already been shown that the profits of speculation are derived from no actual or corresponding augmentation of either products or values ; that they result only from the change of the holders of the values ; and that their gains are ultimately abstracted from the fruits of the industrial labours of the poorer and unspeculating classes, who lose in greater proportion than others gain. Such is the commercial wisdom of this nineteenth century ; yet even in the confusion of the sixth, amid all the darkness and chaos of ostrogothic invasion, the fatal error of such proceedings was recognized. "*Ultra omnes credulitates est, divitem velle fieri, de exiguitate mendici.*" †

The interruptions of agriculture in Europe, and the strange waywardness of the seasons everywhere during the recent years, have augmented the operations, the risks, the profits, and the losses of speculators in grain and other provisions, for which there has been an irregular and unusual demand in consequence of the late disturbances in Europe. Most branches of industry have been

* Sannazzaro. *Ecloga*. vi.

† Cassiodorus. *Var. lib.* xii. *Edict.* xxii, tom. i, p. 18. col. 6. *Ed. Garet. Venet.*

feverishly stimulated, but have been, at the same time, thrown into disorder, and rendered more than ordinarily perilous. The immense increase of commercial and other operations, accompanied with the augmentation of their risks and contingent profits, has given excessive impetus to corporate industry. This social tendency has been manifested in England by the late legislation on limited partnerships, and by the rapidly advancing consolidation of railroads; and still more signally on the continent of Europe, by the continued expansion of that most dangerous instrument of finance, *La Société de Crédit Mobilier*, in France, by the extension of its gigantic transactions into Spain, and by the introduction or proposal of similar establishments in Venice, Vienna, and Turin. The companies organized in this country for oceanic steam navigation, with their clamorous demands on Congress for extravagant appropriations; the numerous projects proposed, with the contemplation of liberal grants of land for railroad communication with the Pacific coast; and many of the schemes of internal improvement in the Western States and territories, exhibit the type which the general disease of the times has assumed in America. Nor is the infection confined to the Great Republic in the northern part of the western hemisphere, but its virulence has extended even to the stagnant or retrograde communities of the southern portion. The symptoms of the plague are largely discernible in the charters granted by the Emperor of Brazil, and the Republic of Bolivia, for the introduction of steam navigation on the Amazon, and the development of the commercial and industrial resources of the vast valley drained by that mighty river.

The moral or immoral effects of these speculating tendencies have been glaringly displayed in the trial of Messrs. Strahan, Paul and Bates, for fraud and embezzlement; in the exposures consequent upon the death of John Sadleir, M. P.; in the copious commentaries of the English press on that startling event; in the abundant revelations relative to the adulteration and sophistication of nearly all articles of food, and of numerous manufactures; in the Rugeley and similar murders, and in the prospective impracticability of life. Assurances, in consequence of the terrific frauds and crimes which they provoke and reward; in the frequency of murder by poisoning, a hundred instances of which were stated by Dr. Taylor to have come within his own cognizance during the year; in the speculation and malfeasance connected with the management of railroad companies, as specially exemplified by the Southwestern Railway Company, and the late meetings of the Eastern Counties Railway Company;* in the continual indications

* *Railway Morals and Railway Policy*. By Robert Spencer. London. 1855. Postscript. Pp. 59-75.

afforded by English, and we might add, other journals of habitual and systematic frauds in the ordinary routine of business. There were also sundry rumours and some authenticated facts concerning the transactions of the great Greek houses in England, engaged in the grain trade, during the Turko-Russian war, which do not suggest a favourable estimate of the morality or beneficial effects of speculation, even when occupied with the exchange or production of real material values. Nor do the allegations of the extensive bribery and corruption, practised in Congress, and openly charged upon its members, permit us to believe that the high places in our own government are removed from the general contamination. Indeed, every position taken by us can be readily sustained and extended by the abundant evidence of current transactions, if any pains be taken to collect, compare, and preserve the business annals of the time.

Even the suggestion of the prospective scarcity of the materials and aliment of machinery has not been left entirely without recent corroboration. Our attention has been attracted by the anxieties of France, relative to the deficiency of its coals, and by the consequent transference of a large part of the iron trade of Europe to Prussia. Everywhere great influences are silently working towards a grand explosion; the separate steps of advancing dangers are almost unheeded; in the bustle and activity of eager industry or of inebriating speculation, immediate effects are so exclusively contemplated as to prevent the attention from ranging far into the future, and from combining together, into one general inference, the numerous disconnected testimonies which furnish the true oracles of the passing age.

Everywhere many dangerous tendencies are now pressing forward to the speedy development of national disaster. However divergent in principle, or dissimilar in aspect, they are acting in concert for the production of a common result. Of these, speculation is the most immediately pernicious, and perhaps the least remediable. It admits of indefinite amplification, and almost infinite dissemination; like a high-pressure engine, its energy increases after the point of security is passed, and is augmented until the moment of final explosion. Then ruin ensues, and the danger is realized in its full extent, almost before it is suspected by any one. Such seems to us the condition of modern trade, and such the prospective result of modern speculation. So far as we have yet perceived, the only check on its diffusion is the existence of slavery; for this institution, and the social system determined by it, have hitherto repelled its ravages, and even its extensive admission in the Southern States.

The latest incident connected with this subject which has come to our knowledge, is the autograph letter of the Emperor Louis Napoleon, addressed to M. Ponsard, to acknowledge his services

in the cause of virtue and the public weal, by his recent comedy, *La Bourse*. It is well that the stage is at length assailing this monster, and directing public indignation and ridicule against it. But the imperial commendations are very suspicious, since the Emperor is believed to dabble largely in the funds, and to be deeply interested in the *Société de Crédit Mobilier*.

ART. II.—IRVING'S LIFE OF WASHINGTON.

Life of George Washington. By WASHINGTON IRVING. In three volumes. [Unfinished.] New York: G. P. Putman & Co. 1855-1856.

ADVANCING years seem to accumulate fresh lustre and increasing honours on the name of Washington. Time, which consigns so much else to oblivion, and dims so much of what once dazzled mankind, imparts to his fame a more luminous projection, and reveals it in new and outstanding proportions. As we more deeply search and better understand the other personages of history, we learn the better to understand and appreciate Washington. In them, we discern only so many foils and tests, rather than rivals or doubles of his renown. The contemporaries, who gazed on him near, could not comprehend his relative and proportional greatness. Swayed by the passions of the hour, they sometimes questioned his far-reaching and prophetic policy; but results generally exchanged his enemies into friends, and dissidents became his converts. He was at once the representative of the glorious past, and the herald of a brighter future. War and peace, the eagle and the dove, perch together on his escutcheon. He stands at the head of that small catalogue, which itself occupies the van of worldly greatness; we mean the class of warrior-statesmen. Therefore, we are not attracted to a new life of Washington by the ordinary interest and instruction to be derived from history or biography; we expect and demand from it fresh illustrations of immortal principle, of the better genius of our country, and of the happier type and promise of humanity.

The title-page of the work now to be noticed, presents a strikingly felicitous collocation of names. From its first announcement, it rang like a fitting harmony on every cognizant ear. It told that the writer, who, on the whole, seems best to deserve the combined appellation of the father of American literature, and the

most favourite American author at home and abroad, devotes the sunset of his brilliant career to the biography of the father of his country, and of the most popular man of the world's history. By a sort of characteristic modesty and propriety, he undertakes not his labour, until he has, in a manner, educated and matured himself into an appropriate capacity for the task. Had Mr. Irving attempted the life of Washington thirty years ago, the admirers, both of himself and of his hero, might have apprehended a deficiency of certain qualities indispensable to the specific undertaking. True, they would have safely looked for every charm of thought, and every grace of style and narrative. But, there was at that time wanting to the compositions of this distinguished author, a certain nervous and masculine ruggedness, necessary to the complete historian or biographer. The exquisite polish, the melting lusciousness, the studied beauty of almost every sentence, although adapted to purposes of high intellectual refinement, appeared to be not the most suitable drapery of historic truth. The favourite veins, also, which the author had hitherto wrought, were not closely kindred with a sturdy research into matters of fact. Speculations on general life and manners, humorous satire, quaint and piquant narrative, the very essence, in short, of excellence in essay-writing, constituted not the promise of an ideal biographer of Washington. Accordingly, by some prophetic instinct, impelling him towards that lofty function, he seems to have trained and chastened himself by a long intermediate elaboration of various histories and lives, into that precise degree of breadth of conception and stern intellectual muscularity which the task required. The result is, that the style of the work before us, with a very few exceptions, is all that could be desired. The narrative is captivating and *entraining*; the admiration for the hero described is more enthusiastically exhibited than by any preceding biographer; the various topics are marshalled and dwelt upon with artistic felicity and tact; and while the elements of poetry and eloquence are superinduced upon the merits of his predecessors, the author's determination to present exact historical truth everywhere, overrides and extinguishes the mere inclination to produce effect. Fancy and imagination are only allowed to be the handmaids of his severe research. *What to say* is evidently his predominant aim; *how to say it*, though not neglected, is but a subordinate purpose, for which, however, nature and genius have amply provided. Although the author must be somewhat advanced in years, the only marks of age, betrayed throughout his work, are the wisdom, truth, and justice of his manifold conceptions.

It is rather an embarrassing task to approach the critical examination of a yet unfinished production. Every work of a fragmentary nature seems to preclude the exercise upon it of a complete and equitable judgment. The true scope of an author can rarely

be appreciated, until he has wrought his subject out into the entire fulness of its relations and conclusions. Like an architect, he cannot be fairly judged, until the keystones and cornices are all fitted in, and the roof compresses the four walls into a unity. These remarks are especially applicable to the three initial volumes of the "Life" before us. They conduct the hero not far beyond the middle of his career. They still leave him involved in the uncertain agony of alternate success and defeat. The splendid *denouement* of the story is still at a distance. Some of the most important portions of Washington's life and interesting developments of his character are as yet untold. The lion has not yet struggled out from the incumbent earth, to pace in full majesty his appointed domain. The military career of Washington only severed his country, like a piece of amorphous metal, from its parent bar. It was his statesmanship and diplomacy that moulded it into the coin, and gave it an enduring stamp. Who can dare to predict how these pregnant topics will be treated, even by the plastic pen of Irving?

We would gladly, therefore, have suspended our critical labour, until a complete possession of materials had placed us in a more satisfactory condition to perform it. But other considerations seemed to urge upon us a different decision. This *Life of Washington*, though not completed, has yet assumed a sufficiently substantive character, to claim the notice of a publication devoted to the record of contemporaneous literature. We know that the public do not and will not wait for the termination of the work, but that they read with avidity each successive volume as it issues from the press. Criticism, therefore, instead of lingering behind the rest of the world, which will not, in this case, tarry for her tardy conclusions, must herself mingle in the passing current, if she would fain hope to "pursue the triumph and partake the gale." In short, a right-placed deference for the author, a sense of justice to our readers, and a regard for the interests and pretensions of our journal, at once concur in extorting from us the present article, inadequate and premature, as in some respects it must necessarily be.

The portion of the work, however, already executed, is sufficient, we apprehend, to justify us in one preliminary criticism, suggested by the form and title which the materials have been made to assume. One of the most important requisites of authorship, involving often no little skill, clearness, and definiteness of conception, is the adoption of a title precisely commensurate with the nature of the task to be performed. This requisite seems not to have been fully exercised by our admired author on the present occasion. His book is very much more, and promises, too, to be still very much more than "*The Life of George Washington*." Now, it is most true that we, and as we believe, everybody else would rejoice to read whatever comes from the pen of Washington

Irving. We could scarcely imagine a happier literary prospect before us than to be able to sit down every morning of our lives, and peruse a new sheet of commentaries from that pen on the history of the American revolution, or any other subject that it might choose to illustrate and adorn. But when a distinct life of George Washington is promised or given to the world, the world, for various reasons, expects something in a different shape from what it here finds. It expects, indeed, everything immediately connected with the hero to be related with sufficient fulness of detail to place his whole character in the truest light. But it does not expect a copious history of the entire American revolution, nor innumerable digressions, however delightful, detailing the account of events only connected with Washington, by being contemporary with him, nor extended biographies and notices of individuals who happened to be his contemporaries or his coadjutors in the great work of his life.

That Mr. Irving has, in fact, been thus diverted from his original plan, is manifest from an expression of his own, in a note prefixed to the third volume. Neither in the title, nor in the preface of his work, is there any intimation that the American revolution at large was to be the subject of his lucubrations. But the theme, as we are not sorry to say, grew under his hands, and he was tempted to wander from event to event, and from character to character, until the completion of the three volumes, confidently projected as a whole, and announced by the publishers, finds him still only in "the middle of affairs." Accordingly, he now informs us that his object has been "to present a familiar and truthful picture of the *revolution*, and the *personages* concerned in it," so that "the characters introduced might speak for themselves, and have space in which to play their parts." Exceedingly pleased, as we are, at this recognition and confirmation by the author of the real nature of his performance, we only regret, for his publisher's sake, for his own, and for the reading public's, the too contracted misnomer selected at the outset.

Yet, it might be difficult now to devise a satisfactory substitute for it. The author's own language, in the note just quoted, would imply the proper title to be, *A History of the American Revolution*, especially as he there makes no allusion to Washington, as the main subject of the history, and speaks of his legitimate task as one much more comprehensive. But this title, on the other hand, would manifestly be inadequate, for we are really to have a complete and substantive biography of Washington, interwoven with these sketches of the revolution. The work opens with an account of the genealogy of Washington, as of its prominent and paramount subject; and the rise and progress of the revolution are brought in only quite incidentally, and subordinately to the commanding figure. Perhaps some such title as the "Life and

Times of George Washington," though the author as well as ourselves may have been sick of its triteness and abuses, would have embraced as many points of the case, and evaded as many objections, as any that could be suggested. This, of course, would comprehend the revolution, and the various characters and events which it suited the author to describe, without burdening him with the necessity or responsibility of furnishing a complete view of any other than the main subject. We presume that the oft adopted title of "Life and Times" never can be expected to signify more than just so much of the *times* as the memorialist pleases to elaborate.

A model life of Washington, as we believe, does not require the various episodes and descriptions of characters which have been introduced by Mr. Irving. Would the work, for instance, have been less valuable as a biography, if the accounts of Indian tribes and traders before the revolution had been compacted into a briefer notice? The history of the three expeditions of 1758, with which Washington had nothing at all to do, need not to have been expanded into a whole chapter, nor would the notice of Wolfe and of Wolfe's engagement at Quebec, clear and spirited as it is, but equally irrelevant with the three expeditions, have required to occupy as much space as the account of Braddock's defeat, in which Washington was present. The ten pages detailing the battles of Concord and Lexington might well have been reduced into one or two, even had the author avoided the brevity of Mr. Sparks, who dismisses the whole by simply remarking that "the tragical day of Lexington and Concord had occurred."* The battle of Bunker Hill, so well and minutely detailed † through a whole chapter, befits, in this respect, rather a history of the revolution than a life of Washington, who had not the slightest personal agency or influence in the event. So also in regard to the battle of Fort Moultrie, though its story has never been better told. The history of operations on the Canada frontier under the direction of Schuyler, might well have been compressed, since Washington had scarcely a nominal connection with them, and was not responsible for them, as they belonged, by the unfortunate policy of the Congress, to an entirely separate command. The jealousies and rivalries between Schuyler and Gates, together with those in which other officers were involved, seem detailed beyond the fitting pro-

* The conciseness of Mr. Sparks occasionally leaves something to be desired. Thus he notices, perhaps too transiently and incidentally even for his general plan, the event of Burgoyne's surrender. He says not a word of St. Clair's retreat from Ticonderoga, and not a word of Stark at Bennington. They were all of essential, however indirect, importance to Washington's wider strategy.

† To perceive how happily Mr. Irving has availed himself of new historical materials, compare his account of the Bunker Hill battle with Marshall's.

portion for a mere life of Washington. The pathetic story of Miss McRea is most affectingly and beautifully given, but is liable, we think, to the same course of remark. So likewise as to the spirited narrative of events attendant on Burgoyne's invasion from Canada; it would be peculiarly appropriate and valuable in *Memoirs of the Revolution*, but is here the counter-extreme to Mr. Sparks's "mere mention." The same remark is applicable to the long episode of the affair between Wilkinson and Gates. So far as Washington was involved, a few paragraphs would have sufficed. The accounts of the "*Mischianza*," &c., in Philadelphia might also have been omitted, although confessedly very interesting. General Lee seems to be one of the author's favourite characters for description, but we know not why, to the exclusion of so many other officers and leading spirits in the revolution. Most readers, we think, would have greatly preferred an abridged account of Lee and others, if the void could have been supplied by brief sketches of the eight brigadier generals appointed at the outbreak of the war. John and Samuel Adams deserved some descriptive mention. How well the author could have struck off daguerreotype miniatures of all these, and more, is evident from his concluding notice of Governor Dinwiddie, vol. 1, p. 262. And to conclude these passing criticisms, which we willingly refrain from extending, we would have reduced, in a mere life of Washington, the account of events connected with the siege of Newport to a much briefer compass.

It may be said that Mr. Irving has anticipated and obviated these criticisms by the following conditions which he lays down in the preface to his work :

"In writing the biography of Washington, I am obliged to take glances over collateral history, as seen from his point of view, and influencing his plans, and to narrate distant transactions apparently disconnected with his concerns, but eventually bearing upon the great drama in which he was the principal actor."

But the question is, how far shall these incidental illustrations extend? If no assignable limit must be proposed, so long as materials exist for their introduction, then Mr. Irving has not fulfilled his own conditions, for it is evident he might, up to the point of his history already reached, have given us several more volumes of "glances at collateral history," and narrated many other "transactions bearing upon the great drama." But if the language in his preface means, as we presume it to do, that just so much of this collateral history and of these transactions should be given, as may adequately illustrate the complete character and sphere of Washington, then, we apprehend the preface does not

obviate, but vindicates our criticisms on this point. In the nature of things, we suppose, there must be some line of distinction between a life of George Washington, and a history of the American revolution; otherwise, Mr. George Bancroft would have been justified in giving to the revolutionary portion of his history the title of Life of Washington. If the line is drawn and maintained by Mr. Irving, we are unable to perceive it. It was well preserved by Dr. Ramsay, who devoted one volume to Washington, and three to the revolution. Both of Dr. Ramsay's works, by the way, possess very considerable merit, being executed in a fine historical spirit of impartiality and philosophic penetration. The Edinburgh Review, when reviewing Marshall's Life, mistakenly characterized Ramsay's as being only an abridgment of Marshall. A slight inspection is sufficient to detect the groundlessness of the charge. Something, we suspect, had led the reviewer to confound Ramsay's Life with that of Dr. Bancroft, which, if we mistake not, was more open to the criticism.

But that we may happily appeal to the authority of Mr. Irving himself, as approving and justifying the principle we are insisting on, is apparent from his own remark at vol. 1, p. 327, where he says, "we do not profess, *in this personal memoir*, to enter into a wide scope of general history, but shall content ourselves with a glance," &c. So also, vol. 3, p. 478, he declines to do anything more than "*briefly note the issue*" of certain military enterprises at the South, because they were "*so far under Washington's control.*" Now, if the same rule of composition had been elsewhere employed; if only the "issues" of military enterprises at the North, "*beyond Washington's control,*" had been "*briefly noted,*" and the like principle rigidly adhered to in the treatment of every topic, no ground would have been presented for these criticisms, and the "Life," as originally contemplated, would have gracefully fallen within the manageable compass of three volumes.

Mr. Irving would probably have escaped these contradictory predicaments, and avoided some trouble, into which, if we may judge from the deprecatory language of the note prefixed to his third volume, it appears that he has fallen, had he adhered to the old-fashioned method of arriving fairly at the end of his work before the beginning of it was ushered into day. The insatiable rage of the modern public for serial and fragmentary literature seems in a manner to have victimized our excellent author. The reading world, not satisfied with beholding and enjoying the perfect creations of its greatest minds, demands, as it were, to be admitted behind the scenes—to grasp the conceptions of the master-workman as they come glowing from his brain—and to be flattered with the consciousness, that he is still toiling for them while they are revelling in the expanding productions of his hand. If Powers would build a gallery for shilling spectators over his studio,

he would realize from the arrangement more than from the orders of his liberal patrons. This prurient impatience is no doubt the secret of the process by which the Macaulays, the Dickenses, and the Thackerays are compelled, as authors, to hold converse with the world. They must deliver their work by immediate and unrevised instalments. No waiting until the ninth year for them. The *feuilletonnaire* literature of France is an instance to the same effect. As the author of *Tristram Shandy* gives a consequence to his hero, even before he becomes baby born, so would the public do in regard to each literary offspring of distinguished birth. All England reads the reports of parliamentary speeches while the orator is still upon his legs. In Peter's Letters to his Kinsfolk is described the luxurious privilege of sitting in a publisher's back parlour, and perusing the successive sheets of some keenly expected work, ere it issues from the hands of the binder. It is this very privilege for which our public are vehemently contending, and, by their outside pressure, they will certainly gain their point at last. If our friends Putnam & Co. are desirous of doubling the result of their pecuniary speculation, we advise them to publish the remainder of Irving's *Washington* on this plan. A weekly or tri-weekly sheet, comprising sixteen pages of it, would probably rival the circulation of Harper's Magazine, or of the London Illustrated News. Such is the irresistible tendency of the day. And it will go further yet. The time, we predict, will come, when the master-minds of this world will be constrained to sit, each in their telegraphic centres, and communicate their thoughts along the wires to the north, south, east and west of their own country, if not of the whole world. Should this to any one seem an extravagant supposition, let him compare the two or three columns of telegraphic despatches which now appear in almost every daily paper in New York, with the two or three little sentences with which this mode of intellectual intercourse a few years ago commenced. The expansion of newspaper literature never made more rapid advances than this. If the public are so eager for the immediate reception of news and facts, they will soon demand, and they do even now demand, enlightened and satisfactory contemporaneous *commentaries* on those news and facts. And thus the reign of telegraphic authorship has begun.

But to go back to the category, considerably less advanced, indeed, in which writers with Mr. Irving's attractions find themselves. This demand of the public for rapid instalments of authorship, has its advantages and disadvantages. Doubtless it is highly encouraging and exciting to the writer, and taxes the utmost stretch of his powers, while it appeals to every grateful, ambitious, and generous motive within him, to maintain the high and exacting standard imposed upon him by an admiring public. But then, on the other hand, it deprives him of that repose of spirit, and that

absolute command of materials and of time, which seem essential to the most perfect literary results. It is hardly possible, under such circumstances, to provide for symmetrical proportion, for necessary correction, for leisurely modification, for a growth, slow, like nature's, in most of her great creations. Surprises and embroglios, in short, must be apt to occur, such as evidently are found to involve author, publisher, and reader at the close of these three most engaging volumes. On one horn of the alternative here pointed out, we see, for instance, Macaulay and Irving; on the other, Prescott and Motley.

Our advice and earnest wishes, therefore, would run to this effect, that Mr. Irving should be encouraged, both by his publishers and the country at large, to go on indulging "his own sweet will" among the extant memorials of the revolution, until not a scrap worthy of being preserved, shall escape his loving industry, or at least his "elective affinity." No matter whether the task requires six or ten volumes for its completion. When at length, however, it shall have been executed, we would have the model biography proper of George Washington condensed from it, either into two or three volumes, according as should be judged expedient. The result, we are confident, would go far to satisfy the desires, and gratify the tastes of many coming generations.

We believe that every American has within his mind a certain beau-ideal conception of Washington, which no biographer can perfectly represent. As there was a reserve in the living hero's manners, so there is an undeveloped depth in his historical and traditional character.. We feel that, like the *corps-de-reserve* of an army, there was that within him which was not brought out into life and action. Accordingly, one is apt to say, after every eulogy and every biography, however detailed, however analytical, however finely descriptive, "Ah, it is all very well, but the real Washington went something beyond it. You cannot make objective the subjective image in my soul." This we said within ourselves when closing Guizot's fine essay on the great man, which seizes, with a penetrating and comprehensive sagacity, and with some originality of comment, the most characteristic points involved in the biography and compilations by Mr. Sparks. Now, we feel persuaded that Mr. Irving's biography, if reduced and condensed, as above suggested, will approximate much nearer than any other yet executed to this undefinable conception of the American mind. But to the best expression of this effect, the abbreviation recommended seems to be necessary. There must not be too much collateral portraiture. The attention should not be diverted from the dominical picture by a confusing crowd of illustrative concomitants, even though they be the best of their kind.

Yet, even such an approximative work, we venture to imagine, ought not to affect the popularity, extinguish the claims, or super-

sede the use of Sparks's Life of Washington, the only performance that can fairly be considered a rival of Irving's. The indefatigable researches of Mr. Sparks may be said to have introduced a new era into the biography of Washington. All who had preceded him in the same direction, including even the voluminous Marshall, were to the last degree jejune and barren in facts relating personally to the hero. Enduring will be Mr. Sparks's praise for supplying this void, and particularly for illustrating his work from the magnificent compilations of Washington's letters and other writings, which the biographer himself had the merit, at vast labour and expense, of ushering into the world. Well may Mr. Irving have confessed his obligations to the same collection, since perhaps one half of his new matter has been derived from that very source. His researches have, indeed, extended over wider and very valuable fields; but we are happy to transcribe here his generous testimonial to Mr. Sparks's labours, as equally honourable to both parties, appearing as it does after the somewhat rude though effectually repelled assault of a foreign titled historian. "I have made frequent use," he says, "of 'Washington's writings,' as published by Mr. Sparks; a careful collection of many of them, with the originals, having convinced me of the general correctness of the collection, and of the safety with which it may be relied upon for historical purposes; and I am happy to bear this testimony to the essential accuracy of one* whom I consider among the greatest benefactors to our national literature, and to whose writings and researches I acknowledge myself largely indebted throughout my work."

We should have been pleased if Mr. Irving had stated in his preface the specific grounds of his new undertaking, pointed out the deficiencies of his predecessors, described the new materials he has employed, and indicated the precise needs and demands of the public in regard to the subject of his work. As his modesty may have declined the task, we trust that some particulars of it will be found to have been executed in the course of the present article. But how valuable would have been a critical sketch from Mr. Irving's hand, of the most considerable biographers of Washington!

We proceed, therefore, to remark, that on the whole, the present age will, at all events, transmit to posterity two distinct biographies of Washington, of equal authority, and with similar claims, but each possessing a distinct, appropriate, and specific value. Readers, whose leisure and tastes dispose them to the luxury of a protracted and diversified study of the subject, will be amply provided for by Mr. Irving; whilst that very numerous class, who can only afford the perusal of a more compact and limited per-

* We have sometimes thought that a splendid literary monument to our chieftain's fame might consist in a *Catalogue Raisonné* of every sort of tribute that has been paid him.

formance, may enjoy a satisfactory and a similarly authentic impression of the hero's character from the work of Mr. Sparks. Thus, a literary Stuart, and a literary Houdon have both been employed on the same great sitter. In the production of the one, we may indeed behold all possible grace of illustrative colouring and magic variety of delicate shadowing; but not from that of the other are absent those exact outlines, and that perfect truth of expression, which faithfully convey to us a presentment of the living man.* Meanwhile, the most laborious students of revolutionary history may expatiate at large in the eleven additional volumes which Mr. Sparks has filled with the writings of Washington.

We now proceed to communicate a few less general impressions and criticisms that have been suggested by attentive perusals of the work before us.

It opens, as already intimated, with a very elaborate and *recherche* genealogy of the family of Washington, traced through various changes of name and fortune, even back to the age succeeding the Norman conquest. Deference would thus seem to be paid to European, rather than to American habits and prejudices. We can perceive in such an extended and minute inquiry, little beyond the gratification of a refined curiosity. With a slight stretch of fancy, indeed, we may recognise here and there, among the numerous remote ancestors of Washington, certain qualities which were also exhibited by the hero himself. But upon the different or opposite qualities, known or unknown, which characterized many others of his progenitors, the author of course does not dwell. Moreover, it doth not appear how many fine qualities descended from the two hundred or more mothers and grandmothers, along whose veins certainly flowed no Washington blood. We would willingly believe our hero to have been as much indebted to his immediate mother as to the whole line of Wessyngtons and Washingtons down. No just conclusion, therefore, can be drawn from an induction so incomplete. We might as well be pointed to certain great and good qualities that have appeared in individual *Englishmen* of the past. We can only perceive a curious *coincidence* in the fact relied upon by Mr. Irving, that an indirect ancestor of Washington defended to the death one of the cities of Charles the First. Indeed, if he had happened to be found fighting on the other side, we should have considered him a still fairer precursor of his descendant's hatred of tyranny. Besides, would it not, on the whole, rather diminish than enhance our impression of the greatness and originality of any man's character, to be convinced that he was indebted to one of his remote progenitors for

* We have always considered the style of Mr. Sparks as worthy of his subject; serene, simple, elevated, clear, and full.

one quality, to another for another, and so on, through a long process of physical transmission? We love to think of Webster or Calhoun, as our own independent, unborrowed Webster or Calhoun, instead of a contribution from the phenomena and wealth of the past. We are, somehow, such practical believers in an immediately superintending Providence, and in the conscious interference of creative energy in the current of human affairs, conjoined with the general capacities of our divinely imaged, though sinful race, that we prefer to contemplate a great man *per se*, as a sort of salient specialty, a direct and original gift of God. And our larger admiration would rather be lavished on the man who was *not* indebted to his ancestors for any prominent attributes, but who, by his force of character, broke through the chain of mere hereditary influences, whatever they might be. Still, we have no doubt, that families, as well as nations and races, are possessed of certain common characteristics that distinguish them from others. We, therefore, willingly surrendered ourselves to the pleasing speculations awakened by Mr. Irving's opening chapter. So far as it appears, the family of the Washingtons have played an honourable part along the less prominent ranges of history. No stain, within our knowledge, seems to have rested on a single bearer of the name. That our Washington belonged to such a family, is a fact of gratifying interest. It confirms a general, moral, and historical truth. But let it not go for more than it is worth. Let it not conflict with the sturdy republican theory, that each man, after all, must stand, for a true estimate of his character, on his own individual foundation. So that we can accept, only with certain limits and qualifications the apparently generous doctrine of the author in the following concluding paragraph, with which he apologises, as it were, for flying in the face of our national tastes and prejudices as to long-drawn heraldries and genealogies: "We have entered," he says, "with some minuteness into this genealogical detail, tracing the family step by step through the pages of historical documents for upwards of six centuries; and we have been tempted to do so by the documentary proofs it gives of the lineal and enduring worth of the race. We have shown that, for many generations, and through a variety of eventful scenes, it has maintained an equality of fortune and respectability, and whenever brought to the test, has acquitted itself with honour and loyalty. Hereditary rank may be an illusion; but hereditary virtue is a higher patent of innate nobleness, beyond all the blazoning of the Herald's College."

Now, we allow that hereditary virtue, if such an attribute be possible, and if the very expression be not a paradox, is a higher patent of nobility than hereditary rank; but hereditary virtue, also, is equally liable to issue in an illusion; and the true American theory, coincident also with the purest dictates of philosophy, we

take to be, that personal, underived, autonomical worth, is the safest and highest possible patent of nobility among them all.

In a few succeeding chapters, Mr. Irving has traced, with admirable research and penetration, the seminal elements of Washington's special career and character. We are led among the scenes of his youth, and are indulged with some precious glimpses of the society in which his early years were passed. The subject, we hope, may still be susceptible of a much wider illustration. Cannot some competent hand, ere time shall be permitted to destroy the requisite materials, undertake the task of bringing to view everything that can exhibit society and manners in Virginia, as connected with the old Washington family, previous to the revolution? Doubtless much may be gleaned in this field from letters, family records, papers of the day, books, etc. One or two excellent novels, indeed, have thrown the light of history, as well as of imagination, on some of the scenes and times in question. But we should be glad to know exactly what the history and fact are, uninvested with the imagination, or at least enjoying ourselves the privilege of investing them with our own imagination. Indeed, the whole of a possible rich "Washingtoniana," we are persuaded, remains yet to be compiled. We remember reading a few years ago, in the newspapers, a sketch, by a Virginian eyewitness, of Washington depositing his vote at a popular election, as late, we think, as 1798 or 1799. His dress, his deportment, the impression he made on bystanders, were picturesquely described. We were shown the general beginning to mount an old flight of outside stairs necessary to admit him into the hall of election. The structure being somewhat crazy, a fear was started and circulated, lest it might give way beneath his weight, when several of the electors rushed forward and placed their hands and shoulders beneath the stairs, to secure for him a safe footing. Are there not many persons now living, who can favour us with reminiscences as distinct and personal as this, although not such fine subjects for a picture? Of late years, in many parts of the country there have been family gatherings of all who are connected with particular names. A gathering of the "Washingtons," we apprehend, would excite a degree of interest as yet unsurpassed. Were each of them requested to bring to the assemblage whatever memorials he might possess of his ancestors, and could each be induced to unfold his own appropriate treasures of memory and tradition, some worthy chronicler might be on the spot to receive their several contributions, and communicate them to the eager public. So much the better were the chronicler an Irving.

Among other recommendations which distinguish the present work from the general body of its predecessors, we would advert to the following. Mr. Irving has shed more satisfactory light than we have hitherto enjoyed on the problem of Washington's motives

for joining the resistance against Great Britain. The long injustice and neglect which, notwithstanding his transcendent deservings, he certainly experienced from his superiors, united with his sense of the difficulty, if not hopelessness, of ever surmounting the disadvantages of his colonial position, impart no little plausibility to the theory which would trace his conduct to promptings of a more or less selfish character. Our author has presented an array of circumstances, incidents, and expressed sentiments on the part of Washington, assuredly sufficient very much to weaken the force of such a theory. Our own impressions on this delicate subject are, that as Washington was not above the infirmities of humanity, and must have peculiarly felt the wounds inflicted on the most sensitive and characteristic part of his nature, these painful experiences of his early life may be allowed to have given him a bias towards the principles and aims of the revolution, and never perhaps to have ceased exerting some latent force. But we must remember that his personal experiences represented the wrongs, or the exposure to wrong, of numerous others besides himself, and that, consequently, sympathy must soon have expanded and purified whatever motives originated in self. His own better sense might have made him feel more keenly, and perceive more clearly, the merits of the general question. As the great struggle advanced, and the higher elements of his soul became developed, there is no doubt that the influence of the loftiest principle restored him fully to that just and grand balance of character, peculiar to him on this as on every other subject.

Another new service rendered in this work to the cause of revolutionary history, consists in the preparatory information it has conveyed in respect to the treason of Arnold. The author has not yet arrived in the course of his narrative at the event itself, and we have no doubt that he will illustrate it by various impressive revelations. Former historians have left the matter comparatively in the dark, and have treated Arnold's defection more as an isolated and independent crime than in the light of a long train of antecedents. Or it has been summarily ascribed to the influence of his dissipated and expensive habits. But Mr. Irving has, with great and continuous industry, brought to view the train of Arnold's previous relations with the army and with Congress; his disappointments, and his sense of injustice and neglect. It is at once affecting and impressive to behold the sympathy which Washington all along cherished in regard to Arnold's afflictions, and the entire confidence he reposed in his integrity and competence. There arises a sort of vivid dramatic interest in the contrast involved between these feelings and the ultimate treason. The continued baffling opposition experienced by Arnold, is also rendered, by the confidence shown him on Washington's part, so much the more unaccountable. Indeed, the only desideratum we felt in the author's

treatment of the whole topic, was his failure to explain the intrigues, or prejudices, or perhaps the better founded causes, which prevailed to thwart the claims and aspirations of Arnold, who seems to have long borne them with singular patience and forbearance. And on the whole, although no considerations can justify the treason, or obliterate the damning spot from Arnold's escutcheon, yet we are inclined to predict, that the present work will have set in a fair view those slightly redeeming palliations, which impartial history so often at length produces, to relieve the painful enormity of human transgression. At all events, more explanation will have been furnished to the mystery of the traitor's motives.

Considerable elucidation is also afforded in regard to the cabals among Conway, Lee, Gates, and others, to supplant the influence, and perhaps the position, of Washington. No regular conspiracy to overthrow him seems distinctly brought to view. Insubordinate and insurrectionary sentiments, it is true, are deeply scattered here and there in the correspondence of those officers and others. There were periods during the war, when we can scarcely wonder that Washington's popularity should have declined, and his policy be distrusted. Disaster followed disaster, in most disheartening succession. On a few occasions, one of which especially was the battle of Brandywine, he was certainly outgeneraled. Then, too, his frequent inaction could not be understood. He had himself generally caused his forces to be publicly overrated, in order to deceive the enemy. His daring enterprises themselves seemed to throw reproach and suspicion on his own Fabian strategy. Even the loyal scent of the noble and faithful bulldog, Israel Putnam, became at times perplexed. Thus, the unavoidable disappointments in the public mind, and the bewildering excitements of an untried national life and death adventure, concurring with the criticisms of those officers who claimed to be Washington's rivals in military art and experience, almost naturally produced some movements of secret opposition against him, which ought not perhaps to be entirely ascribed to sinister impulses. The biographers of Washington, we observe, are generally inclined to treat this subject as onesided advocates, without those comprehensive allowances, which deal impartial and charitable constructions all round to the unseen hearts of men.

In these days of dark alarm and peril to the country and the institutions which owed so much to Washington, we cannot resist transcribing out of the present work a quotation from one of the hero's general orders, in which he animadverts on the sectional jealousies prevailing as early as the year 1776 among the American troops. In subjoining to it the brief commentary of the author, we would express our profound sympathy and approval at his patriotic suggestion :

"It is with great concern that the general understands that jealousies have arisen among the troops from the different provinces, and reflections are frequently thrown out which can only tend to irritate each other, and injure the noble cause in which we are engaged, and which we ought to support with one hand and one heart. The general most earnestly entreats the officers and soldiers to consider the consequences; that they can no way assist our soldiers more effectually than by making divisions among ourselves; that the honour and success of the army, and the safety of our bleeding country, depend upon harmony and good agreement with each other; that the provinces are all united to oppose the common enemy, and all distinctions sunk in the name of an American. To make this name honourable, and to preserve the liberty of our country, ought to be our only emulation; and he will be the best soldier and the best patriot, who contributes most to this glorious work, whatever be his station, or from whatever part of the continent he may come. Let all distinction of nations, countries, and provinces, therefore, be lost in the general contest who shall behave with most courage against the enemy, and the most kindness and good humour to each other."

"The urgency of such a general order," remarks Mr. Irving, "is apparent in that early period of our general confederation, when its various parts had not as yet been sufficiently welded together to acquire a thorough feeling of nationality; *yet what an enduring lesson does it furnish for every stage of our Union!*"—Vol. ii, p. 300.

The same penetration which guided the author among the earliest formative elements of Washington's career, accompanies him also along the course of his narrative, when occasionally elucidating some of the finest points of the hero's character. No one has been more felicitous or deeply searching in the views presented upon that subject. We are impatient to welcome, if not curious to witness, the completed portraiture that awaits us from the same hand. Cicero, in his description of Cæsar, enumerates good fortune among the qualifications of a military commander. We have often considered this a large element in Washington's mingled career; but have never seen it noticed in any summary of his attributes. And is it not high time for the biographer of Washington, in estimating his whole character, to assume more comprehensive ground than a mere positive eulogistic assertion of his good and great qualities? He may sometimes have to be defended, as well as eulogised. An antagonistic attitude may bring out the deeper truth about him. Negation seems an essential help to a better definition and comprehension of infinity itself. Certain ethical questions are from time to time started, involving perhaps the highest fame of our revered hero. The scrutinizing genius of modern history, which subjects to its crucible every character of the past, the awakening moral sense of mankind, and the increasingly recognized lofty standard of Christian morality, would summon even

Washington to their awful bar, and place him on his defence. While awarding him some of the brightest virtues and glories of the warrior, they may arraign him for too eagerly rushing along the darker and rougher paths usually trodden by the warrior. They may put to the question his early and long cherished taste for the bloody contests of the field. They may ask, if he never contemplated with too much indifference, or even with an exultant, unchristian pleasure, the distresses and destruction of his enemies. They may demand why he readily lent himself to the deceptions and falsehoods of war, such as so many have severely condemned when practised by a Bonaparte. They may fancy some inconsistency in his deliberately and habitually tempting hundreds of his countrymen to the danger of perishing as spies and criminals, while punishing the same function in André with unyielding severity. They may interrogate him, and in this they will especially be joined by rulers and subjects of the present day, whose mutual relations are everywhere growing more and more critical, as to his repeatedly urging his bleeding and exhausted country to protract an apparently hopeless contest, when the decision of the question seemed almost to rest upon himself alone, and when, had he quailed for an instant, the cause must have been given up as lost. They may demand, whether there were no alloy of obstinacy or of mere desperation, in the patriotism of his decision? Whether the contest were of as much importance to the multitude of combatants as to the ambition and security of himself and his class? Whether the probabilities of success were sufficient to warrant a perseverance in the perilous struggle? Whether the growing strength of the colonies would not, in a few years, have enabled them to assert their independence without the enormous moral and material sacrifices of the actual revolution? Whether, in short, he would have deserved no chastisement, had he proved an UNSUCCESSFUL REBEL? In regard to his military reputation, also, a severe if not unfriendly criticism may yet inquire, whether many of his misfortunes might not have been expected? Whether many of them might not have been avoided? And how far his successes may have been owing to the blunders, the incapacity, and the perverseness of the enemy? Does not tradition, too, speak of his having carried some of his stern and exacting qualities to extremes in private life? Believing that the freest discussion of these queries will result in the undiminished elevation of our hero's position—flaws even sometimes revealing the inherent vigour of the strained and burdened metal—and that the points in question have never yet been all adequately met by preceding writers, we shall gladly see them entered upon by the finely ethical, yet comprehensive and accomplished spirit, which is now fondly brooding over and influencing Washington's undying fame. Doubtless, also, his general policy as a statesman will be instructively discussed in connection with the other topics;

and we shall be happy to see some elucidation of what we regard as one of the greatest paradoxes in history, that while Washington's reputation has been growing higher and higher with his countrymen, and the universal reverence among them for his name has approximated to a species of idolatry, certain of his political principles have exercised in the same quarter little or no influence, and the vast majority of the masses have repudiated the very authority which they adored.

Since Mr. Irving's work has in fact assumed more or less the form of memoirs of the revolution, we regret that he has so lightly touched several topics which might have been greatly indebted to his adorning and illustrating pen. In the further progress of his task, we hope that he may yet find occasion to pay attention to these topics, or perhaps to weave them into subsequent editions of what is already executed. We will notice a few that have occurred to our minds. We think, then, that a larger use might well have been made of Mr. Sparks's collection of the General's writings, as well as other sources, and believe that the public would have gladly accepted them as occupying the space now devoted to less interesting matters. Why, for instance, was that perfectly admirable letter omitted, which we find in the appendix, note 3, of the second volume of Marshall? It is a farewell address to Washington, from the officers of the first Virginia regiment, on the occasion of his resigning the command, and was written in 1758, when he was but twenty-six years of age. Nothing could more clearly show the deep impression he had already prematurely made upon his contemporaries. Every line of it seems addressed, not to a young soldier in the mere morning of life, but to one who had exhibited the experience, the services, and the highest acquired merits of forty or fifty years. Further in the progress of the revolution, Dr. Franklin's discovery of Hutchinson's and Oliver's letters seemed to us of too great interest and importance to be absent from so comprehensive a sketch as that undertaken by our author. Nor could we miss, without considerable regret, an account of the noble and affecting conduct of the town of Salem (Massachusetts), when generously sympathising with the distresses of Boston, and declining to profit by the misfortunes of her doomed sister.* No passage in the revolutionary history was more worthy of Mr. Irving's soul-moving powers. And why not insert, partially or entirely, those three golden, glorious, unsurpassed instruments, issued by the first Continental Congress? We have no doubt that Madame de Staël had these very compositions prominently in her mind's eye, when she so highly complimented the American State papers as perfect in their style and kind. They would, of them-

* See Marshall, vol. ii, p. 165.

selves, constitute a valuable little volume, as comprising the historical merits and essential principles of the revolution. One or two others of the same class and crisis might be included. They are all well presented, though in an abridged form, by Marshall, vol. ii. Marshall's star, as the biographer of Washington, has indeed set below the horizon, giving place to the brighter and fuller luminaries that succeeded it. But we should be ungrateful and unjust not to remember, that in his sketches of events immediately preliminary to the revolution, he has had no rival except the younger Bancroft. Marshall's narrative of these transactions (high praise, we confess!) is as full of breathless interest as Irving's, and he has comprehended in it a great variety of most relevant particulars, for the omission of which by his more brilliant and renowned competitor, considering the plan of his book, we are unable to account. Marshall's narrative of the battle of Long Island, we have also the temerity to prefer somewhat to Irving's, on the score of clearness and fulness.

Some surprise, also, we confess to have felt for the omission in the present work, of any allusion to that pleasant little epistolary interview between Washington and the future President Dwight, then a chaplain in the army, during the melancholy winter of Valley Forge. It sounds like some sweet song of birds bursting in amidst the dreadful din of arms. Our readers shall have the pleasure of perusing a portion of the correspondence here, as we believe it to have been rarely quoted or referred to. It certainly constitutes a choice morceau as well in the literary as the military history of our country. We extract it from the fifth volume of Mr. Sparks's collection. Dwight was chaplain of Gen. Parsons's brigade, stationed then at West Point. "The application, which is the subject of this letter," said he, in writing to General Washington, "is, I believe, not common in these American regions, yet I hope it will not on that account be deemed impertinence or presumption. For several years I have been employed in writing a poem on the conquest of Canaan by Joshua. This poem, upon the first knowledge of your excellency's character, I determined, with leave, to inscribe to you. If it will not be too great a favour, it will certainly be remembered with gratitude."

Mr. Dwight's letter was enclosed in one from General Parsons, in which he says of the poet :

"He is a person of extensive literature, an amiable private character, and has happily united that virtue and piety which ought ever to form the character of the gentleman, with the liberal and generous sentiments and agreeable manners of a gentleman. Of the merit of the performance he mentions, I am not a competent judge; many gentlemen of learning and taste for poetical writings, who have examined it with care and attention, esteem this work in the class of the best writings of the kind. He will be

particularly obliged, by your excellency's consent that it should make its first appearance under your patronage."

GENERAL WASHINGTON'S REPLY.

"To the Rev. Timothy Dwight :

"Headquarters, Valley Forge, 18th March, 1778.

"SIR : I yesterday received your favour of the 8th instant, accompanied by so warm a recommendation from General Parsons, that I cannot but form favourable presages of the merit of the work you propose to honour me with the dedication of. Nothing can give me more pleasure than to patronize the essays of genius, and a laudable cultivation of the arts and sciences, which had begun to flourish in so eminent a degree before the hand of oppression was stretched over our devoted country ; and I shall esteem myself happy, if a poem, which has employed the labour of years, will derive any advantage, or bear more weight in the world, by making its appearance under a dedication to me. I am, &c."

We are happy to appeal to Mr. Irving's own example in some portions of his work, for instances of what we have been desirating in other portions. Thus, how valuable, apposite, and delightful are the extracts which he gives from the diary of John Adams, in regard to the doings of Congress on the appointment of Washington as commander-in-chief ! He has some capital illustrations, from original documents, of the picturesque incident furnished by the arrival of the Connecticut lighthouse at the camp in New York. Could he not have derived from the diaries and letters of Mr. and Mrs. Adams, and other contemporary sources, some interesting sketches of the state of society and modes of life in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, while those cities were occupied by the British ? Before tradition becomes silent, or manuscripts extinct, it is much to be hoped that records of this kind may be placed beyond the reach of destiny. Works, like the little volume of Eliza Wilkinson's letters, edited several years since by Mrs. Gilman of South Carolina, would assist the extensive compiler of these desirable notices. The autograph collections of Dr. Sprague of Albany, Mr. Tefft of Savannah, and a few others, would furnish still fresh materials for the faithful chronicler.

We hope that at the close of Mr. Irving's work a copious index will not be forgotten. Every name as well as event should be traced to the page where it is recorded. More maps and engraved sketches of battles, both of simple character, are desirable. They greatly assist the reader, by saving hours of comparison and imaginative construction. When not placed near those portions of the narrative which they illustrate, references should be made to them in the margin. We should have advised the numbering of the chapters to be continued throughout the history, instead of commencing a new series for each volume. The great histories have been generally so divided. A unity is thus preserved throughout the

whole. And when, as will probably be the case, Mr. Irving's work shall have an edition in one volume, there must be an awkward dislocation by the present arrangement.

We are glad, on the whole, that the author's fine taste induced him to abandon one feature of composition, into which his well-known playful humour was beginning to beguile him in the early stages of his work. We allude to such sentences as the following: "John Bull is faithful to his native habits and native dishes, whatever may be the country or clime, and would set up a chop-house at the very gates of paradise." (Vol. i, p. 67.) Referring to the convivial habits of one of Washington's fellowpioneers in the wilderness, he tells us that "there may have been a moist look of promise in the old soldier Van Braam," p. 83. It is hard to say why these little caricatures and slynesses should not be permitted to diversify and enliven the grave march of history. The charge of puritanic precision seems awaiting the critic who objects to them. But somehow they were uniformly repudiated by the exquisite taste of the ancients. Many a modern historian, too, has been unboundedly popular without them. And our author, as just now observed, ceases to follow them up. No other instances of this frolicsome vein occur, we believe, in the course of the three volumes, with a single exception, which we here notice for another reason than a matter of taste. In vol. ii, p. 12, note, one of the occupants of Washington's celebrated headquarters in Cambridge is said to have been Mr. Worcester, "author of the *pugnacious* dictionary," &c. We suggest whether it is worthy of Mr. Irving's characteristic kindness and gentleness of heart to transmit this literary, and almost personal, sarcasm to posterity. Would not some other epithet have more truthfully designated one of the most faithful, laborious, and valuable services which the present age has rendered to the cause of letters? If *pugnacious*, that work has been, on the whole, but *defensively* pugnacious at the worst. Our excellent author himself, we believe, at one time mingled in a kindred fray, siding too, if we mistake not, with some of the principles maintained by Mr. Worcester. We are confident that in future editions some happier expression will be substituted for what here seems an inadvertent misprint. Reverting to the topic of these pleasant little humorous ebullitions, to say nothing more of their jarring with the general tone of dignity throughout the work, nor that, although they were capital in Salmagundi, they might be out of place in a life of Washington, (something like the chorus of "fol-de-rol," interspersed throughout an article in a Review,) we would observe, that in the present performance they are singularly unnecessary. The natural elasticity of the author's pen imparts to his whole history an unflagging interest. Always attracted to the most engaging topics, and instinctively dwelling on each at a precisely sufficient length, he permits no sense of *ennui* to steal into

the reader's mind. His genial, sympathising narrative takes full possession of our very souls. Except, perhaps, in the case of some of Gates's and Conway's embroglios, or some of the difficulties of the author's pet general, Schuyler, or a report of the interminable quarrel between Washington and Lord Howe, about the exchange of prisoners, the merits of which we could never exactly comprehend, and suspect that there was some fault on both sides, we scarcely remember a page which even whispered us to *skip*. So that we do not need to be called now and then from our smooth and rapid journey, and entertained by the author's agreeable tooth-pick remarks, as he sits enrobed and slippered in his easy chair. If we indulge Mr. Prescott in the habit, it may be that he chiefly confines it to his notes, or that he has not quite the sort of general buoyant charm of Mr. Irving, though even in that we would not presume to point out his deficiency.

From similar considerations, we are hesitating whether to pronounce it a merit or not in the present history, that the author occasionally indulges in a certain agreeable artifice, which is a favourite habit with writers of fictitious narrative. We mean the suspending of a chain of the interest at the close of a chapter, with the promise of resuming it at a distant interval. Thus, one chapter concludes in this way :

"On the fourth of September he overtook Montgomery at the Isle la Motte, where he had been detained by contrary weather, and, assuming command of the little army, kept on the same day, to the Isle aux Noix, about twelve miles south of St. John's—*where, for the present, we shall leave him, and return to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief.*"

So, again, another closes thus :

"How he conducted himself on his arrival in the city, we shall relate in a future chapter."

There certainly is a piquant charm in these little conversational interludes, reminding us of our old favourites, Fielding and Scott. It is true that the history, as a history, would have been equally complete without them. At all events, they make up in vivacity what, with some readers, they may seem to detract from the elevated tone of the general narrative.

A few not very important statements in the course of these three volumes, may possibly require correction in future editions. We note such as have occurred in our perusal, for the sake of persons owning the extant edition, as well as for the consideration of the author and his publishers.

"John and Andrew Washington."—Vol. i, p. 16. For *Andrew*, Sparks inserts *Lawrence* Washington. There may be a reason

for differing here from Mr. Sparks, but we are not aware of it. We wish that this and a few other instances had been explained.

"The three Delaware chiefs."—P. 175, bot. Page 173 mentions that there were but *two*. It may be worth while to have the number right in both cases.

"The Duke of Brunswick."—P. 190. Should it not be the Duke of Cumberland? See p. 152. How could the Duke of Brunswick have been a patron of Braddock? We are not enough posted up to decide on the identity of the dukedoms, which was a possible thing in the royal family of that time, at successive periods at least, but suspect an error.

"Her husband, John Parke Custis."—P. 277. We believe it should be Daniel Parke Custis. Their *son's* name was John. Washington himself, in a letter or instrument written soon after his marriage, refers to the preceding husband of his wife under the name of Daniel.

"The Duke de Choiseul."—P. 327. Count Vergennes must have been intended here. See p. 308. Choiseul was the rival of Vergennes, which may have unconsciously suggested the mistake. We see that the cheap edition has corrected it.

"General Howe with the left wing."—P. 476. Rather, with the *right* wing, if the statement at the top of the page be correct.

"A mile distant to the west."—Vol. ii, p. 5. We should say to the *east*. Corrected in the new edition.

"Stationing Capt. Claiborne."—P. 160. Confounded, it would appear in the next page, with Capt. *Dearborn*. Dearborn, we presume, was the man.

P. 197.—Nantucket should certainly be Nantasket.

P. 247.—1766 should be 1776. Corrected as above.

P. 483.—"The former," we think, should be *the latter*.

Vol. iii, p. 144.—Delaware Bay is put for Chesapeake Bay. Corrected, we understand, in later copies.

"Lee was the son of the lady who first touched Washington's heart in his schoolboy days," &c.—P. 197. This does not exactly agree with the account in vol. i, p. 36, where the fact is only dubiously mentioned as a tradition. Perhaps, in the progress of his work, the author has lighted upon some confirmation of it. If so, the two passages should be harmonized.

"British detachment moving towards Monmouth."—P. 429. The text seems to imply that the detachment moved the opposite way, towards *Middleton*. The error, if one, is the same in Sparks, from whom the engraved sketch of the battle is copied.

"General Grey's incursion was rather to the northward than eastward."—P. 474. By the way, at p. 216 of this volume, Gen. *Gray* should have a different orthography to identify him with Sir Charles *Grey*, pp. 463, 474.

Next to matters of fact, we descend to matters of expression.

Foreseeing that this work will make its way to the future as a classic, we would mention a few points in which the correction of mere phraseology may give it that character more completely. Our list, like the preceding, is, as might be expected, quite brief, and is submitted rather in the way of suggestion than of authoritative decision. Such discussions, too, have something of a general interest.

Can we say that a frontier is "*marauded* by bands of savages?"—Vol. i, p. 233. We are unacquainted with any authority which gives the verb *maraud* other than a neuter signification. Yet, for aught we know, some dominant writer, like Mr. Irving himself, may have changed the *substantive* maraud into a transitive verb, stamped the coin with his imperial authority, and rendered it as proper to speak of marauding a country as of officering an army.

"To this Prescott *demurred*, that those employed to convey them, and who were already jaded with toil, might not return to his redoubt."—P. 472. Except in the mere technical language of litigation, do we ever use the word *demur* as signifying a verbal *reply* objecting to a previous proposition? Would the author have spoken of Prescott's *surrejoinder*ing, if he had carried on the dispute further between him and Putnam?

Speaking of Morgan's riflemen: "They will be found of signal efficiency in the sharpest conflicts of the revolutionary war."—Vol. ii, p. 21. Observe, they are to be found by the readers of the history, who were not present in the sharp conflicts of the war. Might it not, therefore, be better said, they will be found *to have been* of signal efficiency, &c.? The phrase, as it stands, befits a poem rather than a history. Only a vivid imagination can be supposed to transport the reader into the scene of the conflict.

"Militia *had to be the dependence* until a new army could be raised."—Vol. iii, p. 25. Such a bald colloquialism grates harshly in the midst of hundreds of pages of the purest classical writing; and, though justified by the high authority of Burke, we are not altogether reconciled to the use of dependence in an objective sense, to express the thing depended upon.

"Such parts of the country *which* he might think the enemy intended to penetrate."—P. 86. Evidently a mere *lapsus pennæ*.

"His own valiant spirit required it."—P. 198. It should be *Washington's* own valiant spirit required it. The remark refers to Washington, and as he has not been mentioned for more than a half page, and the mention of other subjects and other personages has intervened, the word *his* conveys not immediately the author's meaning.

Is it exactly correct to speak of the *cover of a wood* as equivalent to *intrenchments*?—P. 231. The Americans do not appear to have had time to throw up intrenchments.

"Joined a force under General Fellows."—P. 264. This force

had just been previously described, p. 260. So we would say, "joined *the* force," &c.

In the rapidity of composition, there occurs some less than a half dozen sentences of an incomplete syntactical structure; such, for instance, as the following: "Israel Putnam was a soldier of native growth. One of the military productions of the French war, seasoned and proved in frontier campaigning."—Vol. i, p. 412.

"Stark hunters and bush fighters, many of them upwards of six feet high, and of vigorous frame, dressed in fringed frocks or rifle shirts, and round hats."—Vol. ii, 21. See also p. 14. The difficulty here, however, is rather one of punctuation than of style. The verbless subjects are evidently in apposition with the predicate nouns of the preceding sentences.

"Polemical battles" (vol. i, p. 11) we have heard objected to by high authority as tautological. But as usage confines the word *polemical* to controversial theology, the expression seems correct, and unaffected by strict etymology. Thus, there may be polemical as contradistinguished from military battles.

Owing, we presume, to the same cause of rapid writing before suggested, no explanation accompanies the mention of the "Quebec act," vol. i, p. 403. The other occasions of colonial discontent had been sufficiently elucidated. Marshall, or Sparks, gives or describes the Quebec act.

"Arnold's *old* adversary, Major Brown."—Vol. ii, p. 155. No opposition has yet been seen between Arnold and Brown.

"Assisted by the cannon at Governor's Island."—P. 351. We have not yet been told how Governor's Island got out of American into British hands. Marshall specifies the occasion.

P. 477.—It has not been shown how and where Gates returned to his army.

"His former encampment at Philipsburgh."—P. 509. Not mentioned, we believe, before.

We dislike, in a work of such elevation and dignity, the introduction of such provincialisms as *perriaugers*, which occurs on page 272 of the same volume. To a large majority of readers, this word will be utterly unintelligible, except as they may collect the meaning from the tenour of the narrative. It is the French *piroque*, Americanized into *perriauger*.

P. 488.—We must quarrel with the prosaic translation of the epitaph on Col. Rahl:

"Hier liegt der Oberst Rahl,
Mit ihm ist alles all."

"(Here lies the Colonel Rahl,
With him all is over.)"

Had our author kept a poet laureate to share the honour of his historic labours, he might have been helped to some such inadequate couplet as this:

Here lies the chieftain Rahl,
Forever lost to all.

Such, we believe, is the amount of our prying, yet dubious, animadversions through three bulky tomes. If we have made them with any exceptionable purpose, we are sufficiently punished by the result. We could not have framed a handsomer compliment to Mr. Irving's standing as a writer. A list of delinquencies like this would not have injured the reputation of a deliberately written letter of three pages, much less of three delectable, valuable, and remarkable volumes.

So the pedant inspector dismisses his more gifted and thorough-bred pupil from the stand.

ART. III.—LIFE AND WRITINGS OF MAIMONIDES.

Opera Maimonidis. 8 vols. in 4. Folio. Vienna.

WHILE the Israelites can boast of a host of Rabbins, highly distinguished in the various branches of literature; in the great man, of whose life and writings we are now going to treat, they have produced a profound philosopher and divine, whose literary fame has elicited for him that immortal and well-known Jewish proverb, "From Moses to Moses, there was none like to Moses," i. e., from the great Lawgiver to Moses bar Maimon.

Maimonides has, in their esteem, exercised the greatest influence, not only on his contemporaries and on his nation, but also on the civilized world in general: an influence which still, after the lapse of centuries, is felt, and even found on the increase, the more the improvements of mankind place them on a level with a sage, whose great mind and enlightened liberality outstripped his own age, and has not yet been attained by ours.

Rabbi Moses bar Maimon, called "Moses the Egyptian," "Hasphardi" (see Nachmanides), "Hacordovi" (see Wolf and De Rossi), "Abu Amran Musah ben Abdallah ben Maimon" (see Casiri), or, with the Greek termination that has since been affixed, "Maimonides," and among the Israelites, by a peculiar species of abbreviation with which they are familiar, "Rambam," was born at Cordova, a city of Spain, on passover eve, being the 30th of March, A. D. 1131, according to Wolf and De Rossi, or 1135, according to Carmoly and Zeenz, or 1139, according to others, at the expense of his mother's life, who died in giving him birth.

Said to be descended from Rabbi Judah the Holy (the compiler of the Mishna), and therefore by a female line from king David.

Rabbi Maimon, his father, held the dignity of judge of the Israelites in his native city, Cordova. He was very highly distinguished for his great learning, and is said to have been descended from an ancient and distinguished family, which had, during seven successive generations, held the dignified office of judge.

Buxtorf quotes this his own statement of honourable pedigree, as found in the conclusion of his commentary on the Mishna: "I, Moses, son of Maimon the judge, son of Joseph the sage, son of Isaac the judge, son of Joseph the judge, son of Obadiah the judge, son of Solomon, son of Obadiah the judge;" yet, the renown he himself acquired has eclipsed all these.

In early life, however, Maimonides was remarkably indolent and unpromising in genius. His slothful disposition, which rendered vain and useless all paternal efforts to educate him, completely alienated him from his father's affections, who, in a moment of passion, very severely chastised and reproached him. This kind of treatment the pride of the youth could not endure, even at the hands of his father. He, therefore, quitted his paternal home and sought refuge in the synagogue. Being overcome with grief, he fell asleep; and on awaking he resolved to throw off his habits of idleness, and, by industry and intense application, to render himself worthy of a long line of distinguished and virtuous ancestry.

In accordance with this firm resolution, he took the road to Lucena, a city of Spain, Andalusia, thirty miles S. S. E. of Cordova. In this place he found a very warm friend in the person of Rabbi Meir, son of Rabbi Joseph ben Megas, who took him as a pupil; and in his very celebrated school, our youth made a considerable progress in the manifold branches of learning then taught. Up to about A. D. 1150, the youthful student was almost neglected by his father. The peace of Maimon's family was very much disturbed during almost all the period of the youth's absence. An effort, therefore, on the part of Maimon to find out his son and bring him home, would have been only adding one more trouble to his many other troubles. This was owing to the general confusion which then prevailed throughout the Moorish dominions in Spain, in consequence of the persecutions to which the Almohad monarch, Aab-d-al-Mumen, in his zeal for the propagation of Islamism, subjected the Israelites—persecutions which raged with very particular severity at Cordova, under the immediate eye of the Moslem despot. Indeed, so severe was the persecution, that at one time any Israelite staying a month longer, without embracing Mohammedanism, was to forfeit his life, and his children were to be reduced to slavery.

On leaving Lucena, his benevolent teacher kindly furnished him with letters of recommendation to several influential Israelites

at Cordova, and through them he was invited to address the congregation in the synagogue on the Sabbath after his arrival. Up to the moment when his public discourse ended, our noble and distinguished youth was carefully guarding the secret of his descent. No premature discovery was to lessen the enjoyment of the noble triumph which he meditated. In his address, which was very eloquent and impressive, Maimon's son shone with all the brilliancy of his acute and profound mind. The auditors were entranced, but more so Maimon, who received his once missing child with rapture, and, amidst the acclamations and congratulations of the affected congregation, conducted him to his beloved home.

Restored to the affections of his parent, he returned to his studies with redoubled ardour. In order to perfect himself in the knowledge of the Arabic language, astronomy, mathematics, and medicine, he frequented the very celebrated schools (according to Leo Africanus), of Ebn Tophail Ebn Saig, and more particularly the great Averroes, whose great learning and profound investigations of the Aristotelian system of philosophy, assembled round him a very great number of pupils. It was from this learned Arab that the son of the Hebrew judge received his knowledge of Aristotle, whose works were brought into Europe by the Arabs, where they gained an influence, which, for many centuries, pervaded the whole of Christendom.

The events which happened both to Averroes and Maimonides, and nearly at the same time, bore a singular coincidence. Averroes, whose full name is Aabd-Allah Mohammed Ebn Omar Ebn Roshd, first placed at Cordova as a *cadi* or judge (an office held both by his father and grandfather), by the African prince of the Mohadites, commenced delivering in that city, a public course of instruction, by which he gained many personal enemies. Accused of having spoken with disrespect of the Alcoran, he was stripped both of his dignity and entire fortune, A. D. 1163. In his distress he sought a refuge among the Israelites of Cordova; some say even in the house of Maimonides. Soon after this escape he fled from that city and took refuge at Fez, in Africa; where he was compelled to undergo a very humiliating penance at the door of the mosque, and to recant some of his opinions, which were considered adverse to the religion of the Alcoran. He afterwards returned to Cordova, where he was soon reinstated by Yoseph ben Jacob, king of Morocco, both in his former dignity as a judge, and his office as professor, which he continued to exercise during the space of about forty years.

While the storm was bursting over the head of the devoted victim, Averroes, Maimonides was accused of having shared the deistical opinions of his friend and teacher, was exposed to all the calumnies which malice could invent, and to all the persecutions

which mistaken zeal could inflict. And when, subsequently, it was discovered that his was the house in which Averroes had found an asylum, the illfeeling harboured against him, both by Israelites and Moors, increased to that degree that he was compelled to quit his Spanish fatherland.

About this period, the Almohad monarch caused the poor Israelites to be very severely persecuted, in consequence of the rich coffin that contained the embalmed body of Mohammed at Mecca, having been robbed of many diamonds and valuable jewels by a band of Arabs, aided by some accomplices in the town; the guards, however, in order to screen their negligence, accused the Israelites that had come from Toledo of the act, saying they had been sent by the other Israelites of Spain to commit it. The report being believed, many Israelites were put to death, forty synagogues were burnt, and a decree issued, calling upon Israelites and Christians to embrace Islamism, whether they would or not.

In consequence of these troubles, a great many of the Israelites, discontented with the African despot and African rule, sought an alliance with the Christian sovereigns, especially king Alphonso VIII, of Leon and Castile. Maimonides, however, who was at all times disinclined to look favourably on Christians, and, alas! also on Christianity itself, preferred remaining on the Saracen territory in Spain, and consented to an outward conformity with the rites of Islamism, in preference to seeking a refuge in a Christian country.

As soon as a favourable opportunity presented itself, he escaped to Africa, and, after a short residence at Morocco, established himself in Egypt. There, for some time, he lived in obscurity, maintaining himself by trading in medals and precious stones. Egypt was, at that time, the seat of intestine and foreign warfare. Fatimite caliphs, descendants of Ali, the son-in-law of the prophet Mohammed, were gradually sinking into such a state of weakness, that they were no longer able to preserve their dominions. Anarchy, and hostile inroads of Christian kings and Turkish sultans, ruled supreme. In this state of confusion, Maimonides accommodated himself to circumstances, and suffered his master mind and transcendent talents to lie, as it were, under the influence of an opiate. As soon as the Turks, after completing their conquests in Asia, overthrew the reigning dynasty in Egypt, and established their dominion in that country, Maimonides, meeting with Al-Fadhl Aabd-Arrahhim Ebn Al-Baisani, one of Salaheddin's generals, and a man of sense and learning, immediately attached himself to him, and very soon after became his physician and counsellor.

By this means, Maimonides was soon brought to the favourable notice of Salaheddin Yoseph Ebn Agub, formerly vizier of Bagdad, who became sultan after the year 1171, or (as he was more usually

called) Saladin, king of Egypt, and was taken into his majesty's service, as physician-in-chief, and privy counsellor.

About this time (according to Alkifti's statement), a king of the Franks (name not mentioned), was taken ill at Ascalon. This king of the Christians, though inhabiting a land which, according to the notions of the age, he must have considered defiled by the footsteps of a Jew—though placed at the head of a band of adventurers that had proved the most sanguinary persecutors of the defenceless Hebrews; though able to boast of ruling over a country but two generations back cleared by the sword of the noisome weeds of Judaism, yet the medical skill of Maimonides held such powerful inducements even to him, that he felt he would be safe in his hands, and accordingly invited him to come into the country where his race was hated, into the royal presence, nay, wished to entrust him with his royal life.

At this time, the triumph of Maimonides was complete, being courted by two hostile monarchs, occupying most prominent positions upon the stage of the world. Maimonides, however, giving the preference to the Moslem monarch, positively refused to render any service to the king of the Christians.

His elevation excited, of course, the envy of others, who, alike jealous of his fame and fortune, sought not to emulate or to surpass him in talents, but strove, by mean intrigues and foul calumny, to ruin him in the good opinion of his royal master. A Mohammedan lawyer from Spain accused him publicly of profaning the religion of Islam, by having abandoned it for Judaism; but the king himself defended his physician-in-chief on the ground that a forced religion is no religion. Finally, he was accused of having attempted to poison his royal master. Whether justly or not, the sultan sent him to spend a few years in disgrace and exile. He is said to have spent all the time of his banishment in a cave, and devoted it entirely to his manifold studies, the fruits of which have filled many volumes.

He was afterwards recalled and reinstated in the favour of the sultan and his court. All the former ill feelings were now exchanged for those of respect and admiration. In short, Maimonides, happy in the circle of his affectionate family, in the possession of a large share of worldly goods, respected by every one that knew him, admired and beloved by a numerous circle of friends and disciples, and nearly idolized by a great portion of his coreligionists, seemed now to have attained the zenith of his glory. Indeed, so far had his fame spread, that the desire of seeing him is mentioned by an eminent Arabian scholar, Aabd-Allatif, as one of the motives for his repairing from a distant country to Egypt. His time was devoted to the noble task of benefiting either the mind by his writings and instruction, or the body by his medical skill and exertions. His unremitting activity is described by him-

self in a sketch of his way of life during forty years, when his time was divided between his practice as a physician, his employment at the court of Egypt, and his diligent and extensive labour in his study. It is preserved in a letter written by him to Rabbi Samuel Aben Tibbon, the diligent translator of his Arabic works into the Hebrew tongue:

"The residence of the king and my abode are situated at some little distance. Every day I am obliged to appear at court; if the sultan, or one of his wives or children, are ill, I remain there the greater part of the day. If all are well, I return home, but never before noon. Then, having dismounted and washed my hands, I enter my house, which I generally find filled with people. Israelites and Gentiles, rich and poor, merchants and magistrates, friends and enemies, await me. I request their permission to take some food, which I only do once in the twenty-four hours. After that, I converse with each of my visitors, and prescribe medicines for them. Meanwhile, people are continually coming in and going out, so that it is generally two hours after dark before all the attendance ceases; I then throw myself on a couch, exhausted with fatigue, and take a little repose. You may imagine that, during all this time, no Israelite can come to me for private intercourse on religious subjects. It is only on the Sabbath, when the greater part of the synagogue come to me after morning prayers, that I can give them any directions for their conduct during the week. Then we read together a little until noon, after which some return to me, and we read together again till the time of evening prayer. This is my usual way of life. Do not think, however, that I have completely described it. When, by the help of God, you may be able, after having finished the translation for the use of your fathers, to come and see me here, you can convince yourself, by your own eyes, of the truth."

How this learned Israelite, in the midst of such overwhelming occupation, could find the leisure requisite to collect and digest materials for the numerous and voluminous works which have flowed from his pen, is indeed astonishing. His books amount to more than forty in number, and some of them are of great magnitude. To name some of them will give an idea of the wide field of his studies, and the variety of subjects on which he wrote.

A commentary on the Mishna was the labour of his youth, begun while he was yet in Spain, in his twenty-third year, and concluded in Egypt, in his thirtieth year. This work was written in Arabic, accompanied with several very valuable introductions to the various orders or single treatises of the Mishna. These valuable introductions were translated into Latin by the celebrated orientalist, E. Pocock, and published by him in the original Arabic and the translation, at Oxford, A.D. 1655, under the title of "*Porta Mosis*." Manuscripts of this commentary in the original language are still extant in various libraries; among others, in the Bodleian. This whole work was translated into

Hebrew in fragmentary parts, by the following respective rabbins, viz.: Samuel Eben Tibbon, and his son Moses; Judah Charisi; Joseph Alfual; Chaim ben Baka; Jacob Ahsai Badrashi; Solomon ben Jacob; and Nathaniel Almali. Numerous complete Hebrew editions of the whole work are extant, and to be found in thousands of Hebrew libraries. A part of it had been translated into Latin by Paul Riccius, and published under the title of "*Epitome Doctrinæ Talmudicæ*;" and the whole of it by Gulielmus Surenhusius, who published it along with the commentary of Rabbi Obadiah, of Bartenora, in his edition of the Mishna, published at Amsterdam, between A. D. 1675 and 1689. It was also translated into the Spanish language by Rabbi Abraham ben Reuben ben Nachman, under the title of "*Misnaioth con el Comento de el Hacham Rabbino Mosehbar Maimon*," published at Venice, A. D. 1606; and into the German by R. J. Fürstenthal, under the title of "*Das Jüd. Traditionswesen, dargestellt in des R. Mos. Maimonides Einleitung in seinen Mischnakommentar, &c.*" Breslau, 1842.

The following extract from his preface to the Mishna may not prove unacceptable :

"Know that everything under the lunar sphere is created for the use of man. If there are animals and plants, the utility of which is not apparent, it is because our ignorance has not been able to discover it. The proof is that every age makes discoveries of the utility of certain animals and plants; objects that to us seem poisonous, possess their salutary qualities; we have an evident proof in vipers, which, although noxious reptiles, have been rendered useful to man. Then, since man is the end of all creation, we must examine for what purpose he exists, for what end he is created. We see every object of the creation produce the effect for which it is created; the palm yields its dates, the spider weaves its cobwebs. All their qualities render the animal or plant proper to attain their purpose. Then what is that of man? It cannot be to eat, drink, propagate, build walls, or to command; for these occupations are separate from him and add not to his essence, and he possesses nearly the whole of them in common with other animals.

"It is, then, intelligence only that augments his being and elevates him from a lowly condition to a sublime state. It is but by reason that man distinguishes himself from the other animals; he himself is but a rational animal. By reason, I mean the understanding of comprehensible subjects, and above all, of the unity of God; all other knowledge tends to conduct him to that; but to arrive at it he must avoid luxury, for too much care bestowed on the body destroys the soul. The man who abandons himself to his passions, who renders his understanding subservient to his corporeal desires, does not demonstrate the divine power that lies within him, that is to say, reason, which is a matter floating in the ocean of space.

"It results from what has been said, that the purpose of our world, and the objects contained therein, is man endowed with knowledge and good-

ness. For a man to be perfect, he must combine in himself science and action, that is, the knowledge of truth with the practice of virtue. This is what not only our prophets, but the ancient philosophers taught us, and it will be found more detailed in my exposition of the 'Ethics of the Fathers.' Throughout the law you find this precept, 'Learn and then practice.' It inculcates that knowledge precedes action, for knowledge leads to actions, while they do not lead to knowledge."

Knowledge, in Maimonides's opinion, is power. This truth he fully proved in his very numerous, profound, and original writings, which have constituted a new era in his nation's religion and literature. Respecting him, Justiniani thus writes: "Fuit auctor iste candidus, minimeque superstitiosus; plus certe veritati addictus quam nœniis importunis neotericorum Judæorum. Percipies porro illum quæ sunt religionis religiose, quæ philosophica philosophice, quæ Talmudica talmudice; ac demum quæ sunt divina tractare." And Clavering, Bishop of Peterborough, says: "The memory of Maimonides had ever flourished, and will flourish forever." He compares him to Thomas Aquinas, and Abravanel to Scotus. "The latter," says the Bishop, "over-subtilly sought for arguments in everything, and often tires his reader instead of convincing him; but Maimonides, who is more solid, more nervous and strong, is contented to produce a small number of convincing reasons."

Ten years later, he composed the "Yad Hachazakah, seu manus fortis quam fecit Moses in conspectu Israel," which is an abstract from the Talmud, containing only the resolutions or decisions made therein on every case, without the descants, disputes, fables, and other trash under which they lay buried in that vast load of rubbish. This work, says Dr. Prideaux, "is one of the completest digests of law that was ever made; I mean, not as to matter, but in respect only of the clearness of the style and method in which it is composed, the filthy mass of dirt from under which he dug it, and the comprehensive manner in which he hath digested the whole. Others among them (the Israelites) have attempted the like work, but none have been able to exceed or come nigh him herein. And for this and other of his writings, he is very deservedly esteemed the best author among them."

This complete pandect of Judaic, civil, and common law, consists of fourteen books, being the work of twelve years. It is written in very pure Hebrew, and in an easy and elegant style. It was first published at Soncino, A. D. 1490, folio. Republished at Venice, 1521, three volumes, folio; and at Amsterdam, dated A. M. 5461, four volumes, folio. Selections from it have also been published in Hebrew and English, with notes, by Bernard, in a book entitled, "The Main Principles of the Creed and Ethics of the Jews, exhibited in selections from the ad Hachazakah of Maimonides, with a literal English translation, copious illustrations from

the Talmud, &c." Cambridge, 1832, 8vo. The order of this book is as follows, viz.:

I. The book of Knowledge, containing five treatises: 1. Foundation of the law; 2. Ethical rules; 3. On the study of the law; 4. On idolatry; 5. On repentance.

II. The book of Love, containing six treatises; treating of the various devotional rites and ceremonies, such as the reading of the Shemaa Israel, of the wearing of the phylacteries, the fringes, &c.

III. The book of the Seasons, containing ten treatises; treating of the Sabbath and festivals, and the rites and ceremonies connected therewith.

IV. The book about Women, containing five treatises; treating of marriage, divorce, and all relations connected with or growing out of the state of marriage.

V. The book of Holiness, containing three treatises; treating of the acts that are derogatory to the dignity of the Israelite, as the partaking of prohibited food, &c.

VI. The book of uncommon Things, containing four treatises; treating of oaths, vows, and the like.

VII. The book about Seeds, containing seven treatises; treating of the produce of the soil, and the various laws connected therewith.

VIII. The book of Service, containing nine treatises; treating of the temple and its vessels, the divine service, the daily and additional sacrifices, and every other circumstance connected with these matters.

IX. The book about Sacrifices, containing six treatises; treating of those sacrifices that are brought on occasions other than those mentioned in the foregoing book.

X. The book of Purification, containing eight treatises; treating of things contact with which renders unclean, and also of the mode of purification.

XI. The book of Damages, containing five treatises; treating of all kinds of damages and their compensation.

XII. The book of Property, containing five treatises; treating of the modes of conveying property, and of partnership, and of other circumstances growing out of these relations.

XIII. The book of Judgments, containing five treatises; treating of all kinds of trusts, loans, &c.

XIV. The book of Judges, containing five treatises; treating of the sanhedrim, witnesses, rebels, kings, wars, and other relations connected with these subjects.*

In the preface to the whole work, Maimonides very ingeniously

* For the benefit of the Christian student, we will subjoin a catalogue of those parts of this work which had been translated and published in Latin.

De Fundamentis Legis cum vers. lat. et notis Juncto Textu heb. Amst., 1638; and

fixed the number 613 as being the exact number of the precepts contained in the Pentateuch; answering to the numbers of 248 bones and 365 sinews in the body of man; calling upon man to worship his Creator with his whole body and soul.

The whole of this work is to be translated into German. Two parts of it have already been published at Königsberg, 1846, '7, '8. Its title is as follows: "Das Grosse Werk Maimûnis in Deutscher

without the text, *Moses Maimonidæ Theoremata de Principiis Juris Divini*. Amst., 1680; by W. H. Vorst.

Canones Ethici Mos. Maimonides cum vers. lat. et cum notis uberioribus. Amst., 1640 and 1653; by G. Genz.

De Studio Legis, cum vers. lat. et notis. Oxford, 1705; by Bp. R. Clavering.

Latina Interpretatio Tractatus Talmud Torah, Mos. Maimon. Strasburg, 1705; by J. Ulmann.

De Idololatria, cum vers. lat. et notis, along with his father's work, *De Theologia Gentilium*. Amst., 1642, 1666, and 1700; by D. Voss. The same work. by J. B. Carpzov.

De Pœnitentia, cum vers. lat. et notis. Cantabrig, 1631; by G. N.

The same work, without text and notes: Helmstädt, 1651; by J. Hilpert. *Ib.* cum vers. lat. et notis: Oxford, 1705; by Bp. R. Clavering. *Ib.* cum vers. lat. et specimen observationum philol. in V. T. Strasburg, 1705; by J. Ulmann.

De Lectione Shemaa. Leipzig, 1703; by L. D. Vollhagen.

De Phylacteriis, schedis, et de libro Legis, lat. convers. cum notis. Haran, 1705; by J. H. van Bashuysen.

De Peniculamentis Sacris, cum vers. lat. et notis. Ff. a. M. 1710; by J. H. May.

Tr. de Circumcisione, cum vers. lat. Strasburg, 1661; by S. Schmid. *Ib.*, Königsburg, 1705; by Ch. Walther.

Tr. de Festo Expiationis, cum vers. lat. Paris, 1667; by L. C. de Veil.

Tr. de Fermento Expurgando et massa non Fermentata Tempore Paschali, cum vers. lat. Paris, 1667; by L. C. de Veil.

Tr. de Siclis, hebr. et lat. cum annotationibus. Leyden, 1718 and 1727; by J. Esgers.

Tr. de Consecratione Novilunii, cum vers. lat. Paris, 1669; by L. C. de Veil. Without the text, Amst., 1701. It is also to be found in Ugolino's *Thesaurus*, vol. xvii. Venice, 1744.

Novilunii Initiatio, ad Mentem Talmudistarum, pro Festis Judæorum determinandis, parandoque ipsorum Calendario a Rabb. Mose Maimonide. Jena, 1703; by H. B. Witter.

Tr. de Jejuniiis, hebr. et lat. Leipzig, 1662; by J. B. Carpzov. *Ib.*, Paris, 1667; by L. C. de Veil.

Tr. de Matrimonio Ebræorum Caput Decimum, &c. Jena, 1746; by J. F. Hirt. The whole treatise, *De Matrimonio s. Maritatione*, hebr. et lat.; by L. C. de Veil. Paris, 1673.

Tr. de Repudiatione Caput Primum, hebr. et lat. Jena, 1718; by J. J. Sonnenschmid.

Tr. de Prohibito Congressu et Incestu, caput xiii et xiv. Oxford, 1679; by H. Prideaux.

Tr. de Cibis Prohibitibus, latine dedit sine textu hebr. cum notis. Hafn., 1722-24, by M. Wöldike.

Tr. de Juramentis, lat. cum notis diffusis. Heidelberg, 1672; by J. F. Mieg. *Ib.*, Leyden, 1706; by J. C. Dittmar.

Tr. de Estimatione rerum et personarum et de anathemate ac devotione ad usum sacrum, hebr. et lat. Ultraj., 1720-23; by H. Langenes.

Tr. de Heterogeneis non Jungendis aut Ferendis, caput 1-3, hebr. et lat. Upsala, 1713; by L. Hellman. *Caput 4-5*, by M. O. Beronius. Upsala, 1714; et *caput vi*; *ib.*, 1727.

Tr. de portione Pauperibus Relinquenda, hebr. et lat. Oxford, 1679; by H. Prideaux.

Tr. de Primitiis Offerendis et Donis Sacerdotum, hebr. et lat., usque ad caput vii incl.

Uebersetzung u. d. T. Mischne-Tora in 14 Büchern, das gesammte Jüd., theol., philos., ethische und rituelle Gesetzesgebiet umfassend, by E. Soloweiczky.

Several Hebrew scholars have promised, from time to time, to favour the literary world with an English version of this work, but none of them has redeemed his pledge.

In the following extracts from his ethical rules, we will let Maimonides speak for himself as to the soundness and sublimity of the precepts, and the correctness of the views therein detailed.

Having, in the first section, adverted to the different passions, tempers, and dispositions of mankind, and laid down, as a general rule, that extremes are to be avoided, and that moderation in everything is the duty of man, he proceeds to say :

"SEC. 2. There are, however, some dispositions in which it is wrong to pursue even a middle course, but the contrary extreme to which is at once to be embraced, as, for instance, pride. It is unlawful to balance between pride and humility; but duty commands us to be as humble as possible. It is not sufficient to be merely meek, but man ought to be truly humble. To teach this, the sacred Scriptures relate concerning Moses, 'Now the man Moses was very meek, above all the men which were upon the face of the earth.' Numb. xii, 3.

"In like manner man ought entirely to avoid wrath. If circumstances require a man to evince his displeasure, even then he must only assume the semblance of anger, without harbouring the reality. The way of the righteous is, if they are insulted, they retort not; they bear themselves reviled, and answer not; they rejoice amidst their sufferings; and to them

Upsala, 1694-5; by G. Peringer. Ib. caput quartum, hebr. et lat. cum notis. Leyden, 1702; by J. R. Cramer.

Tr. de Anno Septimo et Jubileo, hebr. et lat. cum notis. Ff. a. M. 1708; by J. H. Mai (fil.).

Tr. de Domo Electa s. Sanctuario, lat.; by L. de Chapello,—to be found in Ugolino's Thesaurus, vol. viii. Venice, 1744.

Liber de Ministerio Sacro, lat. convert. et brevibus notis atque iconographia Templi illustravit. Paris, 1678; by L. C. de Veil.

Liber de Sacrificiis, lat. convert. cum notis. London, 1683, and Amst., 1701; by L. C. de Veil.

Tr. de iis, qui non tenentur habere sacrificium expiationis, cum vers. lat. et notis. Hafn., 1711; by P. S. Aarhus.

Tr. De Vacca Rufa, lat. cum notis. Amst., 1711; by A. Ch. Zeller.

Tr. de Synedriis eorumque Poenis, hebr. et lat. Amst., 1695; by H. Honting.

Tr. de Rebellibus, hebr. et lat. Wittenberg, 1700; by J. L. Lenz.

Tr. de Luctu et Lugentibus, lat. Leipzig, 1666. Ff. a. M. 1691; by M. Geier. It is also to be found in Ugolino's Thesaurus, vol. xxxiii. Venice, 1744.

Tr. de Regibus et eorum Bellis, hebr. et lat. cum notis. Rutter., 1699; by M. Leydecker. Ib., capita 8-10. Oxford, 1679; by H. Prideaux. Ib., capita 11-12. Paris, 1572; by G. Genebrard. Ib., cap. 11, hebr. et lat. Upsala, 1692; by G. Peringer.

The Book of Knowledge is also translated into Spanish, entitled, "Tratado de Moralidad y Regimiento de la Vida, di Rabbiniu Mose de Egipto, por Dav. de Lara." Hamburg, 1662.

may be applied the language of Deborah, 'Let them that love Him be as the sun when he goeth forth in his might.' Judges v, 31.

"Man should make it a rule not to be loquacious, and only to speak what the occasion absolutely requires. Even in teaching the law, or any science, let the words be few, but their meaning comprehensive. The rule is, let your instruction be concise. Many words with little meaning is folly. Thus Solomon says, 'A fool's voice is known by multitude of words.' Eccles. v, 3.

"It is forbidden to man to make use of flattery and deceit. He is not to feel differently in his heart from what his mouth expresses; but his inward feelings are to be in unison with his conduct, and he is to speak as he thinks. Truth in words, sincerity of mind, and a heart devoid of guile, is the duty of every man; as the law ordains, 'That which is altogether just shalt thou follow, that thou mayest live.' Deut. xvi, 20.

"Man is not to indulge in boisterous mirth, rude laughter, and jeers; nor is he to sink into apathetic melancholy, but is to be cheerful. Idle mirth and giddiness lead to indecency. We are to avoid alike the extremes of joy or sorrow, and be cheerful, and receive every man in a pleasant manner. Man is not to be too greedy of gain, or to strive for riches; nor is he to be lazy, or indulge in idleness. He must be of a satisfied disposition, devoting little of his time to worldly affairs, but much to the study and observance of the 'divine laws.' However humble his lot may be, he is to be cheerful and satisfied, and be neither envious, rancorous, nor coveting worldly grandeur; for envy, passions, and ambition, deprive a man of a close intercourse with his Maker.

"Should a man think, that as envy, passions, and ambition are very pernicious qualities, he will embrace the opposite extremes, and to do so devote himself to abstinence, as, for instance, not indulge in wholesome meat and drink, not to marry, or occupy a respectable dwelling, or dress becomingly, but to envelope himself in sackcloth and haircloth, as the idolatrous priests do; he would be doing wrong and committing a sin. Man is to abstain only from that which is prohibited by the law, and is not, by oath or vow, to deprive himself of those enjoyments which the law by its permission sanctions. Penances beyond what the law ordains, are comprised in this remark; and it is with respect to such that Solomon said, 'Be not righteous overmuch; neither make thyself overwise; why shouldest thou destroy thyself?' Eccles. vii, 16.

"Man is to impress on his mind, that whatever he does is to be with the intention to glorify his Creator. His rising, his walking, his speech, and all his occupations are to have that aim. If, for instance, he is engaged in his daily avocations, he is not to aim at the gain only for its own sake, but as a means of obtaining what his preservation requires; such as food, raiment, and a dwelling for himself, his wife, and family. When eating, drinking, or indulging in conjugal endearments, his purpose is not to be the mere momentary gratification of his desires, but he is to take only such food as is wholesome and nourishing, and not that which is pleasant to the palate only, if it be in any manner pernicious. So that he is to consider all his food as a medicine required for his sustenance. In the midst of his endearments he is to recollect what is their aim; and even when he lies down to sleep, let it be with the intention to arise cheerful and refreshed

for the service of his Creator. Let the aim of all his undertakings be the glory of the Deity. Thus Solomon says, 'In all thy ways acknowledge Him, and He shall direct thy paths.' Prov. iii, 6.

In digesting this complete code of Jewish laws, our author evinced the most persevering assiduity, combined with a profound judgment. He had a thorough and intimate acquaintance with his whole subject, of which he had a full view, at once rapid, correct, and comprehensive. He had very maturely digested his plan, and from it, he in no instance departed. His intention, as he himself declares, was to put an end to that superficial, half-and-half sort of knowledge which the Rabbins have introduced among the Hebrews.

About a century before this work made its appearance, Rabbi Isaac Al-phe, in vain attempted to produce the like of it; and the honour of having produced the most full, comprehensive, and clear system of Talmudic legislation, methodically arranged, free from all those extrinsic admixtures with which the parent work abounds, is only due to Maimonides. The great merit of his arduous undertaking was very speedily and generally acknowledged; his fame established, and an honourable rank was assigned to him among the worthies of his nation.

Next in order, we notice his work, "The Book of Precepts." This is a full and lucid exposition of the 613 precepts contained in the Pentateuch, and enumerated in his preface to the *Mishneh Torat*. It was originally written in Arabic, and a manuscript in this language is still in the Bodleian. It was translated into the Hebrew by Ibn Tibbon, and others, and published at various periods, with several commentaries attached to it by various learned Rabbins. German and Italian translations of this same work have also been published.

Next comes his work on logic, "Terms used in the Art of Thinking." This treatise on logic was originally written in Arabic; and is now translated into the Hebrew, German, and Latin languages. It has also been commented upon by the celebrated Mendelssohn; and is to be found in very many notable libraries in Europe.

After the lapse of some time, Maimonides published his *Moreh Hannebochim*. Some think that by this ostentatious title, he alludes to a saying of Pharaoh, who, when seeing the Israelites somewhat perplexed in consequence of the Red Sea and the high mountains, in their way, exclaimed, *Nebochim Him* (they are entangled). That his fancy was, that, as the ancient Moses did deliver Israel from that perplexity, so the modern Moses should deliver the same people from the confusion and labyrinth, which was occasioned by several passages of the law, which they did not understand. This, says Dr. Basnage, was a good idea, for he made it a principle, never to follow the doctors implicitly, and

insisting principally on the literal sense of the sacred Scripture, he has very often hit upon the right meaning of God's word. This principle has elicited for him the following expression of Scaliger: "Primus fuit inter Hebræos qui nugare desiit."

Indeed, he was not altogether raised above prejudices, so as to be free from inserting in the body of his work, many things which are censurable by exact critics; but, says Dr. Basnage, it is so difficult for a man absolutely to divest himself of the notions he has sucked with his mother's milk, and which seem essentially connected with the religion he professes, that we ought to admire the good sense and equity of those who make part of the sacrifice, and pardon them what is wanting to make it perfect.

Maimonides's principal design in this work was, to silence the cavils of the materialist, and put the scoffing infidel to the blush, by proving the truth and authenticity of the sacred Scriptures, and convincing his readers that the divine law revealed to Moses is in perfect accordance with the choicest gift God has bestowed on man, "his reason." The work is partly critical, partly philosophical, and partly theological; and is divided into three parts. The first contains seventy-six chapters, and treats of the various synonymes, homonymes, metaphors, allegories, and similes found in Scripture; and, moreover, comments on prophecy—heaven, the universe, and angels. The second part discourses, in forty-eight chapters, on God, on the celestial bodies and their influence, and on the law. The third, containing eighty-four chapters, treats on the vision of Ezekiel, providence, and the reasons for the divine commandments.

This work was originally written in Arabic; copies of it, in that language, are still extant, four being in the Bodleian. The reason why he did not write it in Hebrew, is variously assigned: his enemies assert that he feared to bring the many new, not to say heretical ideas which his book contained, before the Israelitish communities, in a language which all could comprehend, and that therefore he preferred concealing them, particularly from the learned Rabbins of the French school, by adopting a language not very generally understood. His friends, on the contrary, assert that his reason was simply because the Arabic language is more copious than the Hebrew, and that, from having continually studied the Arabic authors, who had written on philosophy, that language was more familiar to him, and more completely in his power on philosophical subjects, than any other he was acquainted with. It appears to us, says Dr. Raphall, that in this case, as in many others, the most charitable opinion is likewise the most true. Had concealment been the object of Maimonides, he would not at all have written, and would certainly not have been so active to encourage and assist those who translated his book into the Hebrew language.

The first translator of this work into Hebrew, was Rabbi

Judah ben Solomon ben Al-Hophni, called Al-Charisi, and is the author of the work *Tachckemoni*. This version, however, seems to be very obscure, and was soon superseded by that of Rabbi Samuel ibn Tibbon, which was, in every respect, more successful. This learned Rabbi, having been requested by the principal Rabbins of Provence, to translate the *Moreh Hannebochim* into Hebrew, deemed it his duty to correspond with Maimonides, sending to him specimens of the translation, and the Arabic copy from which he was translating, that he might revise it, and also correct those errors which had crept in through the carelessness of transcribers. It was, on this occasion, that Maimonides, being glad that a translation of his work had been undertaken by a very competent man, deemed it proper to send him the following advice: "Whosoever wishes faithfully to translate a work, must avoid rendering it literally, and must not be tied down by the too anxious study to adhere to the precise wording of his original. He should, on the contrary, seize upon the precise meaning of entire sentences, and then render that meaning in such phrases as are most in accordance with the idiom and genius of the language in which he is writing."

This work of Maimonides, though highly esteemed by posterity, has only gained real influence over a small minority of his coreligionists, at least in as far as relates to the important reformation in religious belief, which he endeavoured to bring about, and the philosophical bent which he tried to give to Rabbinical Judaism. This attempt caused, for a time, discussions and agitations in the synagogues, whose character was decidedly opposed to any philosophical tendency, notwithstanding the light with which, in other respects, they appear highly gifted. Its doctrines threw them all into consternation and division. Such an expurgation of Judaism from the legends of the Talmud, and such an effort to induce his people to use the common sense of general mankind in connexion with revealed truth, could not fail to arouse the bigotry of the old school of Rabbinites.

The first outcry was raised at Montpellier, a city of France, where Rabbi Solomon and two of his disciples, Rabbi David and Rabbi Jonah, brought against the work an accusation of heresy, both in respect of the Talmud and the word of God. Rabbi Solomon, who presided over the synagogue at Montpellier, observed three things: 1st. That Maimonides, having studied under the famous Averroes, had embraced the principles of the Peripatetic philosophy, and frequently introduces it in his works; which did not agree with the religion of the Cabbalists, who would not be obliged to reason justly, and have bounds prescribed to their imagination. 2dly. As Maimonides has very distinctly specified the end of the rites and ceremonies of the law, he gave a very great advantage to the Christians; because he showed thereby,

that the end of this institution having ceased, the laws were to be abolished. And, 3dly. That Maimonides has treated of the operations of God, in a manner well enough adapted to the scholastic divinity; and, therefore, the Dominicans have thought it their interest to give vogue to this work, instead of condemning and burning it. In consequence of these charges, the book was condemned and burned in the market-place, and a sentence of excommunication was pronounced against any one who should read it, or any other work imbued with the Greek and Arabic philosophy, or the writings of Greek and Arab philosophers.

This great insult, conveyed by the public burning of Maimonides's book, and the excommunication pronounced against its readers, became the signal for general war; and the synagogues of Spain also were very soon divided into two great and formidable parties. Whilst Rabbi Judah ben Joseph Al-phachar, chief Rabbi of Toledo, made common cause with Rabbi Solomon of Montpellier, the most celebrated teachers of the Spanish synagogues formed a decided majority in favour of Maimonides. The Narbonnese Rabbins retaliated the excommunication, and along with those of Gerona, and Saragossa, loudly and strongly condemned the intemperate zeal of the French Rabbins. Indeed, many, even of the congregations of Provence, have joined in this condemnation. Rabbi Solomon, however, was not to be overcome, and, after a long contest, he went so far, relying on the support of his partizans in Castile and the north of France, as to excommunicate all those congregations of Provence, Arragon, Navarre, and Catalonia, who persisted in defending the cause of Maimonides.

Sometime ere this bursting of the storm, Maimonides had closed his mortal career, and gone to appear before the tribunal of Him who is righteous and just. He, however, having always been free from prejudice, having a mind fully enlightened by philosophy, and a heart warmed by philanthropy and piety, being also gifted by nature with talents of high order, accompanied with solidity of judgment, and profundity of thought, did not think it amiss to express in his *Moreh Hannebochim*, the following opinion in reference to at least a part of the Talmud:

“I have said in my comment on the Mishna that I would explain the parables, proverbs, and tales of the whole Talmud, and I had already collected matter for doing so; but, upon reflection, I abandoned the design, and for the following reasons: If I were to explain a parable by another parable, and a proverb by another proverb, and hidden things by hidden things; I should have gained nothing; but to explain those passages as they should be for the common people, is not expedient. And if one of the many foolish Rabbins reads these histories and proverbs, he will find an explanation not necessary; for to a fool everything is right, and he finds no difficulty anywhere. And, if a really wise man reads them, there will

be two ways in which he will consider them. If he take them in their literal sense, and think them bad, he will say, this is foolishness; and in so doing, he says nothing at all against the foundation of the faith; or, he thinks there is a mystery in them, and goes his way, thinking well of the story, but explaining or not explaining it.

"There are persons (Rabbanim) who object to the assigning of a reason for any law whatever, and according to them it is best not to institute any inquiry into the cause of any law or warning. This objection proceeds from unsound minds, which possess no clear consciousness of the motives for this objection. They imagine that if these laws have a useful discernible object which induced God to command them, then they resemble such as are given by human beings, and might have been given by them. But if no object can be discovered and no advantage assigned, then are they doubtless from God, for a human mind would not have fallen upon such things. These weak-minded reasoners imagine man more perfect than their Creator, inasmuch as they think that man would command nothing without purpose, while God would command that which is useless, and caution against things, the practice of which is harmless. Away with such an idea. Precisely the reverse is the case, and the object of all laws was to procure some advantage, as we have explained the text, 'And the Lord commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God, for our good always, that He might preserve us alive, as it is at this day.' Scripture further says, 'Keep therefore and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, 'Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people.' Scripture thus says that even the statutes will teach the nations that they are founded on wisdom and knowledge; and if the laws have no motive, if they serve no object, bring no advantage, and avert no mischief, why should the believers or practisers be considered as a great and wise nation? But the matter is undoubtedly as we have stated, viz.: the object of every one of the 613 precepts is either to convey some correct notion, to remove some erroneous opinion, to accustom to some good order, to prevent iniquity, to inculcate good habits, or to caution against bad habits; and they may be reduced under three heads, viz., intellectual, moral, and social qualities; every law, therefore, tends either to promote social virtues, or to diffuse true knowledge or morality."

And, in a letter to his disciple, Rabbi Joseph, who was about to open an academy at Babylon, he says:

"Beware of wasting your time in the exposition and laborious poring over the Gemara (i. e., Talmud); for I have read much therein, and have drawn from it but very little profit."

With such passages before us, can we wonder at the rash conduct and intemperate zeal of Rabbi Solomon, who ever yielded an implicit obedience to the following Talmudical decision?—"All those who reject the Agadoth, (i. e. legends, aphorisms, parables, apologues, &c.) as did Sadock and Baithos, are deniers of the law, and as such are condemned on account of the greatness of their

wickedness and sin, forever, even forever and ever!" Rabbi Solomon and his associates, were filled with the utmost consternation, when they found, set forth with authority as weighty as that of Maimonides, the doctrine that Talmud and Theology were not identical. They were accustomed to cherish a spirit, which removes every difficulty merely with *ipse dixit*, and intimidates every inquirer with the terror of the name of Freethinker. When, therefore, they saw discussions and researches sanctioned, which they thought must rob their objects of the misty covering of sanctity, and the precious rust of antiquity, under which they had lain concealed for ages, and finding the venting of their indignation in low murmuring altogether unavailable, they thought it was high time at once to hurl the thunders of their anathema against each and all who persisted in defending the cause of Maimonides.

The full conviction of the indissoluble tie subsisting between the law and their traditions, was so deeply rooted in the minds of the Israelites and their teachers, that no sooner was the war declared by the Arch-Rabbi of Montpellier and his party, than almost all the synagogues were engaged in it, either as condemners or defenders of Maimonides; and the result was a forcible interruption of friendly relations between the Israelites in various places.

During this period, the zeal of both parties became more fierce; and the spirit of irritation and hatred acquired daily greater strength. But while mutual animosity was thus reaching the highest pitch of exasperation, Rabbi David ben Joseph Kimchi, who had been elected ruler of the Narbonne, stepped forward, and introduced the cause into the synagogues of Spain, with the intent of effecting a reconciliation between the contending parties, and thus if possible of restoring that harmony which formerly had subsisted among the Israelitish congregations. Kimchi, who is very celebrated as a grammarian, commentator, poet, and philosopher, feeling deeply hurt that Rabbins, who were altogether unacquainted with philosophy, should attempt, by downright force, to control public opinion, could not avoid siding with the defenders of Maimonides. His offer to become umpire was hailed with general acclamation, and several of the French Rabbins, who at first made common cause with the Arch-Rabbi of Montpellier, became also very desirous of an amicable arrangement, and entrusted him with full powers for the purpose.

While Rabbi David Kimchi was carrying on an unsuccessful correspondence with Rabbi Judah ben Joseph Al-phachar, Arch-Rabbi of Toledo, the friends of Maimonides were continually gaining ground, and increasing in numbers and influence. In order to check their progress, the Arch-Rabbi of Montpellier thought it proper to implore the aid of the French Catholic priests, calling upon them to put a stop to the spread of an heresy which sapped alike the fundamental truths of both creeds; and they,

acceding to his request, ordered, that wherever the book *Moreh Hannebochim* was found, it should be burned.

This unexpected, unnatural attempt to force public opinion by erecting Roman Catholic priests into fit judges of Jewish religious faith, roused Maimonides's friends from a state of passive forbearance; and as it was evident that it was not love of religion but of supremacy, which animated the Arch-Rabbi of Montpellier and his party, the most decisive steps were at once taken by the great men of Israel who supported the cause of reason, of true piety, and of the *Moreh Hannebochim*, and the semblance of peace was once more restored by compelling the leaders of the zealots to sue for mercy.

At this time, Rabbi Bechai, of Saragossa, called upon all the Israelites residing within the kingdom of Arragon and its dependencies, to resist the disturbers of the public peace, and to espouse the cause of the great Maimonides; alleging that as he and his tribunal had hurled the thunders of their anathema against the Arch-Rabbi of Montpellier and his party, they also should follow his example. This appeal was responded to by the Arch-Rabbins of Huesca, Moncon, Calahitajud, and Lerida, who, together with the principal members of their respective congregations, fully confirmed the sentence of excommunication. This example was also followed by several congregations of Provence and Septimania. Rabbi Moses bar Nochman, Chief Rabbi of Gerona, also called upon all the principal Rabbanim of Arragon, Navarre, and Castile to desist from a dispute which had lasted so long and caused so much evil; but Rabbi Meir ben Rabbi Theodoras, of Burgos, attempted to vindicate the conduct of the Montpellier zealots. This vindication called forth a very complete refutation, from Rabbi Abraham ben Rabbi Chasdai Hallevi, of Barcelona, which, coupled with the force of the anathema pronounced against the Arch-Rabbi of Montpellier and his party, and generally adopted throughout the Israelitish congregations of southern France and Arragon, at length, in the year 1232, reduced Rabbi Solomon to the necessity of recalling his anathema, and of suing for peace.

Thus peace was restored, and all the principal Rabbins espoused the cause of Maimonides, with the exception of Rabbi Judah ben Rabbi Joseph Al-phachar, Chief Rabbi of Toledo, and a few others of very minor importance, who still battled for the sacred authority of all the accumulated nonsense of dotard sages, abhorring all the profane research of human reason. These could not endure the doctrine that the precepts and ceremonies of Mosaic institution had any assignable final cause, and that when this motive ceases, the law itself must of necessity be at an end. That would be conceding a large field of argument, indeed, to the Nazarines; and in fact, upon this account, the *Moreh Hannebochim* was not prohibited by the ecclesiastical censorship, as appears

from Kimchi's correspondence with Rabbi Judah of Toledo, and the third charge brought forward by Rabbi Solomon against the book.

The animosity was at first so violent, that the Montpellier antagonists pursued the corpse to its sepulchre, and, erasing the simple inscription, "The greatest of men," they substituted, "The excommunicate and heretic." After they had relented, however, they had the more favourable epitaph restored.

The reformation thus far extended by Maimonides, is practically felt to the present day; his name is revered by the Israelites, and highly respected by Hebrew-reading Christians. The sage leaders of Israel, now freed from the thralldom of controversy, are prepared to pursue the path opened to them by Maimonides, to profit by his instructions, and to increase the stores of wisdom and of learning, which he had placed within their reach in his *Moreh Hannebochim*, and other works. Indeed, another such a stride would emancipate the people from most of the Rabbinic shackles, by which free investigation is impeded or punished.

This work was commented upon by several able scholars, and in modern times by the ingenious Solomon ben Maimon. It has found various Latin translators, among whom the best known are the following:

Rabi Mossei *Ægyptii Dux seu Director Dubitantium aut perplexorum in tres libros divisus, et summa accuratione Aug. Justiniani etc. recognitus, Cuius index s. tabella ad calcem totius opponitur operis.* Paris, 1520.

Joh. Buxtorf, fil. *Moreh Nebochim s. Doctor perplexorum etc., in latinam sermonem transtulit, cum lemmatibus indicibusque variis illustravit.* Basil, 1629.

Portions of it have been translated into various modern languages. Townley translated into English that portion which treats of the "Reasons for the commandments." There exist several German translations, but the best of them is that by Dr. Simon Scheyer, on which criticism has pronounced a favourable verdict. Ff. a. M., 1838. And, the celebrated orientalist, Mons. Munk, of Paris, is now preparing a new French version from the original Arabic.

We will now notice his work, "The eight chapters of Ethics." Without saying anything in reference to the merit of this work, we will let the following extracts from it speak for themselves:

"Know that the soul of man is single in its essence; but its faculties are manifold. Some philosophers have called each of these faculties a distinct soul; which has given rise to the opinion that man has many souls. This opinion has been adopted by some physicians; so that even their prince, Hippocrates, in the introduction to one of his works, assumes three distinct souls in man; 1. The natural, or animation; 2. The sensitive.

3. The intellectual. Others have called the soul's faculties 'parts of the soul;' an expression frequently employed by philosophers; not that they thereby intend to imply that the soul is capable of being divided, as the body is; but that they consider these different faculties as parts of an entirety, the union of which forms and composes the soul.

"Know furthermore, that, in order to acquire and promote moral perfection, it is requisite to maintain a healthful state of the soul and its faculties. And as it is necessary that the physician who undertakes to cure the ailments of the body should have a perfect knowledge of the various corporeal parts, and be no less acquainted with the causes that lead to disease, in order to guard his patient against their influences, than with the means of counteracting that influence, in order to restore health; so likewise must the spiritual guide, who undertakes the cure of souls and the establishing of sound moral principles, be intimately conversant with the soul and its faculties, in order that he too may know how to prevent and to remove disease, and how to maintain health.

"In order to acquire that intimate knowledge, we commence by saying: The faculties of the soul are as follows: 1. Nutrition, which is likewise called 'growth;' 2. Sensation; 3. Imagination; 4. Desire; 5. Reason. * * * Nutrition is the faculty to lead the particles of nourishment into the stomach, to retain them until they are fully digested, to perform the functions of digestion and evacuation, and completely to separate the nutritive and useful juices which are retained, from all others which must be expelled. How and in what manner does this sevenfold faculty perform its operations? In which members of the human body is the operation most visible or perceptible? Which of them are constantly active? And which are the others that operate only at certain times? All these questions appertain to the science of medicine, and form no part of our examination.

"Sensation is the well-known five-fold faculty of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and feeling; which last is equally found in all parts of the body, whereas, each of the other four has its own seat in some particular part.

"Imagination is the faculty, peculiar to man, of recalling sensations or impressions, even after the objects which caused them are no longer present, to add or diminish, to combine or separate, the same; also to create, from the impressions received by the senses, that which never did, and never can, exist. Thus it creates a ship of iron, navigating the air; a man, whose head reaches the heavens, whilst his feet rest on earth; a quadruped, which has a thousand eyes; and many more similar impossibilities, which it embodies and represents as if they were actually existing. Dialecticians have fallen into a great and pernicious error, when, on the strength of the generally received division of the necessary, the possible, and the impossible, they raised a structure of sophisms, and believed, or led others to believe, that all the creations of the imagination are possible; and did not consider that this faculty itself is none other than the unlimited power of giving existence to what is not, and cannot be.

"Desire is the faculty of wishing or declining; which occasions active approbation or reprobation, the preference or choice of a thing or its refusal; and likewise anger or affection, fear or valour, cruelty or tender-

ness, love or hatred, and the like affections of the soul. All parts of the human body are subservient to this faculty; the hand, to receive or push away; the feet, to walk; the eye, to behold; the heart, to encourage the valiant, or to fail the timid. Thus all the members, whether internal or external, are instrumental to this faculty.

"Reason is the faculty, peculiar to man, of thinking; by means of which he reflects, acquires wisdom and knowledge, and decides upon what is proper or improper. The functions of this faculty are partly active, partly speculative. Of the former class are the powers of imitation and of invention; of the latter, the power of contemplating, when applied to the essential and immutable, which latter is abstract wisdom. Imitation comprises the power of learning or acquiring any science or art, as architecture, agriculture, navigation, and many others. Invention comprises the power of maturely reflecting and deciding whether a thing is practicable or impracticable, and, in the former case, what means are best adapted to bring it from possible into actual being.

"This soul, single in itself, but manifold in its faculties, is the crude material to which reason gives the form. If this form does not communicate its impression, all the other faculties of the soul are vain, and may be considered as useless. Thus Solomon says: 'That the soul be without knowledge, it is not good.' Prov. xix 2. His meaning is, that unless reason or understanding has afforded its impress to the soul, its other faculties are useless. What can be said respecting the form, essence, reason, and its various acquirements—as the object of this treatise is merely ethics—is with more propriety made the subject of the book on Prophecy, to which we refer; and with this remark we will close the present chapter. * * * Moral or good deeds are such as observe the precise medium between the two equally pernicious extremes—the too much or the too little. Moral perfections are mental capacities and aptitudes, which likewise observe the just and equal distance from the two equally vicious propensities—towards the too strong or the too weak. From these aptitudes those deeds or actions necessarily result. To illustrate what we stated above, we mention, as an example,—abstemiousness is alike distant from the extreme ardour of passion, and from total apathy or impassability. The quality of abstemiousness is in itself good, or moral; the aptitude from which it is derived is a moral perfection. On the contrary, too great ardour of passion is the one extreme, total apathy is the other; both are alike pernicious; the aptitudes from which both result—as well that which engenders extreme ardour, as that which causes total apathy—are alike moral imperfections.

"To continue our illustration: generosity keeps the medium between avarice and profusion; valour avoids temerity, as it also avoids cowardice; self-respect is alike distant from ambition or meanness; mildness, from arrogance or baseness; meekness, from pride or cringing; contentedness does not descend into thirst for wealth, any more than it degenerates into slothful indifference; good nature is as unlike to churlishness as it is to stolid fondness; forbearance is as far from hasty wrath as from absolute callousness; nor is bashfulness more nearly allied to impudence than it is to sheepishness.

"It often happens, however, that men confound these differing quali-

ties, and even consider a pernicious extreme as superior to the true moral quality. Sometimes the too much is considered as noble and praiseworthy; as when temerity is preferred to true valour, and a reckless hotspur is mistaken for a hero; so that he who wantonly exposes his life, which, apparently by mere chance, he escapes losing, is lauded as if his inconsiderate daring were true courage. At other times, the opposite extreme is preferred. The too little is alone held to be worthy of admiration; so that cowardice becomes dignified with the name of forbearance; the slothful idler is praised for his contented disposition; and he whose frigid apathy renders him callous to every joy, is revered as a saint who eschews sin. In like manner, profuse liberality and stolid fondness are sometimes mistaken for virtues. But how perfectly erroneous and pernicious are all such deviations from the strict line of moderation? which alone is praiseworthy; to which every man ought to adhere, so as always to weigh his conduct with just discrimination.

"Know, that neither moral perfections nor defects can be acquired or implanted in the soul except by means of frequent repetition and continued practice for a length of time, until they become habitual. When repetitions and practice are confined to good or moral actions, the habitude which we acquire is virtuous; if the contrary, it is vicious. And as no man comes into the world with either innate virtue or innate vice (as we shall fully prove in the last chapter of this treatise), every one's conduct does, doubtless, become regulated by the example of his relatives and the customs of his countrymen. The conduct thus formed may be in strict accordance with the rules of moderation; but as it may likewise depart from these, and diverge into either extreme, it results that the soul may become diseased; in which case the same care must be bestowed on its restoration to health, as in cases of bodily illness would be employed for that purpose. When the corporeal functions are deranged, and the necessary equilibrium of the various parts is disturbed, it is the care of him who prescribes the medicine to note which susceptibility preponderates, and to apply such remedies as will restore a due balance of action. In diseases of the soul, the same course must be pursued, till the moral equilibrium is restored and adjusted. Let us, for instance, suppose a man so much under the dominion of avarice as to deny himself every comfort; which, as we have before enumerated, is a most pernicious moral defect, a detestable vice. If we desire to cure this sick man of his soul's disease, we must not begin to accustom him to the practice of generosity (as a physician would not content himself with prescribing to his patient mere cooling medicines, during the paroxysm of ardent fever, as sufficient to effect his cure); but we must lead him to be profuse, and to repeat his acts of profusion, until the grovelling propensity for avarice which dwells in his soul becomes totally dislodged, and the vacancy is about to be occupied by the opposite extreme, an aptitude for profusion. Then we teach him gradually to moderate his profusion, until it settles into generosity, which we direct him to watch with due care, so that he may not relapse into either of the extremes from which we have reclaimed him. If, on the contrary, profusion is his besetting evil, we must reclaim him by teaching him the practice of strict economy. But, in that case, we must not enforce a repetition of this practice until it is about to become avarice; and this deviation

from the rule we laid down before is founded on the certainty, that it is more easy for a man of profuse habits to moderate them into becoming generosity, than it is for the miser to elevate himself above his sordid vice. Thus, likewise, the apathetic man is more easily excited to moderate enjoyment or abstemiousness, than the ardently impassioned is restrained. It is, therefore, needful to let the latter practice restraint in a stronger degree than the excitement to which we subject the former. The coward requires frequent exposure to danger, in order to get rid of his defect; whereas the overbold does not require to have his daring curbed equally often in order to temper it into valour. The churl requires stimulants frequently repeated to render him good-natured; whereas a little reflection will teach the man who is of too easy a disposition to moderate it. This is the true and approved method and science of curing diseased souls—to teach men the observance of due moderation."

This work was originally written in Arabic; it was translated into Hebrew by S. Ibn Tibbon, and is now already translated into Latin, German, French, and English, and is highly appreciated by Hebrew and Arabic scholars.*

Next in order comes his work on "Happiness," being a treatise in two chapters, addressed, according to Rapaport, to his disciple Ibn Aknin. It was originally written in Arabic. Its Hebrew translation is, as yet, unknown, nor has the time of its composition been ascertained. It was first published at Salonica, 1567, by J. Arvivo; and then in Amst., 1765, by M. Tama.

Next comes his treatise on the "Unity." This was originally written in Arabic, and thence translated into Hebrew, by Rabbi Isaac ben Nathan. It has been recently edited and published for the first time, by M. Steinschneider, with a preface, by Rapaport. Berlin, 1846. It is a complete digest of what Maimonides has stated on this dogma in his work "Manusfortis."

Next comes his "Book of Existence." This is a medical and moral treatise. It was published at Salonica, 1596.

Next comes his "Book on the Calendar," written in Hebrew, and is still in manuscript, preserved in the royal library of Paris. Dr. Carmoly, however, who gives an account of this work, ex-

* C. C. Vythage, *Explicatio R. M. Maimonides Cordubensis super Patrum sive Seniorum Judæorum sententias, complectans octo capita, ubi præclara multo cum in theologia tum philosophia doctissimi explicantur.* Leyden, 1683.

J. Mantino, *Octo Capita R. Mosis Maimonidis, etc., in versione latina, etc.* Bologna, 1526.

Die 8 Einleitungskapitel des Maimonides, mit deutscher uebersetzung. Basil, 1804; Dessau, 1809; and Königsberg, 1832.

Le huit chapitres de Maimonide, etc., traduit en français. Paris, 1811; by M. Berr.

The eight chapters of Ethics, by Maimonides. H. R. London, 1840; by Rev. Dr. M. J. Raphall.

presses doubts as to whether Maimonides is the real author of it.

Next comes his treatise on the "Sanctification of the Name God." From this work, Dr. Carmoly has published some extracts in German. It was published in Hebrew, with annotations, by A. Geiger. Breslau, 1850.

Next comes his "Epistle to the South;" originally written in Arabic, and subsequently translated into Hebrew, by Rabbi N. Hamaarabi, under the title of "The Door of Hope;" and published at Amsterdam, 1660; also at Wilna, 1835, by J. Landon. This epistle was addressed to the Israelites inhabiting the countries of the south, in order to strengthen them in their faith, and to inspire them with fortitude under the religious persecutions to which they were then subject, and to caution them against the imposition of a pretended Messiah, who was then endeavouring to mislead the Israelites. The circumstance which called forth this epistle is thus related by himself: "Twenty-two years ago, a certain man arose in the south country, and stated that he was the messenger sent to prepare the way for the Messiah's coming. He further said, that the king Messiah would reveal himself in the south country. Upon this, many people, both Jews and Arabs assembled round about him, and with them he wandered about in the mountains, calling out, Come with me, and let us go out to meet the Messiah, for he has sent me to you to make even the path for him. Our brethren in the south country wrote to me a long letter, informing me of his manners and habits, and of the innovations introduced by him into the daily prayers, and of what he had told them. They further stated, that they had witnessed such and such of his miracles, and asked my opinion of him. I inferred from the letter that this unfortunate man was insane, without any learning, but still fearing God, and that what he said he had done was all a lie. Fearing for the Israelites there, I wrote an explicit epistle on the Messiah, his characteristics, and the signs of the times in which he is to appear, and warned them to caution the pretender, lest he perish, and the congregations with him. After a year, he was taken prisoner, and all his adherents fled from him. One of the kings of Arabia, who took him prisoner, said to him, 'What hast thou done?' Upon which he replied: 'My lord, or king, I speak the truth, for I have acted at the command of the Lord.' The king said, 'What proof hast thou?' He replied, 'Cut off my head, and I shall be restored to life, and be as before.' The king said, 'There is no stronger proof than this, and if it be so, I and the whole world will believe in you.' At the command of the king his head was cut off, and the Israelites, of many places, were heavily fined. There are still, however, many silly persons who say he will be restored to life, and rise from his grave."

There exists a Latin version of this epistle, under the title of "*Epistola Meridionalis*, lat. vers." Altenburg, 1679; by W. H. Vorst; also, a German version, "*Der Brief nach Teman*," Ff. a. M., 1700; and Berlin, 1711; by J. A. Eisenmenger.

Next comes his "*Epistle to the Learned of Marseilles*." This is an answer to questions put to him concerning certain persons, who, believing in astrology, wished to explain every thing by means of that pretended science, and concerning a certain Israelito who boasted to be the Messiah. It has been translated into Latin, by J. Buxtorf, and is to be found in his "*Institutio Epistolaris*." Also by J. J. Hallevi, under the title of "*Maimonidis Epistola de Astrologia*." Köln, 1855.

Next come his "*Treatise on the Resurrection of the Dead*." This was originally written in Arabic, and subsequently translated into Hebrew, by Rabbi S. ibn Tibbon. It has also been translated into Latin.

Next comes his "*General Epistles*." This is a most interesting collection of letters, addressed to him on various subjects, and his replies to the same. It appeared in Hebrew at Constantinople, 1522, and has been several times printed since then. Some of these letters were originally written in Arabic, manuscripts of which are still extant in the Bodleian. This collection is of great importance, containing, as it does, literary notices, and very interesting information as to the author, his contemporaries, and the views and movements of the age in which he lived. Besides this collection, there is another extant, entitled, "*Peer Haddon*." This contains two hundred and twenty-four sentiments of Maimonides. It was translated into Hebrew by M. Tama, from an Arabic manuscript, formerly in possession of Sasportas of Amsterdam, but now belonging to Dr. Geiger, of Breslau. The Hebrew version has been published at Amsterdam, in 1765.

Next come his medical works, viz.:

"*A Compendium of the Canon of Avicenna*." A beautiful Hebrew manuscript of this work is still preserved at the Dominican convent at Bologna. B. Montfauçon relates in his diary on Italy, that an Italian epistle, added at the end of this manuscript, states that Ferdinand I. had offered in vain two hundred gold pieces for this copy.

"*On Regimen of Health*." This treatise, originally written in Arabic, is an epistle addressed to the king of Egypt; and is also known under the given title. A manuscript in that language is still preserved in the Bodleian. It has been translated into Latin, by E. S. Kirschbaum, under the title of "*Maimonides Specimen Diæticum*." Berlin, 1822; and, into German, by D. Winternitz, under the title of "*Das diätetische Sendschreiben des Maimonides an den Sultan Saladin. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der*

Medizin für Aerzte und Freunde des klassischen Alterthums, mit kritischen und sacherläuternden Noten." Wien., 1843, 8vo.

"The Book of Cures." The manuscript of this work is still extant in the imperial library of Vienna.

"A Commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, according to the Doctrines of Galenus," in seven chapters. A Latin translation of this work, made from the Hebrew version of Rabbi M. ibn Tibbon, has been printed. The Hebrew manuscript, under the title of "Sepher al Rephuah," is still extant in the library of the Vatican.

"Garden of Health." This work treats of the animal and mineral productions of nature.

"Aphorisms of Medicine, extracted from Hippocrates, Galen, Al Razi, Eben Massoræ, and Alsuzi," with his own annotations. It consists of twenty-five chapters, and has been translated from the original Arabic into Hebrew, by N. Hamsati. It was translated into Latin, by H. Mercurialis, under the title of "Aphorismi R. Mosis Medici antiquissimi et celeberrimi, et Galeno, Medicorum Principe, collecti, etc." Bologna, 1489; Venice, 1497, and 1500. Mercurial asserts that the aphorisms of Maimonides are not inferior to those of Hippocrates.

Compendia from twenty-one books, viz.: sixteen from Galen, and five from the works of other authors. They are written in Arabic. Mons Munk brought portions of it to Paris, and rectified the mistake of the bibliographers, his predecessors, who mentioned only the compends from the sixteen books of Galen. Morejon asserts that "it is a most useful work, and merits the highest eulogium, by forming a methodical and learned extract and compendium of the clinical and hygeian spirit of the Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic works. It was a beneficial and glorious undertaking."

"A Treatise on the Hemorrhoides and their Treatment." It was originally written in Arabic, and translated into Hebrew, by Rabbi S. ibn Tibbon. Manuscripts of both the original and version are still preserved in the royal library of Paris.

"A Treatise on Poisons and Medicines which may cause Death;" written in Arabic. A Hebrew version of it made by R. ibn Tibbon, is still preserved in the royal library of Paris.

"Consultation on the Snoring of the Nose and Throat;" written in Arabic, and translated into Hebrew, by Rabbi S. ibn Tibbon. A manuscript of the Hebrew version is still extant in the royal library of Paris.

"A Treatise on Coïtus;" written in Arabic, and a Hebrew version of the same, exists both at Paris and in De Rossi's library at Parma.

"A Treatise on the Asthma, and the Remedies for Curing it;"

written in Arabic; it is translated into Hebrew, and is preserved in the royal library of Paris, and in De Rossi's library at Parma.

"An Exposition of Drugs;" an Arabic manuscript; being a complete Pharmacopeia. It is quoted by Ebn Abi Osaila.

"Consultation of Medicine;" composed for a prince of his age, who was a valetudinarian and a hypochondriac. A Hebrew version of it is preserved at Paris.

"Method of Curing those who have been bitten by Venomous Beasts, or have been Poisoned." This treatise was written at the request of the Sultan, and is quoted by D'Herbelot, under "*Moccalat al Hasliat*." It is translated into Hebrew, and manuscripts of it exist in the libraries of Paris and Parma.

"A Treatise on the Causes of Maladies;" written in Arabic, and a manuscript of it is still preserved in the Bodleian.

"A Treatise on the Podagra." A Spanish translation of this work exists at the Escorial.

Maimonides has also written poetry. Some of his Arabic poems are contained in the Anthology of Abu Bahr Szafwan ben Idris from Yaem.

It is said that he had transcribed, with his own hand, the Pentateuch, from a very correct copy, which had been preserved at Jerusalem, even before its destruction. It is also said that, being moved by the Spirit, he went to Chalon-sur-Saone, the ancient Cabillonum, and capital of Burgundy, where he understood he should find a copy of the law, written by the hand of Ezra; that he was not disappointed in his expectations; that he collated this copy with that at Jerusalem, and found that they perfectly agreed; and that he drew another by it, which he delivered to his disciples to transcribe, and spread abroad.

In delineating Maimonides's character, we feel much greater satisfaction in turning to his own works, and comparing the various incidents of his life therein recorded, with the descriptions given of him by Arabic writers, as also by Jewish admirers and detractors, than by listening to the voice of legendary tradition, which is ever busy in casting a halo round the life of illustrious men, and of adoring and stamping it with the impress of the marvellous.

Both friends and enemies acknowledge that Maimonides could well stand comparison with the best of men. He felt a singular attachment for his friends and disciples; and possessed and cherished within his heart, the most pure and genuine love for his wife and children. He loved all men without any religious distinction; and his heaven was fully open to superior merit and knowledge, whatever its creed, provided they had faith in God. He was not only a philanthropist in word, but he practised the principles of philanthropy in the fullest sense the term will admit. His views were both enlarged and benevolent; his intellect capacious, vigorous, and tenacious; and his fine and acute

mind exhibited a combination of powers of the rarest kind. This is fully evidenced in his numerous, profound, and original writings, which have greatly contributed to extend the horizon of Jewish learning and Jewish theology. Nevertheless, we do not find that the system introduced by this remarkable man has ultimately pervaded, to any great extent, the mass of Judaism, or even influenced the doctrines of its teachers.

Yet the "hearer and answerer of prayer" will, hereafter, open a medium of true light for His ancient and unforsaken people: the kinsmen of Jesus Christ, "according to the flesh," shall not be everlasting captives to the mendacious Talmud; the reproach shall yet be rolled away from the natural compatriots of our Apostles, those best of human benefactors; and the church of Israel, in her rejoicing, shall no more call upon the Lord as "Baali, but as Ishi." When that day shall dawn, it will be lamented the more that Moses bar Maimon, and his admirers, did not further exert that high privilege of their talents, to bless and to receive blessings in return.

The time of his death is variously assigned; some say he died in A. D. 1205, others, 1206, and others, 1208, at Cairo, universally looked up to during his lifetime, and regretted at his death by all the synagogues of Africa, Spain, and elsewhere. At Alexandria, and at Jerusalem, funeral orations were delivered, and public mourning assumed. According to Abulfaradge, before his death, Maimonides expressed a desire that his heirs should embalm his body, and inter it by the Lake of Tiberias, where many saints reposed. Rabbi S. Shalam is also of the same opinion. Accordingly, his corpse was carried to Tiberias, where it was interred, and a monument erected, the inscription of which forcibly eulogized his great merits, and celebrated his well-earned fame. His death was considered, both by the Israelites and the Egyptians, a national misfortune, and the year in which he died was called *Lamentum Lamentabile*.

ART. IV.—GROTE'S HISTORY OF GREECE.

History of Greece. By GEORGE GROTE, Esq. Reprinted from the London edition. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co, 17 and 19 Cornhill. Vols. 1–7. 1851. Vol. 8. 1852. New York: Harper & Brothers. Vols. 9–10. 1853. Vol. 11. 1855. Vol. 12.

THE earlier volumes of Mr. Grote's admirable history of Greece inaugurated a new era in the investigation of the career and development of the remarkable people who inhabited the ancient Hellas, and diffused the Hellenic culture with such brilliant success, that they are justly regarded as the chief progenitors of all subsequent civilization. The later volumes have fully sustained the sanguine anticipations excited by the preliminary chapters, and justified the flattering hopes expressed by Niebuhr, when informed of the meditated labours of Mr. Grote. Many years of expectation elapsed, after it was known that this new history of Greece had been undertaken, before the publication of the first two volumes; many more have since passed away during its slow composition—for the subject demanded minute and extensive research—and the successive volumes, multiplying and becoming more tumescent with the progress of the work, lingered along amid the interruptions occasioned by the contemporaneous agitations of Europe. Thus, this History has already become classical before an opportunity has been afforded of criticising it in its integrity; and the public verdict has been unhesitatingly pronounced in its favour, before we have ventured to pass in review its distinctive peculiarities, and the mode of their development. The work, however, is too remarkable in itself, and exhibits too important a phase of Hellenic history, for us to forego the examination, however tardy, of its merits and defects, or to waive the privilege of expressing our views in regard to the general execution of the great task accomplished by Mr. Grote.

The transition from Gillies to Grote is like exchanging the drivelling loquacity of imbecile old age for the quick intelligence and vigorous reflection of inquiring manhood. It is a change slowly and gradually effected. Mitford* and Thirlwall—each the contemporary of one of the extremes—mark the two main stages of this progress, which has been largely facilitated by the patient and conscientious researches of Clinton's "*Fasti Hellenici*." But the immense labours, the acute investigations, and the ever-recur-

* Mitford (1734–1827) was born and died before Gillies (1746–1836). He commenced his *History of Greece* earlier (1784–1810, 4 vols. 4to.), but finished it later than his rival (1786, 2 vols. 4to.)

ring doubts of the German scholars, have been the principal agents of the improvement, and must always be gratefully acknowledged in our thoughts, if it be not always convenient to express our obligations. Without their elaborate, and often excessive inquiries, such a picture of the life and development of the Greeks, as is presented by Mr. Grote, would have been an impossibility. This admission should mitigate our censures of the earlier historians when contrasting them with the latest. Nor is the credit slight which is due to Mitford, notwithstanding his violent antipathies and his passionate perversions. His temper, his prejudices, his associations, and his narrow political predilections, betrayed him constantly into error, often into grievous misrepresentation. But he wrote his *History of Greece* with spirit, and with the ever-present feeling that what he described had once been a reality, and not a silly nursery tale; that the personages and events evoked from the ashes of the past had once been endued with life or achieved by living actors; and that the triumphs, the disasters, the successes, and the follies of the Greeks had been inspired by the common passions of mankind, and influenced by accidents similar in kind, if not in form, to those by which modern nations continue to be affected. We owe much to Mitford for having treated the annals of Greece as a bygone reality, and not as an antiquated romance. No one, however, who regarded the union of king, lords, and commons, and the predominance of a high Tory interpretation of the prerogative and the constitution, as the universal canon of political propriety, could competently enter into the feelings of the Greek democracies, divine their motives, or appreciate their measures. It was much for him to recognize that they possessed feelings, and were occasionally guided in their policy by intelligent impulses. The people are guilty of crimes and follies, but princes and nobles are neither more innocent nor more prudent;* and it is only the ignorance of political bigotry which can venture on a crusade against all the actions of a democracy.

It was not merely in political philosophy that Mitford was a sciolist; his learning was in other respects insufficient for the duties assumed. It was adequate neither in extent nor in accuracy. A writer, so uncritical in regard to his authorities, so inattentive to the scattered notices, composed in widely separated

* "Conchiudo adunque contro alla comune opinione, la qual dice come i popoli, quando sono principi, sono varii, mutabili, ingrati, affermando che in loro non sono altrimenti questi peccati che si siano nei principi particolari." * * *. "Se si discorreranno tutti i disordini de' popoli, tutti i disordini de' principi, tutte le glorie dei popoli, tutte quelle de' principi, si vedrà il popolo di bontà e di gloria essere di lunga superiore." Machiaveli, *De' Discorsi sopra Tito Livio*, lib. i, cap. lviii. We notice with pleasure Mr. Grote's frequent recourse to the political wisdom of the great Florentine.

ages, which have been preserved as the frail and scanty relics of lost historians, was not calculated to reproduce in a symmetrical, homogeneous, and natural delineation, the dissevered members of Greek history, which, during many generations, exists only in fragments. The scholarship, the anatomical skill, the synthetic divination of Niebuhr, were required. Should we not add also the poetic feeling of Arnold, and the æsthetic taste of Thierry? To none of these qualifications had Mitford the slightest pretensions. He was a scholar without accuracy or profundity; he was an acrimonious political partisan without statesmanship or philosophy. His work is no longer of use; it has rendered its full service; it led the way in producing a more sympathetic, in provoking a juster appreciation of the Greeks; and there its vocation ends.

Thirlwall has learning in abundance, and is strictly conscientious in its employment. He is familiar with German erudition, and has availed himself of its discoveries. There is no deficiency in these respects. He is thorough in his researches, and cautious in his statements. Having translated, in connection with his friend, Archdeacon Hare, Niebuhr's History of Rome, he had been initiated into the mysteries of the historical speculation of the Germans. During his collegiate career he had been the most distinguished scholar of Cambridge; and the studies of maturer years had continued to augment the stores of his information. He thus approached the execution of his task with qualifications and advantages far transcending those of Mitford; and his employment of those advantages was so successful, that his work at once became a standard authority, and threw the labours of his predecessors completely into the shade. Nor has it been altogether deprived of its honourable position by the later publication of Grote, for it has merited the eulogy of the later historian,* and has advanced to a second edition contemporaneously with the appearance of the History of Greece which has furnished the occasion for these remarks.

But Connop Thirlwall is one of the mitred dignitaries of the Anglican Church; and, in accordance with his vocation, he is timorous where he should be bold, lukewarm where he should be earnest, wavering in his political philosophy, and inclined to ingenious compromises in his historical views. He has daintily imitated the procedure of Niebuhr, without being inspired by his spirit, or infected by his audacity, which is an important qualification of an historical innovator. Moreover, the animating spirit, the plastic energy, which moulded the thoughts and regulated the actions of the ancient Greeks, escapes recognition; and the elabo-

* Grote. Preface, vol. i, p. iii, iv.

rate work of Thirlwall, notwithstanding its learning, its fulness, and its honesty, is dull and tedious, and inadequate as a representation of the evolution of Greek civilization. Nor is this the sole objection. The harmony of Greek life is undetected; and the actions of the Greeks are thus left without satisfactory explanation, or are represented in a questionable, and frequently in an erroneous manner.

To a large class of readers, too listless to engage voluntarily in the ponderation of conflicting evidences and arguments, too indifferent to attach themselves to any of the antagonist parties in former ages, too apprehensive of the danger of decided opinions, Thirlwall will still offer the most acceptable history of Greece. He presents all the important facts, arranged in orderly and intelligible sequence; he is critical, without being exigently acute; he is a mild antidote to Mitford; he is never betrayed into extreme opinions, whether in regard to the mysterious Pelasgi, or to the measures of politicians. It is not possible to fix upon him the imputation of either Philo-Laconism or Philo-demism. '*Medio tutissimus ibis*,' is his motto; and it is a device which in these days will attract shoals of followers in any branch of inquiry. Admirable as this prescription may have been as a caution to Phaëthon in driving the horses of the sun, it is not the surest path to truth in estimating the motives and policy of the contending factions which struggled for supremacy in the Greek cities, or in determining the historical enigmas connected with ancient Greece. Without a decided choice, it is impossible to establish any communion of feeling with the actors in the great drama of Greece, in which every change was intimately connected with intense personal action and virulent personal opposition, and in which the remarkable unity of popular sentiments produced the closest interdependence between all questions, mythological or political; antiquarian, religious, legendary, literary, or philosophical. In studying the chronicles of such a people, there is no prospect of approximating to a just judgment by endeavouring to discover a compromise between dissenting tenets, and by seeking a steady footing at the imaginary centre of an oscillating equilibrium. Yet this is, in great measure, the course pursued by Thirlwall, and approved by those who are content with his delineations. Such labours obviously invite further competition.

In a classical, or even satisfactory history of Greece, the nineteenth century should require such an exhibition of the successive and varying phenomena, as would enable us to comprehend clearly and sympathetically the whole process of Greek civilization. The origin of the race and of its institutions, may be hopelessly concealed in the darkness of unrecorded time—for every nation passes through a long twilight and a gradual dawn, of which no accurate traditions are preserved—but, after the simple

acceptance of the earliest facts of their history, the further development of the people should be represented in such a manner that we may perceive how every separate change was generated by, or, at least, in strict accordance with, the previous phases of their fortune, and the concomitant influences of their genius and position. The actions, and the social changes, which modified the career of the separate nationalities composing the Hellenic aggregate, should be presented as the results of the general laws of historical progress, transpiring under certain definite conditions; and the history of Greece should exhibit the regular sequence and evolution of natural effects from recognized laws. It is only recently that history has attempted to assume this scientific form. Mr. Grote is entitled to the credit of being the first to treat the history of Greece in accordance with these elevated considerations; and to this mode of contemplating the ages and race described, he is largely indebted for the fulness, verisimilitude, and sagacity of his delineations.

The Positive Philosophy of Comte has won the admiration, and has secured, we have reason to believe, the adhesion of Mr. Grote. We continually discern in his pages the spirit, and sometimes the peculiar views of Positivism. Whatever objections may be justly entertained to that scheme of speculation as a complete and exclusive interpretation of the mysteries of the universe, its distinguished author has given eminent aid to the due appreciation of social problems and historical phenomena, by analysing the processes of human evolution, and insisting on the necessity of recognizing the regular operation of uniform laws in the successions of national change. If, at times, Mr. Grote yields to the infection of M. Comte's philosophical and theological heresies, and espouses opinions more consonant with their special aim than with the acknowledgment of the Divine government, the general effect of his inclination to Positivism has been to enable him to expound the movement of Greek civilization with a coherence, harmony, and perspicacity entirely foreign to the labours of his predecessors, and competent to redeem from tedium his awkward style, his constant neoterisms, his Hellenic and Teutonic involutions of expression, and his endless dissertations. His work bristles throughout with heresies of all sorts—heresies philosophical, heresies theological, heresies political, heresies historical, heresies philological, heresies æsthetical, heresies literary, and heresies biographical; but it is essentially a true portraiture of the Greek people, their feelings, motives, and achievements, and it presents the incidents of their history in an intelligible and luminous concatenation. The soil, the climate, and the seed being given, the history of Greece grows under Mr. Grote's pen like a self-expanding, self-determining organism. This is a triumph, not

merely different from anything accomplished by any of his predecessors, but very far superior to anything they have imagined.

Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα :

"The song descends from Jove." An elaborate exposition of the early theology and legendary story of Greece, forms a grand and appropriate introduction to the main history of the Greeks. This occupies the whole of the first, and nearly half of the second volume, and includes a careful examination of the Homeric question.* It may be too long, too minute, perhaps too intricate and confused ; but, whatever its offences in these respects may be, and they could scarcely have been altogether avoided, it is a fitting vestibule to the temple.

ἀρχομένου δ' ἔργου πρόσωπον
χρὴ θέμεν τηλαυγές.†

But it is not simply as an ornament that it is admirable ; it is useful also as an introduction. It inspires those emotions, sympathies, and associations, which are an indispensable preparation to the intelligent appreciation of the ancient Greeks. The intimate communion of the mythological and heroic legends of Greece, with the actions, the feelings, the literature, the art, the domestic and the public life of the Greeks, had been either insufficiently apprehended or imperfectly indicated by former inquirers. A real service is rendered by placing us in the position, and by the cradle of the Hellenic race, by recording the tales familiar to its infancy, and less tenaciously accredited in its riper years, and by infusing into our minds the delusive fancies and the superstitious imaginations which attended and coloured its career. We are thus put in sympathetic relation with the sentiments of the old and wondrous Hellenes : we are subjected to the breath of the same inspiration which rested in its plenitude upon them ; we are initiated into the same creed, and made participants in the same mysteries which governed their development ; and we are rendered sensitive to the operation of the long-forgotten influences which impelled their hopes, their fears, and their endeavours.

The incessant and often undistinguishable communion of things, human and divine, constituted the rarefied atmosphere in which

* Grote, Hist. Greece, pt. i, chap. xxi, vol. ii, pp. 118-229. We are disposed to assent to the views of Grote in regard to the authorship of the Iliad and Odyssey. They are discreet and moderate, and accord with the conclusions of Fauriel. Mure's voluminous criticism (Crit. Hist. Lit. Greece, b. ii, chap. ii-xviii, vol. i, p. 176 ; vol. ii, p. 247) is inapposite, and defaced with continual fallacies, though marked by patient diligence.

† Pindar, Olymp. vi, vv. 3-4, ed. Bergkh.

an ancient Greek habitually breathed.* Pantheism and Panhylism were not more characteristic of the Eleatic and Ionic schemes of philosophy than the combination of divinity and humanity was of the popular faith. It is impossible to separate these elements by any logical or philosophical device; no alchemy can overcome their mutual affinities, or precipitate the one without precipitating the other also. Hence, if the divine ingredient, albeit a vain poetic imagination, be at any time withdrawn in our interpretations, or obscured in our apprehensions, the motives and impulses by which the race was guided cease to be intelligible. The Greeks lived in frequent familiarity with their gods; their divinities attended them on their streets, accompanied them in their shady walks, visited them by day and by night, and aided or resisted their enterprises. Every breeze wafted a voice from heaven; every meteorological change imported a divine message; every convulsion of nature—and they were numerous and grand, especially in the earlier periods of their history†—revealed the physical intervention of a personal God. The streams were tenanted by divine shapes; the mountains were sacred as the habitual dwelling-place of gods; the seas were filled with naiads and attendants on the rulers of the great deep: the rustling leaves trembled with the whispers of Pan, or were brushed aside by Artemis and her hunting train; the separate trees of the forest sheltered celestial creatures within their rugged barks, like Tasso's enchanted woods. Supreme over all were the Olympic immortals, who condescended to mix and converse with men, and with the daughters of men; and whose progeny was more numerous than the natives of the skies.

In the middle of the fifth century before Christ, Pindar enounced the popular creed, when he exclaimed,‡

Ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς ἡ πνέομεν
ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι.

As late as the tenth century after Christ, the Venetian scholiast

* Μεσται δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἄγυιαι,
πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί· μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα,
καὶ λιμενες· πάντη δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες·
τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἑσμέν.

Arati. Phenomena, vv. 2–5. The last hemistich is quoted by St. Paul, Acts xvii 28. The popular belief is latent under the Platonic expression.

† Wachsmuth, Hist. Ant. Greece, § i, vol. i, pp. 1–4. Thirlwall, Hist. Greece, c. i, vol. i, pp. 34–42. Hermann, Pol. Ant. Greece, c. i, § 6, note 2, p. 13. Pindar, Olymp. vii, vv. 55–63, ed. Bergkh. Aristoph. Acharn. vv. 481–5, et Comm. ad loc. Thucyd. I, xliii, cxxviii; III, lxxxix. Ovid, Metamorph. xv, 296. Procopius, De Bello Gothico, iv, xxv, vol. ii, p. 594–5. Humboldt, Aspects of Nature, p. 216; pp. 262–6, ed. Bohn.

‡ Pindar, Nem. vi, vv. 1–2, ed. Bergkh, who dates its composition about A. D. 460 (Ol. lxxx); cf. Hesiod, Op. et Dies, i, v. 108. Orphica, ap. Clem. Alexandr. Cohort. ad Gentes, c. vii. Thucyd. v, cv.

on the *Iliad* revealed the traces of the same persistent belief.* The Greeks claimed to be the children of the gods. In their estimation, their lineage ascended to Jove, or to the brothers of Jove. Every subdivision of the Hellenic name, and every illustrious family, traced back its pedigree to some hero who was recognized as the offspring of celestial blood.† We reject the principal means of explaining the loftiest triumphs of Greek genius, and the noblest achievements of Greek gallantry, if we exclude from contemplation the heroic ancestry, and the incumbent divinities in whom they believed, and whom they emulated and enthusiastically loved, in consequence of their peculiar belief. Lifeless, indeed, are the rhapsodies of Homer, and the masterpieces of Attic tragedy, and of lyric song, if the celestial personages introduced are regarded as a conscious poetic fiction, and not as an earnest superstition. Ridiculous is the veneration anciently accorded to the Homeric poems, and absurd the influence ascribed, and ascribed with truth, to them, if they are not welcomed as the record of the actions of gods and demigods. Homer was the Greek Bible. Greek society was erected on the basis of Homer,‡ as distinctly, if not as consciously and conscientiously, as the Jewish polity was raised on the sacred substratum of the Pentateuch. This is utterly incomprehensible, and its allegation is almost reprehensible, unless we enter into the feelings which inspired, sustained, and welcomed the ancient mythology of Greece.

In the decay of heathenism, when the temples of the former occupants of Olympus were deserted by their votaries, or closed against them; when the effete dreams of Paganism were cherished by its forlorn adherents with the pertinacity of blind superstition, the anger of the offended gods was still recognized in the portents and miseries which attended the decline of the Roman empire, and the establishment of Christianity. The auguries and the lamentations of Zosimus, Lymmachus, and their pagan contemporaries, are utterly imbecile and inexplicable, unless we are previously familiarized with the daily faith of the Greeks in the legends of their mythology. As we ascend the stream of time, and depart further from the expiring embers of the superannuated religion, its connection with the career of its believers becomes more intimate and more influential. "I venture to forewarn the reader," justly says Mr. Grote,§ "that there will occur numerous circumstances in the after political life of the Greeks, which he will not comprehend unless he be initiated into the course of their legendary associations." Zeus, Poseidon, and Demeter were in-

* Schol. Venet. ad *Il.* i, v. 222, cited by Heyne.

† Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. i, ch. xvi, vol. i, pp. 446-450.

‡ Vide Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. i, ch. xx, vol. ii, pp. 57-118.

§ Grote, *Hist. Greece*, vol. i, p. 11, preface.

voked by the Heliasts, in the oath taken by the juries contemporary with Demosthenes.* The Athenian orators are full of references to the mythical tales of the land; and they employ them, not as graceful ornaments of their artificial periods, but as allegations of fact, and most irrefragable arguments.† Would they, with their consummate and self-conscious art, have pursued this course, if these traditions had not retained their hold on the feelings and convictions of their audience, or had ceased to be operative upon their conduct?

The mythological introduction was a necessary prelude to the satisfactory recomposition of the annals of Greece; and, if it is overloaded with erudition and dissertation—the habitual error of Grote—this blemish may be imputed to his predecessors, who have either treated the topic with too much neglect, or dis severed it from its natural connections. The history of all original nations commences with a line of gods and demigods; every primitive people has boasted of its own saturnian reign, though none of such a brilliant dream as gilded the advent of the Greeks. We refuse the instructions of history, and cramp the proportions of ancient story to the proportions of a prosaic age, when we ignore Osiris, and Baal, and Brahma, and Jupiter, and commence our studies with the definite realities of a later age, when the wild fictions of the olden time were still, but less cordially, believed,‡ though we, in our narrow wisdom, would discard them altogether from our contemplation.

Though Mr. Grote is the most critical and incredulous of the historians of Greece, he is guiltless of such delusive scepticism. History slowly emerges from mythology, and long retains the vestiges of its pristine condition. Grote inaugurates his subject with the primitive convictions and sentiments of the people he describes, and ushers in the history of Hellas, as it revealed itself in the realities of Hellas, with its mythological system. In this able summary of the most attractive fancies that ever adorned a false creed, or shed a poetic glow over the vagaries of human aberration, there is no bald repetition of the customary contents of the Greek Pantheon, but a skilful reàrrangement and amplification of the chief results of modern investigation. We miss any congenial appreciation of the poetic imaginations which constitute the

* Demosth. c. Timocratem, c. xxxvi, vol. vii, p. 322–3, ed. Dobson. Vide S. Petit, Legg. Att., lib. iv, Tit. i, p. 397.

† Vide præsertim, Lycurgi Orat. c. Leocratem, which is rendered wearisome by such references.

‡ The infidelity of Greece, of which Euripides became the poetical mouthpiece (v. Bellerophon, Fr. x, ed. Didot) was introduced by the sophists, and never extended beyond the circles of the philosophers. The Mainotes of Mount Taygetus remained pagans till the end of the ninth century. Const. Porphyrog. De Adm. Imp. c. L, vol. iii, p. 224, ed. Bourn.

phantasmagoria. The old ideals rekindle no responsive flame, height answering to height with fire, like the beacons that announced the homeward return of Agamemnon. The task is admirably executed; but it is performed with the impassive sobriety of a Positive philosopher, not with the enthusiasm of an historical artist. The laborious assiduity of the German scholars had collected, collated, analysed, sifted, and coördinated the scattered indications of the general and local creeds of Greece. The abundant fruits of their inquiries have been conscientiously employed in preparing a connected view of the mythical traditions of the country. There is, however, no servile adherence to authorities, distinguished or obscure; but a bold deduction of novel inferences from the scrupulous examination of the original texts and the modern commentaries. It is an harmonious, and, so far as the fragmentary character of the materials will permit, a connected picture; not lumping together the anomalous and incongruous characteristics of diverse ages and localities, but tracing the growth and development of Greek theology, and following the dissemination of a rite, a doctrine, or an object of worship, from the original place of its limited acceptance to the period and mode of its general adoption. The changes and expansions of particular creeds—the gradual approximation to a national belief, purely Hellenic, and distinct from either earlier or later forms of Polytheism—the introduction of new deities, ceremonies, and mysteries—the influence of foreign ideas on the Hellenic worship, and consequently on Hellenic literature and life—the revolutions of religion even in the pre-historic ages, illustrate the developments and mutations in later periods. Singular acuteness and most diligent fidelity are displayed in the collection of loose indications from the remnants of the early poetry, and in the separation of scraps of valuable information from the chaff of the fragments of the Greek logographers. With these broken straws, Mr. Grote repairs the gaps in former narrations, corrects error, and combines his other materials into a rational and orderly system. There is great ingenuity, as well as a most extraordinary facility of recollection, in the prompt manner in which the mythological statements of the earlier volumes are continually adduced to explain historical incidents in the later chapters.

The view of the theology and legendary antiquities of Greece, entertained by Mr. Grote, is novel in English literature, and is applied by him to a novel extent in historical speculation. The eminent success of the experiment evinces the presence of considerable merits, if not of entire propriety. He has adapted to the primitive Hellenic annals the process so notoriously applied by Strauss to the gospels, and to the biography of our Saviour. His Positive predilections might have suggested this attempt; for there is a strong affinity between Strauss and Comte. This peculiar

mode of contemplating the remote ages of nations, has been designated the mythical. It possesses numerous characteristic advantages. It preserves distinct and intact the legends themselves; it recognizes the lively credence reposed in them; and, without authenticating any thing but the fact and character of the belief, it avoids the cumbrous, awkward, and artificial affectations of the allegorical schemes of interpretation, brought into vogue by Euemerus and his precursors, and fruitlessly favoured by the perverse ingenuity of modern scholars.* If the fables of the olden time be once recognized as susceptible of a rational explanation, we lose sight entirely of the frame of mind and the habits of thought attending their original reception. The life of the pristine age resides in their poetic instincts, and in the poetic fancies habitually cherished as real truths. They had no experience—no precise and recorded facts for their guidance. Reason, which feeds upon experience, and is trained by cautious comparison, was as yet denied to them. “Youth pastures in a valley of its own.”† This is as true of nations as of individuals. They have only the spontaneous inspiration of the ideal faculty to shape flexible traditions into dreams, and thereby govern the actions of their infancy. If we deny to them an unquestioning faith in these imaginations, we paralyse their energies, and enshroud their world in a complete eclipse. The substance and the poetry of their creed are destroyed by the attempt to extract, by the subtle but deceitful alchemy of conjecture, any concealed reality from that whose sole reality consists in its poetry and its belief. In these cases, the fiction is the history. It may hang before our tantalized vision like a curtain before a picture; but, as in the rivalry of Zeuxis and Parrhasius, the curtain is itself the picture—there is no other painting behind it.‡ The “*linteum pictum*” is all: nothing apprehensible lies behind the veil of Isis. These fictions are the earliest discoverable traditions of Greece: the obscurity of the silent time before them precludes us from penetrating, or hoping to penetrate, to their origin and gradual conception. Like the glittering spiculæ shooting through the liquid menstruum in the process of crystallization, they first reveal themselves in a crystallized form, and announce that the chief operation of the plastic force has been already exercised, though it has escaped our cognizance for ever. All that we can know, or should desire to know, on the subject of these myths, is, what were the fables accredited, how were they received, what modifications did they undergo, what emotions,

* Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. i, chap. xvi–xvii, vol. i, pp. 340–489, admirably explains and illustrates the character and necessity of the mythical habit of mind. It is a long digression, but not without its use.

† Bulwer's version of Soph. *Trachm.*, v. 144.

‡ Plin., *Nat. Hist.*, lib. xxxv, cap. x, § 65, ed. Sillig.

and what actions did they inspire. We wander from the path of judicious inquiry, if we refuse to entertain these questions, or pursue the evanescent shadows of their possible meaning.*

From the mythology of the Greeks Mr. Grote descends to the consideration of their land and tribes. He furnishes a minute and accurate delineation of the country which was their first and principal historical abode; and this is succeeded by a still more extended investigation of the subdivisions of the race. It is a peculiarity of his History, meritorious in one aspect, objectionable in another, that it exhausts every topic it touches. The treatment is always thorough. He handles all the obvious, and many recondite points, with a patient perseverance, with a pertinacious argumentation, which scarcely leaves anything unexplained. Whether an unsettled date, a disputed event, a questionable policy, a dubious character, a philosophical fashion, a topographical difficulty, an unusual locution, or an obscure passage in Thucydides, Xenophon, or Demosthenes, engages his attention, he never lets it escape from his grasp, till he has pressed out of it all the information it may contain, and impressed on the mind of his reader all the views and the exact views it suggests to himself, or has suggested to others. The learning of all ages and countries is showered down upon us, till we bend beneath the pitiless storm. Authority is piled upon authority, statement is contrasted with statement, argument is added to argument with diligent iteration, and illustration is appended to illustration, till we yield to his convictions and the evidences adduced in their support, and are worn out with their urgent presentation. Let us not complain; such cause of complaint is too unusual to justify murmuring.

Nowhere is this amplitude of treatment more welcome, or less obnoxious to reprehension, than in regard to the land of Greece—the ancestral home of the Hellenes, the cradle of their civilization. The Hellenic domain embraced a much wider range. Like the German's fatherland, it extended wherever the tongue of Greece was spoken, wherever the gods of Greece were adored.

Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?

So nenne endlich mir das Land!

“So weit die deutsche Zunge klingt,
Und Gott im Himmel Lieder singt!”

The designation of Hellas, in its customary acceptance, signified

* Even Strabo, though still inspired by the old Hellenic influences, perceived that many mythological statements would bear neither examination nor Euemeristic interpretation. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ μὴ ὄντα λέγουσιν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι συγγραφῆς, συντεθραμμένοι τῷ ψεύδει διὰ τῆς μυθογραφίας. Lib. viii, cap. iii. Observe the pointed felicity of his expression. The views of Strabo are acutely exhibited by Grote.

not a definite tract of country, but the country of the Hellenes,* including the coasts of Asia Minor, the islands of the Ægean and the eastern part of the Mediterranean, the Cyrenaic settlements in Africa, part of Sicily, Southern Italy, Marseilles and its neighbourhood, and reaching along the shores of the Euxine to the mouths of the Volga. Hellenic, in antiquity, like Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon in later times, was a term of very latitudinarian import. Pindar ranks the Greek colonies in Sicily with the cities of Greece, and appropriately speaks in the same breath of Himera, Salamis, and Plataea.† The usage arose early, and continued late, for Ovid writes from his place of exile, at Tomi:‡

Hic quoque sunt igitur Graiæ (quis crederet ?) urbes,
Inter inhumanæ nomina barbariæ.

It is necessary to take into consideration this wider application of the Hellenic name, which justifies Mr. Grote's careful and copious descriptions of the outlying members of the Hellenic aggregate; for to them belongs, especially in commerce, enterprise, philosophy, literature, and art, much of the glory of the race. But though Hellas embraced so great an extent and diversity of country, the original, or continuous Hellas, possesses a peculiar and more lively interest as the early home of the people. The characteristics of their primitive abode impressed themselves on the subsequent development of the whole population, and were reflected in their manners and institutions. The genial but various climate of Greece; its rugged mountains and broken surface; its narrow valleys and winter torrents; its difficult defiles; its caverns, and its frequent *catabothra*; its isolated limestone hills, furnished every town with a strong position for its acropolis; its earthquakes, mephitic exhalations, and other subterranean phenomena, exercised a potent influence in determining the superstitions, the social and political organization, and the pursuits of the Greeks. To these peculiarities must be added its extensive and sinuous coast, its promontories, headlands, reëntering bays, and numberless, though often insecure havens, which have tempted the people in all ages to engage in maritime, and usually in piratical pursuits.¶ Hence, a minute topographical delineation of *Hellas Hellenica* (if we may thus convert a generic into a specific designation), is of essential service to the due comprehension of

* Thirlwall, Hist. Greece, vol. i, p. 34. This peculiarity is forcibly presented by Grote.

† Pindar, Pythia. I, vv. 73-80, ed. Bergkh.

‡ Ovid, Tristia, III, eleg. ix, vv. i-iv.

¶ Compare the introductory chapters of Thucydides with the account given in Finlay's Mediæval Greece.

the history of Greece. The jealous claim of autonomy or political independence, displayed by the pettiest cities, and abused by Sparta at all times, and preëminently in the infamous treaty of Antalcidas, was due to the scanty limits and segregated position of the sea-girt and mountain-locked valleys, in which every city and almost every village was confined. To the same cause may also be ascribed in great measure, the amazing disproportion between the populations of the Greek States, and the heroism and fame of their exploits. South of Thessaly there was no field of battle broad enough for the operation of large armies. The face of the country was so furrowed by mountain chains and ridges, difficult defiles, and deep ravines, that a numerous army was crowded together so as to become helpless, or dismembered so as to prevent any reciprocity of support between its different parts. The plain of Marathon is only six miles long, and varies in width from one and a half to two miles. It is divided into two parts by the river Charadrus, and is enclosed on all sides.

"The mountains look on Marathon,
And Marathon looks on the sea."

In front is the bay, while abrupt hills, the spurs of Parnes and Pentelicus, defend the rear, and bend at the extremities to the sea. The plain is still further contracted by extensive marshes on the right and left, which are dry during the heat of summer, but must have been rendered by the rains impassible for cavalry when the battle took place in September, A. C. 490.* It was on the broken ridges of Cithæron that the Greeks encamped, and from them that they descended to defeat Mardonius on the field of Plataea. Northwards, a smooth road over a level plain led to Thebes, ten miles distant;† but southwards rose the unassailable heights of Cithæron, which protected the rear and the flanks of the Greeks. The neighbourhood of Scolus, too, where Mardonius formed his camp of refuge, was so rugged as to occasion the proverb :

Εἰς Σκῶλον μὴτ' αὐτὸς ἴμεν, μὴτ' ἄλλω ἐπεσθαι.‡

These examples are cited as brief illustrations of the absolute

* Wordsworth, *Greece Pict. Hist. and Descriptive*, pp. 108-113; Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. II, ch. xxxvi, vol. IV, pp. 346-8. The legends of the battle field reported by Pausanias, (*Attica*, p. 31, l. 21, ed Sylburg.) show how completely Greek mythology and Greek heroism were intermingled. The spectral armies which continued to haunt the plain, and the spectral horses neighing around the tomb of Miltiades, may have suggested to Zedlitz "*Die Nächtliche Heerschau*."

† 'Οδὸς λεία πάντα καὶ ἐπίπεδος. Dicæarch. *Messen.*, *De Græciæ Urbibus*, § 12. *Fragm. Hist. Gr.*, vol. ii, p. 258.

‡ . . . δυσόικητος τόπος καὶ τραχὺς, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ παροιμία, κ. τ. λ. Strabo, lib. ix, cap. ii.

necessity of a minute acquaintance with the topography of Greece in order to appreciate the incidents and character of its history. We place a high estimate upon Mr. Grote's careful delineation of the physical aspect of the country. In this labour he has had many distinguished predecessors, Heeren, Wachsmuth, Thirlwall, Wordsworth, and numerous others. He surpasses them all in precision, perspicuity, suggestiveness, and compactness; though he possesses neither the topographical instinct of Arnold, nor the topographical fancy of Wordsworth. But he is faithful and diligent, and supplies an instinctive representation of the anatomy, physiology, and physiognomy of ancient Hellas; and, when the occasion requires, of the countries colonized or traversed by the Greeks.

If mythology was one of the parents of history, geography was the other. The logographers and topographers were the precursors of the Greek historians. The fragments of Hecataeus, Charon of Lampsacus, and Xanthus, show how much of their attention was given to topographical details. Herodotus occupies himself with physical and geographical details as much as with historical incidents; but the practice of the father of history was abandoned by the political Thucydides, and has been only recently revived to any considerable extent. Mr. Grote is most assiduous in writing the description of countries and localities with the notice of their inhabitants, and of the record of the actions witnessed by them. He pursues his geographical investigations so zealously as sometimes to subordinate the main functions of history to its accessories. The central idea of the work is never forgotten; but it is often obscured by the facility with which he yields to the temptation of dilating upon the geography and early annals of the Egyptians, Phœnicians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes, Persians, and Scythians. His chapter on Cyrene is the ancient history of Northern Africa. He may have been betrayed into this error by too close adherence to his teacher, Comte, who properly insists upon the duty of historical speculation to study the medium, the external influences, by which social evolutions are affected.

The descriptions of countries, states, and populations, occupy the latter half of the second volume, extend through the third, and recur in the fourth and some of the subsequent volumes. In these delineations is included everything of immediate interest, connected with the separate Greek nationalities, during those ages of obscurity, which do not enter into the consecutive annals of Greece. The government of Pisistratus at Athens, says Clinton,* "is marked as being the first date in Grecian history from which

* *Fasti Hellenici*. Introduction. vol. II, p. 1.

an unbroken series of dates can be deduced in regular succession." Clinton cannot be accused of bringing down too low the commencement of authentic history; he is constantly assailed by Mr. Grote for the opposite tendency. The regular chronology of Greece may descend from the usurpation of Pisistratus, but it was scarcely before the establishment of democracy by Clisthenes, or even before the battle of Marathon, that the authoritative history of Greece began. The long previous ages had not been passed in torpor, but in silence; and they were buried in loose traditions more bewildering than silence:

Omnes illacrymabiles
Urgentur ignotique longa
Nocte, carent quia vate sacro.†

These unknown, or dimly known generations, of which no trustworthy record has been preserved, were full of life and activity. It was a period of rapid growth and vigorous development; it contained the promise, and nursed the energies of the future. It combined the elements of Greek civilization, fashioned them into shape, and rendered the name of Greek a national designation.† It spread the colonies and the arts of Greece along the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Euxine. It created the wealth, the commerce, the numbers, the spirit, the laws, and the institutions of the Hellenic race; and it is probable that the resources, the enterprises, and the capabilities of that race, were never as great as before their reliable history began, until their nationality was extinguished, or transformed and extended, by the Macedonian conquest. The burning of Sardis and the complete subjugation of Ionia, constitute the opening scene of the authentic and continuous history of Greece.‡ By that blow the wealthier and more brilliant half of the Greek family of cities was crushed. All that goes before, eventuating in the prosperity thus overthrown, in the strength and energy capable of repelling a similar fate from the mainland of Greece when threatened by the Persian hosts, and from Sicily, when simultaneously invaded by the Carthaginians, belongs to the uncertain and fragmentary traditions of the pre-historic age.

These traditions Mr. Grote has collected and criticized in the careful notices of the early condition of the several Greek populations. He has distinguished between the fictitious and the

* Hor., iv od. ix, 26-8. A Latin panegyrist ascribes even the fame of Greece to the eloquence of her authors. Mamertini Grat. Actio, c. viii, § 1, vide Amtzen; ad loc. The remark may have been suggested by Sallust. Cat. c. iii.

† Antiphanis Antæus, Fragm. Com. Græc, vol. III, p. 17, Ed. Menicke.

‡ . . . ἀρχὴ κακῶν . . . Ἑλλήσι τε καὶ βαρβάροις. Herod., v, xcvi.

plausible, between the plausible and the true, marking the approximation to credibility as we descend to the later time. The Messenian wars, the institution of the Olympic and the other national games,* the growth of national sentiments, the progress of Greek colonization, the rise of Greek commerce, the legislation of Lycurgus, Solon, and the Italic law-givers; the Amphictyonic Council, the first sacred war, the tyrants, the seven wise men, and the germs of Greek philosophy, the successful cultivation of lyric poetry and music, the introduction of weights, measures, and coined money, all belong to this important period, and are all discussed with signal ability, and his habitual exuberance, by Mr. Grote. All that can be done by critical acumen, combined with copious learning, large historical information, and political experience, is happily achieved; and we may at length compare the scanty array of authentic facts previous to the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ, with the attractive but bewildering display of uncertain or imaginary events. The criticism of Pindar on the miraculous legend of Pelops and his ivory arm, is singularly appropriate to the earlier chapters of Greek history:

ἡ θαυματὰ πολλὰ, καὶ πού τι καὶ βροτῶν φρένας ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον
δεδαϊδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.*

In noticing a work so voluminous, and so replete with suggestion as the present, it is impossible, and would be tedious if it were possible, to touch in even the most hurried manner upon all its principal features and separate divisions. We must check our disposition to dwell upon details, to indicate novelties, to eulogize or cavil at particular views. Some choice must be exercised, and some principle of discrimination adopted, to restrain the tendency to incessant divagation, or too prodigal expatiation. We can only guide our steps by a single thread, and prudence advises the utmost abridgement of the course. Our selection is made; it is dictated by the most essential characteristic of Greek history. If compelled to eliminate the greater portion of Mr. Grote's labours, they are neither ignored nor unappreciated.

From the burning of Sardis to the death of Alexander at Babylon, there is an epic unity and magnificence in the history of Greece, which is vaguely felt, but very imperfectly manifested by Mr. Grote. It is one of the grand stages in the march of humanity. It is a grand triumph in human advancement. It is the first great struggle of freedom against despotism—of Europe against Asia—

* Mr. Grote remembers nearly everything; but in the exhibition of the glory of the victorious athletes, he has overlooked their vituperation by Euripides. Autolycus, *Fragm.* 1.

† Pindar, *Olymp.* I, vv. 44–8, ed. Bergkh.

of the petty forces of the little Greece against the countless hosts of the interminable east. Such a contest can be comprehended only by a sympathetic enthusiasm in the cause of liberty and intelligence: it is invisible to the narrow partizanship and local prejudices of Mitford; it is imperceptible to the conservative indifferencism of Thirlwall; it is inappreciable by the cloistered erudition and dusty pedantry of German scholars; it is only half suspected by the radical fanaticism of Grote. The same contest has been renewed on other fields, and in other centuries, always with the same ultimate result. The wars of Rome against Carthage; of the Roman empire against the Parthians; of Stilicho and Ætius against the Huns; of the Byzantine empire against Khosron, against the Mahometans, and against the Tartars; of Charles Martel and the Spaniards against the Saracens; of the Crusades—are later acts of the same drama, which closed, but not for ever, in the victory of Lepanto, and the triumph of John Sobieski beneath the walls of Vienna. Greece leads the van of the columns of freedom, introducing the world-wide warfare, which, starting from a single city on the rock of the Athenian acropolis, has spread with the lapse of time, till it has embraced the destinies of the human race. Well might the orators of Athens boast of the share of their native city in the emancipation of Greece!* Their boasts were just if the blessing had extended no further; but do they not receive a larger significance, and claim a nobler acceptance, when it is perceived that those victories of the Athenian freemen secured the fortunes and the progress of all posterity? The same battle has been often fought again, with more numerous and better appointed armies, and on ampler arenas; but never has it been fought more brilliantly, never has the triumph been adorned by loftier achievements in arms, in statesmanship, in arts, and in letters. This great resistance of Europe to Asia, in the case of Greece, grew out of, and was intertwined with, the domestic changes of Athens, and was also linked with the contemporary fortunes of the other Greek cities. Persia had her own ambition to gratify, her own injuries to avenge, but she appeared on the soil of Greece as the ally and armed advocate of the Pisistratidæ, who had been expelled from Athens, on the overthrow of their tyranny. The Athenian intervention in the Ionic revolt had been determined partly by natural sympathy for her Ionic colonies, partly by apprehension of the assistance which Hippias might derive from the Persians and the despots in the Asiatic cities, partly by jealousy of Sparta, which had been the declared enemy of the Athenians, and the friend of her tyrants. The stream of Grecian history is not interrupted by its collision with Asia in the

* Isocrat., Paneg. c, xx. Ad Philipp. c, lxii. Demosth., De Corona, c, xxi, lix.

Persian wars; it only rolls on with a larger and ever-increasing volume over its rugged channel, till it spreads over the whole of the then known east by the conquests of Alexander.

Within the larger epic a smaller epic is contained; the mutual rivalry of the principal States of Greece—condensed and exhibited in the inveterate jealousies and long enduring warfare of Athens and Sparta—continued after the depression of the former by the brief and sudden ascendancy of Thebes under Epaminondas, revived at a later day, and out of time, by the Achæan league, by Pyrrhus, and by the Ætolians. This smaller epic, it is perceived, breaks into many smaller epics. The main one, the only one to be now considered, is the rivalry of Athens and Sparta, and its connection with the wars of Persia and Greece.

With this, the larger epic is immediately connected. The two plots are intricately entwined. They may be separated, but the impressiveness of each is grievously impaired by the separation. The overthrow of the Lydian monarchy brought Cyrus and the victorious Persians in direct contact with the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, which had owned a partial subjection to Cræsus. Refusing to submit to the conqueror, they were subdued, and punished with great severity. Taking advantage of the disturbed state of the Persian empire, consequent upon a change of dynasty and organization, incited by the intrigues of Histieus and Aristagoras, and encouraged by the inglorious expedition of Darius against the Scythians, they revolted from the Persian sway, and applied first to Sparta, as the chief city of the mother country, and then to Athens as their own metropolis, for aid. Spartan coöperation was refused; Athenian assistance was rendered, but it was slight and ineffectual. Sardis was taken and burnt. This provocation called for revenge.

The conquest of Greece was resolved upon. The Ionic cities were subdued, and rendered subservient to this design. Hellas proper was, at this time, scarcely as populous, and certainly not as wealthy as the Greek colonies in Asia Minor. Mardonius was despatched to win an easy triumph, at the head of a large army, attended by a powerful navy. Three hundred vessels of his fleet were destroyed in doubling Mount Athos, and he was compelled to return. Two years later, Datis and Artaphernes, accompanied by the exiled tyrant, Hippias, landed at Marathon. The story of that battle does not demand repetition. The Athenian forces, with the aid of a thousand Plateans, gained a complete victory, and repelled the invaders, as well as defeated domestic treachery. Two thousand Spartans arrived after the battle, having been detained at home by jealousy, habitual dilatoriness, or the superstitious observances alleged as their excuse. This victory, and the absence of the Spartans, gave a new life and spirit to the Athenians, and inflamed the rivalry between their respective cities.

Ten years after the battle of Marathon, Xerxes, the young

sovereign of Persia, repeated the attempt at conquest, leading in his train the fleets of Phœnicia and Asia Minor, and an army embracing the multitudinous nations subject to his sceptre. Again, the selfishness and jealousies of Sparta endangered the liberties of Greece; the magnanimity and disinterestedness of Athens were more conspicuous than before. More than half of Greece tendered the tribute of earth and water to Persia. The march of Xerxes was delayed by the heroism of Leonidas and his Spartan band at the pass of Thermopylæ; the fleet was injured by a storm, and checked by the victory at Artemisium; it was finally shattered by the crowning triumph of Salamis. These great successes were due to the foresight, energy, and unscrupulous tact of Themistocles, to the gallantry of the Greeks, and the self-sacrificing spirit of the Athenians, who had abandoned to the enemy their homes, their temples, and their city; and had embarked their present and future fortunes on the waves. From the heights overlooking the Bay of Salamis, and the scene of his great disaster, Xerxes fled in dismay to his own dominions, leaving Mardonius with an army still vast to complete or commence the conquest of Greece, so ostentatiously, and thrice vainly undertaken. Next year, Mardonius was overthrown at Plataea, and the reunited navy of Persia was defeated and destroyed at Mycale.

The foot of the invader was repelled from the soil of Greece; it was never trodden again by a Persian army. The dominion of the seas was wrested from the Persian grasp, and the tide of war rolled back to the shores of Asia, from which the Persian navy was gradually expelled by the allied fleets of Greece, first under Spartan, afterwards under Athenian guidance. The victories of Cimon at the Eurymedon,* and seventeen years afterwards at Cyprus, where he met his death, close this part of the grand struggle. Persian aggression had been repulsed, Persian ambition frustrated, and the Persian monarch confined to the interior of his own domain.

The interest of the story is entirely withdrawn for many years from the side of Persia, and restricted to the native soil of Greece. The exploits achieved or attempted may range over a much wider space, but Greece, and the two principal cities of Greece, become the principal objects of attraction, and other points acquire importance only with reference to them. When Persia reappears, she does not come as a conqueror, but as an insidious, treacherous friend; hostile at heart to those whom she pretends to favour as to those whom she openly hates, and lavishing her bribes for the ruin

* We notice with pleasure that Mr. Grote recognizes the treaty of the Eurymedon. *Hist. Greece*, pt. ii, c. xlv, vol. v, pp. 335-42.

of all Greeks, whom she does not again venture to assail with open and voluntary war.

The repulse of Xerxes defended Greece against external violence, and left free the development of its indigenous civilization. It also rekindled ancient animosities at home. Sparta had been regarded as the head of the Hellenic States. But Athens, after the battle of Salamis, occupied an entirely different position from Athens before that great victory. The institutions of Clisthenes, which are, for the first time, adequately expounded by Mr. Grote,* and the liberty which they had established, had borne their luxuriant fruitage.† The sacrifices of Athens, the energy which she had displayed, the efficacious services rendered to the common cause, entitled her to claim a prouder position than she had yet assumed, and the disposition of her citizens, equally stimulated and encouraged by the recent successes, partly won by their almost unaided efforts, inclined her to enforce her claim. The first step taken in this direction, obviously required as a measure of judicious protection, was the fortification of the city and harbours—the opening of the Piræus—and the construction of the walls. These projects aroused the opposition of Sparta, but were successfully commenced by the extraordinary energy of the citizens, and the consummate diplomacy of Themistocles.‡ The deception was remembered and revenged, when Athens fell into the hands of Lysander at the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The curse imprecated upon his sons by Œdipus, and the fate by which that curse was accomplished, attended the career of Greece. The overthrow of the Persians was the commencement of its realization. The hereditary hostility of the Doric and Ionic races, the legendary contentions of the two communities, their dissimilar temperament, polity, and pursuits, the incompatibility of their respective aims, tended naturally to produce antagonism between Athens and Sparta; and circumstances soon rendered them the instruments and the representatives of the diverse tendencies of the different Greek States. The immediate cause of the open and active rivalry, which fills the mature period of Greek history, and inflicted woes innumerable upon the Greeks (ἡ

* Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. II, ch. xxxi, vol. iv, pp. 126–181.

† Δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ' ἐν μῶνον, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἡ ἰσχυροῖα ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τυραννεύμενοι μὲν οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιουκέντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῷ πρώτοι ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ ὧν ταῦτα ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἡθελόκακον ὡς δεσπότη ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῷ προεθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι.

Herod., v. c, lxxviii.

‡ There is only too much justice in the bitter epithets bestowed upon Themistocles by Timocreon, ap. Plut. *Vit. Themist.*, c. xxi.

Ψεύσαν, ἄδικον, προδύταν.

μυρί' Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγες ἔθηκεν), was the arrogance of Pausanias and the harshness of Spartan supremacy; the equity and affability of the Athenian admirals, Aristides and Cimon; the superior numbers and efficiency of the Athenian navy; the distinguished services recently rendered by Athens to the common cause; and the transfer of the Persian war to the islands of the Ægean, the coasts of Asia, and the bosom of the sea. The confederate marine deferred the naval supremacy to Athens by its own act;* and splendidly did she discharge her new duties. The current of events rapidly converted the preëminence in danger and in function into a veritable empire.† As the wealth of the allies poured into Athens as the common treasury, their contributions came to be regarded as a tribute, and were employed for the advancement of Athenian power in Greece, and induced her to contend, with a prospect of success, with the head of the Doric States, for the same supremacy on land already enjoyed on the sea.

The aggressive and diffusive tendencies of democratic organization unquestionably influenced the attitude assumed by Athens in Greece. It is not the least of the merits of Mr. Grote that he has been nearly the first to recognize, explain, and develope the character of the Greek democracies, and to defend them against the sweeping and acrimonious denunciations of former historians. Himself a liberal and a reformer in politics, he has entered with earnest sympathy into the feelings, the requirements, and the circumstances of the democratic States of Greece, and has thus introduced a juster and more luminous spirit into the consideration of their history. Especially has this been the case in his discussion of the Athenian annals, which he has exhibited in a more pleasing, a more candid, and consequently more intelligible manner, than had ever been previously done. He is as enthusiastic in the display of the virtues of the Athenians, and the excellences of the Athenian polity, as Mitford had been industrious in the defamation of both. The Philo-Laconism of the latter is at length fairly counterbalanced by the Philo-demism of his successor, which is a great advance in historical justice and perspicacity, though it must be confessed it not unfrequently runs into extravagance. Assenting usually to Mr. Grote's views, which we have occasionally anticipated in the pages of this Review and elsewhere, and cordially sympathizing with his aims, we must nevertheless admit that he has exposed himself to attack by his excessive partialities, and has provoked such replies as that of Col. Mure on the religious intolerance of the Athenians.* Into whatever errors he may thus have been

* Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. II, ch. xlv, vol. v, pp. 255-264.

† Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. II, ch. xlv, vol. v, pp. 290-303.

‡ Mure, *Crit. Hist. of the Language and Literature of Ancient Greece*, vol. iv, pp. 519-523. Appendix A.

betrayed, they are venial in comparison with the unmeasured laudation of Sparta, and abuse of the Athenian democracy, which had long been habitual, and which might be appropriately compared to the infatuation which would prefer the retrogressive policy of Spain in comparison with the institutions of England or the United States. It is not too much to say that Mr. Grote has been the first to understand and to elucidate the internal growth of the Greek States, and their complicated and conflicting international, or inter-Hellenic policy, and has succeeded principally in consequence of his ardent participation in the liberal impulses which governed Athenian life.

Brief, but very brilliant, was the period of Athenian glory; still briefer the duration of her power. It is the misfortune of all democracies to exhaust, as well as to attain, rapidly, the fulness of prosperity. Athens was no exception to the rule; her career, like that of Achilles, was soon achieved.

Ὀξύμορος δὴ μοι, τέκος, ἔσσειαι.

Sophocles, the tragedian, was born five years before the battle of Marathon; he was the colleague of Pericles in the expedition against Samos; and he died only the year before the close of the Peloponnesian war. Gorgias, who was born in the year of the victory at Salamis, lived long enough to have heard of the victory of Epaminondas at Leuctra. The birth of Isocrates preceded by five years the Peloponnesian war; his death followed and was occasioned by the defeat of Athens, by the triumph of Philip at Chaeronea. A single life was coëxtensive with the rise and fall of Athens; less than two long lives embraced the triumph and the overthrow of Greece. The fatal lists were opened when Athens triumphed over Persia, and divided with Sparta the command of Greece.

The most exhilarating success attended the first years of Athenian ascendancy. The Persian fleet was repeatedly defeated, and almost destroyed; the Persian garrisons and governors were expelled from the towns in Thrace and on the Hellespont; in a single year, the Athenian arms were displayed in Cyprus, Egypt, the Halicis, Ægina, and Megara;* the Athenian confederacy was organized, and the refractory members reduced to submission; Eubœa, Megara, Ægina were added to the Athenian domain; Boeotia yielded to Athenian influence; the Athenian arms were carried into Thessaly, Acarnania, and Phocis, and to the western shores of Greece and the adjacent islands; Athenian colonies were planted in Thrace, in the northern islands of the Ægean, and on

* Grote, Hist. Greece, pt. II, ch. xlv, vol. v, p. 322.

the coasts of Italy. Athens "was now not merely the first maritime State of Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land power, possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, Lokris, together with Achæa and Træzen, in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase."*

Such was the position of Athens in A. C. 450, when the five years' truce was ratified by the influence of Cimon. This is the culminating era of Athenian glory and power. Athens had grown great, during the last forty years, in military and naval power, in breadth and efficacy of dominion, and still more in the institutions which sustain and ennoble, in the resources which enrich, and in the arts which embellish a State. In these and the succeeding years, the liberal constitution of Clisthenes was developed and systematized, not without opposition and the presumption of treachery on the part of the oligarchical and laconizing faction. By gradual modifications the laws were harmonized with the increased requirements and liberalized government of the country. The revenues of the State were augmented by the regular tribute imposed upon the allies, and by the financial arrangements at home. The silver mines of Laurium were worked with profit; the gold mines of Thasos and Thrace became a fruitful source of public wealth; and the special burthens (the liturgies) of the rich were discharged splendidly and with ease, in consequence of the abundant returns of commerce, agriculture, and industry under the stimulus of the general prosperity. The navy was enlarged and its efficiency increased, by improvements in naval architecture, by the superior discipline and continual exercise of the crews, and by the scientific dexterity acquired in marine tactics. The fortifications of Athens and the Piræus were completed, the city connected with its port, and the communication sheltered from hostile attack by the construction of the long walls. "The painted porch" was erected, and the still surviving Theseum. The gardens of the academy were laid out and opened to the public by the liberality of Cimon; and, from the ashes left by the Persian invasion, those splendid edifices were beginning to arise, which inspired the poets and the orators,† gratified and instructed the people, and furnished models for all future imitation. Intellectual cultivation was not neglected. The stage was rendered

* Grote's Hist. Greece, pt. II, ch. xlv, vol. v, p. 344; cf. Mitford, Hist. Greece, ch. xii, § v. vol. ii, pp. 278-9. London, 1838.

† Demosth., c. Androt., c. v, cf. c. xxii, c. Aristocrat., c. liii, c. Timocrat., c. xlii. Frag. Com. Anonym., xlix, ap. Meineke. Fr. Com. Gr. iv, p. 616.

illustrious by the magnificent compositions of the tragic triumvirate, Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Crates, Magnes, Cratinus, Teleclides, and the other precursors of Aristophanes and Eupolis, inaugurated the triumphs of the comic muse. The philosophers of Ionia, Sicily, Italy, and Greece, introduced the pursuit of abstract speculation into the shady walks surrounding the city of Minerva. Sculpture, painting, and music participated in the general progress, and attained a high degree of refinement. Athens was already becoming, as she afterwards claimed to be, the school of Greece.* Higher eminence might afterwards be won in particular branches of culture, but never did all that could add strength, and energy, and grace, and dignity, and splendour, and wealth, and refinement, to a nation, flourish in happier union than at the period of the five years' truce. There was ample excuse for the vanity, sometimes so amiably, often so ridiculously displayed by the Athenians, who boasted that Attica surpassed all other regions in her institutions, her men, her horses, her air, her water, her figs, her bread, and everything else.†

The most ingenious devices would be unable to compress into this rapid survey even the most hurried indications of the stages of this dazzling progress, or the modes of its accomplishment. Neither would they avail to trace the contemporary consolidation of Spartan power in Peloponnesus, or to follow the contemporary changes in other parts of Greece. An accurate acquaintance with these incidents, their causes and their successions, must be obtained from Mr. Grote, whose philosophy, and erudition, and unabated diligence are never more felicitously employed than in furnishing complete data for the comprehension of the condition, impulses, aims, resources, and policy of the hostile parties who contended for Pan-Hellenic dominion, and sacrificed all Greece with themselves in the Peloponnesian war.

The story of this long warfare, which divided Greece into hostile camps, arrayed the arms, the policy, and the allies of Athens against the arms, the policy, and the confederates of Sparta, and extended its ravages and its fatal bequest of calamities from the plains of Sicily to the Hellespont and Mæander, and even to the Euphrates, is recorded by Mr. Grote with extreme fulness and perspicuity. Thucydides had treated the previous history of Greece as an introduction to the grand conflict between the Ionian and Dorian races, and had prepared his readers for the ensuing scenes by a lucid exhibition of the opposing tendencies and the antagonist resources of the two rival cities of Greece.

* Isocrat., *Panegy.*, c. xii–xiii.

† Isocr., *Paneg.*, c. iv, v; Plato, *De Rep.*, iv, c. xii; Eurip., *Incert. Fab. Fr.*, cxviii, ed. Didot; Menander, ap. Meineke, *Fl. Com. Gr.*, vol. iv, p. 725; *Flag. Com. Anonym.*, xv; *ibid.*, p. 604; Antiphanis, *Homonym*, ap. Meineke, &c., vol. iii, p. 98; Xenoph., *Mem.*, iii, c. iii.

Mr. Grote has the advantage of a broader field of view, ampler limits, and the larger experience of the centuries since elapsed; but he approaches the subject with the same sense of its magnitude as that entertained by his Athenian precursor and guide, and with the same consciousness that its explanation is to be found in the whole series of preceding changes. He feels, and the perception is true, that this general Hellenic war is the central point and the crisis of the fortunes of Greece; it is the confluence of the separate streams of Hellenic action. He sees that it was predetermined by the natural development of preëxistent and ineradicable discrepancies in the elements of Greek society; that the necessary tendency to consolidation, arising from political and social advancement, and the consequent approach to the sentiment of Hellenic nationality, inevitably ensured a collision with the less developed communities, and the representatives of opposite currents of thought, and that the issue of the contest was certain to be ruinous to Greece, whichever party might be the victor. This Mr. Grote appears to recognize, and he enables us to recognize it. We admire the patient acumen with which he has unfolded the Peloponnesian war, placing it and all its details in a bright and just light. He is always scrupulously minute in his investigation; he is especially so in his discussion of this eventful and portentous period. He lingers over every incident; he debates every change of policy and fluctuation of fortune; he scrutinizes every motive and every possible result; he analyzes the motives and estimates with care the character of every prominent actor. The liberties of Greece are at stake, and it is known that the game will be lost. He protracts his sojourn amid the scenes of its mightiest endeavours, and draws out to the utmost length the last hours of freedom and prosperity.

The war had been long anticipated by Pericles, and long postponed by his sagacious statesmanship. He had not been deluded by the thirty years' peace, but employed the brief period of repose in extending, concentrating, and husbanding the resources of Athens, and in preparing for the approaching struggle. Unfortunately, he survived only long enough to suggest the early operations of the war.

The commencement of hostilities found the resources of the combatants considerably changed from what they had been when the five years' truce was concluded. The defeat at Coronea had snatched Bœotia from the dominion of Athens. The Megarid had revolted, and had thereby placed in the hands and at the service of the enemy, the important pass which defended Attica from Peloponnesian invasion.* Sparta had been strengthened to the full

* The importance of such a defence in this quarter was manifested afterwards in the Corinthian war, when the alliance of Corinth enabled Conon to rebuild the long walls of Athens. Grote, pt. ii, ch. lxxiv, vol. ix, pp. 321-4.

extent of the losses of Athens. Her position rendered her always the citadel of Greece;* but recent accessions had increased her offensive capabilities. The good will of the Corinthians had been alienated from the Athenians by the expedition against Potidæa, and by the acceptance of the Corcyraean alliance, which by no means compensated for the odium incurred. Corinth had repressed the hostile designs of Sparta, but the war was finally precipitated by the clamorous demands of the Corinthians for vengeance and redress.

The opposing parties appeared to be equally matched: or rather, the extent and dissimilarity of their respective resources announced an arduous struggle and an uncertain issue. Each rejoiced in the number and flourishing condition of its allies, and in the perfection of its warlike education. Sparta was preponderant by land, Athens omnipotent by sea. The Doric confederacy anticipated success from its disciplined and unbought soldiery, from the concentration of its forces, and the discontent of the subjects of the Athenian empire. The Ionic alliance boasted of its fleets and well-paid marine, of the abundance of its annual revenue, of the skill of its sailors, the perfection of its naval discipline and tactics, the diffusion, inaccessibility, and wealth of its members. The war was decided by the capture of the Athenian army at Syracuse, and of the Athenian navy, unresisting, at Ægos-Potami. The intervals between the commencement of the war and these events were full of changes. At the outbreak of hostilities it would have been difficult to anticipate the result; yet, if the measures of Pericles had been rigidly maintained, his hopes and the apprehensions of Archidamus might have been realized. For, though Athens was exposed to attack and annual siege by the loss of Megaris; and the plains stretching from the Acropolis to Cithæron and the Isthmus were subject to annual devastation: while Sparta was protected by her inhospitable coasts, and the mountain ranges which encompassed her secluded valley; yet Athens could command supplies by the possession of the seas and the monopoly of commerce; her walls might not shield her from the insult of the enemy's presence, but they defended her from his arms; and there were many points in the Peloponnesus, where Sparta was vulnerable, and exposed to the assaults of Athenian triremes. The advantages of the two combatants were as nearly equal as ever occurs in warfare, though the difference seemed to be in favour of Athens.

They were as nearly, and as diversely matched in their guiding spirits, though here again the advantage was on the side of the

* Συγγεῖνον δέ τι καὶ ἀκρόπολις ἔστιν ἡ Πελοπόννησος συμπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Strabo, lib. viii, c. i. Laconia occupied a similar relation even to the Peloponnesus.

Athenians. Archidamus was king of Sparta, and sole commander of the Peloponnesian forces, his colleague Pleistoanax being in exile. He was a Spartan soldier, of singular moderation, equanimity, and discernment. His feelings and anticipations were adverse to his cause; but, like a Spartan, he was ready to discharge his duty with equal steadiness and discretion, whether marching to victory or defeat. Pericles, mature in years, and more mature in experience, retained an envied, but uncontested supremacy in Athens. Brilliant in genius, eloquent in speech, distinguished in war, consummate in council, fertile in resources, sagacious in his estimation of the future, uncorrupted by prosperity, undismayed by disaster, patriotic in his impulses, enthusiastically attached to his native city, but with a liberal regard for the general interests of Greece, possessing the confidence of his countrymen, and full of reliance upon their energies and their capacities,—Pericles was such a leader as the times required, and such a counsellor as alone to equal or to counterbalance nearly all other advantages.

Pericles was not spared to control the war. The gods were adverse to Athens. It might seem that the familiar superstition of the Greeks was justified, and that heaven envied the remarkable prosperity of men.* The plague appeared, and proved more fatal than the Peloponnesian army before the city. It thinned the population crowded within the walls: it crushed the spirits, and undermined the morals of the people, and inflicted the heaviest blow by numbering Pericles among its victims.† The fear of the pestilence repelled the Peloponnesians, but the loss of Pericles was irreparable. In the battles of the Iliad, the heavenly powers descend upon the field to aid and encourage the combatants, but leave them to their fate when the decrees of destiny have consigned them to death or defeat. The presiding genius of Athens abandoned her when Pericles expired.

Mr. Grote scarcely appreciates the effect produced by the death of Pericles, and the exhaustion and demoralization occasioned by the plague. He mentions the numerical loss of knights and hoplites,‡ but, overwhelming as this might seem to be, it was a severer injury that the superstitions of the Athenians were alarmed, and their virtues permanently impaired by this fearful and recurring visitation. In vain they endeavoured to propitiate the offended Apollo by the purification of Delos.§ The plague

* Thucyd., vii, lxxvii, and the remarks on the passage. Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. ii, ch. lx, vol. vii, p. 335, note.

† Grote doubts the fact of Pericles having died of the plague. *Hist. Greece*, pt. ii, ch. xlix, vol. vi, p. 170, note.

‡ Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. ii, ch. xlix, vol. vi, p. 163.

§ Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. ii, ch. li, vol. vi, p. 312.

disappeared, but the decline of Athenian morals and influence continued. This purification, undertaken in the midst of perilous and exacting hostilities, indicates the manner in which superstition and action, mythology and policy were blended in the history of Greece, and especially in the history of the Athenians, the most superstitious and reverential of the Greeks.* Mr. Grote might have judiciously referred to this measure, in the course of his elaborate elucidation of the panic terrors occasioned by the Hermocopidæ.

Deprived of their illustrious chief, despoiled by the Spartan invasions, oppressed by disease, the Athenians still maintained the struggle with spirit and energy. Their enterprises were, however, conducted with a desultory activity, which achieved no important result till the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria by Demosthenes and Cleon.

The success at Sphacteria was more than counterbalanced by the loss of Amphipolis, and the conquests of Brasidas in the Chalcidic peninsula. But so highly did Sparta estimate the pure Spartan blood—as exemplified again in the conspiracy of Cinadon,† and the defeat of the Spartan *mora* by Iphicrates‡—that she was willing to forego the prospects of triumph, and to renounce present advantages for their recovery. She offered in exchange for them her recent conquests, accompanied with the promise of an honourable peace and an honourable alliance. The favourable chance was frittered away by the indecision of the Athenians, and the fatal imbecility or culpable folly of their advisers. The peace of Nicias produced a cessation in the regular hostilities, and allowed some repose to the belligerents, as it permits a rest to the student of the war. It was never more than a hollow truce. It sacrificed the fortunes of Athens to the vain hopes of deluded men. Had Pericles been alive, Athens would not have been reduced to the acceptance of such terms as were offered; had Cleon still bawled in the assembly, she would have secured the fulfilment of the conditions, before surrendering the captives of Sphacteria, the sole guarantees of fidelity; had Brasidas survived, Sparta might have been saved the humiliation of her treacherous proceedings.

We should thank Mr. Grote for his examination of the character and policy of Cleon, and for the justice done, for the first time, to his memory.§ We cannot yet conjure up any sympathy for the leather-selling demagogue, so unmercifully ridiculed by

* Acts c. xvii, v. 23, confirmed by Isocrat., Areopagit., c. xi; et vide Stanley, ad Æsch., suppl., v. 712.

† Grote, Hist. Greece, pt. ii, ch. lxxiii, vol. ix, pp. 247–254.

‡ Grote, Hist. Greece, pt. ii, ch. lxxv, vol. ix, pp. 346–353.

§ Grote, Hist. Greece, pt. ii, ch. li, vol. vi, pp. 285–292; ch. lii, pp. 327–340, 347–355, ch. liv, pp. 475–489.

Aristophanes, but we candidly confess that himself and his measures have been misconceived and misrepresented hitherto; that his policy was more sagacious and patriotic than that of his assailants; and that Mr. Grote merits the credit of having rectified in this, as in so many other respects, the history of Greece. His enthusiasm in behalf of the democracy of Athens has induced him to review every topic employed to the discredit of that wonderful people, and he has wiped off most of the rust which tarnished their fame.

The peace of Nicias was the lull of the tempest before the fullest outbreak of the storm. Never rigidly observed, it was openly broken after the fatal expedition to Sicily. This was a flagrant departure from the counsels of Pericles; it was at utter variance with the caution of Nicias; but was a suitable result of the infusion into Athenian policy of the grasping, lawless, reckless, dazzling ambition of Alcibiades, who had usurped the place in public affairs, formerly held by his relative and guardian Pericles, and recently left vacant by the death of Cleon. Though soon and unfortunately removed from the command of the Sicilian expedition, he continued from the time of his first appearance in public life, till the time of his assassination, to be the evil genius of Greece. His baneful influence is prominently exhibited by Grote: nor is it possible to comprehend the fluctuations of fortune during these disastrous years, without a distinct recognition of the skilful but treacherous hand which governed their tides.

The only manifestation of artistic feeling discernible in Mr. Grote is afforded by his treatment of the rash and unwarrantable attempt to annex Sicily to the Athenian empire. The contrasts of light and shade are dexterously introduced; the reciprocal relations of events are happily discriminated; the connection of causes and effects is philosophically, the characters of the actors in this grand episode are graphically, portrayed, and the influences exercised by them delineated with singular justice and sagacity. The splendid and arrogant commencement of the expedition, and the ruinous disaster of its close; the lofty confidence which attended its departure, the panic-terrors, and the gloom diffused over Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ; the recall and flight of Alcibiades, the delays and superstition of Nicias; the energy, daring, and versatility of Gylippus, and the military energy and gallantry of Demosthenes; the restless treason of Alcibiades; the creation of the Syracusan and Peloponnesian navies, the organization of their success, the decline of Athenian and the rise of Lacedæmonian ascendancy at sea; the perseverance, the patience, and the resources of the Athenian republic, and the blind obstinacy of Nicias, by which those resources were ineffectually squandered, and the army, the navy, the power, the prestige, the hopes of Athens annihilated on a distant shore; the calamitous results of

this overwhelming failure, and the magnanimous resolution with which the Athenians strove to retrieve or mitigate their disasters: these exciting topics are all discussed and appreciated in the most satisfactory manner, and are so arranged as to reflect mutual light upon each other, and to foreshadow the overthrow of Athenian power, by disclosing the causes as well as the circumstances of its decline.

The Sicilian expedition, and the destruction of the Athenian fleets and armies before Syracuse, with consequent effects, the occupation of Deceleia, and the Persian alliance, both contrived by the exiled Alcibiades, determined the future fate of Greece, and ultimately of Persia. After the terrible blow inflicted upon her, Athens did not sink without a noble and long doubtful struggle, and yielded rather to the treachery of factions, and of those armed with power in her defence, than to the strength of her enemies. A year only elapsed after the surrender of Syracuse, till the Athenians regained much of their lost renown by the victory at Miletus. It was rendered nugatory by the conspiracy of the oligarchs, and the revolution achieved by Antiphon, Theramenes, and the Four Hundred. This movement had been inspired by Alcibiades, who offered the temptation of the Persian alliance. The treacherous success was of brief duration. The fleet at Samos, under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, promptly declared against them; Alcibiades deserted them and joined their opponents, with his accustomed offer of Persian alliance: discord broke out in their own ranks; the citizens revolted; the Four Hundred were overthrown, and the Five Thousand assumed the government, and themselves merged in the course of another year into the old democracy.

For one moment, Athens might entertain the hope that her mighty and long continued exertions, her strenuous perseverance under grievous reverses, and oscillations of domestic fortune, were to be rewarded with success. Alcibiades was recalled from exile on the overthrow of the oligarchy: he brought no Persian aid, but he rendered the assistance afforded by the Persian satraps to the Lacedæmonians lukewarm and suspected. He brought, however, to his countrymen his own amazing energy and fertility of resource; and he brought also hope, the best of allies, to the Athenian temperament. He skilfully planned and ably executed an attack on the Peloponnesian and Persian forces at Syzicus. The whole fleet was either captured or destroyed: Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, was slain; the army of Pharnabazus defeated and dispersed.* Despondency overwhelmed the Lacedæmonians; but

* We will not repeat the dispatch of Hippocrates, the secretary of Mindarus, announcing this defeat, which was intercepted by the Athenians, and is quoted by Grote, Mitford, and every other writer on this period.

they were encouraged in the prosecution of the war by the prompt and generous assistance of Pharnabazus, and the counsels of the Syracusan exile, Hermocrates.

We need not linger over the closing incidents of the war—the exhaustion of the finances of Athens; the ruin of her commerce; the jealous suspicions of her citizens. We need do no more than advert to the support afforded to the Spartan fleets and armies by Persian contributions. We need not dwell upon the return of Alcibiades to Athens—his momentary triumph; his outrageous misconduct; his speedy repudiation and disgrace. We cannot prolong our narrative to recount the important consequences of the appointment of the crafty and unscrupulous Lysander to the command of the Peloponnesian navy. His skilful organization of ruling parties, favourable to himself in all the dependent cities—his acquisition of the confidence, friendship, and support of Cyrus; his victory at Notium—his machinations against his successor, Callicratidas,* and the defeat and death of the latter at Arginusæ, which were rendered useless by the unjust and impolitic condemnation of the victorious commanders.† These alternations of fortune are perspicuously narrated by Mr. Grote, and introduce naturally the sudden but final victory at Ægos-Potami, which concluded the war, leaving Athens helpless at the feet of her rival, and which would have ruined her irretrievably, but for the jealousies prevalent at Sparta, and the envy and just apprehension of Lysander, entertained at Sparta, and among the allies of Sparta.

Prostrate, crushed, dismantled, stripped of her allies, her fleets, her revenues, and much of her lucrative commerce; subdued to the galling and dishonourable yoke of the Thirty Tyrants, Athens was degraded into a subservient tributary to Sparta, and seemed to be denied the hope of future supremacy or glory. Her supremacy was never regained; but her glory received new lustre from events subsequent to her disgrace. The overthrow of the Tyrants by Thrasybulus; the reëstablishment of independence and democracy; the campaigns of Iphicrates; the career of Demosthenes; and the gallant but impotent resistance to the aggressions of Philip and the Macedonians, spread a brilliant glow over the sunset of Athenian freedom. The field of Charonea terminated the independence of Greece, but it commenced the ascendancy of Hellenic institutions, and, may we not say, of Attic civilization throughout the world.‡

* The remarks of Grote on the character and death of Callicratidas merit attention. *Hist. Greece*, pt. ii, ch. lxiv, vol. viii, pp. 160–6, 173–4.

† Mr. Grote's partiality for the Athenian democracy tempts him to justify this outrage. *Hist. Greece*, pt. ii, ch. lxiv, vol. viii, pp. 175–210.

‡ *Adsunt Athenienses, unde humanitas, doctrina, religio, fruges, jura, leges ortæ, atque in omnes terras distributæ putantur.* Cic., *Or. Pro L. Flacco*, xxvi, § 62. Cicero has in view the panegyric oration of Isocrates.

The double fratricide was completed by the triumph of Lysander. Sparta received even a deeper wound than she inflicted on her rival; though its fatal character was concealed by thirty years of despotic and ruinous empire. Ten years after the victory of Ægos-Potami, the victory of Cnidus, obtained by Conon and Pharnabazus—the Persians being for the time on the side of Athens—destroyed the Peloponnesian fleet, and the Spartan ascendancy at sea. Then followed the sacrifice of the Hellenic cities of Asia, and the betrayal of the interests of Greece, present and prospective, by the infamous peace of Antalcidas, for the sake of perpetuating Spartan domination by Persian support.* Out of the peace of Antalcidas, and its arbitrary enforcement, grew the treacherous seizure of the Cadmeia; the attempt on the Piræus; the hostilities with Thebes; the overthrow of the Spartan ascendancy on land by the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, the glorious career of Epaminondas, the invasion of Laconia, and the restoration of the Messenians. The expeditions and designs of Agesilaus in Asia inspired Jason of Pheræ with the dream of Asiatic conquest, and pointed the way for the victorious arms of Alexander. Agesilaus himself had been inflamed by the march of the Ten Thousand Greeks under Cyrus, and their brilliant retreat through the heart of the Persian empire—a dazzling episode during the melancholy days of Greece, which Mr. Grote treats so copiously as to repeat nearly all of Xenophon's *Anabasis*.†

The Peloponnesian war destroyed the energies and the capacities of Greece, its social welfare, its political integrity, its morals, and its resources. It left the whole country a prey to discord, jealousy, internal dissensions, and weakness. It established piracy on the seas, and engendered hordes of *condottieri* to endanger and plunder communities formerly protected by a citizen soldiery.‡ It introduced Persian gold into Greece, and subjected Grecian affairs to Persian arbitration. After the victories of the Eurymedon and of Citiun, Persia had been expelled from the soil and the waters of Greece; after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, Persian aid was first invoked by Sparta, and afterwards courted by each of the contending powers. Persian gold and Persian arms decided the victories of the Peloponnesian alliance; Persian gold and Persian fleets gave the victory of Cnidus to Conon and the Athenians, and rebuilt the long walls of Athens; the temptations of the Persian alliance dictated the treaty of Antalcidas, and controlled the destinies of Greece. The day of retribution was at hand, and the Hellenic race, after being disorganized by Persian artifice, and

* Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. ii, ch. lxxvi, vol. x, pp. 1–12.

† Grote, *Hist. Greece*, pt. ii, chap. lxix–lxxi, vol. ix, pp. 1–180.

‡ *Isocrat.*, ad Philipp., c. xl; *Archidam.*, c. xxxii; *De Pace*, c. xvi; *Panath.*, c. lxxv, to quote only from Isocrates.

crushed in consequence beneath the arms of Philip and Alexander, was yet to arise, and under the Macedonian sceptre to blot the empire of Persia from the dynasties of the earth.

Thus the domestic epic of Athenian and Spartan rivalry, which had detached itself from the main epic plan, contemplated by Herodotus,* of Hellenic and Persian—or, rather, of European and Asiatic contention—unites itself again to the parent stem, and becomes merged in it as the result of the Peloponnesian war. As the struggle of Greece for independence, and its brilliant achievement, formed the commencement of the plot, the complete subjugation of Persia and its dependencies by Alexander the Great, at the head of his Macedonian subjects and Hellenic tributaries, constitutes the *denouement* of the grand poem, and ushers in a new phase of history, an ampler civilization than could have been realized on the narrow and divided territory of Greece.

We have accomplished our effort, and have compressed into a few pages, the essence and the significance of Mr. Grote's twelve volumes. This general view of the History of Greece, distorted as it is by its cramped proportions, we believe to be historically true, philosophically just, and aesthetically correct. We have been obliged to omit, with rare and brief allusions, all that intervened from the establishment of Spartan despotism to the Macedonian conquest. This period represents the dying agonies of Hellenic independence. The death-blow had been struck, but Greece did not expire without a long struggle. Seventy years of vain resistance to her fate conducted her to the tomb of her freedom; they form the close of the national iliad of her career.

‘Ὡς οὖν’ ἀμφίεπον τάφον ‘Εκτορος ἱπποδάμιοιο.

No such view as we have hazarded is presented in the verbose history of Mr. Grote; nor is it indicated in his distribution of its epochs.† The parts of his work are grouped together with reference to the nature of his authorities, the chronological successions, or strictly political relations. There is no reference to the requirements of art; and yet art is instructive philosophy. Disproportion of members, dislocation of subjects, and constant repetitions, thus occur, without excuse, because without intrinsic necessity. The unity of idea, corresponding to the unity of national development, and congenially representing the vital harmony of organic growth, is obscured by the frequent changes and interruptions of the current of narration. The epic interest, which should preside over a great historical composition, is wanting; it is frittered away amid the multifarious

* See the opening chapters of Herodotus, and Mure, *Crit. Hist. Lit. Greece*, B. iv, ch. vii, §§ 1–5, vol. iv, pp. 451–471.

† Grote, *Hist. Greece*, Pref., vol. i, pp. ix–x.

changes of episodical excitement. This omission cannot be compensated by the laborious fidelity with which each separate topic is discussed. A complete collection of the Cyclic ballads of Greece would be neither a substitute nor an equivalent for the *Iliad*. The former would be valuable and attractive, as preserving the entire circle of poetic traditions, which had warmed the fancy and inspired the action of the Greeks; it would possess a peculiar charm as exhibiting the complete materials from which Homer had extracted an epic poem; but it would not furnish the *Iliad*, nor explain the enthusiasm with which it had been permanently welcomed. So it is in historical composition; the greatest diligence and the most rigid impartiality will not atone for the absence of the perfections of art.* They rather collect, sift, analyse, arrange the elements of a future history, than produce a classic work themselves. Whatever be the value of Mr. Grote's labours—and we are more inclined to overrate than to underrate them—they leave the field still open for the triumph of an historian who, with greater impartiality, may bring to his task a larger and more lively perception of the unity of Hellenic development, and a more poetic apprehension of his subject. With less learning than Mr. Grote, or even availing himself of his erudition, his successor may achieve a brighter and more durable fame. We regret this unfortunate deficiency, for it lowers the grade of Mr. Grote's triumph. We regret it the more, because, as we have already intimated, he had occasional and intuitive perceptions of the epic character of his subject, but this epic character he has not preserved in his pages. His work is the best exposition that has been given of the career of the Greeks, and is full of new, luminous, and important views, but it is confessedly tedious, and has been abridged even before its completion.† There is no abridgement of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*; yet the defects of Gibbon are greater and less venial than those of Grote; but his merits as an historian, if not as an antiquarian and philosopher, are also of a much higher order; and it is to his excellences as an historical artist that he owes his immortality.

In hazarding this criticism, we must add, that the course pursued in the examination of Grote's *History of Greece*, has compelled us to omit all notice of those important subsidiary topics, which add so much value to the work, and which are treated, often with daring originality, always with fulness and discernment.

* Διὰ τί ποτε τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἥλιον ἀκούομεν τῶν περὶ ἐν συνεστηκυῶν, ἢ τῶν περὶ πολλὰ πραγματευομένων. *Aristot., Prob., lib. xviii, c. 9, p. 917, ed. Bekker & Brandis.* The same question is discussed by Hume in some of the editions of his essays. The discussion is given in the Boston edition, vol. iv, pp. 25–29.

† We refer of course to Smith's agreeable and instructive *History of Greece*.

The Homeric question; the constitutions of Lycurgus, Solon, and Clisthenes; the rise and progress of the great games, and other evidences, causes, and effects, of the growth of a national Hellenic sentiment; the use and abuse of ostracism; the examination of the rise of philosophy, and the theories of the philosophers; the appreciation of the orators and sophists; the career and condemnation of Socrates; the consideration of the Attic drama and dramatists, comic and tragic; all these great subjects, and numerous others of less magnitude, are introduced, and estimated with great originality and care. If we object to the want of art in Mr. Grote's labours, there is never any deficiency of research; if his explanations and digressions are too frequent and exuberant, they usually diffuse a new or a clearer light; if he is betrayed into excesses by his unusual partialities for the democracy of Athens, his extravagance always serves to dispel inveterate misrepresentations; if his style is awkward, and his language uncouth, his views are habitually perspicuous and philosophical; if he is prolix in his narrative and untiring in his repetitions, he is singularly copious in the communication of information; and, if he has not produced a classic history of Greece, he has certainly the honour of having presented the best History of Greece yet written, and may justly be proud of having furnished a vast and orderly encyclopædia of the historical, political, and literary antiquities of Greece.* More than this it was perhaps impossible to accomplish, when so many parts of Greek history had been previously misconceived, and so many were still in controversy. Moreover, his Positivist tendencies, while rendering his political philosophy more scientific, comprehensive, and acute, were not calculated to infuse that larger insight into history, which recognizes the progress of a Divine purpose in the movement of humanity, and passes by an easy transition into the reverential enthusiasm of art. The predilection for Hegelian fancies and the mythicism of Strauss, was still less likely to suggest such a mode of contemplation. Nevertheless, when we reflect upon the rare, great, and numerous merits of this last and most elaborate History of Greece, we can scarcely moderate our transports of admiration, or pardon the adventurous criticism which mingles even moderate censure with the highest eulogy. Grote must long continue to be the cherished companion of scholars, and will always be regarded with pride among the historical monuments which enrich the literature of the English tongue, and attest the learning of its scholars.

* We have said nothing about Mr. Grote's innovations in the orthography of Greek names, and in the nomenclature of Greek divinities. We have not imitated, but we approve them.

ART. V.—FREE SCHOOL SYSTEM OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Compilation of the Acts and Resolutions in relation to the Free Schools. Printed by authority of the Legislature of 1855. Columbia, S. C.: E. H. Britton & Co., State Printers. 1855.

Reports on the Free School System, to the General Assembly of South Carolina, at the Regular Session of 1839. Printed by order of the Legislature. Columbia: A. H. Pemberton, State Printer. 1840.

Report on the Free School System in South Carolina. By R. F. W. ALLSTON, Esq. Charleston, S. C.: Miller & Browne, No. 4 Broad Street. 1847.

THE documents mentioned at the head of this article give a sufficiently complete view of the Free School system, as it was originally established, subsequently modified, and now prevails in this State. The first is not, as the title might lead one to suppose, a collection of all the acts and resolutions passed upon the subject, from 1811, when the system was inaugurated, to 1855, when the compilation was ordered to be made, but only of those which are at present of force. As it was designed chiefly for the use and guidance of the District Commissioners, whatever would swell the bulk, without increasing the convenience of the pamphlet, as a manual for them, has been excluded. It is a complete body of the existing laws, but by no means a complete history of the course of legislation. Those intermediate links, the appointment and reports of committees, so important to a full understanding of the progress of events, indicating at once the need and preparing the way for the successful introduction of change, are all omitted, together with those temporary provisions, if there were any, which expired with the occasion that gave them birth. The title of the pamphlet should be changed to correspond with the real nature of its contents.

The origin of the second document in our series is this: in 1838, the Legislature appointed forty-six Commissioners, one from each district and parish in the State, except St. Philip's and St. Michael's, from which there were two, "to examine and revise the Free School system," and to report to the Governor, each individually, "such amendments and alterations as, in his opinion, were useful." The Governor was also requested to put these reports into the hands of a competent commission of one or more persons, who were to devise and digest a system for the consideration of the next Legislature. Twenty-six of these commissioners reported; their reports were submitted to Professors Elliott and Thornwell, who, in turn, executed the task assigned to them; their report, together with those of the commissioners, was laid before

the Committee of Education in the Legislature, whose report upon all the documents in question concluded the matter. The Legislature did nothing but order the publication of all the reports; and that publication is the document which we have placed as the second in our list. It is an interesting pamphlet, containing the commentaries of twenty-six intelligent men upon the nature and operations of the Free School system, together with suggestions which reveal the real wants of the State, and indicate the measures by which these wants can be most effectually supplied.

The third pamphlet in our rubric, the report of the Honourable R. F. W. Allston, was prepared at the request of the State Agricultural Society, and is a very satisfactory account of our legislation upon the subject up to the time of the report in 1847. It aims particularly to expose the defects of the system, which it has done with signal ability. But Col. Allston was not content to pull down, without being able to rebuild; he shows us the antidote in connection with the evil. We sympathize with the zeal for popular instruction which pervades his tract, and, though we cannot accord with all the measures he recommends, we honour the heart that conceived them, and admire the singleness of aim that proposed them. If we had a few more like-minded men in the Legislature, our system of public instruction, in a few years, would become as adequate and thorough as the circumstances of our people would permit. Col. Allston, it is obvious, has no personal ends of distinction or ambition to gratify; he looks exclusively to the public good, and is prepared for any scheme, whether originated by himself or others, that shall give a reasonable promise of promoting it.

These publications afford a gratifying proof that South Carolina has not been infected with the apathy, which has sometimes been ascribed to her, in relation to popular instruction. The subject has engaged her anxious attention; she has expended no little thought and reflection upon it, invoked the wisdom of public societies and private individuals, and if she has not succeeded in devising a plan commensurate with her wants and resources, her failure cannot be attributed to indifference. From 1811, when she first put her hand to the plough, to the present hour, she has kept the question steadily before her; and though she has fallen very far below the standard of her own expectations, it is an extravagant statement to affirm that she has done nothing, that all her care and expenditures have ended in failure. Considered in the light of an adequate provision for the elementary education of the people, the Free School system is chargeable certainly with gross and serious defects; considered as a scheme for the benefit of the poor and needy, it has just as certainly rescued thousands from the doom of hopeless ignorance, and been the first step in the ascent of others to honours, usefulness, and fame. It has let down a rope

into the sinks of poverty by which a few gifted minds have been drawn up into the clear light and bracing air of learning, refinement, and elegance. The ransom of these minds has been worth more than the whole amount appropriated by the commonwealth. Besides this, the Free School fund has been a blessing to the community at large in many neighbourhoods, which were too thinly settled to support a teacher by their own contributions. The bounty of the State has eked out their deficiency, and kept up a good school, where one could not otherwise have been maintained. In these respects the appropriation has not been in vain. It is the language of exaggeration, and not of truth and soberness, to condemn it wholesale, as an idle waste of the public money. It is something gained that there should be a standing confession of the obligation of the State to provide for popular instruction; something that thousands, to whom the book of knowledge would have been forever sealed, have actually been taught the rudiments of learning; and something better still, that here and there, a few generous minds have had a fire kindled within them, which never ceased to burn, until they themselves became lights in the world.

The causes which have principally obstructed the progress of improvement, notwithstanding the solicitude and exertions both of the Legislature and individuals, have been a mistaken spirit of economy, and division of opinion as to what should be the real object of the system. It is impossible to obviate the defects of the existing scheme, or to institute another of greater efficiency and energy, without much larger means than the Free School appropriation amounts to; and as the frugal habits of our people are somewhat slow in recognizing the necessity of additional demands upon the public purse, which they resolutely identify with their own private pockets, things are doomed to "continue as they were, when the fathers fell asleep." A question has been raised as to the seat of honour; some have lodged it in one organ, and some in another; some have placed it before, and some behind; but if the part in which the spirit of liberty is most sensitive, be a just criterion for determining the place of its residence, there can be no doubt that its chosen retreat is the purse. The freeman is distinguished by the tenacity with which he holds its strings, and that bold look of defiance, with which he lifts it up and shakes it, as much as to say, No fingers can enter here but mine! As the badge of slavery is to have no pocket of one's own, the impression prevails, perhaps very justly, that in proportion as the government is permitted to fumble with the purses of the people, it is permitted to tamper with the spirit of independence; and that, therefore, the safest way of preserving the liberties is to take good care of the pockets of the people. Hence as, in this country, we love freedom "above all earthly

dignities," we have a holy horror of anything that involves the expenditure of public money, and nothing but the sternest plea of necessity can ever justify the slightest approximation to the tyranny of new appropriations. They are to be repelled as assaults upon the citadel of freedom. They must be eyed with watchful jealousy, and questioned with inquisitorial rigour; and if they cannot prove their intent to be honourable and loyal, woe to the unlucky wight, who has been beguiled into their support! Our sturdy yeomen of the up-country realize the fable of Argus in their sagacious vigilance against those sly encroachments of despotism by which, under the pretexes of generous and noble enterprises, the government contrives to worm its fingers into the sacred ark of freedom. They are not to be caught with chaff; and as the wolf in the fable, while he admitted that, in itself considered, it was a very good thing to be fat, still persisted, that if the blessing were to be purchased with a chain, it were better to be lean, and hungry, and free, than fat with a master; so our sturdy republican sovereigns cheerfully accede to all that is said in praise of education and popular improvement in the abstract, while they as stoutly maintain, that if these benefits are to be obtained by lank purses, it is better to have less learning and more gold. One is an airy and the other a substantial good. So infectious is the spirit of liberty, in this form of its manifestation, that it even extends to those who have neither breeches nor pockets of their own; the veritable *sansculottes*, whose zeal is, consequently, a disinterested service for friends and neighbours more highly favoured than themselves, or a Platonic admiration of the principle of the exclusive right of every man to finger his own purse. The most impassioned denunciations, which it has ever been our fortune to hear, of the tyranny of taxes, and of the oppression of the poor by the iron hand of government, for the benefit of an imagined aristocracy, were spontaneous bursts of patriotism that gushed from the bosoms of those, who were precisely in the condition to sing before the robber, and who, in their own proper persons, never had been, and, in all human probability, never would be, accosted by a publican, if their days should be protracted to the age of Methusaleh. The vehemence of their zeal keeps pace with their exemption from the imputation of selfish and interested motives. In proportion as the purse becomes literally trash, a fierce defence of its rights becomes exclusively a matter of principle. But whatever may be the cause, whether the spirit of freedom or the love of money, whenever a scheme is projected that demands a large outlay of means, it is approached with fear and trembling. No responsibility seems to be so terrible to our legislators, as that in regard to appropriations. Even in emergencies which justify themselves, and in reference to which it would seem hardly possible to entertain a doubt, the frown of

the present generation has sometimes been averted by saving its pocket, and transferring the burden to posterity.

That the evil has been more imaginary than real, and that, in many instances, the contracted sentiments attributed to constituents have been only the reflection of the principles and motives of narrow representatives, we suspect admits of little doubt. There is, very properly, a repugnance to lavish and foolish expenditures, and no appropriations are likely to meet with popular favour, nor is it desirable that they should, unless their conduciveness to the public good can be satisfactorily evinced. But there is a class of politicians who assume to be preëminently the friends and guardians of the people, and who, incapable of originating any wise or liberal measures, or of rising to distinction as real benefactors to the State, seek their own personal promotion by pandering to the lowest and most vulgar prejudices, and concentrate their whole zeal for popular rights in their zeal for the public purse. It is these vile demagogues, who, by taking advantage of a natural prudence, create the difficulty; and, when they have made it, use it as an instrument of power. They care nothing for the people, or the treasury—they think only of themselves; and whenever a policy, too broad for their limited vision, too liberal for their selfish aims, and too pure for their corrupt principles, is proposed by the real friends of popular improvement, these harpies at once undertake to defile it by their foul insinuations, and, under the specious pretence of frugality and economy, to render it odious to the public mind. These owls and bats, unable to cope with his daring flight, and afraid of losing their own precarious position, determine, in solemn conclave, that the eagle is blind, and deter the birds of feebler wing from following his guidance. We are perfectly willing to trust the people, whenever a cause can get a fair hearing before them, but we are not willing to trust their parasites and flatterers.

The other cause which has retarded the progress of improvement, is a division of opinion as to what ought to be the object of the Free School system. Some think that the Legislature should confine itself exclusively to the eleemosynary instruction of the indigent; that the system should be for paupers, and for none others, and that those who are able to pay for tuition, should be left to make their own arrangements for the education of their children. Others, on the contrary, maintain that provisions for education should be general, that no difference should be made betwixt the rich and poor, that all should be regarded simply as children of the commonwealth, and as members of the same family, should receive the same care. The inability to agree upon the fundamental principle of the system, has defeated successive efforts for its improvement. The friends of common education will consent to no measures that look to the final and permanent establishment of a mere pauper scheme—the advocates of the pauper

scheme, on the other hand, are as obstinate against any arrangement that looks to the introduction of common schools. The existing system, as actually administered, is a pauper system; as originally established by law, it was meant to be a common school system. The act of 1811 was devised as the entering wedge of a comprehensive plan for general education; but, as a preference was justly and wisely given by the statute, while the provision was yet inadequate for all, to the children of the poor, the temporary exception has been converted into the rule, and an incidental concession into the determining principle of the act.

The reports before us show that there is a marked difference of opinion as to the extent to which the State should interfere with the interests of education. Some of the commissioners are almost prepared for the adoption, out and out, of the system which prevails in Prussia; others endorse the principle, but acknowledge that the details must be considerably modified to suit the exigencies of our people; while others are equally clear that the poor and destitute are the only proper objects of legislative care; that the system should not only be adjusted with exclusive reference to them, but that measures should even be taken to separate them from the children of the rich, in the process of education, so as to save them from those mortifying comparisons, which might lead them from a foolish pride to forego their advantages. While such discrepancies obtain, it were, of course, hopeless to expect a more efficient and energetic system. The Legislature must be agreed as to what it should do before it sets about it. This has been no imaginary impediment; it blocked the wheels of improvement in 1839, in 1853, and will continue to block them until the question is settled. The preliminary point must be determined, of pauper schools or common schools, before a single effective step can be taken for general education beyond the present provision. This point settled, the greatest difficulty we shall then have to contend with, in the way of legislation, is the difficulty of reaching, in an easy and quiet way, the "sinews of war."

Before proceeding to indicate the course which, in our judgment, the State ought to pursue, it may be well to state what the present system really is, and what are the defects which are generally and justly attributed to it. We cannot do better than to avail ourselves of the excellent summary of Col. Allston, simply inserting in the place of the old appropriation the change which was made in 1852:

"The whole of the South Carolina Free School system is comprised in a Board of Commissioners (from *three to thirteen* in number, appointed by joint resolution of the Legislature every three years,) in each election district; each Commissioner being entitled to three trustees to aid him in the discharge of his responsible and gratuitous duties; and in the appro-

priation by the State, of the sum of six hundred dollars for each member of the House of Representatives, to be expended by the several Boards of Commissioners respectively, and accounted for by them to the Legislature at every annual session; failing which account, no new appropriation is made for the defaulting district!

The powers and duties of the commissioners are:

1. To determine the situation of schools.
2. To divide the election district into divisions, assigning to each division one commissioner with the delegated powers of the Board and three Trustees.
3. To appoint schoolmasters, after having examined the individual applicants, and to remove them.
4. To decide on the admission of scholars—trustees to recommend such as they deem fit.
5. To arrange the system of instruction until *some general system be organized.*
6. To unite the Free School fund apportioned to their respective boards, with the funds of private schools for the purpose of instructing as many poor scholars as it will pay for.*
7. To draw on the State Treasury, for the specific sum due, in favour of each teacher, naming him, the number of his school, division, and his time of service.
8. To superintend, generally, the management of the schools in their respective districts.

9. On the fourth Monday in October, to make a regular return to the Legislature, or to *such person as the Legislature may appoint*—of the number of months each school has been kept open—of the number of scholars attending each—of the sums drawn for, on account of each school; ‘and may transmit any observations on the state or regulations of the schools, which may appear to them necessary or important.’†

Penalties on Commissioners of Free Schools, are,

1. If they refuse to serve, twenty dollars each.
2. For failing to attend a meeting of the Board, five dollars each.
3. For neglect of duties, or abuse of powers, from twenty to fifty dollars each, by indictment.
4. For failing to make their return as required by law, fifty dollars on each member of the Board, by indictment.
5. It is the duty of the *Comptroller General*, to direct the *Solicitor of the Circuit*, to bring suit for the recovery of all sums which may have been drawn by any Board of Commissioners of Free Schools, and not accounted for by a regular return, and each Commissioner is made liable for the amount of arrears.

On inspection, and with an acknowledgment of the valuable features

* This plan is pursued throughout the greater portion of the State, and it is a saying in many of the upper districts, that they “*have no Free Schools!*” One of the greatest obstacles to the appointment of a Superintendent is to be found in the jealousy of being overlooked by a public officer, on the part of those interested in these private schools, both principal and supporters.

† Act of 1811, section xii.

of the Acts of 1811 and 1835, the defects of this system will be obvious to every thinking man, who gives his mind to the subject.

The first and chief of these is the want of due and efficient organization. It is without a superintending head, a director, a centre of communication, of accountability, of responsibility. If without such an officer it can be called an established system, it is a lame and imperfect one, depending for success and usefulness entirely on the character and peculiar devotion of the several (45) Boards of Commissioners.

2. It is without adequate support. Funds are wanting to furnish the imperfect and inefficient facilities now enjoyed by a comparative few, to scores of thousands. The number of scholars returned by the commissioners last year, and these, with a few exceptions, for not more than half the year, is about 9,000. By the United States' census of 1840, the number of children in this State, over the age of five years, and under twenty, after deducting all those who are returned as going to schools, academies, and colleges, is near eight times as great.

3. It lacks a most important feature, namely, a law providing for the establishment and maintenance of one or more Normal Schools—a law which has been, or will be found necessary to the due organization, and successful action of every system of public instruction.

4. It lacks a provision for supplying the schools with books, both such as are necessary to the most ordinary, elementary teachings, and such too as are either necessary or highly useful for the progressive education of their pupils past and present."

With these suggestions of Col. Allston we most cordially concur; but we cannot admit that the remedies proposed will render the Free School system of South Carolina "as complete, as successful, and as useful, as the warmest friend among the honourable statesmen who originated it, may have dreamed of as barely possible," unless Free School is taken in the wide sense which it bears in the act of 1811. It there evidently means a school which is open to all, in opposition to private schools, on the one hand, and special schools, on the other. As we have already intimated, the authors of the law contemplated the ultimate establishment of a general and adequate system of Common Schools; they aimed to bring the whole subject of education under the care and supervision of the State, and we have no doubt, that if the Act had been executed according to its true intent and meaning, and public schools had been established in every district of the State, corresponding to the number of members in the House of Representatives, the advantages would have been so conspicuous, that the Legislature could not have stopped, until the means of instruction had been afforded to every neighbourhood, to every family, and to every child. The law was wise, it was strictly tentative and provisional, but its benevolent intention has been defeated by the advantages incidentally conceded to the indigent and necessitous. That we have not misapprehended its ultimate scope, is

manifest from the third section, which expressly provides, "That every citizen of this State shall be entitled to send his or her child or children, ward or wards, to any free school in the district where he or she may reside, free from any expense whatsoever, on account of tuition; and where more children shall apply for admission at any one school than can be conveniently educated therein, a preference shall always be given to poor orphans and the children of indigent and necessitous parents." The Act contains hints, too, which Col. Allston has signalized by italics, of a more perfect organization to be instituted at some future day. The seventh section gives to the commissioners the power of arranging the system of instruction "*until some general system be organized,*" the twelfth section requires an annual return to the Legislature, or "*to any person whom the Legislature may appoint,*" evidently looking to a superintendent, or minister of public instruction. The private opinions of the author of the Act, the late Stephen Elliot, *clarum et venerabile nomen*, are well known. His splendid article on Education in Germany, in the old Southern Review could not have been written by a man who was not heart and soul in favour of making the whole business of education a department of State. He shows himself imbued with the spirit which pervades the Prussian laws.

We have no faith, therefore, in any measures for the reform of the Free School system which propose to leave it to its present partial and exclusive operation. It must be made general, or the benefits can never be extended much beyond what they are at present. The class which it contemplates is too small and scattered to be animated with the spirit of ardent competition; life and energy, the love of learning and of excellence, can only be infused into it by bringing it into contact with the other members of the community, and elevating its aspirations and its aims. The prejudice against Common Schools which still prevails in certain sections of this State, though it does not arise, as the enemies of our institutions are willing to suspect, from the lingering remnants of aristocratic pride, is yet greatly to be deplored. It is unreasonable in itself, and injurious in its consequences. We think that we shall render a real service to the commonwealth, and promote the highest interests of education, if we can contribute anything to the removal of this prejudice, and prepare the way for the introduction of a general and thorough scheme of public instruction on the part of the State.

The principle which distinguishes the works in which the government should engage from those which should be left to private enterprise, or to individual energy and skill, is very explicit. Political philosophers are agreed that, from the very constitution of the State, the ends and purposes for which it exists, whatever conduces to the public good and cannot be achieved by the

separate or combined exertions of individuals, it is the right and duty of the State to undertake. The principle is clear and obvious enough, but its application is fraught with no little perplexity and trouble. It is not always easy to determine what institutions are public benefits, or whether the advantages to be derived from them are commensurate with the expenditures involved; neither is it easy to define by precise rules the limits of individual or private competency. Hence, the very philosophers who are agreed in enunciating the maxim which measures the right of State interference, differ among themselves when they encounter the problem of the extent to which it should exercise the right on the subject of education. Some have gone the length of consolidating all parental rights in the authority of the government, and of recommending to it the watchful and minute inspection of the rising generation which pertains to parents and guardians. The most extravagant statement of this opinion which we have ever seen in any modern writer untinctured with agrarianism, occurs in a passage, quoted by Dugald Stewart, from a work of Dr. John Brown, and which we give as we find it: "It is deeply to be regretted, that the British system of policy and religion is not upheld in its native power, like that of Sparta, by correspondent and effectual rules of education; that it is in the power of every private man to educate his child, not only without a reverence for these, but in absolute contempt of them; and that at the revolution in 1688, the education of youth was still left in an imperfect state; this great revolution having confined itself to the reform of public institutions, without ascending to the great fountain of political security, the private and effectual formation of the public mind. The chief and essential remedy of licentiousness and faction, the fundamental means of the lasting and secure establishment of civil liberty, can only be in a general and prescribed improvement of the laws of education, to which all the members of the community should legally submit; and it is for want of a prescribed code of education, that the manners and principles on which alone the State can rest, are ineffectually instilled, are vague, fluctuating, and self-contradictory. Nothing is more evident, than that some reform on this great point is necessary for the security of public freedom; and that, though it is an incurable defect of our political state, that it has not a correspondent and adequate code of education *inwrought* into its first essence; we may yet hope, that in a secondary and inferior degree, something of this kind may yet be *inlaid*; that though it cannot have that perfect efficacy, as if it had originally been of the piece, yet, if well conducted, it may strengthen the weaker parts, and alleviate defects, if not completely remove them."

This Spartan theory is one extreme; the other is hardly less extravagant, which denies to the State any right of interference

at all, and remits the whole business of education, in all its stages, from the highest to the lowest, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the family, or the church. Intermediate betwixt these extremes, are the sentiments of those who, on the one hand, without entrenching upon parental authority, make it incumbent upon the government to provide the means of universal instruction, and of those, on the other, who devolve upon the State the interests of lower, and reserve to the exertions of private individuals, singly or combined, the care of higher education. The first, which makes education in all its amplitude, a legitimate concern of the government, is the predominant opinion on the continent of Europe, underlies the whole German system, and has found an advocate in names no less distinguished than those of Sir Wm. Hamilton and Dr. Lieber.* The other, which distributes the duty, according to an obvious division of the subject, is the opinion of Smith, and, perhaps, of Dugald Stewart. Both parties, however, are agreed that the real question, upon which the decision of the controversy should turn, is, whether the superintending care of government is an advantage or not? What private enterprise can accomplish without public aid, should be exempt from legislative interference: what the government can do better, provided it is a thing which should be done at all, should be done by the government. The question, therefore, is narrowed down to the single point, as to which is likely to conduct with most efficiency and success, the business of education—the State or individuals?

In relation to lower education, as we have said, there is no difference of opinion. Smith explicitly affirms that this is a subject "which requires the attention of the public," and recommends "the establishing in every parish or district of a little school, where children may be taught for a reward so moderate, that even a common labourer may afford it—the master being partly, but not wholly paid by the public; because if he was wholly, or even principally paid by it, he would soon learn to neglect his business."† Dugald Stewart is equally explicit, that "it is necessary for government to bestow such a systematical attention on

* "If society be convinced," says Dr. Lieber, *Political Ethics*, part i, book ii, chap. v, § xi, "that institutions of deep learning, universities, are of absorbing importance to society, because science must always be far in advance of practice, and because the cultivation of the sciences for their own sake, and not with a confined view of immediate practical application, raises the standard of knowledge in general, is a great blessing to a community, and if the State be convinced that private means must ever be insufficient for the erection of a university, and the collection of large libraries, museums, &c., or if experience have shown that private exertion will not be directed to the foundation of a university, then the State has precisely the same right, and the same obligation to found a university as it has to aid in the foundation of common schools, or hospitals, courts, pilots, or armies."

† *Wealth of Nations*, book v, chap. i, art. ii.

the education of the people, as may afford the means of instruction even to the lowest classes of the community. In the present state of society," he adds soon afterwards, "this may be regarded as one of the most effectual objects of legislation; and the happy effects resulting from the establishments (however imperfect), for that purpose, in Scotland and America, give the strongest encouragement to the further prosecution of the same plan on more liberal principles."* To these testimonies may be added that of M. Say: "But, in the vast machinery of national production, the mere manual labourer is so placed as to earn little or nothing more than a bare subsistence. The most he can do is, to rear his young family, and bring them up to some occupation; he cannot be expected to give them that education which we have supposed the well-being of society to require. If the community wish to have the benefit of more knowledge and intelligence in the labouring classes, it must dispense it at the public charge. This object may be obtained by the establishment of primary schools, of reading, writing, and arithmetic. These are the groundwork of all knowledge, and are quite sufficient for the civilization of the lower classes. In fact, one cannot call a nation civilized, nor, consequently possessed of the benefits of civilization, until the people at large be instructed in these three particulars; till then it will be but partially reclaimed from barbarism. With the help of these advantages alone, it may safely be affirmed, that no transcendent genius or superior mind will long remain in obscurity, or be prevented from displaying itself to the infinite benefit of the community. The faculty of reading alone will, for a few dollars, put a man in possession of all that eminent men have said or done, in the line to which the bent of genius impels. Nor should the female part of the creation be shut out from this elementary education; for the public is equally interested in their civilization; and they are indeed the first, and often the only teachers of the rising generation. It would be more unpardonable in government to neglect the business of education, and abandon to their present ignorance the great majority of the population in those nations of Europe, that pretend to the character of refinement and civilization, now that the improved methods of mutual instruction, that have been tried with such complete success, afford a ready and most economical means of universally diffusing knowledge amongst the inferior classes."†

These extracts, while they distinctly recognise the principle that the State is at liberty to sustain every institution of public utility which cannot be supported by private enterprise or indivi-

* Works, Hamilton's edition, vol. viii, p. 49.

† Polit. Econ., book iii, chap. vi.

dual exertion, expressly comprehend, under that category, provisions for the instruction of the common people. This title, let it be remembered, is not to be confined to the indigent and necessitous; it is by no means synonymous with paupers, but embraces all those who are not exempted, by their condition, from the necessity of labour, including as well those who are possessed of moderate means as those who are dependent for their daily bread upon their daily toil. As we have, in this country, no artificial distinctions of society, the common people of Europe correspond to that large and important class among us, whose fortunes are not sufficient to absolve them from care in relation to themselves and their children; our small farmers, mechanics, and shopkeepers, all, in other words, who cannot, according to the standard of the country, be pronounced rich. Schools for the instruction of the common people in Europe would be common schools among us. The weight of authority, therefore, is in favour of such institutions: they come under the law which determines the right of the State to interfere. They are a great public interest, which cannot be adequately promoted without the supervision of the government.

As, in our opinion, education is a whole, and should not be distributed into independent portions; and as we are equally clear that the regulation and controul of it, in all its departments, constitute one of the most sacred functions of the commonwealth, we shall not be particular, in illustrating our views, to confine the discussion to common schools. The same arguments by which political philosophers vindicate the necessity of national establishments for lower education, prove the importance of them for higher culture. The aid of the public is as essential to the well-being of the college and university, as to the being of the common school. The difference is in degree, and nothing else. Higher education may exist, but it will exist in languor and decrepitude—the lower can hardly be said to exist at all—without the fostering care of the State. The reasoning of Smith, which construes into a positive disadvantage the interference of the government in higher instruction, is founded upon a double misconception—an error of principle and an error of fact;—an error of principle, in supposing that in this as in other departments of effort, the reciprocal relations of demand and supply are sufficient to stimulate private competition to furnish all the facilities that may be needed for teaching all the knowledge that may be wanted. He forgot, as Sir William Hamilton has justly remarked, that, in the matter of education, “demand and supply are necessarily coëxistent and coëxtensive; that it is education which creates the want which education only can satisfy.” An error of fact, in supposing that the abuses which have crept into the great universities of England, were occasioned by their relations to the State—that their chartered privileges have produced their comparative inefficiency. On the contrary, these abuses have

resulted from the neglect of the State, from the subversion, by private influence, of the public constitution, and can only be removed by a more constant, steady, and systematic supervision on the part of the government. The cases of Oxford and Cambridge, rightly understood, make rather against, than in favour of, the hypothesis of Smith ; but, in any event, a general principle cannot be safely collected from a single example.

A very little consideration, it seems to us, ought to be sufficient to satisfy any impartial inquirer, that an adequate scheme of instruction can neither be originally organized, nor successfully prosecuted, without the vigorous coöperation of the State ; and that upon two grounds, the magnitude of the interests involved, and the necessity of a division of labour, in order to infuse life, energy, and the spirit of improvement into the working of the system. Education is a vast and complicated subject ; it includes many more elements than the perfunctory employment of a teacher with full authority to administer, according to his own discretion, either birch or knowledge in his noisy mansion. The qualifications of the teacher, moral and intellectual, the accommodations of his mansion, are themselves far more important matters than those are apt to apprehend, who look upon the school-room as a convenient relief from the rattle and mischief of vexatious urchins. The conditions, too, of successful teaching and successful learning, whether in relation to the instruments employed, as books, maps, globes, and blackboards ; or in relation to the mode of instruction, as accommodated to the age and capacities of the child, and promoting a regular and healthful evolution of its faculties ; or in relation to discipline, as suited to the temper and disposition of the pupils, and fitted to impart a habit of diligence and a love of learning, are never likely to be appreciated, much less exacted, where every neighbourhood is permitted to walk in the light of its own eyes, and after the imagination of its own heart. The truth is, the theory which abandons the whole matter to private competition, practically entrusts it to the supreme direction of the teacher himself. He prescribes the books ; he arranges the studies ; he institutes his rules ; he is an absolute monarch in his little empire ; and, as love of variety obtains as strongly in regard to schoolmasters as in reference to other less important concerns, it is not unfrequently the case that, in some neighbourhoods, the whole machinery of instruction is changed every year. To talk of a *system*, under such circumstances, is perfectly preposterous. The only thing which is regular and uniform, is the agreement of the patrons to be responsible for the salary of the master. He must attend to everything else.

To those who have witnessed the state of things in Germany, in the Northern States of our confederacy, in any country in which education is made a department of the government, and

compared it with the workings of the voluntary system ; who have seen, in the one case, the pains taken in the preparation and trial of teachers, the attention paid to school architecture, the attractions thrown around the schoolroom, and the appliances for facilitating both the business of learners and teachers ; and have contrasted the life, energy, and spirit everywhere displayed, with the stagnant uniformity which the other case as universally presents, there needs no other argument. They have but to look on this picture, and then on that. No wonder that our children, with their bright morning faces, so often realize Shakspeare's description—"creeping like snail, unwillingly to school." There is nothing in the associations of the place to invite either mind or body : "the dismal situation waste and wild," deserves the name which common consent has affixed to it, and we cannot but admire the instinctive sense of fitness which has appropriated these dungeons of the young to localities which the plough has deserted to broomsedge and rabbits.

We remember well the place where our own ideas were first taught to shoot—a log cabin, about eighteen by twenty, the chinks stopped with wood and daubed with clay. One end was almost wholly taken up in a fireplace, in the jambs of which, Noah and his family might have been comfortably accommodated. The chimney was a pen constructed of billets of wood, and open on the side which faced the room, and, though protected from the fire by a thick lining of clay, the destructive element had contrived to elude all obstructions, and to open sundry communications, like that of Pyramus and Thisbe, with the oxygen without. The other end was adorned with a window, a genuine opening, which made no distinction between the air and light, and which scorned the modern contrivances by which one could be admitted to the exclusion of the other. Midway, on one side, was the door, creaking on wooden hinges, and near it, there hung, except when it was in use (and that was not seldom—for, in schoolboy phrase, it was kept hot), a forked stick, which served as a pass to all whom nature or idleness rendered uneasy in their straitened circumstances. No one ever dared to leave the room, however stringent the call, when that stick was missing from its peg.

The other side was minus a log ; the vacant space being used as a light to the general writing-desk of the school, which consisted of a plank extended horizontally the whole length of the room. At a given signal, every member of our little establishment was required to take down his copy-book, put himself at this desk, and set about the serious operation of chirography. During this exercise, our backs were turned to the master ; and well do we recollect the generous indignation with which we looked upon his unfairness in stealing up behind us, slyly inspecting our performances, and, when they were not to his mind, giving us a demon-

stration of his presence, which left the fingers in unfortunate trim for further achievements. *Horresco referens*—our knuckles ache now, albeit more than thirty winters have passed over our heads, when we think of that formidable ruler. What multiplied the danger of slips (the technical name for every kind of blunder, from a mistake in spelling to a mistake in marking), was the manner in which we kept our ink. We had to put it in small vials, and as they were easily upset, we guarded against the chances of loss, by putting in enough of cotton to absorb it. It not unfrequently happened, that in squeezing out the ink, a small fragment of the cotton would stick to the pen, and the consequence was a mark, a huge sprawl, which sad experience taught us was like the seal of fate. Our benches had the merit of training us to early habits of self-denial and mortification of the flesh; we are sure that, for the first year of our schoolboy experience, our feet never rested on the floor when our thighs and legs made any assignable angle; and the only relief we could obtain when the forked stick was missing, was to convert our bodies into an inclined plane, by propping the small of the back against the edge of the bench.

Our dominie was, in many respects, a good-natured man, but even Job's patience could not have been proof against the trials he endured in the grievous misprints of text-books. By some odd fatality, every hard sum in Daboll's Arithmetic had the answer wrong; and we shall never forget the earnestness with which the good old man, after having tugged for hours over a tough question which had stumped our feebler capacities, would expatiate upon the blunders of Daboll, and the merits of Pike, the book which he had studied, and which he recommended to us as the very pink of perfection in figures. Misfortunes, however, never come single; a copy of Pike was at length procured; we prized it as a treasure, and bore it in triumph to our venerable teacher. His eyes glistened with delight, and we reciprocated his joy, in the hope that the course of arithmetic, unlike that of true love, might for once run smooth. *O fallacem hominum spem, fragilemque fortunam!* What was our consternation and amazement, when we found upon trial that we were still the sport of mischievous printers, and that every hard sum, even in Pike, had the answer wrong!

Our teacher was skilled in Latin; but he would never consent to use any other copies of the classics but those of Clark, which contained the text and an English translation in parallel columns. In justice, however, to his prudence, we must say, that he always advised us to put our hands over the English when we were studying the Latin—a thing which we never failed to do when we went to recite, provided we had gotten the English by heart; but, by a singular coincidence, whenever our memories were treacherous, our fingers were slippery. One exercise of the school, at least, was a

hearty one—the closing labour of the day. At a given hour, the teacher vociferated at the top of his voice “spellings,” and every urchin flew like lightning to his dictionary. The scene that ensued beggars all description; it was not exactly like the roar of many waters, or the sound of mighty thunderings, but there was a noise—and such a noise as threw Bedlam into the shade: and what a glorious time was that, when, at the close of the lesson there was a general rush, first for hats, caps, and bonnets, buckets, baskets, and bottles—and then for the door!

This was what is called an old field school; and we have reason to suspect that such institutions are something more than traditions of the past. For two years we are sure that we never saw the face of a patron within the walls of the cabin. It was a wealthy neighbourhood; two of the trustees, if trustees they might be called, were worth a hundred negroes apiece; and they had sons who were here receiving the elements, on which a liberal education was to be afterwards engrafted. They had confidence in the master, and they left everything to his discretion. They had done their part when they employed him and gave him a place to teach in. There may be exceptions to this lax method of proceeding—cases in which a real supervision is exercised, but they are only exceptions, and not the rule. The voluntary system, for the most part, terminates the care and the responsibilities of the neighbourhood in the settlement of the teacher. He makes no complaint of his accommodations—it is not his place; he is satisfied with whatever text-books are at hand, or those which are most familiar to himself, and institutes such discipline as his own indolence and desire of pleasing may suggest, without reference to the dispositions, capacities, and aptitudes of the child.

But even if the principle of private competition did well what it undertakes to do, which is far from being the case, it must still be pronounced a failure, because, in so many instances, it is incompetent to establish a school at all. It makes no provision for those thinly settled neighbourhoods in which, though each parent is able to pay for the tuition of his children, their combined contributions are not sufficient to support a teacher, nor their means to justify extraordinary subscriptions. In political economy there is no demand without a remunerating price, and where everything is resolved into the principle of private competition, the districts which cannot pay, must be practically regarded as out of the market. In other instances, resort is had to the boarding-school, or domestic tutors; the one full of danger at the most precious season of life, when the influence of the family is most needed; and the other, as monotonous and lifeless, as the absence of all competition can make it. Both are evils to which no State should subject its members.

On all these accounts we have no hesitation in denouncing the voluntary system as contradicted by fact. Nothing but the most profound ignorance of what a system of education really implies, could ever induce one to believe that the voluntary principle is adequate to meet the exigencies of the State. All experience is against it. Wherever it has been tried, it has proved a failure. We are happy in being able to confirm this statement by the high authority of Sir William Hamilton :

“ No countries present a more remarkable contrast in this respect than England and Germany. In the former, the State has done nothing for the education of the people, and private benevolence more than has been attempted elsewhere ; in the latter, the government has done everything, and left to private benevolence almost nothing to effect. The English people are, however, the lowest, the German people the highest, in the scale of knowledge. All that Scotland enjoys of popular education above the other kingdoms of the British Empire, she owes to the State ; and among the principalities of Germany, from Prussia down to Hesse-Cassel, education is uniformly found to prosper exactly in proportion to the extent of interference, and to the unremitted watchfulness of government. The general conclusion against the expediency of all public regulation of the higher instruction, is wholly drawn from particular instances of this regulation having been inexpediently applied. Even of these, the greater number are cases in which the State, having once conceded exclusive privileges under well-considered laws, never afterward interposed to see that these laws were duly executed, and from time to time reformed, in accommodation to a change of circumstances. The English universities, it is admitted, do not, as actually administered, merit their monopoly. But, from this example, we would not conclude, with Smith, that all privileged seminaries are detrimental. On the contrary, by showing that in Oxford and Cambridge the statutory constitution has been silently subverted, we should argue that their corruption does not originate in the law, but in its violation ; and from the fact that, while now abandoned by the State to private abuse, they accomplish nothing in proportion to their mighty means, we should only maintain more strongly the necessity of public regulation and superintendence to enable them to accomplish everything. The interference of the government may sometimes, we acknowledge, be directly detrimental ; and indirectly detrimental we hold that it will always be, unless constant and systematic. The State may wisely establish, protect, and regulate ; but unless it continue a watchful inspection, the protected establishment will soon degenerate into a public nuisance—a monopoly for merely private advantage. The experience of the last half century in Germany, has indeed completely set at rest the question. For thirty years, no German has been found to maintain the doctrine of Smith. In their generous rivalry, the governments of that country have practically shown what a benevolent and prudent policy could effect for the university as for the school ; and knowing what they have done, who is there now to maintain—that for education as for trade, the State can prevent evil, but cannot originate good ? ”

Experience, in this case, only accords with what sound reasoning would lead us to expect. The root of the difficulty lies in the circumstance that there is neither division of labour, nor effective responsibility. There are no persons to whom education is specially committed, whose business it is to superintend it, to promote it, to improve it. Perfection is the result of concentrated effort. What pertains to all will be adequately discharged by none. The effects of the division of labour, so admirably depicted by Adam Smith in the opening chapter of his great work on the Wealth of Nations, are just as conspicuous in the moral and intellectual, as in the physical world. Now, the great benefit of State superintendence is, that it divides the work, or rather separates it from the mass of other occupations ; it singles out particular individuals, to whom it entrusts particular departments, holding them responsible for their diligence, fidelity, and zeal, while the direction of the whole is made the exclusive business of other functionaries. It necessitates thought and system ; and thought and system necessitate improvement. Under the present plan we have poor teachers, because no one is responsible for giving us better ; wretched school-houses, because it is no one's business to give us good ones ; and miserable text-books, because it is neither the duty nor the interest of any one to provide better. Improvements never have taken place anywhere, steadily and consistently, except as the result of division of labour, and consequent responsibility, imposed by the State. Private speculation and private benevolence have never been able to achieve more than a partial success. Ancient prejudices, standing abuses, time-honoured customs, especially when they coöperate with the love of ease, have been too strong for philosophy and common sense, when philosophy and common sense had nothing to recommend them but the authority of truth. There must be a categorical imperative somewhere which can convert reason into law, and assent into obedience. The State is precisely the agent with whom this power should be lodged. Its influence, when judiciously put forth, carries a weight which ignorance and prejudice cannot finally withstand. It can embody the wisdom of all, and, by its pervading organizations, diffuse the life, spirit, and intelligence which anywhere exist into all parts.

What we want, therefore, is a general system, in which the principle of division of labour and official responsibility shall be fully carried out. Other changes are tampering with symptoms ; this would reach the seat of the disease ; new life would gradually be infused into every department of education ; our school-houses would no longer be confined to old fields ; we should hear no more complaints of unsuitable text-books, when fit ones were demanded on a scale that would be likely to remunerate the labours of the writer ; and teachers would be stimulated to unwonted

competition, when their bread was made to depend upon their qualifications as determined by a competent tribunal. This happy transformation, of course, could not take place at once. But the tendencies to it would instantly begin to develope themselves, and these tendencies could not fail to be eventually realized, if the superintendence of the State continued to be wisely, systematically, and steadily exerted. Experience has demonstrated this everywhere. If education is now reduced to a science, it was because the State made it the business of men to study it; and if the art has been carried to a great degree of perfection, it is because the State has instituted the keenest competition among those who were called to practise it. But what single step has the voluntary system ever taken in improvement? It has borrowed all, and originated nothing.

But it may be supposed that all the benefits of State intervention might be secured by confining it still to the necessitous and indigent, perfecting the scheme in reference to them, and leaving it to stimulate individual exertions, in reference to others, by the example of its efficiency and success. To say nothing of the objection, that the most important schools would be detached and independent, destitute of a common spirit and a common life, the materials upon which the State would have to operate would obviously preclude the possibility of success. The class, thus thrown upon its bounty, is proverbially slow to appreciate the benefits of education; the greatest difficulty which the present scheme has had to encounter, has been the difficulty of inducing the poor to accept its advantages; and their reluctance can never be overcome until they learn to set a higher value upon knowledge, or are exempt from the necessity of receiving it as a boon. The only way of exciting in them a generous ambition, is to bring them in contact with their more enlightened neighbours, and to present, as a common right, what, if offered exclusively to them, could be considered only as an alms. A general system, in which rich and poor were put upon the same footing, in which all distinctions of class and fortune were merged in the higher distinction of children of the commonwealth, would awaken a new order of feelings, and arouse a spirit of competition which had never been felt before. The love of knowledge will never spring up spontaneously in them; it must be inspired from without, and the common school seems to us precisely the machinery by which it can be imparted. They will catch the infection of more generous minds. The consequences, too, of this promiscuous training would be most happy in removing absurd and degrading prejudices, harmonizing and smoothing the unevennesses, harshnesses, and inequalities of social life, and in rendering the whole population homogeneous. The rich and the poor would meet together in "kindlier and healthier sympathy," and feel that the Lord was

the Maker of them all. But a system, which perpetuates the distinctions betwixt them, and separates them still more widely from each other by cherishing their prejudices, never can succeed; and such must every system of education be, which looks only to the instruction of the pauper.

We are not familiar with the history of Free Schools in Virginia, but from the following passage in the message of Governor McDowell, for 1843, which we extract from the Journal of the Rhode Island Institute of Instruction, we are inclined to suspect that the experience of that commonwealth confirms the opinion which we have ventured to express:

“Having brought to the notice of the last Legislature the subject of general education and of Free Schools, and recommended it to a consideration it did not receive; I should be faithless to one of my clearest and most honourable duties if I did not present it again, and again invoke for it the care, the thought, and the legislation to which it is entitled. Weighty as this subject confessedly is, and every one feels it to be, and knows it to be, with the safe, just, and enlightened action of popular government, and with all the pursuits of rational and civilized man, and consecrated, too, as it has long been, by an inviolate provision of one of our permanent laws, it is nevertheless sadly neglected in our public councils, and year after year is thrust aside as if it had no admitted place among real and practical things. It would seem as if the very provision which was made for its support years ago, by doing something, had thereby intercepted the larger and more beneficent provision which is necessary to support and nourish it aright. Satisfied, as it would appear, that something had been done, the higher and bolder duty of doing more and more until nothing should remain to be done, has long been pretermitted, and successive legislatures have handed down the existing plan and provision of the law under painful and accumulating proofs of their ruinous insufficiency. When it is considered that this plan of common education has been nearly thirty years in existence; that its whole machinery has become perfectly familiar to those who administer it, and whose duties of administration are enforced by penalties; that its minor defects have been corrected as perceived; that material alterations of structure have been introduced, and that every sufficiency of which it is capable has been given to it by its controlling head, whose system, vigilance and fidelity, which makes him an honour to the government, have been so long and so laboriously devoted to the perfection of this scheme; when this is considered, and it is considered also that there is one in every twelve of our grown-up white population who can neither read nor write; that out of fifty-one thousand poor children for whom this scheme is designed, only twenty-eight thousand have been taught anything at all, and that these have been taught an average period of but sixty days during the past year; when these things are considered, will it be said that the result is satisfactory?—that it demonstrates a condition in this branch of public interest and in the means appropriated to sustain it, with which the legislature and the country ought to be contented? If sixty days’ tuition to one-half of the “indigent”

children of the State is the grand result which our present system is able to accomplish after so many years of persevering efforts to enlarge and perfect its capacities, it is little more than a costly and delusive nullity which ought to be abolished, and another and better one established in its place. Supposing it entirely improbable that the Legislature, partaking in all respects in the hopes and interests of the public, will regard it as a duty to continue a system which operates in such manifest subversion of both, they are earnestly invoked to enter at once upon the work of preparing a better, and of preparing it with the ultimate and comprehensive purpose of extending the rudiments of a cheap, if not free education, to every child in the State."

After proposing a modification of the existing system, which is repeated in his message of 1846, viz., to establish in each county, with the consent of a majority of its tax-payers, free schools for common education, the Governor goes on to remark :

"By associating the people of the several counties, as it is proposed to do, responsibly and intimately with the government in support and administration of their own schools, not only will the general subject of education be kept alive at its proper and fountain head, but the actual education of every one, resting no longer upon the footing of a parental duty alone, will come to be claimed and contended for as a legal right. Should the Legislature regard the plan suggested as worthy of any attempt on its part to elaborate it into a system, a principal recommendation of it is the ease with which it can be converted into one for free education, and it is earnestly hoped, whatever the scale on which it may be thought best to begin, that nothing less wise, patriotic, and perfect than this will be thought of for its final and crowning result. Let your system of primary education, which is supported by the funds and protected by the vigilance of all, be free to all; and it will be found at last not only to be the cheapest and the best, but the surest of any to extinguish that spirit of exclusiveness which the education of a part is certain to inspire, and to nourish amongst our people, from their earliest youth, all the sympathies of mutual interest and dependence. Let it be free, and the poorest and most desolate child in the State will have a dowry in your laws which nothing can wrest from his hands, and never will your own call upon him for service be so legitimate; never can you demand that he shall submit himself, for your sake, to pains and dangers, and death itself, with so perfect a right as when you have sought him out in his hours of helplessness, and ministered to his wants, and have put away from his mind one of the heaviest and bitterest afflictions which orphanage and poverty can bring."

We have now stated our reasons for believing that no important reformation of the Free School system can ever take place, without reverting to the spirit of the act of 1811, and aiming at a complete scheme of general education. The State must recognize education as one of its legitimate functions; it must erect it into a department of the government, and treat it as one of the ends for

which the government exists. Nothing short of this will raise it to the dignity to which it is entitled, or impart to it the energy with which it should be pursued. There is not a principle which makes it the right or duty of the State to embark in any enterprise of public utility, which does not equally apply to this great interest. Private exertions will, no doubt, continue to accomplish something: there are classes in the commonwealth who will have schools at all hazards. But private enterprise would also construct roads and bridges, and contrive some methods of commercial intercourse, if the government should refuse to legislate on highways, or to establish mails and post-offices. But who, in his senses, would maintain that the crazy expedients of individual skill should supersede the care of the State? It is not enough that a great public interest be attended to after a fashion; the State must see that it is well done. The modes of superintendence may be various, according to the nature of the enterprise; but, in every mode the principles must be introduced of the division of labour and of strict accountability. These are the secrets of success. The great and radical defect of the present system is, that, springing from an inadequate conception of the real relations of the State to the subject, it not only fails to recognize the whole duty of the government, but even what is imperfectly attempted, is really, though not formally, undertaken as a compromise with conscience, and, like all compromises, is wanting in the intensity and earnestness which characterize hearty conviction.

The most important benefit which we anticipate from the active coöperation of the State, is the impulse which it is likely to impart to education itself. If the universal education of the people should be found impracticable, if the necessities of labour, or the indolence and apathy, characteristic of ignorance, should still operate to prevent the advantages that are offered from being enjoyed on a scale commensurate with their provision, the energy, efficiency, and system, introduced by the concentration of thought and effort, the scientific accuracy which would pervade and regulate every department of the work, would yet be an ample compensation for the pains and expenditures incurred. It will be a great gain to have teaching studied as a science, and practised as an art; to rescue it from the superficial expedients of pretenders and empirics; to adjust it to the intellectual advancement of the age, and to conduct it by methods in accordance with the philosophy of the human mind. Our complaint against the present order of things is not so much that the facilities of learning are partially diffused—though this is a serious evil—as that the facilities themselves are so far behind the progress of the age, that they cease to deserve the name. Compared with the institutions of those nations whose governments have been faithful to their trust, they are impediments rather than helps. No wonder that the German scholars are so accurate and thorough, when we consider the extent to which

the principle of the division of labour is carried out, not merely in the business of superintending and controlling the establishments of education, but in the still more important duties and functions of the teacher. In the gymnasia and universities, not only each general department, but each branch of every department is committed to a different man. As, according to Smith, in the trifling trade of pin-making, "one draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head:" as in the whole process there are about eighteen distinct operations performed by as many distinct labourers, so in the great business of teaching, as conducted in the German institutions, there is one to teach grammar, and another the principles of literature; one to drill in syntax, and another in taste. Whatever requires different qualifications, though it belongs to the same branch of learning, is assigned to different masters. The consequence is what might be expected, a degree of perfection utterly unknown, and, in the nature of things, incapable of being realized, where the schoolmaster is, as he is for the most part with us—a jack-of-all-trades. We insist upon it that education never can be exalted to the dignity of a liberal art, resting upon philosophical principles, and admitting something of the precision and skill which are attained in other arts, until the same method is applied to it which has stimulated improvement in them; and this method it is idle to expect, until the State takes the matter in its own hands, makes the superintendence of the schools one great business, distributed into different parts, and the internal administration another, subject to the same law of division and subdivision. What perfects the trade of the pinmaker, will perfect the work of the teacher.

It is in the higher culture particularly, that this minute subdivision of labour in the offices of instruction is exacted. Every professor should be thoroughly conversant with his own science. General knowledge is not enough—precise and critical information is demanded. But, unless a man is endowed with the genius and industry of Aristotle, Leibnitz, or Hamilton, it is preposterous to expect that he shall teach well a half dozen different departments, because they happen to belong to the same general division of science or philosophy. Here lies the rock on which private institutions are apt to split. They are often obliged, from the *res angusta domi*, to crowd on one man what ought to be distributed among several. They must, according to the homely proverb, cut their coat according to the cloth; and, as they cannot execute the law on which perfection depends, we must not be surprised at bungling work.

Unless education is to be treated as a whole, and the care of the State extended to every portion of it, the benefits of its superintendence will be manifestly very partial. Especially if higher

education is to be eliminated from its life-giving influences, the most important advantages will fail to be realized; all those which affect the methods of instruction will be lacking where they are most needed; and but little, practically, will be gained, but a wider extension of the opportunities of knowledge. But let its care be universal and all-pervading; let it begin with the common school, and extend to the college or university; let it be a system, in which the principles we have indicated are thoroughly and consistently applied, and the scheme of education will present the picture of a living organism, self-developing and self-expanding, under the influences which sustain it, with each member complete for its own functions, and contributing, at the same time, to the general good of the whole. It is Cousin who has drawn the animating picture of education as a connected work; its various subdivisions so arranged, that each is a whole in itself, while at the same time it constitutes a part of a still greater whole. The lower elementary education, for example, should be so arranged as to be complete for those who aspire to nothing more; it should, likewise, be naturally introductory to a higher culture. It should be a finished whole for one class, and a properly adjusted part for the other. So, also, the higher elementary education, that of the grammar school, should be complete for those who are not looking to a liberal education, and yet, in relation to others, subsidiary to the college, or scientific school. This unity in the midst of variety is the highest conception of organic life, and it is precisely what the interference of the State, wisely put forth, secures to education. It is no longer an aggregate of disjointed fragments, but a living body with living limbs.

The elements of such a scheme already exist among us. We have a college, which it is our paramount interest, and should be our chief ambition to foster and cherish; we have in our military academies an organization for imparting that practical intelligence which is needed to develop the resources, and to direct, productively, the labour of the country; and in the district commissioners for Free Schools, we have a part of the machinery necessary to the successful operation of a system of common schools. All the additional machinery required is a Central Board, with a General Superintendent, and a series of High Schools, in each district of the State. Let a plan like this be put in motion, and the system in South Carolina would be more perfect than that of any other State in the Union; and we do not doubt that it is the very system contemplated by the great mind of Elliott, when he took the first step towards introducing it, with significant hints of the ultimate purpose, in the act of 1811. Our Free, converted into Common, schools, classical academies—our military institutions and the college present a series of establishments for every order of learning, which, if they do not exhaust

the logical conception of a perfect scheme of education, meet the wants and exigencies of our people. We cannot but think that normal schools, although the authority of Colonel Allston is against us, may be dispensed with. We are much pleased with the suggestion of His Excellency Governor Adams, in his first message to the last Legislature, that the Free School Commissioners should be allowed to select indigent boys of extraordinary promise, and send them to the high school and college at the expense of the State, on condition that they devote a term of years after their graduation to the duties of teaching. In this way we might provide ourselves with instructors of much higher character and qualifications than a teachers' seminary would be likely to give us, and the teaching would be to these young men a more effective education than any they had previously received. They would gain as largely as the State. The only satisfactory evidence of the possession of knowledge is the power to communicate it, and the most successful method of acquiring is to impart it. There was sound philosophy in the advice given by Lord Kames to a young man who consulted him as to the best way of studying some science: "Write a book on it," said the venerable judge. The classical reader will call to mind a much higher authority than that of Lord Kames, even the venerable name of Aristotle.

We wish it to be distinctly understood, that the principle upon which we have vindicated an adequate system of public instruction, is that of public duty arising from considerations of public expediency. We have not intimated, neither do we believe, that it rests upon any grounds of private or personal right. We have no sympathy with the agrarian doctrines of Hodgskin, Byllesby, Skidmore, and Ming, as set forth and rebuked in the sixth volume of the Southern Review. We can consistently maintain the duty of the State, without admitting a corresponding right on the part of the people; for though right always implies obligation, obligation does not necessarily correspond to a right. It may be my duty to relieve a beggar in distress, but he certainly has no right to demand my money. So it may be the duty of the State to provide the means of public instruction, but no class of the people can exact it as a right. There is no principle upon which we can establish a right to public education which would not equally justify a right to public maintenance. If all children have a claim to instruction, they have an equal claim to support. But if public expediency, and not private rights, is the sole measure of the duty of the State in this case, these agrarian consequences are easily obviated. It is for the good of the commonwealth to educate, it is not for the good of the commonwealth to support, the children that belong to it. It is not expedient to institute any legislation which operates as a premium upon vice or idleness, and encourages

thoughtless and imprudent marriages. It is not expedient for the State to weaken the motives to parental exertion, or to supersede the obligations of a father to provide for his own offspring. It is not expedient for the State to diminish the inducements to economy and frugality, which would be done by the institution of any policy analogous to Communism. It so happens that the education of his offspring is among the least of the cares which press upon the poor man when he is contemplating marriage, or tempted to fall into habits of profligate dissipation. The considerations which burden him are in relation to sustenance, to food, raiment, and shelter, and if he sees a reasonable prospect of securing these, he is willing, for the most part, to dispense with the article of learning. As long, therefore, as the State imposes the maintenance of his children upon him as his own sacred duty, as long as it holds him to the obligation of attending to the urgent demands of their physical well-being, it may safely provide for their instruction, without materially weakening the motives to parental faithfulness. The State may well undertake to attend to the mind, if the father will attend to the body. That sphere of duty will contain checks enough upon vice and dissipation; or if these checks are found unavailing, solicitude for the education would not prove more successful. The fundamental doctrine of the gentlemen we have named, "that every child born in the State is of *right* entitled to full maintenance, clothing, and education, at the expense of the public until he comes of age," we contemplate with unmitigated horror. It drags along with it, as a necessary corollary from the principle, the other doctrine of the same school, that "all mankind at the age of maturity are entitled to equal property." The distinction we have drawn betwixt a duty founded in right and one founded in expediency, cuts the knot and extricates the interests of general education from any sympathy with Communism. Upon this hypothesis we can consistently affirm with Dr. Cooper, that the State should "provide teachers and apparatus at the public expense, for every branch of knowledge without exception," and at the same time maintain that "our drunken and thievish neighbour has no right to call upon us to feed, clothe, and educate his children."

Our discussion has, of course, gone all along on the supposition that education is a great public blessing. The man who denies this is not deserving of an answer. We know that common schools have been censured for not diminishing the amount of crime, and have even been considered as the causes of the vices which they have failed to extirpate. They have suffered from having been the subjects of most unreasonable expectations, in the first place, and then the victims of a violent reaction when these expectations were proved to be futile. The mistake has been in attributing to education a power which it does not possess—the

power to change the human heart. Common schools are not the Gospel, nor the Holy Spirit; they can neither implant a new nature nor eradicate our inborn propensities to evil; and to anticipate from them what every distinctive feature of Christianity teaches us to ascribe to the effectual working of Divine grace, is at once to deny the essential malignity of sin, and the wisdom and fitness of the whole economy of redemption. The common school has not been appointed to regenerate the race—it moves in an humbler sphere; its primary business is with the understandings, the intellects of men: and that knowledge is a good, an end, to which we are adapted from the very constitution of the mind; that man was made as specifically to think and know, as to desire and love; as specifically for truth as for virtue, would seem to be a proposition that no one who comprehends the terms can dispute. That knowledge may be abused by a corrupt heart, is as certain as that property, influence, or any other endowment may be perverted to tendencies foreign to its own nature. Knowledge, in these cases, is only the instrument, and is as harmless of the evil as the knife in the hand of the assassin. It increases human power, but determines absolutely nothing as to the moral dispositions which shall direct and employ it. Those whom it sharpens as instruments of vice, would, no doubt, have been hardly less hurtful, if they had been left to the degrading influences of ignorance. The evil was in themselves, and it would have found a vent in some way. They would, perhaps, have perpetrated more offensively and coarsely the wickedness which they now exercise with more ingenuity and acuteness; and physiologists tell us that the bruises of a dull axe are more painful and dangerous than the keen wound of a sharp one. The man who, without culture, would have been a thief or a robber, may be converted by education into that decent instrument of plunder, which the Dutchman, in his simplicity, thought it the chief business of a city to fabricate, when he defined it as a place where they cheat one another, and call it business;—he who, without culture, might have been a bold and ferocious assassin, may be transformed, by the civilizing influence of knowledge, into the genteel murderer of the field of honour. What use man shall make of his knowledge depends upon the state of his heart. The same may be said of his limbs, and it would be as absurd to institute a discipline to prevent a child from growing, until we had some assurance that its increased strength would be discreetly and prudently employed, as to object to education that it multiplies the potencies for evil. All that we can say of it as mere culture, is that it develops the man. It does not create a single vice—it only, in the worst case, directs its manifestations; and to complain of the common schools as the parents of crime, is as preposterously absurd as to ascribe the wickedness of adults to their once having been boys.

But though we concede that, in the present fallen condition of our race, mere culture cannot renew and sanctify the soul, we still strenuously maintain, that the tendencies of knowledge are inherently and essentially good, and that intelligence is the natural ally of virtue. Light and darkness are metaphors found in all languages, the one representing the good, as the conjunction of truth and virtue; the other representing evil, as the similar conjunction of error and vice. The union of intelligence with crime is accidental—resulting, not from the nature of things, but from the disorder and confusion which sin has introduced into the world; it is a monstrous alliance, cemented only by an evil heart. The connection of the intellectual and moral departments of man's being is so intimate and close, that we cannot conceive of responsibility where either element is wanting, and the action and reaction of the one upon the other is so thorough and all-pervading, that we cannot imagine the possibility of moral, without intellectual expansion. A man's knowledge measures the extent of his duty. To whom much is given, from him much is required.

The effect, therefore, which that subversion of the order of nature which is consequent upon the evil in our own hearts, and by which intelligence is made the instrument of crime, should have upon us, should be, not a desire to exclude intelligence, and thus leave the spirit of evil to its natural alliance with ignorance, but a conviction of the necessity of strenuous efforts to remove the cause of the difficulty. Eradicate the evil, and things are restored to their proper order. There are institutes which God has appointed for this very purpose; there is the glorious gospel of His grace, the training of the family, the instructions of the church. These must be plied in connection with the means of mental culture. The man must be permitted to grow in his whole nature; and while you administer the food and exercise which make him a man intellectually, administer, at the same time, by the proper instruments, that bread from heaven which makes him a man spiritually and morally. Do not put out his eyes in order that he may not see to do evil, but endeavour to give him a heart, which shall make the light a blessing to himself and his neighbours.

We confess frankly, that we have no earthly sympathy with that miserable sophistry which parades the statistics of crime in countries where education is universally diffused, and then jumps to the sweeping conclusion, that the common school is the nursery of vice. Neither the succession nor coincidence of events is sufficient, of itself, to establish the relation of cause betwixt them. *Post hoc* is not always *propter hoc*. The fanatical and radical notions which have infected the masses at the North, did not spring from the common school. They originated in a higher sphere of speculation, and under a very different class of influences. They

began with the crotchets of political philosophers, were taken up by divines, and spread among the people by the industrious arts of demagogues. We venture to say that some of the maxims incorporated into the Declaration of Independence, have done more to propagate visionary theories of the rights of man, and to diffuse a spirit of agrarianism, than all other causes combined. To the history of our struggle with Great Britain, we are indebted for the impulse which every part of the country, where the tendency has not been checked by counteracting causes, has felt in the direction of extreme opinions upon the nature and grounds of society. Our fathers felt the truth, but enunciated it without the checks and limitations by which its universality is conditioned. They propounded as absolute what was only relative, and the consequence was that they deposited an egg from which the scorpion has been hatched. They meant not so; they were honest republicans; but the inevitable tendency of their principles, in relation to the origin of government, is to establish an absolute democracy—the most hateful of all institutions—instead of that representative constitution, with its checks and balances, which, when it reflects the spirit of the people, is the highest safeguard of liberty. The common schools are guiltless of the sin of New England extravagance and disorder. The evil has been transmitted to them from institutions above them.

The existence of the tendencies to absolute democracy in government and absolute equality in property, illustrates more plainly the necessity of popular intelligence to counteract them. Let the people be enlightened, and they will be prepared to appreciate the arguments by which the truth is vindicated. They now side with error, because the other side of the question has never been fairly before them. But unless we are distrustful of the energies of truth, we should rejoice that any culture has put the mind in a condition to entertain its claims. Free discussion is nonsense without general intelligence. It is like eyes in the dark.

We need hardly insist upon the truism that, in popular governments, the intelligence of the people is the indispensable condition of public security. There may be, as some have contended, though we are far from believing it, no natural connexion betwixt liberty and knowledge. If the most enlightened are also the most despotic States, we think that we can explain the phenomenon, without resolving the submission of the country into universal education as the cause. To say nothing of the effect of ancient associations, the charm of prescription, the hereditary spirit of loyalty, in reconciling men to despotic forms—education itself may be acting only the part of a prudent counsellor in deterring from rash and fatal revolutions. But where the people are possessed of rights, intelligence is necessary in order to preserve them; and where they are entrusted with power, it is equally

necessary in order to direct it. To commit the lives, fortunes, and happiness of men to the cruelty of those who are incapable of comprehending the terms of the charter in which these privileges are conveyed, is nothing less than a solemn trifling with what is awful and sacred. Power without intelligence is a blind monster. "Promote, then," says the Father of his Country, and in this he only echoes the voice of all who have reflected upon the subject—"promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion be enlightened."

But apart from these general considerations, which apply indiscriminately to every condition of society, there is a special reason why slaveholding States should pay particular attention to the education of their citizens. In them there is a marked distinction of caste into labourers and masters. It is the privilege of one to superintend, of the other to perform the work. It is obviously important that the social and political differences of these classes, resting as they do primarily upon differences of race and colour, should be sustained by corresponding intellectual differences. The order and security of the commonwealth require that those who are born to command should be able to execute their trust. The dignity of their rank cannot be maintained without the elevation of their minds. Then, again, as the slave is a "living instrument," dependent upon them for the direction of his labour, they should be able to superintend it with intelligence and skill. In proportion as they are enlightened, will his hands be productively employed and the resources of the country developed. Slavery is incompatible with ignorance in the masters, and the value which we attach to this institution among us should stimulate our zeal, to render clear and conspicuous those natural inequalities of race, by which African servitude is shown to be in accordance with the appointment of nature.

We take great pleasure in referring upon this subject to an excellent address, delivered before the Calliopean and Polytechnic Societies of the Citadel Academy, Charleston, by Wm. Henry Trescott, Esq. It is, in all respects, an admirable performance. Pervaded by a genial sympathy with the active and progressive spirit of the age, and yet eminently conservative of whatever in the ancient order experience has justified and approved; avoiding equally the extremes of rash innovation and lifeless stagnation; liberal and patriotic, earnest and manly, and single-minded, and breathing a generous loyalty, of which she is fully worthy, to South Carolina, the address deserves to be in the hands of every young man in the State. We are not so hopeless in reference to general education among the masses in free communities as Mr. Trescott; neither do we think that we have hurt ourselves by

imitating foreign models; but to everything which he has said on the relations of slavery to this subject among ourselves we heartily subscribe, and are glad to strengthen ourselves by such authority:

“The importance of this subject cannot be overrated. The institution of slavery is a great blessing to society, for it is the only practicable method of obtaining the advantages of associated labour without the evils of socialism. But slavery has its inexorable requirements, and the safety of a slave society depends upon their strict performance. And its very first requirement, its indispensable consequence, where it is true to itself, is the elevation of white labour. Under this institution the white race must preserve its superiority by making its work mental as well as bodily. The State cannot with justice or safety allow the white man to come into competition with the black simply as a labourer. By the laws of the land, by our strongest instincts, by the very nature of things, there is an immense, an impassable gulf, between the lowest and humblest form of white labour and the highest development of black. And the only way to preserve this distinction, is to give to every workman in the State the education of a responsible citizen, adapted in its details to that sort of work which his condition in life requires. And this principle, if faithfully carried out, will give to white labour a character, efficiency, and dignity that it has possessed nowhere else in the world. Every society rests upon its own principles, is governed by its own fixed laws. If its legislation is not based upon the same principles, or ventures to run counter to these laws, social disorganization is the result, sure and not slow. Now this State has been labouring for years on the subject of popular education, and with scarcely any success. Why? My firm belief is, because she has started from false principles. We have been studying and imitating foreign systems, based, and in their cases necessarily based, upon the principle of free labour, instead of doing our work in conformity with the nature of our own material. And I believe that if the State will only act consistently with herself, she is able to create and will finally develope such a system of popular education, as none but a slave society can afford—a system which will draw social harmony from materials apparently discordant, and in which every social element will find a field for its peculiar activity. Then indeed shall we have successfully vindicated the wisdom and purposes of slavery, so long reviled. Our whole political fabric will rest securely upon the broad basis of slave labour improved and organized as no labour has ever been before, while every white freeman of the State, realizing his position and educated for his duty as one of the privileged class of citizens, will feel the dignity of work, which in its humblest shape must then, with us, represent the intellect as well as the labour of the State.”

But, after all, the most formidable objection is the expense. When the amount necessary to organize, establish, and keep in operation, a system like the one we have proposed, is collected into one sum, it seems so enormously large, that those who think it the highest recommendation of a good government to “want but little,” will rub their eyes in astonishment and alarm. The

advantages will hardly be able to get a hearing; the ducats, the ducats, the fatal ducats—nothing can counterbalance their loss. But still we are not disheartened; we believe that truth will finally prevail; and if the popular judgment could be reached before the popular prejudices are excited, we believe that it would speedily prevail. Our people are not naturally penurious, and if they have at times endorsed a narrow policy or opposed liberal and generous measures, it was because through “the fatal force and imposture of words,” the merits of the question were kept out of view. A wise educational scheme may have to struggle hard before it comes to the birth; but there is a vitality in it, which will save it from being easily strangled or crushed. The economical objections can be turned into arguments in its favour. The scheme which we have recommended is really less expensive, paradoxical as the proposition may seem, than the want of system which now obtains. If the amount now paid for tuition at exorbitant rates, the amount spent on boarding schools, domestic tutors, and private masters, were all gathered into one sum, we have no doubt that it would actually exceed what would be necessary for an adequate public system. In the present state of things, tuition is a grievous burden to many families of moderate means, who yet prize education more than wealth, and are prepared to consume all their living rather than that their children should be reared in ignorance. We can name persons by no means affluent, whose annual bills for instruction amount to four or five hundred dollars for four or five children. This is really oppressive. We never see in one gross amount what the cost of the voluntary plan is, and therefore we slide into the error, that it is comparatively cheap. We venture to say that there is not a single district in the State, which does not annually pay out more for the partial and defective education it obtains, than would be exacted of it by any ratio of fair and impartial taxation for the support of public schools; the burden would be lightened to individuals, and the benefits extended to all.

If the taxes of South Carolina were doubled, the increase would fall short of what every man that has many children has now to pay for their instruction, and none would be impoverished; we should still be, according to the standard of other countries, exempt from burdens; and yet the amount thus raised would, perhaps, be ample for all the exigencies of a complete educational apparatus. The State, moreover, might introduce the system by degrees; it might begin with the cities or more populous districts, adjusting its appropriations, in the first instance, to the amount they might voluntarily raise. In this way, an opportunity of trial would be given before a very large sum was embarked in the enterprise. The people could judge from the experiment whether the plan was likely to succeed; and they would have the most

effective of all proofs that it was cheap and economical. Several of our sister States commenced their operations on a small scale, and the result was so successful that prejudice died away, and the very arguments which at first were arrayed against the scheme, became afterwards the instruments of its general diffusion.

It deserves further to be considered, that money spent for education is not unproductively employed. It is very far from being wasted and lost. It is intelligence which enables labour to create new values. Intelligence set to work upon the materials of the State, would develop resources and open mines of wealth, that would abundantly repay the commonwealth for every dollar laid out on education. The maxim is universal, where no oxen are, the crib is clean. There must be outlay if we expect income, and the most profitable outlay is obviously that which reaches to the very source of wealth, the directing and enterprising mind, without which capital and labour will both be negative quantities. We believe as firmly that the property of the country will be augmented in value, and that new values will be created on a scale of indefinite extent, by the general diffusion of knowledge, as that any other cause will produce its corresponding effect. Let us hear no more, therefore, of the cost of education—that is not the philosophical view; let us rather represent every dollar judiciously appropriated to it, as so much capital put out at a high rate of interest.

But were it even so that the money should never be returned in the way of additions to the material wealth of the country, we hold that in education itself we receive an ample equivalent. We have not wasted it for nothing. We have obtained in exchange what is more precious than gold and silver. We have no sympathy with that niggard and calculating spirit which weighs knowledge in the scales of a sordid policy; and we blush to think that we should ever have deserved the indignant rebuke which the illustrious author of the Free School act of 1811 has so keenly administered: “Monarchs on this theme may put republicans to shame, and the citizens of the United States, whose wealth seems so exhaustless, when canals, or railroads, or steamboats, or internal improvements, as they are technically termed, are brought to their view, are only poor when called upon to support the first of all internal improvements, that which affects, not perhaps the pecuniary resources, but the rank, the character, the reputation of their country; nay, even the stability and duration of their civil institutions.”*

It is not money, nor cotton, nor rice, nor manufactures—not the

* Southern Review, vol. iv, p. 88, art. Education in Germany, by the late Stephen Elliott.

extent of our exports or imports that will make us a great people. It is not the numbers or resources, it is the spirit of a nation that determines its character. The Dutch were more truly great when they came to the heroic resolution to abandon their cities, their fields, and their firesides, and, betaking themselves with their wives and their children to the deep, seek a home in some distant clime, untainted as yet by the breath of tyranny, than when their commerce covered the seas, and their colonies girdled the globe. Leyden in the height of her financial prosperity is not so noble a spectacle as when, after having stood a desolating siege, from which she was only rescued by the friendly waters of the ocean, she preferred, yet breathless and exhausted, a university within her walls, to a perpetual exemption from taxes. A sordid people can never be great. Avarice is as degrading to States as individuals. The spirit which, even in heaven, admires more the golden pavements, "than aught divine or holy, else enjoyed, in vision beatific," must always be "downwards bent." It can never be the inspiration of genius, eloquence, self-devotion, valour, or heroic patriotism; it never prompted to one lofty deed; it can never sustain a man or a people under great trials and adversities; it could never have taken the Athenians to their ships, with the sublime sentiment, "We are the State." The brand of God's curse was not more clearly upon the forehead of Cain than upon the brow of Mammon, and the individual or the commonwealth that makes money the supreme object of attention, will infallibly sow the wind and reap the whirlwind.* It is a mean, base, dirty spirit, and the parent of the lowest, meanest, and dirtiest vices. To be great, a people must be generous, enlightened, virtuous, and brave. Their inspiration must be drawn from the *soul*, and their ambition must be to possess and exhibit those high qualities which mark man out as only a little lower than the angels, and connect him in sympathy with exalted spirits, and the God that made him.

οὐ λίθοι, οὐδὲ ξύλα, οὐδὲ
τέχνη τεκτόνων αἱ πόλεις εἶσιν
'Ἄλλ' ὅπου ποτ' ἀν' ὧσιν ἀνδρῆς;
Αὐτοὺς σῶζ' εἰδότες
ἐνταῦθα τείχη καὶ πόλεις.

These are the sentiments which we would have impressed upon our own State. We care but little for any other influence at home

* Latius regnes avidum domando
Spiritus, quam si Libyam remotis
Gadibus jungas, et uterque Pœnus
Serviat uni.

—Hor. Od., lib. 2. 2.

or abroad, than that which rises from high character and commanding intelligence; and we even rejoice that our small population, contracted limits, and imperfect resources, cut us off from the scramble of a low and mercenary ambition. We are shut up to the developement and culture of the minds of our people. We are called to this great and glorious work, and if we decline to enter upon it, our ancient reputation cannot save us from degradation and infamy.

ART. V.—CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND AFRICAN COLONIZATION.

Western Africa: its History, Condition, and Prospects. By the Rev. J. LEIGHTON WILSON, eighteen years a Missionary in Africa, and now one of the Secretaries of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. *With numerous engravings.* New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1856.

If the Chinese had sent out missionaries of their faith into all parts of the Christian world, into Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Austria, and also the United States, together with every other part of both North and South America; if all the chief points were occupied by small but active detachments of this pagan irruption, so that they had as it were *invested* Christendom; if they had mastered all its various languages, and were preaching the doctrines of Confucius, both publicly and also from house to house; if they had also translated their sacred books into all these languages, and were printing, and publishing, and circulating them everywhere in Europe and America; if they had established schools in all the chief cities and towns, and were actually getting under their influence the whole education of Christendom; if, everywhere, they were gaining disciples, even a few disciples, but usually the youthful, the intelligent, the energetic, and were associating these individuals into bands, all affiliated together; if all this had been accomplished by them in but a single half century, and if it had been accomplished without any political power backing them up; if it had been accomplished by moral means entirely, and in the face of danger always, and frequently of persecution; if, looking abroad through Christendom, there were to be seen such a thing as we have supposed, would he be considered a fair or wise man who

should ridicule the movement as an utter and contemptible failure?

In estimating the results of such a movement on the part of the disciples of Confucius, would it not be necessary to consider the extent and the strength of that social, political, and religious system built up by Christianity in all these countries; how its ramifications penetrate the whole fabric of society amongst them; how it constitutes, indeed, the very life of these different peoples; and how, accordingly, the whole being of every one of them must vibrate if a foreign hand be stretched out to assail any portion of that system?

That the first shock to the religious sensibilities of these Christian nations had not caused the absolute and immediate sweeping away of these assailants; that they had been tolerated in their assault at all; nay, that their presence had begun to be a familiar thing, and they were fairly at work in pulling down Christianity and building up another religion; would not these circumstances, as we compared the two parties, give some respectability to the assault?

But suppose that it were the whole world, instead of Christendom alone, that the Chinese were thus investing by their moral forces, would not their enterprise then deserve to be considered as truly a sublime one? Would the grandeur of their undertaking be at all diminished by the fact, if it were a fact, that amongst these Chinese propagandists there were differences of opinion on minor points of their common faith, and that accordingly they were divided to some extent amongst themselves? insomuch that occasional sharp contentions arose amongst them, which, however, did not cause them to abandon their common leader or their common cause.

What we have been supposing true of the Chinese, is the actual picture of Protestant Christian missions. And in all paganism there is nothing like it. "This perpetual spirit of aggression characterizes Christianity in its whole history, and lives even in its most corrupt forms. We do not see anything like it in other religions." The author of the *Eclipse of Faith* may well construct out of this difference between Christianity and all other religions an argument for its divine character. "Till we see Mollahs from Ispahan, Brahmins from Benares, Bonzes from China, preaching their systems of religion in London, Paris, and Berlin, supported year after year by an enormous expenditure on the part of their zealous compatriots; till the sacred books of other religions can boast of at least an hundredth part of the same efforts to translate and diffuse them which have been concentrated on the Bible; till these books have given to an equal number of human communities a written language, the germ of all art, science, and civilization; till it can be shown that another religion to an equal extent

has propagated itself without force amongst totally different races, and in the most distant countries, and has survived equal revolutions of thought, and opinion, and manners, and laws, amongst those who have embraced it; until then, it cannot be said that Christianity is simply like any other religion."

The great systems of religious error which divide amongst them the whole world outside of Christendom, are thus making no organized efforts of aggression. They lie slumbering like so many enormous whales, and the keen harpoon of Christian truth shall shortly wake them up to fruitless efforts to prolong their feeble life. Even Islam, once so vigorous, now seems for the most part as *sick* as does its chief political support, the Turkish empire. In the meanwhile, what of infidelity, that mere negation of Christianity? It stands amidst this scene of life, and hope, and effort, on the one hand, and of sluggish torpor on every other hand, it stands *mocking*, as the son of the Egyptian bondwoman stood mocking on that day when the father of the faithful made a feast for his son of promise. It lifts its skeleton arm that has no blood in it, and points its bony finger in scorn of what God is doing in the world by means of Christianity. From the metropolis of England, through all the literary world, its slanderous reproaches go forth again, and its accusations against men that have gone to live and die preaching to the Gentiles, are repeated to readers, many of whom do not know or have forgotten how triumphantly they were answered once and again years ago. But what is it doing, or what has it ever done for humanity? Why do its advocates never go and seek to penetrate with their flickering torches the darkness of paganism? Miserable men! they know their light could never dissipate that darkness; it is for the gospel alone to accomplish this task. School after school of unbelievers rises up and boasts and babbles wherever Christianity has quickened the common intellect, but no one school lives long enough to convert a single nation; and never since the world began did any set of infidels organize themselves and go on laboriously and perseveringly to propagate their opinions among the ignorant and savage heathen. And who would venture to speculate about the probable results of such missionary efforts, supposing them undertaken and persevered in? How long would infidelity take to civilize and enlighten such a group of barbarous islands in the South Seas as Christianity has regenerated in some forty years? Nay, rather let us ask, what kind of a monster would be produced by crossing paganism with infidelity?*

* "They have ever been boastful and loud-tongued, but have done nothing; there are no great social efforts, no organizations, no practical projects, whether successful or futile, to which they can point. The old 'book-faiths' which you venture to ridicule, have been *something* at all events; and, in truth, I can find no other 'faith' than what

The work, whose title we have placed at the head of this article, is a compilation, of course, in respect to the history of Portuguese discoveries in Western Africa, and of English, French, and Dutch exploits in that country; but it is an original work in respect to the present condition of its various tribes, and to the operations of Christian missions amongst them. The fanatical excitement of the day respecting negro slavery, we suppose, must create an interest in any work of this kind; but the one before us now has solid claims. There is something here for the naturalist, the geographer, the historian, the ethnologist, the philologist, as well as something for the Christian, who waits for the coming of his Lord's kingdom in the whole earth. The book sets before its readers, the three great divisions of Western Africa: 1. Senegambia, with its two great rivers, the Senegal and the Gambia; 2. Northern Guinea, with its various coasts, the Sierra Leone, the Grain, the Ivory, the Gold, and the Slave Coasts, and its two military despotisms of Ashanti and Dehomi; 3. Southern Guinea, with its Pongo, Loango, Kongo, Angola, Benguela districts. We are introduced to the three great families of Western Africa which correspond to these three geographical divisions, viz.: 1. The three Mohammedan tribes of Senegambia, the Jalofs, the Mandingoes, and the Fulahs; 2. The Nigritian family, getting their name from the river Niger, which runs through the country from whence they are all supposed to have come; and subdivided into six or seven separate tribes, the Kru and the Ashanti tribes being the chief; 3. The Ethiopian or Nilotic family, so called because supposed to have descended from the ancient nations of the Nile, now spread over the whole southern half of the continent, from the Mountains of the Moon to the Cape of Good Hope, and differing as much from the other two great families as they differ from each other. The habits and customs of these various tribes of people; their social relations and condition; their agriculture and their trade; their superstitions, their witchcraft, their demonolatry, and their capacity of improvement, are among the topics discussed in a simple and unpretending, yet clear and satisfactory manner. We have one chapter on the natural history of Western Africa, and another full of a highly interesting philological comparison

is somehow or other attached to a 'book,' which has been anything influential. The Vedas, the Koran, the Old Testament Scriptures—those of the New—over how many millions have these all reigned! Whether their supremacy be right or wrong, their doctrine true or false, is another question; but your faith, which has been book faith, and lip-service *par excellence*, has done nothing that I can discover. One after another of your infidel reformers passes away, and leaves no trace behind, except a quantity of crumbling 'book faith.' You have always been just on the eve of extinguishing supernatural fables, dogmas, and superstitions, and then regenerating the world! Alas! the meanest superstition that crawls, laughs at you; and, false as it may be, is still stronger than you."—Eclipse of Faith, pp. 48, 9.

between the Mandingo, Grebo, and Mpongwe dialects; the two latter having been reduced to writing first by the author. We have also a chapter on Liberia, one on Sierra Leone, another on the Slave Trade, another on Christian Missions in Western Africa, and a concluding chapter on the necessity under God of the *white man's* agency in the conversion of Africa to Christianity.

We acknowledge a special interest in this book, because its author is a Southern man. John Leighton Wilson (another of the many distinguished Wilsons), is a native of Sumter district, South Carolina, where his kindred still live and flourish. His wife is a highly respectable lady, reared in Savannah, Georgia. They dwelt eighteen years on the African coast, devoting talents, and fortune, and the vigour and prime of their life to the instruction of savage devil-worshippers in the knowledge of Christ. His health at length failing, he returned, and now occupies the position of Secretary to the Foreign Missionary Board of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. This is a position which gives a still wider scope than his former one, to all the talents of Mr. Wilson. His clear, strong judgment, his comprehensive, vigorous intellect; his learning, his energy, his industry, his perseverance, and his larger experience of men and of the world—of heathen men and the heathen world—may here, even more than there, be constantly in exercise. *There* he was, indeed, the father of a nation, and was forming their social, intellectual, and religious character, after the new and perfect model furnished in the gospel. Here, he is the patron of various nations. He has an important share in directing the operation of Christianity upon the whole heathen world. In the one true aspect of all things, their eternal aspect, his position is greater than any statesman's. It calls for, and he brings to it, a statesman's qualities of mind. We repeat it, here is a Carolinian in New York, of whom we are not ashamed. He sheds glory on his country as well as his name and lineage; yet he has been only a Christian missionary! his book is only an account of a Christian mission to the degraded negroes of Africa! and he is now only directing Christian missions to various heathen or unevangelized nations!

What are the grounds upon which such an undertaking is viewed by any persons with a secret and real contempt? The *spirit* of the missionary and the missionary enterprise is one of self-abnegation—the same which gives to Washington all his glory. That father of his country is not revered by mankind for great talents, nor for great military achievements, but for unselfishness. The *object* of the missionary also is grand—as grand, to say the least of it, as Washington's end and object. But if neither the goodness of spirit nor the goodness of end and object which shall characterize any undertaking entitles it to honour, or shields it from contempt amongst mankind—if *success* be the true ground of honour and the touchstone of greatness, then we affirm that

the success also of the missionary—of the company and order of missionaries, is, and promises to be, as full and complete as was that of Washington and his associates. Their undertaking is vaster than Washington's. They have a right to occupy more time than he required.

We think one of the main grounds of that contempt which, either secretly or openly, many indulge towards Christian missions, is, that they are considered a vain and hopeless undertaking. The enterprise, is deemed quixotic,—the offspring of crazy benevolence. To effect the real conversion of savages to Christianity, is reckoned an impossibility. Some, indeed, go further, and set down such a conversion as not only impossible, but undesirable. "There are things in heathen morals and manners which might edify Christian missionaries; as, for instance, the brotherly love and social harmony which exist before missionaries appear;" and as their "amiability and instinctive kindness and joyousness." "There is a genuine religious faith at the root of the practice of cannibalism and of the suttee and other pagan observances." "The well-meaning but bigotted and conceited missionaries destroy these old graces, without introducing any virtues which can be relied on;" and "the poor creatures lose some of the best virtues they have," by means of Christianity, and get nothing good by way of compensation.* But this is an objection to Christian missions we shall not now discuss. Taking it for granted by all our readers, that the introduction of Christianity is beneficial to any people, even for this life, we propose to meet a very general objection to Christian missions which is based upon the *impossibility* of their success.

We suppose all who make this objection would unite in maintaining that what the heathen need first and foremost is civilization: that civilization must, at least, precede Christianity, and open the way for it; and that a true and real reception of Christianity presupposes civilization, and its attendant blessings of education, intelligence, and refinement.

Now, the first question which we would put to any reader who entertains such ideas, is this. Do civilization and its attendant blessings indeed predispose any person or any people to receive Christianity in its real power or in its actual experience? Is not the very genius of Christianity such, according to the Scriptures, as that we are, *a priori*, to expect its rejection by the elevated, and its reception by the depressed? The apostle Paul says, "Not many wise, mighty, or noble, are called, but God chooses the foolish, the weak, the base." The Founder of Christianity himself said of a people that were long under the best preparation to

* Westminster Review, for July.

receive Christianity, that "they should be thrust out," and that others not thus prepared beforehand, should "come from the east and west, and north and south, and sit down in the kingdom of God." He told the most enlightened and best instructed portion of the Jews, while he preached Christianity himself on the earth, that harlots and publicans would receive it before them. The Chinese are a far more highly civilized people than the Hot-tentots or Greenlanders were, but Christianity has been more successful amongst the latter.

But laying out of sight this peculiarity of the gospel, we go a step further and ask the reader to consider another question, viz. : Does civilization always or necessarily insure the moral improvement and elevation of a people? The Chinese are probably the most civilized of all the pagan nations. Is it certain that, on the whole, their moral state is better, for example, than was that of our own Indians before the white man came? Look at the condition of the Greeks and Romans of Paul's time; they are generally considered to have been a polished, refined, intellectual race. But would not many a simple savage tribe put them to shame, in respect to truth, and purity, and humanity? What, for example, was the condition of their females? What, for another example, the laws concerning their slaves?

But let civilization be for the heathen all that any man may choose to suppose. We ask a third question: What is the prospect of Africa, for example, obtaining this boon? Christian missions are ridiculed as quixotic, or worse; but, in their endeavours to propagate Christianity, its friends and believers are at least consistent. But the admirers of civilization as against or independent of Christianity, what are they doing to send what they admire and advocate to the heathen?

We shall be told in reply that civilization cannot be sent or given. We know it. Like liberty, civilization must be the fruit of a development from within. You cannot send civilization to a people; you may bring them individually to it, as our slaves have been brought to it from Africa. You may break them up into individuals, and then plant them in the midst of it; and, there being no antagonism between them and their civilized masters, but, in fact, a union for mutual benefit—so that it is the interest of each that the other should prosper and increase—you may, in these circumstances, civilize the barbarian, or rather, he may, in these circumstances, be developed gradually into a civilized man, the blessed influences of Christianity also meeting him on every hand. But you cannot plant a civilized people among a barbarous people, such being *a people*, and striving in antagonism with each other, as rival peoples will inevitably strive; you cannot thus bring the two together, but, whether the contest be a bloody one or not, the savage man will feel himself doomed, and will, sooner or later,

wither away. Of course, we do not mean to deny, that oftentimes a small and feeble colony of civilized men has been cut off by a superior force of savages, coming down unexpectedly upon them. The case we are supposing is of a colony, fairly established and strong enough, in itself and by reinforcements, to defend itself and maintain the ground it has begun to occupy. Nor do we forget how the northern tribes, which, in countless thousands invaded the Roman empire when it had begun to decline, prevailed in their rude vigour over its growing weakness. The empire had reached its culmination, and might have perished without their attack. In fact, they brought to it new elements of life and vigour. Perhaps if we were acquainted perfectly with all that goes to constitute the truth upon this nice question, we might conclude that the Germans were, in some respects, as civilized as the Romans. However this may be, it is certain that the Rome they conquered did yet subdue them. Weak as were its powers of digestion, it nevertheless assimilated them to itself, and so the civilized man still conquered the savage.* Nor yet have we forgotten that other savage invasion, if we may so call it, of civilized Europe—that far more energetic and enthusiastic invasion by the Saracens, in which, as Guizot says, “the spirit of conquest and the spirit of proselytism were united”—that invasion which was “undertaken with moral passions and ideas,” with the “power of the sword and the power of the word” conjoined. But that was a very peculiar case, precisely because the Arabs came “both as conquerors and as missionaries.” And it is to be doubted indeed, whether, after all, they were, at that time, a much less developed race, either morally or mentally, than were the people they invaded.

What we do mean to assert, and we would assert it with all suitable moderation, is, that in respect especially to modern civilization, with all its improved appliances of art, and all its development of social, political, moral and religious ideas, adding, as they must do, a thousand fold to its strength over any ancient forms of civilization in a struggle with barbarism—that, in respect to civilization thus circumstanced, it would seem to be a law, that its colonies must drive before it any barbarian people with whom they come into an antagonistic position.

There is, therefore, no hope for the heathen of civilization

* “Singular spectacle! Just now we were in the last age of Roman civilization, and found it in full decline, without strength, fertility, or splendour, incapable, as it were, of subsisting; conquered and ruined by barbarians. Now, all of a sudden, it reappears, powerful and fertile. It exercises a prodigious influence over the institutions and manners which associate themselves with it. It gradually impresses on them its character. It dominates over and transforms its conquerors.”—Guizot’s *History of Civilization*, vol. i, p. 489.

from without. And what hope is there, let us ask, for it from within? Take Africa, and how many hundreds of years has she been the same degraded thing she is now? And in all the probabilities which mere civilization can anticipate, how many hundreds of years more must she not remain the same degraded thing!

Now, Christianity may be given to a heathen people, and she may start them also in the race of civilization. Christianity has been given to every people that have got it. It is always external help—help from heaven. And here is one great difference between our Christian philosophy respecting the state and prospects of the heathen, and the philosophy of those who think civilization must go and prepare the way for Christianity. We hold that no moral development from within man, unassisted from heaven, ever really benefitted man. We hold that there are no upward tendencies in any people of themselves, and most manifestly and especially, that there are no upward tendencies in any modern heathen nation, irrespective of external influences. And we hold that God has extended a helping hand to man in the Gospel of Jesus Christ—a helping hand the most direct, the most positive, the most efficient, the most gracious, that ever was extended from heaven.

Let us go a little further in setting forth our philosophy respecting the heathen. As we hold that the help of God is the one and only hope of heathen man, so too we hold that the measure of its being extended to any people, and of its being made efficient among that people, is the sovereign will and pleasure of the Almighty. That Christianity is to prevail finally in the whole earth, we understand Him to have promised in His word; but we do not read that He designs to save all men now living, or to elevate by means of Christianity and by civilization following it, all the nations at present existing. In the person of His Son Jesus Christ He instituted, while on this earth, an order of men whose calling is to preach His word; and commanded His church to send that word to every nation. But He has not said, so far as we know, that when His servants go and preach, the heathen shall all hear and believe. It may be His sovereign pleasure to effect the national conversion, or it may seem good to Him to call individually out of heathen darkness only some portion of the nation; even as it has always been His method to build up His kingdom in this world, not *by nations* but *by individuals*, calling them as individuals, and as such joining them to that holy nation and that peculiar people over which He is King. In the South Sea Islands, for example, there has been a conversion of the nations. Those governments are Christian; their laws accord with Christianity. But even in those islands it is only *individuals* that can be regarded as true Christians. Now the point we would insist on, after having stated our philosophy respecting the heathen, is, that

if it be true, indeed, as has lately been alleged, that many of these professed converts to Christianity are still heathen at heart, and in their dark recesses still practice heathen rites, this is no proof of the failure of Christian missions. Why should we expect Christianity among the heathen to accomplish what her Divine Head has not promised to accomplish by her anywhere upon the earth? Are there not in every country hypocrites doing in secret what openly they repudiate? But we are very willing at any time to enter into a comparison of the actual success of Christianity amongst the heathen with any efforts of civilization for their benefit. The statement of what the latter has done for any heathen people must indeed be a very short one, as there is no such thing as civilization coming to any people from without, as the actual contact of a civilized people with a savage people has always been to the damage of the latter. We do not recall a case in all history where the colonization of civilized men amongst barbarians ever operated to the benefit of those barbarians. Even colonies of Christian people in distinction from missions of Christian ministers have, so far as we know, never gone to any heathen shore, except as the forerunners of destruction to its inhabitants. We are of opinion that the colony of American blacks at Liberia will be found, in the end, no exception to this general law. Mr. Wilson, in the work under review, warns the Colonization Society that this will be, without great care, the effect of their labours. He makes also some other observations on the scheme of African colonization, which we consider eminently judicious. We regard that scheme as particularly open to objection from the standpoint of our present theme. As being a scheme to propagate Christianity by means of civilization; as being a scheme which puts civilization on a level with Christianity, if not in advance of Christianity, with respect to the improvement of the heathen of Africa, it is just here we find the weakest of all the weak places in that undertaking. We propose to discuss the whole question of African colonization before we close, and we drop the subject for the present.

Returning to the point in hand, viz., the comparative benefits of Christianity and civilization among the heathen, we meet an accusation against the former which has been recently urged with a virulent zeal, but which we have anticipated and disposed of in the preceding paragraph. The charge is, that whereas there were formerly in the Sandwich Islands four hundred thousand people, now that Christianity has entered only sixty-five thousand remain. It is admitted by the accusers, that after the discovery of those islands by Europeans, there was the addition of physical and moral mischiefs, diseases, and intemperance; which, acting upon the established licentiousness, might account for even such a

depopulation as is recorded.* But it is urged, that the depopulation has been greater than ever since the introduction of Christianity, although she claims to have put an end to "war, and to infanticide, and to recklessness of life." This depopulation is, in the first place, traced to the fact that all their "customs were changed and their pleasures taken away" by the missions. A second way in which, it is said, they have caused this depopulation, is that the naked people have been taught to put on clothes. It seems that this has "rendered them liable to consumption." Another of the depopulating influences of Christianity, is that their heathen and licentious "sports and festivals have been suppressed," which causes them to mope and die. Another way in which the advent of Christianity has been disastrous, is that the missionaries and the nobles live in so much luxury, that the rest of the people are "under-fed," and have to "suffer a chronic hunger which their fathers never knew." The fifth and last charge against Christianity, is of a piece with these other four. It is, that the missionaries oppose what is known as the custom of "local husbands," and also preach against fornication, and punish sensuality with church censures; and hence whenever wicked civilized foreigners lead astray native females, the "public shame" which follows is, of course, the fault of the missionary. And so, too, the infanticide resorted to in order to escape from that shame is the fault of the missionary! And therefore because infanticide, of course, helps depopulation, that depopulation which is going on at the Sandwich Islands is to be laid at the door of Christian missions!

To state, is to refute such objections to Christian missions at the bar of all common sense and candour. The depopulation of the Sandwich Islands is indeed a melancholy spectacle. There is in it all, however, nothing different from the universal law of colonization. The missionary has not been alone at the Sandwich Islands. Civilization, too, has gone there—civilization, as represented by a large body of American and of European settlers. And civilization, which could not be given to them from without, could nevertheless blight them, as it always does, and must blight the barbarian that comes into antagonism with the civilized man. And if this be the law of colonization; if it be ordained by the Creator, that, whether with or without bloody warfare, the savage people must fade before the civilized people; while we drop a tear of pity for the "poor Indian" and the poor savage of every name, that submissively bows before his irreversible fate, and retires out of sight, we do not understand how this matter can be fairly brought into the war against Christian missions. If that be God's plan and

* Westminster Review, for July, 1856.

purpose, we do not know that it is revealed by Him anywhere in the Scriptures. It is revealed by Him in the book of His providence only. But we are not of those who reject either revelation. We humbly receive whatever He reveals in either book. We bow submissively to it all, for we cannot presume to judge Him. If it be His purpose to fill the world with a superior race for the glory of the millenium to dawn upon, we do not see why that should damp our zeal for saving, as far as possible, the present fading races. His written word commands us to go and preach the gospel to them. All we have to do is humbly to obey, and, filled with awe of His terribleness and with adoring gratitude for His grace, to feel that all our toils and sacrifices are ten thousand times repaid, if we can be the means of saving only some individuals of them, ere they pass away.

If the reader would justly apprehend the success of Christian missions, let him consider fairly the present state of the case.

1. Many important points have been already occupied. From these points the light is radiating in all directions. It is getting brighter continually at all these chief points, and at other new points continually fresh lights are being kindled. Is there not, therefore, some reasonable hope of the darkness everywhere receding, at last, before the light?

2. Much preparatory work has been accomplished, which could not, except by miracle, have been done without time and labour. The apostles had miraculously given to them the knowledge of tongues, but the modern missionary must patiently learn them. And so, the Scriptures must be laboriously translated and printed. And so, the slow processes of education must be carried on, for years, in order to have a soil prepared for the good seed. And so, there must be a slow and patient acquiring of the confidence and respect of the heathen. Their prejudices must be *lived down*, by years of kindness, and of probity, and patient endurance of their reproaches. Now these are some of the preparatory works which were indispensable to a *beginning* of the missionary work. And these have all been to some extent accomplished.

3. But there was a preparatory work to be done also in the church at home. She was to be roused. She was also to be trained. A generation must be trained at home who should know how to *give*, and also a generation who should know how to *go*, that the gospel might be preached to the heathen. Something has been done in these preparatory works.

4. Meanwhile, the providence of God has been marvellously coöperating with the church. China and Turkey (and we may add India too), closed to the Christian missionary thirty years ago, are now thrown open to him. In Turkey, the fullest toleration of Christianity is the established policy of government. In the meanwhile, commerce and the arts are in an hundred different ways

made subservient by God's providence to the work of Christian missions. And yet these encouraging features of the case, we would not have the reader contemplate alone. Other views must be taken along with these, in order to a just conception of the case. "We have laboured, prayed, and hoped," says a missionary in India, "for their conversion, expecting God, in his own time, to take out of them a people for His name! Some hear us attentively, attend our Sabbath preaching, read the New Testament, and sometimes ask us to pray for them. But, on the other hand, I see the evil influence of Hinduism, Mohammedanism, and Pantheism, on the character of the people in such a way, that I am led to fear the masses are generally sinking under these influences." "Our work is just begun," says another; "while a few names are added to our church yearly, myriads are added to the swarming ranks of heathenism. We could have no hope, but the Lord of Hosts." Here, as with a needle, does this missionary touch the very point of weakness in the whole enterprise, considered in a mere human point of view; which is, that in the very moment that they, by God's blessing, convert one heathen, and he is translated out of the kingdom of darkness into that of light, hundreds are in that very moment born naturally into a state of sin and misery. So that, instead of gaining ground, Christianity is actually losing ground every moment. This is a difficulty in the way of the success of Christian missions which their adversaries seem not to have considered. It is greater than all their enumerated difficulties put together. Yet is even this nothing, before the invincible cause of Christianity; because, as said the missionary, "our hope is in the Lord of Hosts." For Him, "nothing is too hard." He can "convert a nation in a day."

But there remains a second main ground of contempt for Christian missions, upon which we would offer a few observations. This is the opinion, that the enterprise as commonly understood and pursued by its friends, is a melancholy, baseless, and fanatical delusion. Christians, generally, believe that all heathen men and women, dying such, are lost. The great motive power of the whole undertaking is this belief. It must be confessed that, with a lamentable inconsistency on the part of the Christian church, this awful belief, like some other Christian beliefs, operates very feebly. Yet, what else, we would ask, is operating at all for the good of any heathen people? Let civilization or philosophy point to any benevolent or unselfish efforts whatsoever, on the part of either of them, to improve savage men.

But this old and well nigh universal belief of the Christian church is represented in some quarters as belonging only to the dark ages. For this enlightened age, such an idea does not answer. We are too civilized, we are too liberal, and too humane for it. In vain do old-fashioned Christians point to the express

language of the Bible. In vain do they produce positive testimony from the Apostle Paul, or argue from various declarations of our Saviour, and from His ascending command to preach to every creature. There is a tribunal of appeal in this age, higher than the Bible—and that is human reason and human sympathy. The moral intuitions of humanity can better teach us the future of the heathen, than can God himself.

The readers of this journal dwell in an old-fashioned section of the country. We are behind the age, undoubtedly, in many of its improvements. We have not yet given up our Bible, although we confess that we come very far short of obedience to the rules of that book. We still venerate it as a perfect standard of faith and obedience. When modern civilization condemns slavery as a barbarous and wicked institution, we go to *the Word*, and, finding it there sanctioned by the God of Abraham, and by our Lord Jesus Christ, we do not suffer a sickly sentimentalism to explain away the distinct language of that inspired volume. And when the same modern philanthropy, more humane and more merciful than God reveals Himself to be, would explain away what the same Word says, respecting the heathen, we will still hold fast to our Bibles. That Divine book is not good enough for abolitionists, nor for any other sect of the brotherhood of human reason and human charity, but it is good enough for us. We want no better Bible, and no better God.

It is worthy of notice how the denial that the heathen are in any danger of perishing, which has recently appeared in a certain quarter, is accompanied by the denial that Christianity does the heathen any good, or makes them any better. The idea is broadly held forth, that the heathen are better as they are, than Christians themselves. Christian missions “destroy what is good among them, and put only evil in its place.” “At the bottom of the suttee and of cannibalism, there is a genuine religious faith;” but at the bottom of Christian missions and of the Christian faith which produces them, there is only folly and fraud. It is not very long since we were informed from the same quarter that the “early books of the Old Testament abound with misapprehensions of the meaning of ancient astronomical and chronological emblems, and with imaginative interpretations and misreadings of hieroglyphical records;” that “the Pentateuch is a miscellaneous collection of fragmentary records—a compilation of old documents, interspersed with narrations founded on oral traditions;” that the story of the serpent reads “like one of the numerous myths which arose out of the zodiacal emblems;” that “the story of Joshua is one of the whimsical mistakes in the progress of the change from the pictorial hieroglyphic to the phonetic mode of writing;” and that “in fact, Christ himself denied the infallibility of the Jewish

Scriptures, and was nailed to the cross, in great part, on account of this 'infidelity.'"

From the same humane, meek, and liberal quarter, also was promulgated not long since, the following imprecation of "death without mercy" upon the Christian clergy—well illustrating what Robert Hall called the real *ferocity* of infidelity :

"The crime of depriving a fellow-creature of life, is not the offence of greatest magnitude of which any human being can be guilty. If capital punishment be allowable for that, then would death without mercy—the death of the Mosaic law, death by stoning—be the appropriate penalty, not of Sabbath-breaking, but of trafficking in superstition; trading in man's weakness, and with his loftiest aspirations; converting his instincts of awe and reverence for the wonderful and admirable, into abject terrors; his most sacred emotions of grief, his solemn moments of parting on the confines of eternity, his very hopes of immortality, into implements of a craft, a source of income, a miserable instrument of popularity and power; and, the object attained, endeavouring to perpetuate it by proclaiming the infallibility of creeds and canons, persecuting those who question it as infidels to God, resisting the extension of knowledge among the masses, or rendering it exclusive and nominal, and thus seeking to crush the human mind under the wheels of the modern Juggernaut of conventional idolatry."

We are aware, of course, that doubts of the Christian doctrine respecting the future of the heathen, extend to many persons who have no sympathy with infidelity. Even amongst the supporters of Christian missions, some take the low view lately put forth, to our surprise, in a very respectable quarter in the north of Britain :

"We shudder at the accounts of devil-worshippers which come to us from so many mission-fields. We pity the dreary delusion of the Manchees, who enthroned the evil principle in heaven. But, if we proclaim that God is indeed one, who could decree this more than Moloch sacrifice of the vast majority of his own creatures and children for no fault or sin of theirs, we revive the error of the Manchee; for the God whom we preach as the destroyer of the faultless, can be no God of justice, far less a God of love. It needs no exaggerations, such as these, to supply a sufficient motive for missionary enterprises. Our object is to introduce Christianity with all the blessings that accompany it; its true views of God, its ennobling motives, its pure morality, the elevation of life and manners, the civilization, the knowledge, even the material progress which are sure to follow in its train. And we may leave it to God himself, to decide how the benefit of Christ will be extended to those whom it has pleased Him to permit to live and die in ignorance of His gospel; confident that the same rule of perfect justice, tempered with boundless mercy, has one uniform application everywhere and to all."*

* North British Review, for August, 1856.

This theory of the object of Christian missions is not from the Bible. We are gratified to be able to say it is understood to be an expression of individual opinion only, by the conductor of that journal. The religious press, both of England and Scotland, has animadverted upon it severely. The Free Church of Scotland is not responsible, either directly or indirectly, for the sentiments of that journal.

But it is no strange thing that some well-disposed persons should fail to follow out the teachings of the Bible upon this subject. We continually observe the same phenomenon in respect to various other subjects. As respects the principles of the slavery question, for example, it is not infidels alone that entertain opinions not warranted by the Bible. Some good Christians do the same. So, as respects charity, how many pretty things are said in these days, by a very good kind of people too, which find no warrant in the word of God. The spirit of the age, in some of its strongest aspects, is latitudinarian. The liberal minds of this age denounce bigotry and sects. In their zeal for toleration, they are intolerant of those who make any difference between the most opposite ideas. They love error as well as truth, and evil as much as good. Let them but have their ease, and all opinions are alike matters of the most charitable indifference. Thus we see how many sides there are to selfishness. But Christianity and the Christian Scriptures are distinctive; and, without some degree of that which this age calls bigotry, there would never have been and never be again any patriots or any martyrs. And if, indeed, the bloodiest battles ever fought have been about Truth, that only shows what a precious thing truth is.

We venture to assert that many of those good, easy souls, who cannot admit the idea of heathen perdition, have never considered how, in their benevolence and charity, they either make out the gospel a curse to any people, or else totally repudiate the Divine justice. If the heathen shall all be infallibly saved without a union by faith to Jesus Christ, and if those in Christian lands, who believe not in Him, are lost, then it is better to be born in heathenism, which insures eternal life to all, than under the gospel, which certainly involves the doom of some. But if, on the other hand, all those in Christian lands who repent not, and believe not in Christ, as well as those who repent and believe, shall alike be saved, what becomes of the justice and veracity of God? We wish all these "charitable" people would study their Bible better, and, better following out the teachings of the Bible, would cease to occupy, unconsciously, the ground of those who reject the Bible. There is not much to be feared from infidelity, if we can just isolate and identify it. There is a neighbourhood in the upper part of this State, where the attempt was made some years ago to get up a congregation of that strange kind of Christians, who hold

the salvation of all men alike. For a short time, the true scope of their doctrine was concealed, and all went well. But their creed came fully and fairly out at last, and then the common sense of our people, and their knowledge of the Bible, revolted alike at such a monstrous perversion of Christian truth, and they quit all attendance upon such a ministry. The deserted building is now pointed out to the traveller by the name it bears in all that region, as the "No-Hell Church." It was this name which helped to kill it. There were involved in the name, as in the creed, two contradictory and mutually destructive ideas. The name made them patent to every understanding. The idea of "No-Hell" rendered nugatory the idea of "Church," and the creed, thus exposed, soon forsook the field.

If the reader suggest that, after all, the idea of heathen damnation is too awful to be entertained, we have only to say, it is indeed an unspeakably awful idea; but so are several other ideas which we admit. The Bible gives us the idea of a world in ruins! Is not that awful? It gives us the idea of that ruin of the world, being moral and eternal! Is not that awful? It gives us the idea of God becoming incarnate, and crucified for the redemption of His own creatures from His own curse! Is not that awful? Now, if we admit these ideas, can we not admit that other idea? But if we prefer to reject the Bible, because of these awful ideas, what shall we do with the constitution and course of nature, that is analogous to the Bible? Are not pain, and woe, and death, and sin too, all of them *facts* patent before our eyes? Tremendous facts, occurring under the government of a good God, and an Almighty God? If the future destruction of heathen men and women, which is plainly revealed in the Christian Scriptures, lead us to reject those Scriptures, what shall we do when we behold the constantly recurring fact of their present destruction as often as they come into collision with superior races of men? Or with that other melancholy fact, that, as fast and faster than the existing races and generations are being destroyed, others are being born into their places? If we could have our own way, no doubt we should ordain the immediate banishment of death from the world, as well as of sin, which introduced it; and if these things might not be, then no doubt we should prohibit any further increase of human life under such a curse. But, if the infinite and incomprehensible Governor of the Universe should condescend to speak to us, while thus presuming to criticize His ways that are past finding out, He would, perhaps, do it merely by some such word as that which silenced presumptuous and complaining Job: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?"

We postpone till our next number, what we have to say on the subject of African colonization.

ART. VII.—UNIFORM CURRENCY.

Essays on the Progress of the Nations in Productive Industry, Civilization, Population, and Wealth. By EZRA C. SEAMAN. New York. 1851.

Bartlett's Commercial and Banking Tables, adapted to the Currencies of all Commercial Nations. By R. M. BARTLETT. Cincinnati. 1853.

THE discovery of gold in California and Australia is producing changes and disturbances in every department of business. Its influence has already been decided and real, even in the brief period that has elapsed since it began to operate. In five or six years its effects could not be very large, but they have been sensible and measurable, indicating how great they will become when they have been allowed time for accumulation. The progress is slow and noiseless, but it is wide-spread and all-penetrating. As the annual supplies of the precious metals are poured into the channels of trade, they swell the magnitude of the current, change the prices of merchandize, interfere with the contracts between man and man, and disturb all the operations of commerce. By altering the relative proportions of gold and silver, they encourage governments to call in their old coins, and stamp them with new values, or to change one standard for another, thus wronging their creditors, and violating the contracts they have made with the people. As the advance in some products will take place sooner than in others, prices will be changed irregularly. Inequality and injustice will be introduced into almost every branch of trade, and where long contracts are made, as in railroad bonds or government stocks, the depreciation of the metallic currency cannot fail to work a large and serious injury.

Many questions of importance are suggested by these changes : the adoption of a single standard of value, instead of the double one of gold and silver ; uniformity in the coinage of the different countries ; the extension of the decimal system of France and the United States to the several countries of Europe ; these and other questions are important, because they relate to the subject of money, in which such deep interest is felt by all classes of society, and to the justice or injustice of governments, whose highest duty is to preserve honesty and good faith among the people.

It is doubted by some persons whether the large supplies of gold from the mines of Russia, California, and Australia, have yet produced any appreciable effect upon its value. But the changes already effected in the currency of the United States and of France, and the knowledge we possess of the amount of coin in Europe and America, and of the annual supplies received from the mines, forbid us to indulge in any doubt on this subject.

The history of our gold currency in the United States is, of itself, decisive of this question. Twenty-five years ago our gold eagle would not circulate with our silver dollar, although their comparative weight is nearly the same as now, when both metals are daily exchanged for each other. Before 1834 we had no gold coin in our currency. Every eagle that was issued from the mint was immediately bought up and exported to foreign markets. The importer of French silks and wines could discharge more of his indebtedness by one hundred eagles than by a thousand silver dollars. When these were carried to the mint of Paris, and melted down into bullion, and restamped as French coin, the gold made a larger number of francs than the silver. The same was true at London, where the two metals had no legal relation to each other. The half-eagle was heavier than the English guinea, but five silver dollars would not sell for twenty-one shillings, sterling money. The New York merchant, therefore, who desired to pay his debt in England with coin, when the exchanges between New York and Liverpool were unfavourable, preferred to send eagles rather than dollars. In fact, the price of the ten dollar gold piece was quoted from \$10.40 to \$10.60; that is, one hundred eagles were worth 1,040 to 1,060 dollars of silver.

At present, both our metallic coins circulate together. Ten eagles are equivalent to one hundred silver dollars. Neither is quoted at a discount. When an export of the precious metals takes place, both are shipped together. The difference of value is so slight as to be inappreciable to the brokers who are sending coin abroad to meet their bills of exchange, or pay their foreign indebtedness. The quotations of bullion in the Liverpool market, during the year 1855, placed gold of our standard at 75 shillings per ounce, and silver of the same fineness, from 5 shillings to 5 shillings 1½ pence. The average of these quotations gives a ratio of 14.81 between the two precious metals. As our eagle contains 258 grains, and ten silver dollars contain 3,840 grains of the same fineness, their ratio is 14.89. The market value of bullion, at Liverpool, being thus nearly the same as the mint valuation, there is little if any choice which metal should be selected for exportation. At the average quotations just given, it would be best to remit silver, since gold is valued a little higher at the mint than at Liverpool. But the difference is too small to be of any importance. Under the old coinage law of 1792, which remained in force until 1834, the eagle contained 270 grains 22 carats fine, and the dollar 416 grains, of a fineness of 8,924 ten-thousandths. This gave a relative value of 15; that is, every thousand dollars of silver contained fifteen times as many grains of the pure metal, as a thousand dollars of gold.

It thus appears that when our gold dollar was lighter than it now is, compared with silver, containing of pure metal only 6½ per

cent. of the weight of the silver dollar, it was all exported as soon as it came from the mint, being sold in the market at 4 or 5 or 6 per cent. premium; and that now, when it contains a larger proportion of gold, 6.71 per cent., it circulates freely with the silver, and is not preferred at all for exportation.

This history is decisive of the fall of gold or the rise of silver, because it shows that the price of gold, measured in silver, has declined in the last thirty years. As, however, the supply of silver has been nearly stationary, and the demand for it nearly the same, while the supply of gold has largely increased, it is evident that it is the gold which has depreciated, and not the silver that has risen in value.

The history of our currency from 1834 to 1853 is a confirmation of the conclusion just mentioned. Under the influence of Gen. Jackson and Col. Benton, our Congress passed a law, in 1834, lessening the weight of the gold eagle from 270 to 258 grains. In 1837, its fineness was altered from 22 carats to 900-thousandths. The fineness of the silver dollar was also changed to 900-thousandths, but its weight was so altered that the amount of pure silver in the coin remained the same as before. The changes in the gold coin were, however, both in the same direction. It was made lighter and less pure. The alloy was increased from $\frac{1}{12}$ to $\frac{1}{10}$, and the weight was lessened twelve grains.

The effect of this alteration in the mint value of gold, was to introduce it freely into our circulation. It did not come in rapidly, so as to exclude the silver, but it came in abundantly. The two metals circulated together, and were readily exchanged for each other. The country banks generally held their specie in silver, and often sold gold at a premium, but the city banks held both the precious metals in their vaults, and generally paid out both at their counters without any decided preference. Everything moved on without disturbance, until the discovery of the California mines in 1848. The treasures of Australia were opened in 1851, and the production of the two countries soon told upon our currency. The silver coin was rapidly bought up for export. The country merchants carried the dollars and half dollars received at their stores to New York, and sold them at a premium. The banks, finding their silver above par, sold it for gold, gaining three or four per cent. by the exchange. Their vaults were replenished with eagles instead of dollars, to redeem their bills and pay their depositors. The brokers sent our silver abroad until all the channels of circulation were drained, and small change became so scarce, that it caused great inconvenience in our daily transactions of business. In 1853 Congress interfered, and reduced the weight of the dollar from 412½ grains to 384, to prevent its exportation. The mint came into the market, and by paying 3 or 4 or 5 per cent. premium for the silver in circulation, and by stamping a less quantity

than before with the old names of half dollar and dime, it has supplied us again with a silver currency. This interference of Congress was an acknowledgement of the depreciation of gold. The object and intention of the act of 1853 was to prevent the exportation of the silver coin, and it effected this object by debasing the dollar so as to put it on a par with the gold that had already been depreciated by its abundance.

These two periods in our history tell, therefore, the same story. In 1830 and 1856, the comparative weight of the gold and silver coins of the same name was nearly the same; but in 1830 the gold was withdrawn from circulation on account of its superior value, while in 1856 it circulates freely. In 1840 and in 1852, the two were of exactly the same comparative weight; but the silver was withdrawn in 1852, while both circulated together in 1840. In the first case, the mint valuation in 1830 was below the market price, but its depreciation in 1856 brought the two together. In the second case, the value at the mint and in the market in 1840, were the same; but the depreciation of the gold in 1852 brought it below the market price of silver, and drove the silver out of circulation.

The movements of the currency in other countries, accord with this conclusion. In England gold is the only legal tender, except for small sums under forty shillings. Silver being estimated higher by the mint than it is in the bullion market, the depreciation in gold has not yet made itself apparent in the withdrawal of the silver. The inferior currency, when both circulate together, will always drive out the superior. But the English silver of 1840, although inferior, could not displace the gold because of its illegality in large transactions, and the limited amount in circulation. By the act of Parliament passed in 1819, the silver crown of 5 shillings was made to contain 403.6 grains of pure silver, and as the pound contains 113 grains of pure gold, the ratio of the two metals at the mint is only 14.27. And as gold, although it has now depreciated considerably, is yet nearly 15 times higher than silver, its legal value in the current coin is so low that it is more profitable to export it than silver. No disturbance has therefore taken place in the English currency, on account of the depreciation of gold in the markets of the world. The silver coin is never exported, because it is rated too high at the English mint. It cannot push out the gold from circulation because it is not a legal tender for large amounts, and thus all is quiet and steady. In France, however, where the two metals have both been legal currencies, the equilibrium has been disturbed precisely as in the United States. The mint price of gold is 15½ times that of silver. Before 1850 this was lower than the market value, and by consequence silver was the great medium of circulation, and gold was at a premium. The price of gold was but

little higher in the market than at the mint, but still the excess was appreciable. The agio, or per centage above par, was seldom more than 1 or $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Twelve-thousandths was a common quotation at Paris, and, as gold was more convenient than silver for many of the uses of currency, this premium was readily given. Silver was generally used in trade and in the small transactions of business; the gold by travellers and in the larger operations of commerce where bank notes might not be employed. The currency was therefore mainly of silver; on the principle well known and universally acknowledged, that, if two mediums be both current, the inferior will always exclude the superior. The exclusion was not complete, because gold was wanted for some purposes in which it was preferable to silver. The estimate of the circulating coin in France, by M. Leon Faucher, a banker and financier of high authority, gave 3,000 millions of silver francs, and 350 millions of gold, making a proportion of more than eight to one. But since 1850, all this is changed. The agio on gold has entirely disappeared, and silver is now quoted at a premium. The bankers are busy buying up the five franc pieces, which have so long been the principal currency of France, and sending them abroad to meet their foreign indebtedness. Gold is flowing into the country to supply its place. The Paris mint is busy coining napoleons and not francs. Slowly, but surely, the silver is drawn from the provincial channels of circulation and its place supplied with the new treasures of California and Australia. During the year 1855, the exports of silver were 318 millions of francs against an import of 121, showing a loss of 197 millions in a single year. At the same time the imports of gold were 381 millions against an export of 163, showing a gain of 218 millions, which slightly exceeds the loss of silver. During the last three years, the imports of gold over silver were 923 millions, and the exports of silver over gold were over 479 millions.

For a long period of time the currency of France has been stable, when suddenly it is disturbed throughout the whole extent of the empire. The jewellers and manufacturers of plate have been melting down the silver for the arts and the luxuries of the people, the friction of constant handling is abrading and lightening the circulating coin, and to meet these demands no new supply is introduced. On the contrary, the bankers are busy shipping it abroad and importing gold in its stead. The new gold has to supply the place not only of the silver exported but of all that is consumed in the arts. Before 1850 the mint at Paris coined about 15 millions of gold francs every year; now it sends forth about 250 millions. In the last five or six years, probably one-fourth of the three thousand millions of French silver coin has been changed by the substitution of gold. Such a decided movement of specie furnishes an unanswerable argument for the depreciation of gold

since the discoveries of California and Australia in 1848 and 1851.

Some idea may be formed of the amount of this depreciation by the quotations in the English market of the price of silver. Gold being the only legal currency of Great Britain, silver is sold in the market as any other commodity is, at the best price that can be obtained. The immense commerce of London and Liverpool with the new world, attracts to these ports nearly all the products of the American mines. This is the centre where they are gathered, and whence they are distributed to Europe and the East. The sales being large and frequent, and among many competitors, the market price approximates very nearly to the true value. As silver is easily moved from port to port, and the supply and demand both remarkably stable, the price is steady, and without much fluctuation. One or two per cent. in a year is the utmost range of prices. The sales being paid for in gold, which is the English standard of value, the price of silver will rise as gold depreciates; and this rise of one will measure the comparative depreciation of the other. The quotations for Mexican dollars per ounce on the first of January of the following years:

1849,	1850,	1851,	1852,	1854,	1855,	1856,
have been $58\frac{3}{4}$,	$58\frac{7}{8}$,	$59\frac{5}{8}$,	$59\frac{1}{2}$,	$60\frac{1}{2}$,	$61\frac{3}{8}$,	$60\frac{1}{2}$,

pence. On the 20th of September of the present year they were $60\frac{1}{2}$, and on the 3d of October, 61 pence per ounce. If $60\frac{3}{4}$ be taken as the average rate for 1856, the rise compared with 1849 would be nearly $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, or, compared with 1850, about $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. Small as this is, it will disturb the currencies of every country where both metals are a legal tender, causing an export of silver and a substitution of gold in its stead.

All these movements of the currency in the United States and France, and in other parts of the civilized world, do not establish a depreciation in the precious metals, but only an alteration in the relative value of gold and silver. We have spoken of the change as if it were caused by a depreciation in gold, because of the great increase in its production, while that of silver remained stationary. But nothing yet brought forward reaches the question whether the circulating coin, which is the legal measure of value, and the great standard by which all the transactions of trade and commerce are compared, has declined or advanced. Both may have risen, and silver more than gold. Both may have declined, and then it must have been gold more than silver. But whether the whole mass of the precious metals has varied so as to cause an advance or a decline in prices, or whether one has remained stationary, is another question, and one of great importance.

It is a common opinion, that the recent large supplies of gold have already produced a marked effect on prices; that the high rates which have prevailed for corn, cotton, and slaves—for sugar,

coffee, and iron, have been in part brought about by the enlargement of the currency of the world. The slight depreciation of gold compared with silver, which we have been hitherto discussing, could not have produced any considerable portion of these advances. A decline in gold of 3 or 4 per cent. would only raise cotton a quarter of a cent per pound, and this is almost inappreciable in the many fluctuations to which it is liable. The average advance in cotton, for example, during the last five years, is much greater than this:

From 1845 to 1850 the total exports of cotton were.....	3,744,000,000 lbs.
Their official value was.....	276,318,093 dollars.
Making an average price per pound of.....	7 cents and 4 mills.
In the five years from 1850 to 1855, the exports am'td to	4,745,000,000 lbs.
And their official valuation was.....	475,010,289 dollars.
Giving an average price of.....	10 cents per pound.

Here is a rise of two cents and six mills, which is thirty-five per cent. on the average from 1845 to 1850.

Similar advances have taken place in many important articles of commerce, and it is obvious that the small depreciation of gold compared with silver, amounting to 3 or 4 per cent., is insignificant and almost inappreciable amongst the other disturbances to which the prices of all kinds of productions are exposed.

Let us inquire, then, what is the amount of increase in the circulation? Has it caused an advance in prices, or has it been only one of many other causes? Have silver and gold both depreciated? And must the two be regarded as one in estimating their effect on prices?

Many estimates have been made of the amount of the metallic currency. Some of these have been made by bankers and financiers; some by ministers of government; by officers of the mint; by parliamentary committees; by writers on political economy; and some by statisticians, who have studied this subject with much industry and labour. The facts that have been thus collected have not brought the different estimates very near each other, but they are sufficiently near for our present purpose. The results of the several authorities have fixed the currencies of Europe and America, for the year 1850, at from twelve to fifteen hundred millions of dollars. Since that time, the supplies from the mines have furnished to the mints six or seven hundred millions, thus making an increase of 40 or 50 per cent. As an increase of the circulating medium advances the price of commodities in the same ratio, if everything else remains the same, we have this astonishing result, that the mere change in the supply of the precious metals has raised the price of every article of consumption 40 or 50 per cent. in the last six years. It is the common opinion that the gold of California has had some effect of this kind, and that a great enhancement of prices will soon take place under its influence, but

few have supposed so large an effect already produced. It is desirable, therefore, to investigate the facts with care before so great a change can be admitted. A rise of one-third on lands, houses, and slaves; on all the productions of agricultural and manufacturing industry; on wages, rents and profits; on everything that is bought and sold—because of the mere enlargement of the metallic currency, is so astounding a change, that it will claim more particular attention.

At the commencement of the present century, the annual supply of gold and silver from the American mines, was stated by Humboldt at $43\frac{1}{2}$ millions of dollars. This distinguished traveller visited the mining countries of the New World, and copied the official accounts of the mints, the treasuries, and the custom-houses. His history and his reputation opened to him records that had hitherto been kept secret from the rest of the world. He explored the mines, and learned the methods of smelting and purifying the silver. He visited the gold washings and the veins of precious ore, and inspected the machinery for crushing the quartz rock, out of which the gold was gathered. His reports are, therefore, reliable and trustworthy. The valuable work of Mr. Jacob on "The Production and Consumption of the Precious Metals," was published in 1831, and brings our knowledge on this subject down to 1830. By his statistics, it appears that this American supply, after increasing a little up to 1810, fell off then very largely, on account of the Mexican and South American revolutions. The mints of Mexico, which, in 1800, coined more than half the amount from America, only issued 19 millions in 1810, and 11 millions in 1811, and 5 in 1812, against 26 millions in 1809. In 1813, this coinage advanced to 11 millions, and maintained this average up to 1830. Peace being now generally restored, and English capital extensively introduced, the Mexican mines began to improve. The reports furnished to the British government by their several American consuls in consequence of a motion in the British Parliament in 1830, and published by McCulloh in his "Commercial Dictionary" in 1839, show that the supply from America was then 25 millions against $19\frac{1}{2}$, the average product of the preceding ten years. Since that time, the supply has advanced considerably. Several statements in Hunt's Magazine, and in the London Athenæum, and in the London Times, give the present production at 39 or 40 millions. This includes all the North American and South American mines, except California. The receipts from Hungary and Saxony, and the rest of Europe, except Russia, and from the gold dust of Africa, is only five or six millions, and is nearly stationary. From Russia, the production has largely and rapidly increased. In 1829, it was three millions; in 1835, four; in 1840, six; in 1842, ten; in 1844, thirteen; in 1846, seventeen; in 1848, twenty; and in 1850, twenty-one. The necessities of Russia during the

last five years, would encourage the workings of these Siberian mines, and thus prevent any decline. No increase, however, took place, as the coinage of the Russian mints, during this period, was nearly stationary. It was for

1850, 1851, 1852, 1853, and 1854,
20, 18, 20, 21, and 21 millions of rubles.

From California and Australia have come, however, the largest supplies. Gold was first discovered on our Pacific coast in 1848; but the deposits at the mint for coinage that year, were only \$44,177. They increased rapidly for the next three years; since which time, they have remained nearly stationary. The total deposits of California gold at the United States mint, both for coin and for bars, up to the end of 1855, according to the reports of the director of the mint, have been \$313,234,507. The amount that had been mined, and sent off from San Francisco, is, however, much above these deposits. For the year 1851, for example, according to official returns in Chili, \$2,372,000 were received from California. The shipments to Europe by steamers and sailing vessels, as far as appears by their manifests, were, in the same year, \$4,600,000; the amounts carried by passengers to Europe, and to the several countries of South America, were large; the consumption by jewellers in California and the United States, of uncoined dust, was considerable; and the amounts circulated on the Pacific coast of pieces stamped by private bankers, amounted to several millions. In 1853, the shipments to London alone were \$4,975,662, and in 1854, they were \$3,781,080. For the seven years, ending with 1855, the total production must have exceeded four hundred millions; probably 450 would be near the true production to the end of 1855; but to err, if at all, on the safe side we will count it at only 400 millions.

The Australian gold fields were discovered in 1851. The exports to Great Britain, in this year, were £906,336. In 1852, they were £9,735,000. In 1853, 1854, and 1855, they were £10,347,000, £9,028,000, and £11,512,000. Here is an official export of more than two hundred millions of dollars. If to this be added the amounts exported to other countries both of Europe and America, and those carried by passengers and not entered at the Custom-house, the total supply must certainly exceed 210 millions. We have thus a total production for the six years from 1850 to 1855 inclusive, of a thousand millions of dollars, viz.:

From California.....	400 millions.
“ Other American mines.....	240 “
“ Europe and Africa.....	30 “
“ Russia.....	120 “
“ Australia.....	210 “
Making the total in Europe and America.....	1,000 “

Of this production and of the silver coin previously existing, a large export has been made to India and China. From the time of Pliny, who styled the East "the great sink of the precious metals," the outgoings of specie from Europe to Asia have continued almost without interruption. In 1800 the annual remittances by the Cape of Good Hope, and the Levant, and through Russia, were placed by Humboldt at $25\frac{1}{2}$ millions of dollars. The great extension of English manufactures, for a time nearly stopped this drain. In 1830 the exports of specie from Bengal to Europe and America exceeded the imports. The same was true for China in 1832. But recently the current has returned to its old course, and at the present time it has swelled to a greater magnitude than at any former period. For 1856 the exports from England alone have been at the rate of 50 millions per annum. Mr. Walsh, late Professor of Political Economy in the University of Dublin, says that over 105 millions have been exported from England in the five years from 1851 to 1855. For 1855 they were £7,358,161; for 1854, 1853, 1852, and 1851, they were £4,300,302; £4,590,867; £3,551,977, and £1,818,380. Adding in the year 1850, and making a small allowance for other countries besides Great Britain, and for the trade through Turkey and Russia, the result for the six years from 1850 to 1855 may possibly reach 140 millions.

The wear of the coins, according to the rule of Jacob, would be 30 millions for the whole six years. The consumption in the arts for jewelry and plate have been estimated at 28 millions per annum by the same author; at 22 by Mr. Seaman, in his valuable work on "The Progress of the Nations in Industry and Wealth," published in 1850; at 18 millions by Humboldt, and at 17 by McCulloch. Taking the highest of these estimates, and allowing something for the increase in population and wealth for the last five years, the consumption in the arts may be counted at 30 millions per annum. The total outgoings, then, from the thousand millions produced, will be three hundred and fifty millions, viz.:

For the exports to Asia.....	140	millions.
For the wear and loss of coin.....	30	"
And for consumption in the arts.....	180	"
Making a total of.....	350	"
And leaving for new coinage.....	650	"

No one can review these figures without perceiving that this result is the minimum addition that has been made to the metallic currency of 1850—the smallest allowances for supplies and the largest estimates for consumption having been uniformly adopted.

It might be a matter of interest to know where this accumulated treasure has gone. By reference to the coinage of our mints and our exports of specie to foreign countries, as published by the Secretary of the Treasury, it will be seen that the coinage of gold in the six years ending 1855 amounted to \$313,932,820; while the

excess of our exports of specie over the imports in the same period was only \$174,394,190. Besides this addition to our domestic coin of more than 139 millions, it is well known that many millions more are brought in annually by immigrants from abroad; and this importation, unnoticed at the Custom-house, far exceeds the consumption in the arts, and the loss by wearing and by other causes. So that not less than 150 millions of the 650 added to the currency of the world, are to be found in the United States. If the increase in other countries is only half as rapid as it is here, the whole of the new supply is easily accounted for. In a recent report made to the Emperor of the French by his Minister of Finance, we learn that the excess of imports over exports in France since 1850 has been 160 millions. So that, even after allowing for losses and consumption in France, much more than 100 millions of the 650 is to be found in that country. The remainder is to be looked for in the rest of Europe.

The total amount of the precious metals used as coin was estimated by Jacob in 1830, at fifteen hundred millions of dollars. They were then decreasing; but the revived working of the American mines, and the rapid advance of the Russian supply, soon put a stop to the decrease, and kept them nearly stationary until 1850. Humboldt's estimate for the year 1800 was lower than Jacob's. Seaman's, for 1830, and 1840, and 1850, is very nearly twelve hundred millions for each of the three periods. If we take the largest of these, the addition of 650 millions is forty-three per cent. on the coin in circulation in 1850.

An enlargement of the currency, if everything else remained the same, would cause an advance of the price of commodities in precisely the same ratio. This principle we are familiar with in the expansion and contraction of our banks, and it is confirmed by all experience. Its operation is readily seen when irredeemable paper money constitutes the currency; but the principle is precisely the same when the circulating medium consists of coin. In both cases a decrease in the worth of the usual measure of value causes prices to advance. Just as a diminution of the length of a yard stick would increase the number of yards in a piece of cloth, or a lightening of the pound weight would increase the number of pounds in a bag of cotton, so the reduction in the worth of a dollar would increase the number of dollars for which any article might be purchased; that is, would advance all the prices of merchandise. The yard is the unit of length, the pound of weight, and the dollar of value; and any diminution in either increases the number of times that the unit would be contained in the given magnitude. Money is not a perfect invariable measure of value, but it is the legal and the common one. The yard is subject to some changes from temperature, still it is the legal standard by which all linear distances are reckoned. The pound

changes its true weight when the air that surrounds it expands or contracts, or when it is carried to different latitudes or elevations. These, then, are not perfect measures ; in fact for some of the exacter purposes of science allowances are made for these variations, so as to obtain an unchangeable standard. In like manner is gold an imperfect and invariable measure of value, though the legal and common standard by which all contracts are made.

Now if this measure should be lessened ; if the precious metals could be found as abundant as coal ; if they could be procured as easily as iron, or copper, or lead ; if the cost of producing them should decline ; if the gold dust should descend on the earth in showers and be gathered as water, the price of every commodity must advance in the same ratio as the standard declines. The price of a bag of cotton is the number of dollars it will command, and a decline in their worth would enlarge the number of dollars that would be required to purchase the cotton.

It does not always follow that an increased abundance of an article is an index of its decline. This is generally the case, however. The true average market value is determined by the cost of production. But when, in consequence of the discovery of new mines more easily and cheaply worked than those formerly known, the supply of any metal is rapidly increased, it indicates a decline in the cost of production ; and the supply goes on increasing until the price falls to the exact cost of bringing the metal to market. The enlargement of the supply is a measure of the decreasing cost of production. So the increased amount of current coin is a measure of a decrease in its worth, and of the advance in the price or money value of every article of merchandise.

These consequences are acknowledged by all writers on political economy, and confirmed by universal experience. The facts which we have brought together, being once established, the conclusion is irresistible, that prices have advanced since 1850 in the same ratio with the precious metals. This advance, is, however, only true if everything else remained the same. But as the population of the world has increased a little in six years, and as commodities have been more or less multiplied, so that a larger amount of specie is needed to circulate them ; the average advance in prices on account of the gold discoveries of 1848 and 1851 cannot be as large as 43 per cent., but must be reduced in proportion to the increased demand. Our population in the United States and in Canada has increased 15 or 20 per cent. in that time, but the rate in Europe is very different. The subjects of Queen Victoria are not 5 per cent. more numerous than in 1850, and the inhabitants of the other countries of Europe not two per cent. The increase of commodities is not probably larger than that of population. And to balance these demands for additional currency, we have the facilities furnished by new banks, which, by securing

deposits from their customers, and permitting them to transact their daily business by checks, lessen the demand for coin or bank notes. But if we give to the enlarged demand its fullest influence, the 43 per cent. advance cannot be reduced below 35 or 40. So that we are forced to the conclusion, that under the influence of the new supplies of gold from California and Australia, a rise of more than a third has already taken place in the average prices of all the products of industry.

This is very large, but it is no more than the facts warrant, and the fullest reliance may be placed on the result. This change, great as it is already, is still going on. The receipts from California and Australia are only begun, and when other years have accumulated their influence, the effect will increase with time, and disturb still more those prices which are the basis of our business and our commerce.

It might be supposed, at first sight, that the per centage of increase in the precious metals should be counted on the whole circulation of specie and paper money. But a little reflection will correct any such notion. An increased supply of coin permits the banks to expand their issues, and, as self-interest always impels them to extend their circulation as much as possible, the paper money will be sure to enlarge, *pari passu*, with the specie. This expansion has taken place in the United States, as appears by the bank returns published by the Secretary of the Treasury, which show that the circulation of the paper money advanced in the six years between 1849 and 1855 from 115 to 187 millions. The wars in Europe, and the consequent demand for specie for remittances to the East, and the want of confidence in paper money in the troublous times of the last few years, may not have permitted as large an advance there, in bank notes as in specie; but the difference cannot be large—not enough to effect the conclusion that has just been established.

The great reduction in value, which has been insisted on, in regard to the circulating coin, may seem inconsistent with the slight depreciation of gold which was mentioned in a former part of this article; but the inconsistency is only apparent. The 3 or 4 per cent. depreciation which has taken place in gold, is entirely with reference to silver. As long as both metals circulate together at any large commercial points, as at Havre or Paris, a change in the value of one cannot take place without carrying the other with it; nor can any greater change than two or three or four per cent. take place in one when measured by the other. Just as if wheat should rise in price in New York, it would bring up with it rye, and corn, and buckwheat, and other grains that could be used in its place. If the ordinary price of wheat were a dollar, while the three other grains, just mentioned, were ordinarily 60 cents, a rise of 50 cents in wheat would cause an advance of nearly 30 cents in

the others. The price of rye, measured in wheat, would be three-fifths, or nearly three-fifths, at all times; the comparative worth of one, measured in the other, remaining nearly invariable. Six bushels of wheat would buy ten of corn, both when wheat was scarce, and when it was plenty. The rise is in wheat, but it extends to the other grains. So it would be, if, instead of a rise, a decline should take place. These principles are exactly the same for money. There is no depreciation in silver of itself. The present production is not equal to the consumption in the arts and the exportation to the East. The abundant supplies from California make gold depreciate two or three per cent. at first, and immediately this metal is transferred to where silver can be found. By taking the place of the silver, and driving it out of circulation, the silver becomes abundant compared with the demand for it, and depreciates. The two currencies would be then nearly together again, until a farther depreciation of gold takes place by a new supply. A second substitution, a second release of silver, and a second decline succeed each other. If the decline in gold is only one per cent., this substitution is made slowly; a difference of two or three per cent. accelerates it very much; and four or five per cent. is the maximum depreciation that can possibly occur, while both metals are used together as a circulating medium. But this two or three or four or five per cent. is not the measure of the total depreciation of the gold, but only the temporary excess of its depreciation over that of silver.

The future progress of this decline in the value of the precious metals, and of the rise in prices, will go on in precisely the same manner for the future as it has in the past. It was felt first in the United States, because of our excessive mint valuation of gold, under the laws of 1834 and 1837. We counted it worth sixteen times as much as silver, and its depreciation was felt here soonest. When our silver was nearly all carried off, Congress interfered and lowered the mint value of gold to 15 times that of silver. The ratio in France is $15\frac{1}{2}$, and the abstraction of silver is now going on there. The amount in circulation being very large, and commerce in France being comparatively sluggish, the displacement goes on slowly. But unless a change is soon made in the mint regulations of Paris, the silver will disappear as it did here, and force the government to adjust the mint value of the two metals to the market rates. This may be done by raising the amount of gold in the napoleon, or reducing the weight of the silver piece of five francs. The latter was the plan adopted in the United States, but either would produce the same effect. If the government should make this alteration, then the demand for the East, and for the arts, exceeding, as it does, the annually supply of silver from the mines, must be met by the coins of Germany or other countries where silver is in circulation. When the mint

prices of the two precious metals in these countries shall be altered so as to prevent the exportation of the silver, new calls will be made on the United States, or on France, and another lightening of the silver coins will be required. The value of gold being only 10 or 12 times that of silver in the markets of the East, the exports of the precious metals thither must long continue to be of silver only. Nowhere in Asia is gold a legal tender, silver being everywhere the only lawful currency. There was, for many years, a tendency to introduce the gold mohur into circulation in India, through the influence of the East India Company. It was authorized to be received in the payment of taxes, and was beginning to have general circulation. It never had, however, the sanction of the government as a legal coin. When the depreciation of gold commenced in 1851 and 1852, the people of India began to pay their dues to government and to other persons more and more largely in gold. They refused, however, to receive it back from the government, because it was not as valuable as silver, and because the government was obliged, in good faith and by law, to pay in silver. The Indian government, perceiving the inextricable difficulties into which they were likely to fall by having all their receipts in one metal, while compelled to make their payments in another, issued a notification in December, 1852, that, from the first of January following, no more gold should be received into the treasury. Thus ended, for the present, all the prospect of stopping the Eastern drain of silver, and confined to Europe the new treasures of California and Australia. The great channels of circulation in all these countries of Europe where gold and silver both circulate by law, must be filled with gold, and from time to time new changes must be introduced to retain the silver. After one or two alterations have been made in the mint valuations of silver in France and the United States, and in other countries of Europe, England must receive her call for silver, and her shilling token must be given up. By her laws, gold is only 14.4 more valuable than silver; but the abundant production of gold, and the increased need for silver, will bring the more precious metal down to this ratio, and force England at last to the same changes that had been found necessary in other countries. This course must be continued until the depreciation of gold and the rise in prices shall prevent the working of some of the mines, by so diminishing the amount of commodities that can be obtained for the labour employed in mining, that it can be more profitably employed in other pursuits. When this withdrawal of labour and capital from the mines shall so reduce the supply that the production shall equal the consumption of the world, both for the arts and for the wear and loss of coin, then the equilibrium will be restored, the depreciation will cease, and prices will no longer advance. The tendency towards this equilibrium will be in both directions. The decline in gold

will lessen the profits of the miners and discourage production. At the same time it will increase the demand for ornaments and watches and plate, and because of the enlarged amount of coin in circulation, made necessary by the rise in prices, it will also increase the loss by wear and by shipwreck. This enlargement of the demand for annual supplies of gold, as well as the decrease of supplies from the mines, will unite, therefore, in restoring the equilibrium between the production and the consumption of the precious metals.

Although this progress must go on, it will not continue as rapid hereafter as it is at present. Every enlargement of the currency lessens the per centage which the annual supplies bear to the whole coin in circulation, so that the rise in prices will be in a diminished ratio. The advance in the money value of European merchandise will increase the demand for the products of the East. If cotton shall continue to be worth nine or ten cents a pound, or shall advance to still higher rates, the imports from the East Indies will increase. If silks shall advance at Lyons, new activity will be given to the commerce with Asia. If the price of coffee rises, the enlarged consumption of tea will cause more extensive shipments from the Chinese empire. In like manner will the advance of sugar, of hemp, and of every production of the East, encourage our trade with that quarter of the world. These new imports into Europe must be met by larger shipments of specie, and thus the annual demand from the mines will be increased, and the equilibrium of supply and demand hastened.

In the present and prospective disturbances of the currencies of the world, the most favourable opportunity is presented to the governments of Europe and America to adopt a uniform coinage. In the United States we have twice changed our coins during the last quarter of a century; why did we not accommodate them to the coins of England and France, with which countries our commerce is so large? In 1834 our half-eagle contained 123.75 grains of pure gold. It now has 116.1. Why was it not changed to 113.001, so as to correspond to the English sovereign? In 1850 our dollar contained $371\frac{1}{4}$ grains of pure silver. It now has 345.6. Why was it not made exactly equal to the five-franc piece of France, which has $347.36\frac{1}{4}$ grains? These accommodations could easily have been made, and would have afforded great facilities for trade and commerce. As France will soon be forced to change her mint values of gold and silver, why not invite her to a treaty arrangement, by which uniformity in coinage will be secured between the two countries? As England is anxious to secure a decimal currency, why shall not the three countries work together, and adopt a common system in which a dollar and an eagle, a franc and a napoleon, a shilling and a sovereign, shall be of the same fineness, and exact multiples of a common unit, so that they can be readily exchanged for each other?

Such an arrangement is called for by strong interests, and it can be effected without any violation of good faith, or any interference with the contracts between the citizens of their respective countries. The losses and inconvenience of the existing arrangements are very great. We are large exporters of gold, and our eagles and half-eagles are shipped by every steamer to Liverpool, and then transported to London, the great centre of the commerce of the world. As our coins are not current in Great Britain, the Directors of the Bank of England send these coins at once to the mint, new and beautiful as they are; and no seigniorage being required by the government, they are sent without hesitation or delay. Here they are re-melted and refined. A new and different amount of alloy is mixed with the pure metal, and the gold is re-issued in the shape of sovereigns, having the stamp of England on them instead of that of the United States. The coin is returned to the bank, only to be transferred to Paris, where it is again uncurrent. Fresh, and new, and pure, as sterling coin can be, it is transmitted to the French mint, melted and purified again, alloyed with a different percentage of copper, and returned to the Bank of France. There is no rest for it here. It must be sent to Germany or Spain, to Austria or Russia, to be melted, alloyed, and stamped again, with new names, devices, and weights; and at every transfer there is a loss in value; at every recoinage there is an expenditure of capital and labour, a waste of metal, of time, and of interest. The government, the people, and the merchant all lose, and nothing is gained by any one. Not even the money changers are benefitted by the operations, for they have to give their time and their skill, and their industry, for the charges they make for exchange.

These losses are small compared with the inconvenience to the merchants and the injury to commerce. The price of exchange would be largely decreased by a uniform currency. As it is impossible in any part of the United States that exchange on New York or Boston should rise or fall more than a quarter or a half per cent., or at farthest one per cent., so exchanges between New York and Havre, or New York and Liverpool, could only vary a fraction of one per cent., if the coins of the two countries were current in both, or if their exact value was generally known. The price of exchange would then be the mere cost of transporting the coin, while now it varies two or three per cent., or more. The general ignorance of the exact value of foreign coins, tends to narrow the trade to a few merchants engaged in that particular branch of commerce, and thus interferes with the free competition which is the life of business, and the best security for fairness among merchants, and for prosperity and activity in commerce. When cotton is quoted at Havre as worth so many francs per hundred kilogrammes, or as having risen or fallen so many

centimes per half kilogramme, few persons understand the quotations, or the amount of the advance, or of the decline. Business is thus shackled and restrained because only a few know how to act, on account of the difference of coins and the mysteries of exchange.

Free trade, free interchange of commodities, free intercourse between the business men of every country, is the great discovery of modern politics; and everything that tends to promote it is to be cherished and encouraged. Uniformity of weights and measures would be a great *desideratum* also, and every aid should be given to bringing about a "consummation so devoutly wished for." But, as governments move slowly, and as so radical a change in the ideas, and names, and magnitudes, as is implied in a uniformity of weights and measures, can only be effected with difficulty, there is no reason to delay the changes in the currency till all shall be rendered uniform. The reasons for making the coins uniform are much stronger than those which favour uniformity of weights and of measures. The object can be effected with ease, with simplicity, without disturbing names, and without violating contracts. Some changes are absolutely necessary, and in making them it is just as easy to stop where some neighbouring nation has stopped, as to go beyond or to fall short of their limit. Besides, the coin itself is exported while weights and measures are not. Cloth, and wine, and iron, are shipped from one country to another, and are then bought and sold by different measures than before. But the measures themselves are not transferred beyond the boundaries of the State which employs them. When coins, however, are carried abroad, they are not only merchandise, but standards of value, and to deprive them of this last quality is to lessen their utility, injure the exporter, and disturb the transactions of commerce.

The present time being so suitable for this reformation, when changes in the currency are made indispensable in consequence of disturbances in the values of the precious metals, by the opening of new sources of supply, it is important that this change should be made on correct principles, in good faith with the people of the several countries, and with as great advantage as possible to the interests of commerce, of free trade, and of international brotherhood.

1. In any reformation of the coinage of different countries, it is of the highest and most indispensable importance that justice between man and man, and between the governments and the people, should be preserved inviolate. Very slight changes in the current coins may, however, be made without violating this principle. In 1834, 1837, and 1853, the United States altered the value of their coins, but a severe scrutiny of the several acts of Congress will not establish any unfair or unjust principle in our legislation on this subject. If any wrong was done, it was too slight to be worthy of

notice. The debasement of the coinage has been the disgrace of kings and emperors in dark and barbarous ages and countries, and the iniquities of a depreciated and irredeemable paper money have been sanctioned in modern times by nearly every country in the civilized world. These wrong-doings have not been confined to Europe or America, to the present century or to the preceding one. But whether approved by sovereigns or by the people, they are none the less dishonourable and wicked. Let the public faith be kept pure, untarnished, inviolate. No repudiation, no payment of obligations in name and not in reality, can be tolerated or approved by the three great nations who are at the head of the commerce and the civilization of the present age.

2. In any change that may be made, it is most desirable to retain as much as possible of the present state of things. This is important in all reformatations; but in matters of business it is especially important. Nothing enters so completely into our daily life and thoughts as money. Not that all persons are absorbed in the pursuit of gain or in the accumulation of wealth, but the price of every article of food and clothing, of everything we consume or produce, is of necessity often presented to our minds. Our habits of thought and action in regard to cost and prices are thus deeply fixed in our nature, and to uproot them will be difficult, if not impossible.

3. It is greatly to be desired that the French *gramme* should be employed as the unit by which all the coins shall be weighed. This weight was adopted by France at the suggestion of her men of science, under the influence of the strongest feelings of fraternity among all nations. It was not obtained by weighing a grain of wheat from the valleys of the Seine, or by measuring the foot or the arm of a French emperor, but from the great earth herself, which, being the common property of all nations and people, furnishes an appropriate metre for a universal standard. It is not dependent on an arbitrary weight deposited among the State archives, which may be lost or destroyed. The circumference of the earth supplies the metre, and the weight of a certain measure of water determines the gramme. The English and American pound, or ounce, or grain, have no such claims to preservation. Perfectly arbitrary, dependent on a standard pound kept in the Tower at London, they present no claims to recognition out of the country where they have been adopted. A Frenchman or an Italian, a Mexican or a Brazilian, sees nothing in them that he can appreciate; while for the metre and the gramme every civilized people of the globe admires the science and skill with which they have been determined, and approves of them as good and proper measures for the use of all mankind.

4. It is also desirable to preserve, as far as possible, the decimal system. This has been adopted in France and the United

States, and its advantages are so great that it would be impossible to induce us to return to the old system of pounds, shillings, and pence, of livres, deniers, and sols. The English have not yet adopted this system, but an earnest desire among the merchants, the politicians, and the scientific men, has been expressed in its favour. A commission of distinguished statesmen and men of science, has been appointed by Parliament on this subject, and the witnesses examined, as well as the commission, have been unanimous in recommending it. Many difficulties are presented to its general introduction, especially as to weights and measures, but a slight effort will overcome them all, as far as relates to the coinage.

5. A fifth point, not less important and indispensable, is the preservation of the common names, applying them as near as possible to the same absolute values. If a shilling or a pound or a dollar or a franc were abrogated entirely, no force of law in a free country like ours could drive them out of use. In spite of pains and penalties, the people would still employ them in their daily business transactions; in their private calculations and estimates; in their books and accounts and sales and purchases. And if the law should affix these names to new coins of different values, the confusion between the old and new systems would lead to misunderstandings and disputes and hardships and injustice, so that trouble and wrong, instead of peace and equity, would follow the efforts to introduce harmony and uniformity among all nations.

6. In making any new system, it should conform to the recent change in the comparative value of gold and silver, and fall a little below the existing ratio, so as to anticipate any slight deterioration of gold which may hereafter take place.

The increased supply of gold from California and Australia has produced, as yet, but little effect on the comparative value of gold and silver. The market value of gold before 1850, was $15\frac{1}{2}$ or 16; but it has now receded to $14\frac{1}{4}$ or 15. The quotations for the last report of the London market, were for

Foreign gold in bars, (standard) per ounce, £3 17s. 9d.

Silver in bars, (standard) " 5s. 2½d.

The standards for the two metals are different. The gold has one-twelfth alloy, the silver $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The ratio between the two then becomes 14.89. It would not, therefore, be well to rate the gold higher than $14\frac{1}{4}$ times the value of silver.

7. It is desirable that the fineness of all the coins should be the same, and that this fineness should not be expressed in the antiquated nomenclature of the English, as so many carats, quarters, and fractions of a quarter, but in percentage, as has been done in France since 1816, and as has been done in the United States since 1837. This fineness is 90 per cent. in both countries, and there is no good reason why this should not be adopted by all.

8. All changes in the coinage of the two metals should be made

in that metal, which, even though legal, is not current. In England, gold only is a legal tender, and the principal metal employed as a currency. From 1717 to 1816, gold was overvalued at the British mint, and silver was, therefore, excluded from circulation. In 1816, a change was made in the silver coin, and gold was undervalued, but silver not being made a legal tender for more than 40 shillings, was kept out of circulation. The change in England ought then to be in silver.

In France, before the recoinage of 1785, as well as since that period, gold was undervalued at the mint, and was, therefore, excluded from circulation. The present change should, therefore, be in gold; but it must be made soon, if made at all, for the depreciation now going on in gold has brought it below the mint value in France, and it is flowing thither rapidly, and driving the silver out of circulation.

In the United States, since 1853, gold is the only lawful standard of value, silver not being a legal tender for more than five dollars. This important change in our currency was made in the recent bill for lightening our silver coin. Any change that shall be made, ought, therefore, to be in our silver; which, though current, has no legal value, except for the purposes of small change.

By following out this condition, the governments will act in good faith with their citizens. When gold does not circulate, any alterations in it will be neither inconvenient nor unjust—and so of silver. If only one metal is current or legal, the understanding and intention in every agreement, and in every obligation, is to pay a certain number of dollars or francs or pounds, in the legal or current coin, and any changes that may be made in the other uncurrent or illegal metal, will not interfere with the contracts or engagements of the citizens.

9. It is important to preserve the franc as the unit for silver, and the pound as the unit for gold. These have many claims for preservation, which the dollar and the eagle have not. The franc is intimately connected with the metrical system, introduced by the scientific men of France, and founded on the measure of the earth's circumference. It is legalized in Belgium, and extensively used in Italy and other countries of Europe. The present pound has been preserved unchanged for more than a hundred years. It was introduced with the House of Hanover, and, since 1717, has been the only unit of account in England. It survived the suspension of specie payments during the French revolution, and the violent changes in the currency of Great Britain, made by Sir Robert Peel in 1819. Since that time, the sovereign has been the only legal and the only current unit of the United Kingdom. The silver dollar and the gold eagle of the United States have neither been made sacred by time nor by uniformity. The dollar has recently been diminished seven per cent., and the eagle has been three times

changed in less than a quarter of a century. Our country is new, and our people flexible and ready for reformation and improvement. Used to change, we cannot claim that our coinage should be adopted as the model for old, stable, and conservative countries, where innovation is a crime, and reform the signal of danger and alarm.

It might seem difficult at first sight to retain all these important requisites, and secure uniformity without disturbing the existing system to an inconvenient and alarming extent—to preserve the gramme, the pound, the franc, and the decimal system, the present names and values, and the recent ratio between gold and silver, without violating good faith, or interfering with the obligations between man and man. But though difficult, it may be done.

If the franc is retained as the silver unit, it will be easy to accommodate our dollar to this, by making it exactly equal to five francs. This would increase its present amount of pure silver only about one-half of one per cent.; and as we have, but three years since, reduced it seven per cent., so small a change is unexceptionable.

If $14\frac{1}{2}$ be taken as the proper ratio between gold and silver, the weight of 25 francs in gold will be readily determined. The pure silver would weigh $112\frac{1}{2}$ grammes, and the gold 7.62712 . This would equal 117.7505 grains, and agree almost exactly with 1,000 English farthings. An ounce of standard gold, or 440 grains of pure gold, is coined at the English mint into £3 17s. $10\frac{1}{2}$ d. So that a pound contains 113.0016 grains, and a 1,000 farthings 117.7100 . This differs from the 25 francs only three hundredths of one per cent. If the 25 francs of gold were made to weigh exactly $7\frac{1}{2}$ grammes, the agreement would be still more complete, although the ratio between the two metals would then be a trifle less than $14\frac{1}{2}$. The number of grains in $7\frac{1}{2}$ grammes is 117.7178 , which differs from 1,000 farthings of the present English standard pound less than the ten thousandth part. By counting 25 francs a guinea, or a thousand farthings, and by making the franc and the guinea of these two weights, viz., $4\frac{1}{2}$ grammes of silver, and $7\frac{1}{2}$ grammes of gold, the currencies of France and England could be brought into harmony with each other, and with the market rates of gold and silver. By increasing our half-eagle from 116.1 grains of pure gold to 117.7178 , the coins of the three nations would become identical. These are all the changes that are necessary to bring the three currencies into harmony.

1. As to the gold coins: to make the American half-eagle and the French piece of twenty-five francs identical with a new English coin containing one thousand sterling farthings, to be called a guinea. Its weight to be $7\frac{1}{2}$ grammes of pure gold, or $8\frac{1}{36}$ of standard gold, of 90 per cent. fineness.

2. As to the silver coins: to make the American dollar and

the English four shilling piece, which they propose to denominate a double florin (but which ought to be called a dollar), identical with the five franc piece of the French, viz., $22\frac{1}{2}$ grammes of pure silver, or 25 grammes of standard silver, of 90 per cent. fineness.

These changes cannot be objected to by the United States, because they are too slight to be noticed in the ordinary transactions of commerce, and because they tend to repair the slight injustice of our legislation of 1853, by increasing the dollar, which was then made 7 per cent. lighter than it had been, and by increasing the eagle about one per cent., which by its real depreciation had made the change of 1853 necessary.

It ought not to be objected to in England, because their principal currency is in gold, and that is retained unaltered. The new proposed coins—a florin and a guinea—would be exactly equal to 100 and 1,000 farthings, and would thus permit them to introduce the decimal system, without changing their unit or altering their common names. The present money of account could easily be reduced to the new coins, and existing contracts settled with simplicity and justice. Thus, £3 5s. 6d. reduced to farthings, would give 3,144 farthings, or 3.144 guineas, or 3 guineas 1 florin and 44 farthings. The shilling might be made to contain $12\frac{1}{2}$ pence, or fifty farthings, and be exactly half the florin. This guinea is not of exactly the same weight as the coin formerly used of that name, but as the name is familiar, and the new coin nearly of the same value as the present guinea, the name might be retained.

The greatest difficulty would probably come from France. Her five franc silver piece is indeed retained unaltered. Her gramme is made the unit by which all the coins are to be weighed. The decimal system, for which she has made so many exertions and sacrifices, is extended to England. The standard of fineness, long since adopted by her and then by the United States, is made universal. By all these alterations the pride and self-love of the French would be gratified; but as she would be required to call in her present gold coins and substitute in their stead new ones of greater weight, opposition might be expected. The present napoleon of 20 francs is $15\frac{1}{2}$ times lighter than 20 silver francs. The proposed coin of 25 francs (which ought to be called an eagle), is only $14\frac{3}{4}$ times lighter. The present gold franc weighs 322.58 milligrammes, and the proposed one is to weigh 338 $\frac{1}{2}$. The old coins will have to be re-melted and re-issued about one-twentieth heavier than before. This is made necessary by the depreciation of gold, and is, therefore, just to the people, and just to the government creditors.

But, though all these reasons favour this change, it is to be feared that the desire to depreciate, rather than to improve, the weight of the coin, which is so natural to sovereigns who have debts to pay,

will out-weigh all these considerations, and induce them to reject every such proposition. We have changed our coins three times in the United States, but have always debased them. The English have changed their silver coins nineteen times in the last eight hundred years, and only twice have they made them contain more metal than before, the increase being then only one or two per cent. So has their gold coin been depreciated 22 out of the 24 times it has been altered. The same is true in the history of other countries, and it is to be feared that such will be the future history of governments. If the French emperor should rise superior to these unholy motives, and consent to give to his people a larger amount of gold than was promised when gold was more valuable than it now is, all difficulties might be removed.

Here is a table containing the changes proposed, with the percentage of difference between the old and new coins:

PURE METAL.	Weight of present Coins in Grains.	Weight of new Coins in Grammes.	Change of value per cent.
Silver Five-franc.....	347.36	22½	0
“ Dollar.....	345.60	22½	½— —
“ Florin (100 farthings).....	336.36	22½	3¾— —
Gold guinea (1,000 farthings).....	117.71	7⅝	0
“ Eagle.....	116.10	7⅝	1⅜— —
“ Eagle of 25 Francs.....	112.05	7⅝	5 — —

The extension of this system to the other countries of Europe would not be difficult. The Russian imperial would correspond to our eagle. The sequin of Tuscany, the ducat of Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, Wirtemberg and Holland, would be very nearly the same as eleven francs. And so the other coins of Europe could be declared equal to a certain number of dollars or francs or shillings, and new coins issued containing such a multiple of the unit adopted by the three great commercial nations of the world, as might be approved by the rulers or by the people of each particular country.

Never in the history of commerce was so favourable an opportunity presented for securing a uniform coinage, exchangeable everywhere, without objection or delay or expense, by name and by weight, according to law and to custom. Commerce has been extended wider and farther than ever before in the history of the world; the coins of different countries approximate already to simple multiples of a common unit; the discoveries of California and Australia are disturbing the relative values of the precious metals; the true principles on which the coinage of money depends, are everywhere understood; the desire for free trade and universal brother-

hood among nations is to be found among the rulers and the people of every portion of the civilized world, and everything favours the establishment of a single uniform currency for every nation in Europe and America.

ART. VIII.—CICERO DE OFFICIIS.

- M. Tullii Ciceronis in Philosophiam ejusque Partes Merita.* Auctore RAHHÆLE KUEHNER, Dr. Hamburgi. 1825.
- M. Tullii Ciceronis De Officiis Libri Tres.* Ex recensione JO. MICH. et JAC. FRID. HEUSINGERORUM. Brunsvigæ. 1820.
- M. Tullii Ciceronis De Officiis Libri Tres.* With English Notes, chiefly selected and translated from the editions of Zumpt and Bonnell. By THOMAS A. THACHER, Assistant Professor of Latin in Yale College. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1850.
- M. Tullii Ciceronis ad Marcum Filium Libri Tres.* Erklaert von G. FR. UNGER. Leipsig. 1852.

FIELDING has compared the ancients to "a rich common, where every person who hath the smallest tenement in Parnassus hath a free right to fatten his muse." From time immemorial this convenient doctrine has met with general acceptance, and, as a custom, has prevailed even with those who could make no just claim to a freehold on that consecrated ground. The shepherds of Apulia and arid Calabria used to drive their flocks to the mountain pastures of Lucania and Samnium in spring, ascending to valleys higher and higher with the increasing heats of summer, and returning to the plains in the same leisurely way with the approach of autumn. While upon this *ager scripturarius* the slave minders of the herds literally "tempered the wind to the shorn lamb," they were themselves in a very exposed position as regarded their morals, and generally ended by becoming banditti. Their owners left them and their flocks to live in the best way they could. They provided them with nothing, and to their demand for clothing, sometimes replied in this most suggestive way, "What, are there no travelers with clothes on?" For this privilege of pasturing their herds, and converting their keepers into robbers, the owners had a tax to pay—the *scriptura*—and none could escape the inexorable *publicani*. But the free right to fatten one's muse upon the rich common of antiquity is subject to no such prohibition, and is attended

with no such deplorable consequences. The only tax which he has to pay who resorts to the wide domain enriched and left by the ancients for his intellectual development and nutriment, is that of intense application and glowing enthusiasm. He must "quit his ease;" he must feel that he is upon his own estate, bequeathed to him by his intellectual ancestors, and he should tread it with the firm step of an hereditary proprietor, and cultivate it with the industry which personal and individual interest alone can impart.

We heard a few years ago a homely illustration of the advantages derived from a connection with the ancients. A traveller had gone with a party of friends to witness an excavation at Pompeii specially ordered for their gratification. In this city of the dead, his mind became absorbed by strange reveries crowding thickly upon him from the spirit of the past. At the hour fixed for return to Naples, he slipped away from his companions, feeling the fascination of the spot too vividly to leave it. With unsated curiosity, with ever fresh and unflagging interest, he lingered behind in the villa of Diomed, whence were taken so many exquisite ornaments, and the impression of the breast of a young woman left upon the ashes which had gradually gathered around her. "Death, like a statuary," says Chateaubriand, "had modelled his victim." At the Herculanean gate, where was found the skeleton of a soldier on guard, he paused to admire that iron firmness and perfect discipline which could endure to sustain such an appalling scene, and to await the gradual but foreseen and certain result of the ashy shower closing around him, and stifling life by inches. In the street of tombs, he pondered long before one upon which was sculptured a ship arriving in port, the anchor ready to be cast, the sailors aloft furling sail. It was Cicero's conviction of what death is, beautifully represented to the eye, "*Portum potius paratum nobis et perfugium putemus.*" The day waned, and the last train was soon to depart. To the right rose Vesuvius, sending up a graceful volume of smoke and flame, in association a sort of infernal region, in the centre of a delicious heaven, which spreads around and above, bewitching the senses and the soul. To the left gleamed the laughing and joyous sea, wooing with soft whispers and gentle embraces the shore—*gratum littus amœni secessus*—which winds to meet it in a thousand graceful forms. How could the enthusiast leave these thrilling and captivating scenes! As he gazed on either hand, and pictured to himself the events which had taken place in the space of sea and earth which lay so tranquilly before him, the rough voice of the guide broke the spell of his enchantment, as he said, "Signore, blame not Vesuvius too much. If it destroyed Pompeii, it gave me and many more an occupation. It is an evil wind, you know, which blows nobody good. *Mille grazie a Vesuvio,*" said he, bowing respectfully towards the volcano; and he added, "*Mille grazie a Signore,*" as the *buono mano* touched his palm, and practically enforced the truth of what he had said.

It will not be necessary to attempt to adjust the relative claims to our respect and study of the ancient writers who have come down to us. It suffices to assert, most unequivocally, that the present could not be what it is without the past—the whole past with which we are acquainted; and that those links, strong as adamant, but invisible except to the eyes of intelligence and cultivation, which bind us to former times, can never be severed. The attempt to do so could only proceed from ignorance and prejudice. That mysterious impression made upon our souls, minds, and tempers by what we read, study, think about, and inwardly digest, by what even seems to float unconsciously by us, becomes indissolubly blended with the mental and physiological conformation which we derive from our ancestors by blood; and we can no more erase it than we can change the features of the countenance, the mould of the form, or the physical constitution and idiosyncrasy which we severally possess. Chemists maintain that in the material world nothing ever ceases to exist. Only the forms of things change, not things themselves. Whatever is, is forever. There is perpetual succession in the modes and conditions of being, but no actual cessation of being itself. This is eminently true of thought, which, essentially immortal, is forever borne down on the stream of existence, clear or turbid, according to the conditions and circumstances—the media of its manifestation. If Pythagoras did not in the person of Euphorbus, as he claimed to have done, take part in the Trojan war, he yet lives in his system of philosophical and religious opinion, or in parts of it. While we reject the metempsychosis of souls, we must give large allowance to that of thought and mind.

Every one who has given proper reflection to the subject will allow that a perfectly original treatise is the rarest thing to find. Its foundation principles, or the germs out of which it grew, or the tendency of which it is but the completion, the development, will almost inevitably be found somewhere else. How few have ever been able, candidly, to congratulate themselves that they had originated any ideas at all; and how many who have toiled in the fields of speculation have arrived at the discouraging conviction that their labour has been in vain, except in so far as it was itself a pleasure! They reluctantly conclude that their endeavour must be to give appropriate expression to what oft was thought, and that they must be content to gather up, sedulously, the fragments of truth and opinion as they find them scattered through the ages of the world. Their hearts, like Manfred's, teem

“ With silent worship of the great of old!
The dead, but sceptred sovereigns, who still rule
Our spirits from their urns.”

One of the most voluminous writers and prolific thinkers of

antiquity, was Cicero. In almost every department of human thought, upon a vast variety of topics, he has exerted his powers, and with a success which ancient and modern times have been equally agreed upon to commend and admire. Let us grant him the grace upon this occasion, which, we read in Plutarch, he often asked, and let us view him as a philosopher and moralist, rather than as an orator. In early life, indeed, and that after some successes in the forum, he had almost resolved to retire to Athens, and amid the shades of the academy, to devote himself to philosophy; and throughout life, as opportunity served, he cultivated it with all the ardour of a first and enrapturing love.

While, then, in a cursory notice of his "De Officiis," we proceed to consider him *en philosophe*, let us bear distinctly in mind that his purpose in his treatises was to impart to his countrymen, in an agreeable and attractive manner, the outlines of the philosophical structures reared in Greece, rather than to claim the honours of a discoverer, by presenting any complete system of his own. It will likewise be appropriate to give heed to the caution so well expressed by Garve: "Never did philosopher find himself in a more favourable position to gather experience on the nature of civil society; on the diversity of characters; on the influence that certain qualities exercise over public opinion; on the effects of passion, and the advantages of virtue. But this same situation was little proper to sound the depths of abstract ideas, or to meditate on the nature of the invisible forces, whose visible results are alone perceived in society, and in the transactions of life."

In the spring of the year 45 B. C., Cicero sent his son Marcus to study at Athens—*domicilium studiorum*—under the direction of Cratippus, a Peripatetic philosopher whom he highly esteemed. The most intimate relations grew up between the master and the pupil. In a delightful letter to Tiro, his father's freedman, he describes their charming interviews, which sometimes lasted the whole day, and often a part of the night. The suppers, jokes, and pleasant surprises are not forgotten. He urges upon Tiro to come to Athens to make the acquaintance of his delightful instructor, and his circle of learned and accomplished friends. Young Cicero evidently had a fine time of it; his father having provided for him liberally, nay, even splendidly, and on a scale which the sumptuous Atticus approved. In the summer of the next year, Cicero set sail for Athens,* hoping to gratify at once the affectionate interest which he felt in his son's welfare, and the love of philosophy and literature, which was scarcely less strong and enduring. The wind proved unfavourable, and he was induced by patriotic considera-

* For the political motives of this journey. see 1st Phil., c. 1 and 2.

tions, and by some friends whom he met, recently from Rome, to return thither, in the expectation of an adjustment of his difficulties with Antony.* This hope proved fallacious, an open rupture ensued between them, and Cicero, having delivered the first of the divine philippics, retired to Puteoli, where he had written his *Academica*; and as from the heights of his commanding villa he calmly looked out upon the restless waves beneath, so from the serene eminence of his lofty and disciplined genius, he took a survey of the nature of man, his contending passions and conflicting interests, and announced to him his moral duties. The work was designed more particularly for his son's instruction, and derives a peculiar character and colouring from this circumstance. In a letter to Atticus, he beautifully says: "Nos hic φιλοσοφούμεν (quid enim aliud) et τὰ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος magnifice explicamus, προσφωνούμεν que Ciceroni. Qua de re enim potius pater filio?"† In another letter, written to the same friend about the same time, he says: "προσφωνῶ autem Ciceroni filio. Visum est non ἀνοικεῖν."‡ He seeks to impress upon his son at the outset, that though his advantages in studying at Athens, and under Cratippus, have been very great, and his improvement doubtless proportionate, still that a discussion by his father, who had received the acknowledgments of the learned, both as a speaker and writer, should command his particular attention, and would both enrich his style, and assist to settle his principles. He fixes immediately upon the subject of *duties* as the most appropriate to them both, and vindicates its comprehensiveness and universal interest. No condition of life is exempt from moral responsibility. No one can pretend to be a philosopher, and overlook *this* subject. It is the paramount theme of them all. But some schools, by the low views which they take of the chief good, making the measure of it pleasure or advantage rather than virtue, confound all just ideas of duty, and practically cut the roots of friendship, justice, and liberality. They undermine courage, and overthrow temperance. They have no right, therefore, to be heard. Only the Stoics, who make virtue the sole, or the Academics and Peripatetics who, consider it as the chief good, can be considered competent to enunciate any authoritative, invariable, and rational rules of duty. In treating this subject, then, Cicero proposes to draw liberally from the fountains of the Stoics, and to take Panætius as his immediate guide. It has been well said by Macintosh, that "the Roman orator, though in speculative questions he embraced that mitigated doubt which allowed most ease and freedom to his genius; yet, in those moral writings where his heart was most deeply interested, followed the severest sect of philosophy, and became almost a Stoic." Claiming, like Horace,

* Epis. ad Att., 16. 7.

† Epis. ad Att., 15. 13.

‡ Epis. ad Att., 16. 11.

he had it in his mind to present for his son's admiration, not the ideal wise man of the Stoics,* but a virtuous, efficient, dignified and patriotic statesman. In determining the question of duty in any given circumstances, we find the first consideration to be as to the virtuousness of the thing—"honestumne factu sit, an turpe;"—the second, as to its utility; and the third, as to the comparative claims of virtue and utility when they seem to conflict or clash. To these three categories of Panætius, Cicero adds two more, the comparison between degrees of the *honestum*, and also between degrees of the *utile*. In this he departs from the Stoic dogma of the equality of virtues and vices. The first and longest book treats of the *honestum*, and gives a thorough analysis of it; the second respects the *utile*, i. e., good with reference to external objects; and in the third, in which he has not any longer the guidance of Panætius, he discusses those cases in which a conflict appears to exist between the *honestum* and the *utile*, and shows that so far from being at variance, that a just view of each will prove them to be identical.

Notwithstanding that Horace has intimated that father Chrysippus sometimes uttered sheer nonsense, and that Homer conveys better and plainer moral lessons than either he or Crantor, it is incumbent upon us to ascertain what foundations the great prop of the Stoic porch and others laid for their moral system. The Stoic philosophy was an organic whole, branching out naturally into physics, ethics, and logic, just as an egg is composed of shell, white, and the yolk.† Logic was the shell, ethics considers what is relative to man, and the object of physics is the cognition of God and divine things. There is between the two latter all the difference between God and man.‡ While in their system physics has an undoubted preëminence over ethics (or rather originally had—for a different view was subsequently entertained of their comparative importance), a very intimate connection was held to subsist between them, and was as strenuously maintained at that time as it was in later days, when the philosophic emperor Marcus Aurelius so strongly expressed the mutual dependence of metaphysics (the physics of the early schools) and morals.§ The order of the universe proceeded from the divine thought, and was established by the divine fiat. All moral inquiries must start with universal nature, and that disposition of things which Jove has made. The dependence of man's moral life upon the great law of

* See Pro Murena, 29 and 30, his admirable rallery of the Stoic sapiens. Conf. Hor. Sat., Lib. 1. 3. Epis., Lib. 1. I.

† Ritter, His. of Anc. Phil., vol. 3.

‡ Tantum inter duas interest, quantum inter deum et hominem. Altior est hæc, et animosior, etc.—Senec., Nat. Quæst., Præf.

§ Med. Lib. 3. 13.

order and harmony impressed upon nature, became the grand leading principle of Stoic philosophy, and its first and most fundamental maxim was, to follow or to live agreeably to nature. Every special nature must be brought into conformity with the universal. The degree of its subordination to the harmony of the universal frame, will be the measure of its development, and of its progress in virtue.

Apart from the ambiguity and vagueness of the term universal nature, it proved barren of suitable precepts for the regulation of life. It prescribed no clear and obvious rule of rectitude for the various contingencies of existence. It dropped back, therefore, to a more subordinate position, and the individual nature was advanced to its place. In seeking the characteristics of virtue, or the constituent elements of duty, the philosopher must make his appeal directly to individual nature, and be content with her response to his questionings. The law of life must be gathered from what is stamped upon each individual being's consciousness. The conclusion reached was, that it resided in the reason—the ruling power of the soul—whose supremacy and perfection it is all important to secure and maintain. The terms, nature and reason, became all but synonymous, and as indissolubly associated in their system, as man and his genius in popular language, and in the descriptions of poets. The maxim to follow nature became then equivalent to live agreeably to the law of unperverted, of perfect reason.

The Supreme Being, who has prescribed moral duties, has given the rational nature from which we are to learn them, and the faculties necessary to eliminate them. We have not to go far to seek them.* The source of duties is very near to every one—is each one's own heart and conscience. There is a veritable law, viz., right reason, agreeable to nature, of universal force, eternal, whose commands urge to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain from evil. This eternal and unchangeable law rules at once all nations and throughout all ages. He who does not obey it, flies from himself, and is at war with the nature of man.† Cicero frequently and eloquently expatiates upon this great unwritten law—yet written in men's hearts, according to St. Paul—which Horatius Cocles obeyed in keeping the bridge, though no statute required of one man to resist a whole army; and which Sextus Tarquinius violated in the rape of Lucretia, while yet he broke no statutory regulation of his

* Quidquid nos meliores beatosque facturum est, aut in aperto, aut in proximo (natura) posuit.—Senec. de Benef. 7. 1.

† Cic. de Rep., Lib. 3. 22 This splendid passage is apparently in answer to the assertion of Carneades that "*jus autem naturale nullum esse.*" It takes exception likewise to the definition of the Roman jurists, "*jus naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit,*" etc.

country. For them and for all there is a reason emanating from nature impelling to good, and forbidding crime, and which commences not to be law only when written, but its obligation begins with the divine intelligence with which it is contemporaneous.* He who properly heeds this voice coming from the inmost recesses of his conscience, like an oracular response from the very adyta of the temple, will learn above all things the significance of that celebrated inscription upon the frontispiece of the shrine of Apollo at Delphi, "Γνωθὶ σεαυτὸν," and appreciate Cicero's explanation of its force,† and the striking passage in which the youthful moralist-poet Persius, has so grandly expounded and inculcated its meaning.‡ Self-knowledge in this extended sense will satisfy man that he carries in himself the seeds of all virtue, and that he cannot escape from the obligation which such possession imposes, to develope them by reason in the appropriate field of society, and in the designated paths of duty.§ In the first place there will appear to be a fundamental distinction between man and beast. The latter is wholly a creature of sense, wanting "discourse of reason," having but the faintest perception of the past or the future, and incapable, consequently, of acquiring experience and foresight.

"Tis man alone that joy describes
With forward and reverted eyes."

He, endowed with reasoning faculties, discerns causes, traces effects, "looking both before and after," sees the end from the beginning, and makes adequate provision for life.

But a closer scrutiny will develope much more. We will find imbedded in our nature the great cardinal principles into which the *honestum* may be resolved. We find it a universal characteristic of mankind to love their offspring, and to cling to their fellow-beings in the fraternal intercourse of society and language. They show themselves mutually friendly, recognize both public and private obligations, and thereby become animated in spirit, and invigorated for active exertion. These natural principles are the foundation of *justice*.

Another of man's most striking characteristics is, his earnest desire of, and laborious search after, truth. Disengaged from necessary cares and business, we feel an uncontrollable desire to

* Cic. de Leg., Lib. 2. 4.

† Cic. de Fin., Lib. 5. 16. Tus. Quæst., Lib. 1. 22.

‡ Pers. Sat., 3. 65. seqq. See also Juv., Sat. xi. 27. E cœlo descendit Γνωθὶ σεαυτὸν, &c.

§ Sunt enim ingenii nostri semina innata virtutum.—Cic. Tus. Quæst. 3. 1. See also Examen de la Philosophie de Cicéron, par M. Gaultier de Sibert. His. de l'Académie des inscriptions, Tom xliii.

learn, and to add to our acquisitions, and we regard the knowledge of things abstruse and wonderful an indispensable condition of happiness.

A strong inclination will likewise be discovered for ascendancy, so much so that a well constituted mind will refuse obedience to any one not authorized to instruct, and exercising just and lawful sway for the general good. From this temper springs greatness of soul, and contempt for worldly concerns and interests.

It is, again, a high prerogative of reason and nature, that man alone can recognize order, decency, and propriety, in words and actions. He only has an eye to see beauty, grace, and symmetry in the objects of sense, from which he infers their greater desirableness in conduct and language, and consequently avoids everything excessive, effeminate, and unbecoming, and observes the golden mean in all things.* These four cardinal virtues, justice, wisdom, fortitude, and temperance, are the subdivisions of the *honestum*, or virtue. They are intimately bound together, and yet they have, each, its appropriate and respective set of duties. Such is the outline which Cicero draws of moral excellence, which, he says, adopting a sentiment of Plato in reference to wisdom, if it could only be perceived by the eyes, would raise the highest transports of enthusiasm; and the eternal sight of which, accompanied by eternal regrets that it is no longer attainable, constitutes that awful curse which Persius invokes upon the head of tyranny.

The duty of wisdom is to search after truth. Its appropriate field is speculation. We instinctively love knowledge, and are attracted to its pursuit. But we must be on guard that we give our assent only to what has been well considered, that we choose proper and worthy subjects of study, and that we do not become absorbed by airy abstractions to the neglect of the pressing duties of life. Wisdom is allowed her intervals of "sweet retired solitude," but the exacting Stoic and Roman practicalness intrudes even into her bowers, and would draw her forth from her "pensive secrecy." The other three virtues directly concern active life, and belong to the field of human needs and responsibilities. Of these, justice, under which is included beneficence, is of the largest extent and of the highest splendour. The first duty she imposes is to do no harm to others—*nisi lacessitus injuria*—and to respect the rights of property as established, both public and private. Her second injunction is, that as nature has opened her bountiful bosom to all, so should we bring into the common stock of society our varied contributions, and feel, with Plato, that we are not born exclusively for ourselves, but that our country and friends claim a share in our being.

* See De Fin., Lib. 2. 10—a skilful and delicately drawn sketch of the *honestum*.

We are liable to be led into injustice from the pursuit of riches and the love of glory; they must accordingly be kept within the bounds of the strictest fairness and justice. The failure to defend innocence when accused in our hearing, is strongly reprobated as an instance of indirect injustice. As a general rule, no action should be ventured upon of which we doubt whether it be just or not. The very doubt implies thought of wrong. He touches lightly several controverted points, as the effect upon obligations by a change of circumstances, the force of those extorted by fear, and procured by deceit. He alludes to the cases in which obligations conflict, and where injustice may be wrought by the too exact and malicious construction of law, and insists that justice should be observed to the spirit, and not to the letter. He sets forth our duties to our enemies, and shows the temper with which we should prosecute wars, whose design he makes to be to secure peace and tranquility; he discusses the obligations of promises made to an enemy, and establishes the claims which even slaves have upon our justice—*operam exigendam, juxta præbenda*—that they are entitled to what is just and equal. In several chapters he dwells upon beneficence as the complement of justice. What can be better than his description of friendship, than which, he says, nothing can be more binding or more lovely. When the same pursuits and desires are found in different persons, it must result that each will be as much delighted with the other as with himself, and Pythagoras' idea of friendship, that it is several composing one, will be realized.

Fortitude dazzles the eyes of men; they generally esteem it to be the noblest of all the virtues; but the Stoics very properly correct the error which dwells in the popular apprehension of it, and expressively define it to be "virtue battling for equity." True courage, therefore, cannot be said to belong to any but the good, truthful, and candid man, and the rareness of this loftiest courage, which gains ascendancy over others through ascendancy over itself, only makes it the more honourable where it is exhibited. He displays a very remarkable elevation of tone where he disallows anger and resentment against adversaries, and inculcates placability and clemency. It is perhaps enough, he says, for our enemies to show repentance and regret for their misconduct. A Socratic serenity and evenness of temper he considers peculiarly desirable in a country where equal rights and freedom of speech are enjoyed, and he heartily wishes that the governors of a State were as passionless as the laws.

We do not know where can be found more just, pleasing, and elegant rules and suggestions on decorum and the minor morals, than from the twenty-seventh chapter to near the close of the first book. Chesterfield's advice is based upon cold selfishness and ungentlemanly duplicity, and only touches upon the surface of

things, and the mere externals of mien, address, and the like. Cicero lays down the right principles of honourable conduct, and makes pleasing manners and agreeable bearing proceed from them as at once necessary consequences and beautiful results. He endeavours by several terms to convey the import of *σωφροσύνη* · it is *verecundia*, native modesty, which shrinks from giving offence to others; it is *temperantia et modestia*, self-restraint; it is *sedatio perturbationum et rerum modus*, the sway over the passions, the calm of the soul, and just propriety of conduct; it is *decorum*, the becoming, and is the outgrowth of the *honestum*, from which it cannot be parted. It belongs to all its divisions, and can only be separated from them in idea. It is the bloom of virtue, and corresponds to beauty and colour in the complexion; as these show the vigorous constitution and sound health of the body, so does this become a proof and an exhibition of genuine probity in the soul. It gives lustre to the life, and secures the approbation of those about us by the due order, consistency, and regularity which it enforces in all our words and actions. It enjoins upon us to pursue the path which leads to harmony with nature, under whose guidance we shall never err or stray.

When we recall the extravagant perversion and contraction of this beautiful philosophical term, it is cheering, it is refreshing to get away from the hot and foul breath of modern harangues, and to be borne aloft into the pure, pellucid air of writers of the olden time, who “use all gently,” and understand as well as observe the temperance which they inculcate.

But time would fail us were we to attempt to string all the pearls, or to dive after all the corals, which shine in the transparent depths of this treatise. Without going into any further analysis, or attempting to trace more minutely the course of thought, we are entirely in earnest in pointing the reader to it as one of the purest sources of instruction and enjoyment which have been transmitted to us by the ancients. The comparison of it as a whole—in its conception, extent, and soundness of views, execution, finish, and colouring, in its design and its adaptedness to secure that design—with more modern and less unpretending works;—the inquiry into the state of morals and manner of daily life likely to exist where such a pure and lofty scheme could be deliberately put forth, in a country illustrated by so many noble and self-sacrificing deeds, and where the compliment of Pyrrhus to Fabricius, that the sun could more easily be turned from his course than he from honour, might have been extended to more individuals than among any other people who have ever lived;—and incidentally, the probable sincerity of the opinions promulgated, and the amount of their influence upon their expounder and author—are topics which we are compelled at present to forego; but it is our purpose, or at least our wish, to resume the subject, and to give it more extended and articulate treatment.

The reader who bears in mind some passages near the beginning of this article, may now be disposed to inquire of us, what amount of originality do we attribute to Cicero in the "De Officiis."

There has been a general agreement in the schools of philosophy upon positive duties and practical rules. Epicurus even has inculcated pure moral doctrine, though inconsistently with his general scheme. To ascertain their duties, men have interrogated nature, and receiving one uniform response from her, have come to entertain substantially uniform opinions upon them. The ideas of the "De Officiis" are undoubtedly drawn from the Greek schools, and principally, as we have seen, from the Porch. What work on philosophy or morals can claim any other than a Grecian paternity? With faculties wonderfully subtle and perfectly trained, the Greeks engaged in abstruse investigations with a genuine relish. They possessed, above all people, that "philosophic talent" which Gibbon so highly extols. Their intellectual vision pierced through the dark recesses of speculative truth, and irradiated all the leading questions of morals, virtue, honour, beauty, etc. In every department of letters they were preëminent, and worthy of imitation. Cicero makes it a point to insist upon this, upon all suitable occasions, while he claims just as determinedly for his countrymen other and not inferior qualities, such as depend upon nature, not literary effort. What he anxiously desired was, that to the high native moral excellencies which they possessed, the Romans should join the elegance of Greek erudition, and the subtlety and profoundness of Greek speculation. It was his constant aim to develop and mature fully the taste for philosophy, which, since the extraordinary impression produced by the celebrated embassy of the philosophers, Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes (155 B. C.), and the influence exerted by Polybius and Panætius, who had lived and taught at Rome, had been gradually growing up in that city. Notwithstanding that many of the best and leading characters of the country approved of and encouraged it, this taste advanced but slowly. It was adverse to the peculiar tendencies of the Roman mind. Oratory, statesmanship, forensic tact, legal acquirement, coolness, and far-reaching views in council, military success, agriculture,—these were pursuits and merits of which they had a just, if not exalted appreciation. Their predilections were all for the tangible, the actual. They felt but slight inclination for cold and dry abstractions. The lines of Virgil, in which he concedes eloquence, statuary, astronomy—the arts of peace, in short—to the Greeks, express the swelling consciousness of the peculiar destiny of the Roman people to be conquest and supremacy, and are strictly true to the universal feeling upon the subject. In an exulting apostrophe to Greece, Ovid betrays the same feeling; he who fought well, says he, best knew the Roman art, and he was the true orator who hurled the javelin home.

In undertaking to treat philosophic questions, Cicero constantly discloses his sense of the national indifference, if not antipathy to them. He knew that a prejudice stood in the way of an attentive, candid hearing. "There are men," he says, "and they by no means unenlightened, to whom application to philosophy is wholly displeasing."* His evident embarrassment at the thought of the reception which works upon such themes from his pen would be likely to receive, shows that the prejudice against them was not yet overcome, and sufficiently illustrates the strong conviction which he entertained of the necessity of a wider diffusion and intenser appreciation of philosophic discussion. He justly thought that, in such matters, it is wrong to stop with a mere smattering.† He undertook, therefore, the office of interpreter of Greek philosophy to his countrymen. It was his noble ambition to open up to their "view, through the means of their own language, the conclusions of Greek sages on weighty subjects, with the purpose of enlarging their minds and reforming their morals." He sought to draw forth from the shades of the Greek Academy and the Porch, into the sunlight of public knowledge and general appreciation, precepts that were pleasing from their beauty, and suited to regulate the life and purify the heart.

It may be asked what particular considerations induced him to follow Panætius. In the first place, he was no doubt attracted by his style, which is said to have combined solid reasoning with delicate handling, deep erudition, and easy method. He had likewise abated much of the rigour of his school; he was not an unquestioning Stoic, but chose to submit their tenets to the test of reason, and relinquished such as seemed to him not to be well established. Besides, he had lived in Rome, and had been greatly admired, and followed there. Lælius and Scipio were his friends and scholars.

He had treated this subject (περί τοῦ καθήκοντος) in two books. The third, upon the resolution of cases growing out of the apparent conflict of virtue and utility, he had promised, but never executed. His discussion of the two first heads was brilliant and accurate. With some modifications—*correctione quadam*—Cicero proposes to follow him in these—not that he has any idea of merely and tamely translating him. He will add to, or omit, as may suit his plans and opinions. In Aulus Gellius, we have preserved a chapter of the second book of Panætius, which we do not find in Cicero. By the way, the language of Gellius is to the effect, that Cicero *emulated* the work of Panætius with great ardour and exertion.‡ Posidonius had supplied the omission of Panætius, we infer from Cicero's letter to Atticus (16–11); and he applied to

* De Fin., 1. 1.

† Tus. Ques., 2. 1.

‡ N. A., 13. 27.

Calvus, a scholar of Posidonius, for the heads of it. It does not appear that he received them, for he says, we believe subsequently, that, not approving anything which had come into his hands upon the subject, he will put the finishing touch to the incomplete work of Panætius, by his own unaided power. He has done it, we think, very successfully, and conclusively demonstrated, that, in all possible cases, honesty is the best policy. He has reached that excellence which Rutilius Rufus thought all mortals must despair of, that of adding to the unfinished work of Panætius, a conclusion worthy of the original; a task which he had compared in its difficulty to that of finishing the Coan Venus of Apelles.

We have several times met with the objection that this work is not sufficiently comprehensive. It is, it is said, not a dissertation upon the principles of morality applicable to mankind in general, but limited almost to those which pertain to man in society, and restricted, moreover, particularly to the ruling class—legislators, commanders of armies, high public functionaries, judges, teachers, and *savans*. The principal point of view is unquestionably politics, and there is exhibited throughout a tendency to run into political maxims. Kühner is probably correct in saying that Cicero, when he composed the work, had Plato's political writings before his eyes. We grant this, but we do not consider it a defect. The general principles here laid down admit of the widest extension, and are adapted to promote virtue and integrity in the lowest as well as in the highest condition. If those who preside at the altars of religion, who make the laws, administer the affairs of the State, conduct the education of the youth of a country—whose appropriate and delightful task it should be likewise to mould the character to goodness and generosity, and to confirm it in ingenuousness and simplicity—if they would make their laws, instructions, and, above all else, their examples, conform to these pure precepts, the good influence would necessarily descend through all orders, ranks, and conditions, and be felt at the furthest extremities of society. Cicero looks to the fountain heads of influence, and seeks to heal them, and to keep them pure.

We should not value, nor would the world have valued, this work half so highly, had it been a technical, methodical affair. It is the Roman life which we see in its pages, the noble array of historic and illustrious personages who are introduced so naturally, and attract while they awe us by their stately bearing and their exalted sentiments, that constitute its principal charm. The justest views and the most unexceptionable moral sentiments are richly illustrated by the amplest experience of men and things. The style, too, derives thence a practical adaptation and an exquisite genial flavour, which is in the highest degree fascinating, and rarely met with in disquisitions of philosophy.

“When he treats abstract subjects,” says Erasmus, “which are beyond the capacity of the vulgar to comprehend, and which

many of his contemporaries thought could not be explained in Latin, what neatness, brilliancy, facility, variety—in fine, what sprightliness! Until the time of Socrates, philosophy was limited to physics. It was he, they say, who, treating it on the moral side, gave it entrance into the houses of individuals. Plato and Aristotle aimed to introduce it into the courts of kings and the tribunals of magistrates. Cicero, in my opinion, has made it appear in the theatre, and has taught it to speak so distinctly that even the pit can understand and applaud. Many as are the works which he has left us on these important matters, he composed them in the most stormy times of the republic, and some even after all hope was lost.” The “*De Officiis*” fitly concluded the brilliant series. Through the loopholes of retreat he kept an eye upon Rome and the senate, but discerning no star of hope, and despairing of any amelioration in the state of things, he turned to his favourite solace, and sought to relieve his disquietude and gloomy apprehensions, in the composition of a work which should be a monument at once of pure morality, devoted patriotism, and sincere love for his distant son. Throughout it, there runs a mingled stream of tender, paternal affection, of despondency as regards the interests of liberty and right in the future, and, by way of offset, a strong sentiment of pride, rising sometimes into reverence for the past glories of his country. There are also, like the ruddy and golden hues of autumnal leaves, catching a brighter glow from the slanting rays of the setting sun poured through the arches of the forest, gleams of a high spiritual tone, of calm, charitable judgments, and of philosophic if not religious resignation to present evils and the impending doom.

* In note, p. 206, instead of “Kühner has shown,” read, Kühner. He has, &c.

ART. IX.—HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

A History of Philosophy in Epitome. BY ALBERT SCHWEGLER.
Translated from the original German, by JULIUS H. SEELYE.
New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1856.

THE intellectual dignity of philosophy will always insure for its history a profound interest amongst cultivated men. To trace the progress of human thought in the highest province of knowledge; to sit in the seats of the philosophers, on the serene heights of speculation, and see the torch of truth as it passes from hand to hand, down the vista of time, cannot but be interesting to all but ignoble

minds. As but few can study philosophy in the works of the philosophers themselves, most men must receive its doctrines at second hand, in the narrations and expositions of history. Hence is at once manifest the importance of the noble theme to which we now propose to introduce our readers.

The History, by Schwegler, though of reputation in Germany, as we are informed, is, in our opinion, a trivial performance. It is only because it is the last history of philosophy which we have read, that it becomes the occasion of this article. We shall borrow nothing from it, either of fact, criticism, or arrangement, in the historical review of philosophy which we are about to present. In truth, it is because so many epitomes of the history of philosophy are from time to time put before the public, which, like Schwegler's, are vehicles to a great degree of the writer's peculiar opinions, or of the school to which he belongs, rather than a true historical narration of the consecutive series of doctrines which have, at different epochs, been promulgated in the progress of human speculation, that we are induced to offer a critical outline of the history of philosophy, unbiassed by any arbitrary theoretical preconceptions as to the course of the development of doctrine. It is true, that the historian of philosophy must point out the outward relations and the inner connections between the doctrines of different philosophers, in order to make the history intelligible. But then, this should be only a subordinate and ancillary criticism, merely to illumine the path of narration, and not to interpolate any assumptions of the historian's own. Schwegler, from the beginning to the end of his history, has assumed that the great end of philosophy is to identify subject and object, and accordingly has corrupted the whole stream of his narration with this Hegelian conceit.

The history of philosophy (overlooking the Eastern periods anterior to those of Greece), presents three great periods: 1. Antiquity; 2. The Middle Ages; 3. Modern Times.

Ancient philosophy comprehends three epochs. The first, from Thales to Socrates, about one hundred and thirty years, gave rise to four principal sects—the Ionic, founded by Thales; the Italic, founded by Pythagoras; the Eleatic, founded by Xenophanes; and the Atomic, founded by Leucippus and Democritus. The second epoch was from Socrates to the promulgation of Christianity, about five centuries. The third epoch extends from the preaching of Christianity to the age of Charlemagne, or rather into the sixth century; for philosophy, like all other cultivation, was extinguished in the barbarism which immediately preceded the reign of that great monarch.

From Thales to Socrates, but one problem was discussed—the origin of existence; the essence of things; the formation of the universe. Each of the four sects of philosophers, during this epoch,

was distinguished for the boldness of its hypothesis in attempting to account for the origin of the universe. The different sects varied from each other only in the principles of their solution of the one problem. The magnificence of the world without withdrew philosophers from contemplating the world within. Philosophy was, therefore, physical, not psychological—of nature, not of the mind. The contemplation of nature had filled the poets Hesiod and Homer with mythical dreams. Every part of the physical world had been personified by them. In their age, the Greek mind had no other notion of causation than the agency of actual personages. All the operations of nature were supposed to be carried on by the immediate agency of actual persons. The four sects of philosophers which we have mentioned, dispelled the myths of the poets from the contemplation of nature, and substituted for persons, powers or forces inherent in matter, as the causes or formative principles of nature. And Anaxagoras even suggested one Mind as the framer of all things. These four sects of philosophers made the first step in philosophy beyond the mytho-poetic conceptions of the poets. In the poets, the emotional element of the mind was paramount, expending itself in a personifying sympathy, peopling the earth with all those personages which figure in Greek mythology. In the philosophers, the intellectual element was paramount, looking at the operations of nature as mechanical and dynamic. Still, the thoughts of the highest minds were directed to the contemplation of the panorama of the external world.

To the sects of philosophers which we have considered, succeeded the Sophists. This class of thinkers belongs to a peculiar stage in human progress—to a period of criticism or transition. The previous sects of philosophers had failed to find any platform of truth on which the reason of man could rest satisfied. Their labours had ended, and no fruits had been garnered into the treasury of knowledge. They, too, had no successors in their labour to solve the problem of the universe. The different views of nature, taken by the several sects, had all proved unsatisfactory, and yet seemed to have left no other possible view. This, the Sophists saw. The Sophists were, in truth, the offspring of the thinking of these sects of naturalists. Their parentage is shown in the fact, that, in general, they were materialists. The common doctrine of the Sophists was, that doubt attaches to every opinion, and that it is impossible to find certainty in anything. They were thorough skeptics. However much these actors in the great drama of thought may differ in special doctrines, on the one thing of skepticism they were agreed; and in their skepticism, we find the place on which they stand in the great order in which the leaders of thought, at different epochs, are marshaled in the sequences of history. We must not, as has been so often done, regard this era

as one only of decadence; for, while we repudiate the opinion of Mr. Grote, that the Sophists were as honest teachers as Socrates, and their doctrines only a little less enlightened, we readily admit that they planted in the field of thought many fruitful germs. They called out investigations in the theory of knowledge, in logic, and in language. The methodical treatment of many branches of knowledge was begun by them. They were the first to make style a special object of study amongst the Greeks. Greek rhetoric sprung out of their teachings. They, in a word, prepared instruments, and also cleared the way, to some extent, for the new progress which was to succeed.

Now begins the second epoch of ancient philosophy. Socrates is the leader in this period of the struggles of the mind of man with the difficulties of knowing theoretically—of construing to one's consciousness what he feels and sees within and without himself. The Sophists had withdrawn attention from nature, and the solutions of those problems which had engaged the first four sects of Greek philosophers, and had fixed attention on language in itself, and in its contents. They, in fact, began a revolution in the thinking of the nation. Socrates was trained in their discipline. He profited especially by the lectures of Prodicus and Anaxagoras. In fact, his method was that of the Sophists; and when he turned his assaults upon them, his victories were not due more to the greater truth which armed his doctrines, than to his greater skill in their own art of dialectics; but yet, we must carefully distinguish the Socratic from the Sophistical spirit of philosophising. That of the Sophists was proud and boastful, as their very name, σοφισται, *wisemen*, indicates: that of Socrates was humble, as the name he adopted, φιλοσοφος *lover of wisdom*, to distinguish himself and school from the Sophists, shows. And while the spirit of the Sophists was boastful, it was skeptical; but while that of Socrates was diffident, it was hopeful of certainty and truth. The fruitful germ which Socrates introduced into philosophy, was the problem of human consciousness. The mind was, in his philosophy, its own point of departure, and its principal object. With him began the new era in philosophy, where the inscription on the Delphic temple, "Know Thyself," became the watchword of philosophy. In consciousness Socrates found that basis of truth which the Sophists had failed to discover. They dwelt upon language and its contents; and as these contents were merely the factitious unities of popular and uncritical observations, much contradiction, as well as vagueness, would be found in the doctrines of all prevailing thought. Socrates, therefore, based his method upon consciousness, and, by what he called *intellectual midwifery*, unfolded truth from the minds of those whom he conversed with. This was the positive application of his method: and so far it was his own. But then, it must be borne in mind that Socrates merely taught

men *how to philosophise*, and did not teach them *philosophy*, for he declared that he had none to teach. Through the negative application of his method he refuted the Sophists, by showing contradiction between their doctrines. This, however, was but the common dialectical method of the Sophists themselves, of asking questions adroitly chosen for their logical relations to the doctrines in dispute, and making the answers obtained, the premises from which conclusions are deduced at variance with the doctrines of your antagonist, and yet consonant with his admissions in the answers to your questions. Socrates achieved his triumphs in the thinking of his age, by adding a new force to the method of the Sophists, which made it positive as well as negative, and that in the profoundest applications as well as in ordinary problems which lie more on the surface of knowledge.

Socrates had many followers, who, though they diverged much from each other in doctrines, all gave much attention to human consciousness, and continued the Socratic movement. Amongst these were the two greatest thinkers of antiquity, Plato and Aristotle.

Plato, like every other philosopher, saw that the great end of philosophy is to explain the phenomenal world, and especially the sensible universe. For it is this universe that, from his earliest infancy, presses without ceasing upon the attention of man. Nowhere else is this object of philosophy more distinctly displayed than in the writings of Plato. He wrote no systematic treatise of philosophy; but his philosophical doctrines are woven through his various dialogues, not so much for themselves as for a basis to his moral, political, and physical theories; in the *Phædo*, to prove the immortality of the soul; in the *Republic*, to sustain his ethical and political principles; in the *Timæus*, to explain and verify his physical theories. Plato's philosophy is but the life, the central principle, of his practical doctrines. Man, living and acting amidst mysteries, and himself the greatest mystery of all, was the great object of the philosophy of Plato. To explain man, and all that concerns him, either in the past, the present, and the future, was what Plato strove to do by his philosophy. He did not turn away from the realities of nature, and spend his life in unreal dreams, as those who talk so much about his mysticism, opine. It was the actual, passing before our senses and experienced in our consciousness, that he attempted to explain, and to found upon a basis of verity.

With this view of the scope and purpose of Plato's philosophy, let us inquire into the method by which he endeavoured to accomplish his ends.

Socrates, the master of Plato, was duly impressed with the weakness of the human mind, and felt how narrow are the limits of human knowledge. In fact, he circumscribed human know-

ledge within much narrower bounds than most of the great teachers of our race. Physical inquiries he entirely repudiated as beyond the comprehension of man. He was, in truth, rather a moralist and dialectician, than a philosopher in the sense of one addicted to the higher walks of speculation. And the vice of his method was the one, common to the Greek philosophers, of taking for granted that the motives contained in common language are sufficiently accurate and expressive of realities for a basis of philosophy. This is sufficiently exemplified in the discussion reproduced by Plato in the *Phædo*. It is taken for granted, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is to be deduced from the common notions then entertained upon the topics out of which the argument was to be constructed. There is no attempt to evolve new principles out of the facts of consciousness; no effort to trace lines of original speculation through secrets of psychological manifestations; but all the proofs are deduced from the inaccurate notions embodied in the language of the times. The doctrine, that all acquired knowledge is but a reminiscence of what was learned in a prior state of existence, approaches nearer to an attempt at the evolution of a new principle by reflective analysis from psychological phenomena, than anything else in the dialogue; but this was doubtless a sophism of Plato's own, put into the mouth of Socrates, and is, after all, a shallow pretence resting upon mere assumption. The whole inquiry consists of assumptions and ratiocinations. There is no sifting of premises, no searching for principles amidst psychological facts manifested in self-consciousness; but the whole fabric rests upon the notions embodied in the language of the people. There is no designed attempt at any more accurate basis for the deduction of conclusions.

The doctrine of Plato, as to the circle of human knowledge and the powers of the mind, differed widely from that of Socrates. Plato thought that no speculation is beyond the reach of the human mind. His was an ambitious philosophy. But we will show, that, like the speculations of the other Greek philosophers, his philosophy was founded upon popular notions and remnants of doctrine handed down, in loose traditions, from older speculators, who built upon the same superficial basis.

The fundamental doctrine of Plato's philosophy is, that there are real entities subsisting in the universe, corresponding to the general terms used in language; and that these general entities, called *ideas*, are the only proper objects of science: and that the method of philosophising is to close the senses, and dwell in intellectual contemplation on these *ideas*, and to note their relations and combine them into propositions, and deduce conclusions from these propositions: and that the conclusions will correspond with the empirical truths of physics and the practical truths of morals, because the logical relations of these *ideas* correspond with the

physical and moral relations of their images or representations—the phenomena of the physical and moral worlds. Such is the method of Plato when explicitly unfolded.

It results from such a method, that Plato's physics and Plato's logic, or, more strictly, Plato's metaphysics and Plato's dialectics, are the same. His physics is a logico-physics. The words of popular language embodied his whole field of observation. And the logical relations of the words, therefore, constituted, or were commuted with, the physical relations of the things signified by them; because these things were nothing else than the popular meaning of these words. This is sufficiently exemplified in the Platonic doctrine of contraries. This doctrine is, that the ultimate powers of nature are contraries, and that everything is generated by its contrary. "There is (says Plato) a certain medium between the two contraries. There are two births, or processions—one of *this* from *that*, and of *that* from *this*. The medium between a greater and a less thing is increase and diminution. The same is the case of what we call mixing, separating, heating, evolving, and all other things without end. For, though it sometimes falls out, that we have not terms to express those changes and mediums, yet experience shows, that by an absolute necessity, things take rise from one another, and pass reciprocally from one to another through a medium." It is manifest, that the two *births*, or *processions*, spoken of as subsisting in nature between contraries, are nothing but the logical relations of the meaning of the words *greater* and *less*. There are no births, or processions, in nature, corresponding with these relations, constituting a generative medium between the entities *greater* and *less*. The whole doctrine is an affair of words. The reasoning is logico-physical. There is nothing real beyond the meaning of the words. The whole of philosophy and science is made nothing more than the development of the meaning of the terms of common language. Plato's philosophy, therefore, like all ancient philosophy, reposes upon mere popular notions. He finds the words, *equality*, *big*, *little*, and other like words, in popular language, and, instead of looking into nature for the real things intended to be signified by these terms, he conceives that there are realities independent of nature corresponding with them. That Plato's supposed higher objects of knowledge, called *ideas*, are but the popular signification of general terms, is sufficiently manifest from Plato's own theory of the origin of this sort of knowledge. His theory is, that though the knowledge of *ideas* is acquired in a prior state of existence, yet it is recovered in this world by the ministry of the senses exercised upon individual objects, which recall the *ideas* by reminiscence. This theory shows, that these *ideas* are but the general notions formed by every one in the exercise of his faculties upon the objects of nature. In other words, *ideas* are only the meaning of general terms, which express only relations, and afford no irrespective objects.

So, then, the Idealism of Plato, when sifted to the bottom, is found to be the mere Phenomenalism of the common mind—a lame empiricism. There is no deeper principle underlying it, as is pretended—no knowledge of higher essences remembered from a prior state of existence. A severe logic takes off the veil, and Plato is seen to stand on the common ground of the meagre empiricism of the ancient philosophy. All philosophers necessarily take their departure from the same general experiences, whatever may be pretended to the contrary; and the different results of their speculations will depend upon the difference in the accuracy, the extent, and the completeness of their observations, and legitimate inferences or deductions.

Aristotle appears next in Greek philosophy; he was the very genius of subtlety and of system; and no greater thinker has yet appeared in the family of man. He saw that the basis of science and philosophy must, from the very structure of the human mind, be phenomenal. Therefore, he strove to fix logic on a psychological basis. With this view, he proceeded to analyze the senses, and account for the origin of knowledge through sensation. He repudiated the Platonic doctrine of *ideas*, and contended that the only real existences are individuals, and that generals *may* be nothing more, so far as the purpose of demonstration is concerned, than terms denoting a property common to an indefinite number of individuals. “The steady contemplation (says Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*), of any individual object under that aspect in which it agrees with other individuals, will recall many similar objects to the mind; the stability of the one will communicate stability to the others, and thus give birth to what are called universals, that is, to general terms, equally applicable to an indefinite number of individuals.” Laying down this doctrine as the basis of his theory of knowing, he at once constructed his logic in accordance with it. Therefore, in his *Posterior Analytics*, he thus lays down the psychological basis of demonstration: “For the purpose of demonstration, it is not necessary to suppose the existence of general ideas, but only that one general term can be applied with truth, and in the same sense, to many individuals. It is not necessary to suppose that general terms, denoting any class of substances, express anything besides the different particulars to which they apply, any more than the general terms denoting qualities, relations, or actions. One general term stands for a variety of particulars, considered under one and the same aspect; but to suppose that this term requires one substantial archetype or idea, as general as itself, is the hearer’s fault; such a supposition not being necessary for the purpose of demonstration.”

If we should stop our inquiry here, Aristotle would appear to be a mere Sensationalist; and such is, sometimes, the account of him in history. Plato is represented as a pure Idealist, while Aris-

totle is represented as a pure Sensationalist. This is a great mistake; each is both an Idealist and a Sensationalist—maintaining that human knowledge is derived from both the intellect and the senses. Plato, it is true, considers intellect exercised upon ideas, the sole source of *science*; yet he ascribed some degree of knowing to the senses. Aristotle ascribed much more importance to sense, but yet made both intellect and sense the conjunct principle of science. He rejected the Platonic doctrine of ideas, but, as we shall see, did not advance as far beyond it as the quotations from his writings which we have given above seem at first to indicate.

It behooves us here to inquire, what is the Platonic doctrine of ideas? The word *idea*, since the time of Des Cartes, has been employed to denote the objects of our consciousness in general; and, since the time of Gassendi and Condillac, whose school analyzed our highest faculties into our lowest, the word has been used to denote the objects of our senses in general. We have already seen that Plato used the word in a far different sense from either of these. He employed it to express the real forms of the intelligible world in lofty contrast with the images of the sensible. It was in this Platonic sense that Aristotle rejected the doctrine of ideas. "Plato (says Aristotle), came to the doctrine of ideas, because he was convinced of the truth of the Heraclitic view, which regards the sensible world as a ceaseless flowing and changing. His conclusion from this was, that if there be a science of anything, there must be, besides the sensible, other substances which have permanence; for there can be no science of the fleeting." In Plato's view, science demanded the reality of ideas as permanent existences, independent of sensible phenomena. Aristotle maintained that there is no proof of the independent reality of ideas; and that, at any rate, the doctrine furnishes no ground for the explanation of being. That Plato, in order to make science possible, had arbitrarily posited certain substances independent of the sensible and uninfluenced by changes—but that only individual things are offered to us objectively. Therefore, that it is the individual which is conceived as universal, or perhaps, that the universal is perceived in the individual; and that this conception or perception is the objectified idea of Plato.

The doctrine, that the universal can be perceived in the individual, which was, *perhaps*, the opinion of Aristotle, when sifted to the bottom, is simply this. The products of the understanding or generalising faculty have both a general and an individual element, constituting two opposite logical poles. The simplest operation of this faculty is to compare together the points of resemblance between objects, and reduce them to one in the synthesis of thought. The product of this process is a concept. A concept being the result of a comparison, necessarily expresses a relation;

it therefore affords no absolute or irrespective object of knowledge. In this aspect, it is general; but it can be realized in consciousness, by applying it, as the term of relation, to one or more of the objects which agree in the point or points of resemblance which it expresses. In this aspect, it is individual. A concept, therefore, is a synthesis of the universal, and the individual expressed in a term of relation. And it is the obscure consciousness of this conjunction of the universal and the individual in the products of the understanding, which has led men to assert the existence of universals in nature. It is but the common error in philosophy of commuting the subjective for the objective. This criticism, we believe, has never been made before. It seems to us to furnish a clue to the fundamental errors in philosophy.

From the criticism of Plato's doctrine of ideas, arose Aristotle's doctrine of matter and form. Aristotle enumerates four metaphysical causes or principles; *matter*, *form*, *moving cause*, and *end*. But these four can be resolved into the fundamental antithesis of matter and form. Matter and form, therefore, are, according to the Aristotelic doctrine, the only things which cannot be resolved into each other. Matter, according to Aristotle, is capable of the widest diversity of forms, but is itself without determinate form: it is everything in possibility, but nothing in actuality. Matter is thus a far more positive thing with Aristotle than with Plato, who treated it as a shadow. We must guard against the supposition, that Aristotle means by *form* what we mean by *shape*. The Aristotelic form is an activity which becomes actualized, through matter, in individual objects.

Aristotle's theory of knowledge corresponds with his theory of forms. As, according to his metaphysical doctrine, forms or universals exist not apart from, but in individual objects, he made, as we have said before, both intellect and sense important faculties in science. He held that there is an *a priori* knowledge paramount to, but not exclusive of, the *a posteriori*. That, though universals are known through the intellect and implicitly contain particulars, yet we may remain ignorant of particulars until they are realized through the senses. Therefore, that intellect and sense combine in framing the fabric of science. Accordingly Aristotle's method is two-fold, *deductive* and *inductive*; the first allied with intellect and forms, or universals; the second, with sense and individuals. In conformity with this doctrine, Aristotle seems to have considered syllogism proper, or deduction, no less ampliative than induction; that deduction did, in some way, assure us, or fortify our assurance, of real truth.

Though Aristotle turned the mind to outward contemplation, he did not perceive the full import of observation, nor the full scope of induction. He still, in conformity with ancient thinking, made universals the paramount element of science, and intellect

the paramount principle. It is true, that his doctrine of universals differed metaphysically from that of Plato; but logically it came to very much the same result in its influence upon method. There are, according to Aristotle's theory of knowledge, certain universal principles existing in the mind, rather as native generalities than as mere necessities of so thinking, which furnish the propositions for syllogism; therefore syllogism or deduction is not dependent for these on induction. Syllogism is thus the paramount process, and induction an inferior process, which may be used as corroborative of deduction; and may be especially used by such minds as cannot realize *a priori* universals, but may perceive them in individuals. Aristotle directed all his energies towards constructing a system of deductive logic. And he assumed that the notions contained in the language of his day were sufficiently accurate for philosophy and science. Some of the profoundest distinctions of his philosophy are to be found in the very structure of the Greek language. The distinction, for instance, of power into *active* and *passive* which is said to have been established by Aristotle, and was adopted by Locke and by Leibnitz, is found in the very fabric of the Greek language, which possesses two sets of potential adjectives, the one for active and the other for passive power. Those significant of active power are denoted by the termination *ιως*, and those of passive, by that of *τος*.* Though, therefore, Aristotle extricated logic from the metaphysical errors of Plato, he fell into a like error, but not so gross, under a different name; for Plato's *ideas* and Aristotle's *forms* are, at bottom, but the common notions expressed by general terms. In his investigations, Aristotle generally starts out by saying: "It is said so and so;" and his procedure is ratiocination founded upon common notions. The doctrine of contraries, too, as was the case with Plato, is a sophistry by which he deceived himself. And in his reasonings, his doctrine of *forms*, sometimes, unconsciously to himself, slips into Plato's doctrine of *ideas*. And we doubt whether Aristotle's estimate of induction, as a method of material inquiry, was higher than that of the ancient Greek skeptics as recorded by Sextus Empiricus in these words: "Induction is the conclusion of the universal from individual things. But this induction can only be correct in as far as all the individual things agree with the universal. This universality must, therefore, be verified before its induction can be made: a single case to the contrary would destroy the truth of the induction." The weakness of induction, as indicated by this criticism of the skeptics, was overrated by Aristotle; as his whole logic seems to assume, in the very subordinate place given to

* Ποιητικον signifies that which can make, and ποιητων, that which can be made; κινητικον, that which can move, and κινητων, that which can be moved.

induction. But yet Aristotle was so superior to all other Greek philosophers as an observer of nature, that we find in Suidas, he is called *the interpreter of nature*—Ἀριστοτέλης τῆς φύσεως γραμματεὺς ἦν.

Let it not be supposed, from what we have said of the deficiencies of the Aristotelic logic, that we value it at a low estimate; it is far otherwise. We put the highest estimate, both upon the influence which it has exercised directly upon the progress of knowledge, and indirectly in disciplining the higher faculties of the mind. It was as great a need in Aristotle's time as the inductive method was in Bacon's. The work to be done, in the state of knowledge in Aristotle's time, was to sift the thought accumulated, discover its logical dependencies, eliminate, by the principle of contradiction, as Socrates did in his conversations with the Sophists, apparent errors, and retain what would stand the test of logical principles. The time had not arrived for the inductive method of objective observation and material illation. This we will endeavour to elucidate.

All thinking is either materially false, or formally false, or both. We have shown, that there was much material falseness in ancient philosophy; as the notions which formed its matter were the result of unscientific observation. But this was not the only vice of ancient philosophy. There was in it, also, a great deal of formal or logical falseness; and, until this was corrected, the time had not come for correcting its other vice. Even in so profound a thinker as Plato, there are paralogisms of every kind so gross as to astonish the modern mind not familiar with the looseness of ancient thought. The very ingenuity of the Greek mind led to sophisms. And many of these sophisms, which are seen by the modern mind to be a mere play of wit and acuteness, were deemed very important by some of the most distinguished thinkers of antiquity. In ancient times, men lived more in public, and carried on scientific investigations more in oral discussions, or conversations, than in the soliloquy of private meditation. Profundity, therefore, would be less valued than wit, dexterity in questioning, and adroit discovery of objections. The Sophists were accomplished masters in this art. There were, too, certain artificial rules, by which their dialogues were regulated. Every answer to a question, for instance, was to be *yes* or *no*. The interrogator, therefore, could constrain his adversary to move in a foreseen manner.

Now, as the method of science was not understood, men might perceive a fallacy, and yet not be able to point it out; for they had not even the requisite language to express these fallacies. How compendiously does the technical expression, "begging of the question," indicate a common fallacy! Such expressions, furnished by logic, not only facilitate the exposure of error, but enable us to get clearer views of truth. It was, therefore, the first

demand of science, that the laws of thought should be investigated and understood, so that, by their application, fallacious reasonings might be discovered. This Aristotle attempted by considering the reasons embodied in ancient thought. He saw that the clue to the whole scheme of Sophistry, was to discriminate the essence of the internal thought from the accident of the external expression. In this way, he discovered, that the syllogism is the one form of reasoning, and that fallacies consist in the covert violations of the logical laws which govern the syllogism. He developed this doctrine into the greatest monument of speculative genius which illustrates the history of philosophy. The great purpose of the Aristotelic logic, was to purge the understanding, and to keep it free of those errors which arise from the confusion and perplexity of inconsequent thinking.

The purpose of this article forbids any more extended review of the doctrines of the followers of Socrates. Plato and Aristotle rise so far above all others, in the importance of their contributions to the progress of philosophy, that, in a sketch like this, an examination of their doctrines must suffice.

The Romans were not acquainted with philosophy until after their conquest of Greece; and they never did succeed in speculative inquiries. Cicero reproduced and developed the moral philosophy of the Greeks, and, carrying the spirit of the orator into philosophy, he clothed it in the grand habiliments of the eloquence nurtured amidst the meditative shades of Tusculum. "*Hanc enim perfectam philosophiam* (says Cicero), *semper judicavi quæ de maximis quæstionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere.*" But, for the most part, philosophy was at Rome degraded to a menial to serve personal interests, by displaying an apparent love of truth in a pretended devotion to elevated studies. Rome has, therefore, no chapter in the history of philosophy.

After the Macedonian conquests, Alexandria became the great focus of learning. From its situation, it was the centre of the commerce of the world; many were attracted thither by the libraries of the Ptolemies. Here met philosophers from the East and the West; the religious dogmas of Jew and Gentile, Pagan and Christian, and systems the most opposing, met on the same arena. Plotinus, Proclus, and Porphyry, were the most distinguished philosophers of this school. Their doctrines were Platonic, and therefore the school was called Neoplatonic. Their philosophy was, however, a cloudy exhalation from the vast inundation of the confluent streams of diverse doctrines which had flooded in from many nations. It vanished before the light of Christianity. The only doctrines of Paganism, which existed after this period, were those adopted by the fathers of the Christian Church.

The fathers of the Church devoted little attention to philosophy, and still less to nature. They gave a preference to Plato,

but were adherents of no particular system, culling and selecting from all. "God (says Chrysostom) did not send men into the world to syllogise and form arguments, but to expound the truth—not to dispute and contend with one another, but to deal out truth with impartiality. It was not in philosophical arguments that the Apostles interested themselves, but they preached simply and clearly, and it is from their example that we are to act." And Clement of Alexandria says: "What I call philosophy, is not what Plato and Aristotle have promulgated, but what they have spoken true and favourable to religion." Such are the most favourable views of philosophy entertained by the fathers of the Church. For, some of the sects, especially the Epicureans and Stoics, they openly attacked. St. Augustine did more than any other of the fathers of the Church to further philosophy; but he conformed his doctrines to Christianity.

But this twilight of philosophy at last sunk into night in the sixth century, and for several ages there is a blank in the history of speculation.

Our modern philosophy, like our civilization, takes its rise in the middle ages. Its character in these ages, is philosophy under ecclesiastical authority—*philosophia ancillans theologiæ*. The middle ages begin when the church became disencumbered from the ruins of ancient philosophy. This crisis was not until the time of Charlemagne. He was the vassal of the Pope. He opened schools throughout his vast empire; and from these philosophy obtained the name Scholastic. The clergy were the cultivators of this philosophy, and its character is given in the nature of its origin, and may be summed up in the saying of Joannus Scotus Eregina, *There are not two studies of philosophy and religion, but what is true philosophy is also true religion.*

The Scholastic philosophy is distributed into several epochs or changes. During the first, philosophy was under absolute subordination to religion; during the second, the subordination was softened down to an alliance; and in the third, a separation took place, indistinct at first, but finally more discriminating; and at last, terminating in modern philosophy.

The rampant spirit of physical inquiry in this age, is too prone to look back at the schoolmen as mere logical knight-errants, and their philosophy as logic run mad, because it did not advance physical science. Because the schoolmen, not perceiving the relativity of general terms, and that they afford no irrespective objects, wasted so much time in disputes about Nominalism and Realism; and not discriminating the primary and secondary qualities of matter, and therefore not perceiving that the words denoting the secondary qualities were ambiguously applied both to the knowing mind and the object known, disputed, whether fire is hot, sugar sweet, grass green, and other like questions; it has been concluded that all

their discussions were idle disputes of mere words. And because they were subject in all their judgments to the Church, as recognized arbiter, it has been supposed that all the doctrines of the schoolmen were the blind opinions ordered by the unreasoned decrees of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. In these conclusions there is great error; for, with all the circumscription of the Church, there was ample scope left for the loftiest speculations. Though the authority of the Church was imperative when it issued its mandate, yet she left a large proportion of the problems of philosophical theology undetermined; and questions which, among Protestants, would cause a difference of sects, were decided in either alternative without impairing the orthodoxy of the parties. The fact is, that the faculties of the human mind were never more vigorously exerted (just as is the case with lawyers, though their discussions move, too, within the limits of authority), than during the middle ages by the schoolmen; though often on trivial questions, with trivial results, but often on important questions, with important results.

We are indebted to the schoolmen for much of the analysis which shows from the nature of the thing that the formal laws of thought are the adequate object-matter of logic. We are also indebted to them for the proper scientific definition of truth, as *the correspondence or agreement of a cognition or a cognitive act of thought with its object*. The schoolmen did also much towards fitting the modern languages for philosophical thinking. The great problem of philosophy is, to analyze the contents of our acts of knowledge or our cognitions, and discriminate what elements have been contributed by the knowing *subject* and by the *object* known. There must, therefore, be terms adequate to designate these correlative opposites, and discriminate the share each has in the total cognition. The exact distinction of *subject* and *object* was first made by the schoolmen. This distinction involves the whole science of mind; for this science is nothing more than the articulate discrimination of the subjective and the objective, in themselves and in their mutual relations. The two opposite pairs of nouns, *subject* and *object*, and adjectives, *subjective* and *objective*, taken together and correlatively, enable us to designate the primary and most important antithesis of philosophy in the most precise and complete manner. Therefore it is seen that the most important seeds of modern philosophy are to be found in the Scholastic.

The capture of Constantinople by the Turks, in the year 1453, scattered over the West the learned Greeks of that capital; and then it was that philosophy rebelled against the supremacy of Aristotle and the Church. Philosophy, which had been the mere handmaid of the Church, came now to be cultivated for itself. New schools were opened, and almost every school of antiquity had its

supporters. Europe beheld the revival of the Academy, the Lyceum, and the Porch. The system which first rose into greatest repute was the Platonic, contaminated with many mysteries of the Alexandrian fathers. But there arose a sect of independent thinkers, whose doctrines were subversive of even the spirituality of God and man. Cardamus, Tulesimus, Beregard, Cesaipinus, and Verini, present a group of philosophers who cannot be classed under any particular sect. They launched out into speculations which we are forced to admire for their vigour and independence. Skepticism had its supporters, at this time, in Montaigne and others. But the whole philosophy of this age, was a mere reflex of that of antiquity. The want of method was the fundamental defect; and exclusive deference to authority was the great impediment to mental progress. It is difficult for us, in this age of free thought and speech, to realize the extreme submission to the authority of the Church, when that authority was exerted, and the absolute deference paid to Aristotle, during the scholastic period. The two great ends to be accomplished, in order to set free the human mind, were to discover a better method of philosophizing, and to shake off the yoke of authority.

Scholasticism had turned away the minds of thinkers from nature. But now, nature began to receive a remarkable degree of attention. The discovery of America, and of the passage to the East Indies, had widened the scope of view; and the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, had carried the thoughts of men beyond the limits of tradition and authority, and given an entirely new direction to the thinking of the age. These discoveries refuted a series of traditional errors and prejudices, and gave the thinking mind a self-dependence which caused it to break loose from the fetters of authority, and place itself upon the basis of observation and experiment, inquiry and proof.

At this juncture in the progress of thought, the most majestic and prophetic mind known to the history of philosophy, rose up to lead men in the new career of investigation which had been begun. Trained in the practice of a jurisprudence the most technical, and in its routine the most servile, and the most obedient to authority and traditional usage of any which has been established amongst men, we see the remarkable spectacle of a Lord Chancellor of England laying aside, for the moment, the king's seals, to become the keeper of the seals of nature. And in a majesty of diction unparalleled in the history of philosophy, this great thinker proclaimed to the world a new method of philosophizing to guide the mighty spirit of inquiry which was abroad, over the fields of observation. Philosophy, no longer confined to the schools, is led forth by a politician and lawyer, out from the confines of authority into the amplitudes of nature. From this moment, the freedom of the human mind was established. This man of business, this

accomplished courtier, this cunning lawyer, this consummate orator, this leader in the affairs of the world, appears on the stage of philosophical thought, with a more comprehensive grasp of thinking and a greater forecast, than any one of even the many trained, especially to philosophy, who had preceded him. It is, at once, manifest to the eye of history, that a great revolution in the modes of philosophical thinking has been accomplished; and that henceforth philosophy is to pursue new paths. The power of the schools is gone, and that of the individual is asserted and established. Authority can no longer prevail against reason.

The revolution which Bacon effected is analogous to that accomplished by Socrates; for as the latter was said to bring down philosophy from heaven to earth, so the former may be said to have brought philosophy from books and tradition to nature. The philosophy of antiquity, Bacon showed, leaped at once to the highest generalizations or laws, without attending to those intervening particulars, through which we must pass to arrive at a perfect generalization. Its method was a treacherous logic, as we have shown, which limited everything to the mechanism of language; and as words serve only as registers of our thoughts, our doctrines cannot be exempt from error, unless we determine the original notions for ourselves. It is, therefore, says Bacon, necessary to purge the mind of these errors which it has imbibed. He therefore, attempted, what was never attempted before, a systematic classification of the kinds of error. Of these he enumerates four, and calls them Idols. The first, he calls Idols of the Tribe, being inherent in human nature; the second he calls Idols of the Den, being those of each individual; the third he calls Idols of the Market, being those formed from the society of men; the fourth he calls Idols of the Theatre, being false notions derived from systems of philosophy, and the contents of popular language. Bacon makes philosophy a mere interpretation of nature, and says: "The doctrine of idols bears the same relation to the interpretation of nature as that of the confutation of sophisms does to common logic." Therefore, the first step in a true method of philosophizing (interpreting nature) is to point out "the idols and false notions which have already preoccupied the human understanding, and are deeply rooted in it." The second step is, "the formation of notions and axioms on the foundation of true induction, which is the only fitting remedy by which we can ward off and expel these idols."

Bacon points out the difference between the ancient method and his own in these words: "There are and can exist but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms; and from them as principles, and their supposed indisputable truth, derives and discovers the intermediate axioms. This

is the way now in use. The other constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms, which is the true but unattempted way." It is important to have distinctly in mind the precise end which Bacon designed to accomplish by his new method, or *Novum Organum*. It was manifestly intended to supersede the old method, or *Organon* of Aristotle. Its very name evinces this. Much difficulty, however, has been created in regard to this question, by making distinctions in logic, which neither Aristotle nor Bacon understood. Logic has very properly come to be distinguished into pure and concrete or modified logic. Pure logic is conversant about the form of thought; concrete logic is conversant about the form of thought as modified by the empirical circumstances, external and internal, under which man exerts his faculties. Pure logic, therefore, proposes as its end, the *formal* or *logical* perfection of thought, and has nothing to do with its *real* truth; while the end of concrete logic is real or material truth. Now, it has been contended that Aristotle's logical treatises are of pure logic, while Bacon's treatise is of concrete logic; and that consequently their scopes are entirely different, and the ends intended to be accomplished by Aristotle and Bacon are different also. In this opinion there is some truth and much error. Aristotle had no definite, certainly no adequate, notion of the distinction between pure and concrete logic; and therefore has, throughout the logical treatises which have come down to us, confounded the two. The end of his logical treatises was not merely formal or logical truth, but real or material truth also; the two not, in fact, being discriminated. It was as a means towards real or material truth, that Bacon considered the Aristotelic logic; and it was in this aspect he designed to supersede them. The whole force of the *Novum Organum* rests upon this fact. The Aristotelic logic had in fact confounded the distinction between formal and material truth; and it was this very confusion which constituted its vice. In consequence of this confusion, it was considered a method of philosophising, a means by which new truths could be elicited or gathered in. It was, in other words, considered creative, and not merely plastic. It is true, that Aristotle hangs the whole chain of our mediate knowledge upon a comprehensive belief, and maintains that the ultimate or primary principles of knowledge are incomprehensible, and rest in a blind, passive faith. Yet, such seems to have been his notion of the scope of syllogistic reasoning, that, somehow or other, as we have already said, he makes it independent of induction; and in this seems to ignore his principle of primary beliefs. At all events, he has left the relation and correlation of syllogism and induction so confused, and his psychological, metaphysical, and logical doctrines so ill adjusted, that we feel warranted in saying that Aristotle con-

founded formal and concrete logic, and formal and material truth. Bacon, therefore, viewing the Aristotelic logic as a method of philosophising, of searching for material truth, attempted to supersede it in that purpose; but to leave it as a means of formal truth, of discussing questions about which there was no dispute as to the data. This was certainly Bacon's view and purpose. His whole doctrine of method is directed to the contents, and not to the form of thought—to the matter, and not to the consecution of our thinking. It is from this point of view we must look at the *Novum Organum* to appreciate it.

The great fallacy which Bacon directed his hostility against, as the one which especially vitiated ancient philosophy, is the commutation of the subjective with the objective. All the errors which Bacon classified as Idols are subjective illusions, which had been commuted in the ancient philosophy with objective realities. This fallacy manifests itself in two ways. The one is to assume that the notions of things contained in common language are correct and complete interpretations of nature, and that the true mode of building up science is to analyze these notions, and combine them in their logical relations, because the logical relations of the notions will correspond with the physical relations of their objects. The other way is to assume that there are general notions or principles, which are an original furniture of the mind, or are remembered from another state of existence, and that nature must conform in its manifestations to these ideas, and that by considering these ideas we can interpret nature. Both of these manifestations of this cardinal error are, as we have shown in our review of ancient philosophy, at bottom the same. That its true character is the commuting of the subjective with the objective, is manifest in the consideration, that as a notion is the joint product of the action of the subject and object, it follows that whatever a notion contains not corresponding with the object, must be the contribution of the thinking subject alone; and if the notion be only a partial interpretation of the object, but is considered complete, it is still mistaking an ideal illusion for a real object. The grand error of the ancient philosophy was to combine, and by syllogistic or deductive reasoning develope, these subjective illusions into systems supposed to be explanations of objective realities.

The whole scope and end of Bacon's method was, therefore, real or material truth. And here the question arises, *what is truth?* The schoolmen, as we have already shown, have given an answer which is now acquiesced in as correct. *Truth is the correspondence or agreement between our thought and its object—between our thought and what we think about.* The Baconian method was especially directed to maintain this view of truth. "For we are founding (says Bacon) a real model of the world in the understanding; such as it is found to be, not such as man's

reason has distorted." Again he says: "We neither dedicate nor raise a capitol or pyramid to the pride of man, but rear a holy temple in his mind, on the model of the universe, which model we imitate." And still further: "Let men learn the difference that exists between the idols of the human mind and the ideas in the divine mind. The former are mere arbitrary abstractions; the latter, the true marks of the Creator on his creatures, as they are imprinted on and defined in matter by true and exquisite touches." It was, therefore, to the objective world that Bacon especially directed attention, so as to secure the mind from the vice of the ancient philosophy—of commuting the subjective with the objective—of substituting the fictions of the imagination for the realities of nature.

As, then, Bacon's method has in view the advancement of the real sciences, it may be well, for the sake of precision, to state what are the objects of these sciences, as, according to the view of truth above given, the correspondence between these sciences and their respective objects constitute their truth.

The real sciences are sciences of fact; for the point of departure from which they set out is always a fact, a presentation of mind. Some of these rest upon the presentations of self-consciousness, and these are facts of mind. Others rest upon presentations of sensitive perception, and these are facts of nature. The former are the mental sciences; the latter are the natural sciences. The facts of mind are given partly as contingent and partly as necessary. The latter, the necessary, are universal virtually and in themselves; the former only obtain a factitious universality by a process of generalization. The facts of nature, whether necessary in themselves or not, are given to us only as contingent and isolated phenomena, and therefore have only that empirical generality which we bestow on them by classification.

Now, it is with the facts of nature that Bacon's method, as developed by himself, more especially deals. The great end of his *Novum Organum*, therefore, is to ascertain that empirical generality, or factitious universality, amongst isolated phenomena of nature, which is accomplished by classification; for it is only in this way, according to Bacon, that man can bring the immensity of nature within the scope of his knowledge.

In accordance with this view of philosophy, particulars or individuals become the important objects of consideration in the Baconian method. And Bacon, in the face of ancient philosophy, which busied itself about universals, had to defend the study of particulars in these words: "With regard to the meanness or even filthiness, of particulars, for which (as Pliny observed) an apology is requisite, such subjects are no less worthy of admission into natural history than the most magnificent and costly; nor do they at all pollute natural history, for the sun enters alike the palace

and the privy, and is not thereby polluted. For that which is deserving of existence is deserving of knowledge, the image of existence."

As, then, particulars are the primary objects of the Baconian method, this method must begin with the senses. Accordingly, Bacon says, "We must guide our steps by a clue, and the whole path, from the very first perceptions of our senses, must be secured by a determined method." And he enounces his method in these words: "It ought to be eternally resolved and settled, that the understanding cannot decide otherwise than by induction, and a legitimate form of it."

Here the question emerges, *what is induction?* Bacon had not a very discriminate notion of it. In the procedure which he calls induction, or rather by which he exemplifies it, he confuses analysis and synthesis, and does not even sufficiently discriminate between observation and induction; as he includes, in what he calls induction, the objective process of investigating individual facts as preparatory to illation, as well as the illation from the singular to the universal. Nor has any writer, as far as we know, sufficiently explained and exemplified induction. The loosest notions are entertained on the subject. By the best writers, induction is said to be analytical, whereas it is synthetical. This confusion, however, often arises from the confused and even contradictory notions which are entertained of analysis and synthesis. The process, which by some is called analysis, is called synthesis by others, and *vice versa*. These discrepancies and contradictions we will endeavour to explain, and found upon the explanation a more accurate determination of induction.

There is and can be but one method in philosophy; and what have been called the different and more or less perfect methods, are merely different applications of this one method to the objects of knowledge. Method is a rational progress—a progress of the faculties towards an end; and method in philosophy signifies the progress conducive to the end which philosophy proposes. The ends of philosophy are two—the first being the discovery of causes; and the second, the resolution of things into unity. These ends, however, fall into one; as the higher we ascend in the discovery of causes, we approximate the nearer to unity. The detection of the one in the many is, therefore, the end to which philosophy tends continually to approximate. What the method in philosophy is, will appear the more clearly, if, in the first place, we consider philosophy in relation to its first end—the discovery of causes.

Causes, taking the name for a synonym of that without which their effect would not be—and they are only coëfficient elements of their effect; and effect is the combination of these primary elements to which we give the name of causes, and the concurrence

of which gives existence to the effect. The acid and the alkali, for example, are the causes of the neutral salt, and also its coefficient elements. To the elements we give the name causes; to the combination, we give the name effect. Now, as it is by experience we discover what causes are necessary for the production of an effect, it follows that the only way by which we can attain to the knowledge of causes, as causes, is in and through their effect; and the only way we can become aware of their effect, as effect, is in and through its causes. In as far, therefore, as philosophy is the research of causes, the only necessary condition of the possibility of philosophy is decomposition. The decomposition of effects into their causes is called analysis. In its philosophical signification it means the separation of the parts of any complex whole.

But, though analysis is the fundamental process, it is not the only one. It is but a means conducive to an end. We analyze only that we may comprehend the objects; and we can comprehend only as we are able to reconstruct, in thought, if not in reality, what has been decomposed. This mental reconstruction is, therefore, the final procedure in philosophy, and is called synthesis. Of these two processes, the former is called the regressive, as ascending from effects to causes; the latter is called the progressive, as descending from causes to effects. These two processes are the necessary parts of one method, and are relative and correlative of each other. Analysis, without synthesis, is the means cut off from its end, and is only a begun knowledge. Synthesis, without analysis, is no knowledge at all; for synthesis receives from analysis whatever elements it recomposes. Synthesis supposes analysis as the prerequisite of its existence, and is dependent on it for the qualities of its existence; for the value of every synthesis depends on the value of the foregone analysis. If the elements furnished by analysis be assumed, or not really discovered, the synthesis will, at best, be but a conjectural theory; and if the analysis be false, so will be the synthesis. The legitimacy of every synthesis, therefore, depends on the legitimacy of the analysis which it presupposes. These two relative procedures are thus equally necessary to each other in the acquisition of knowledge, and are as indispensable to the existence of philosophy as the processes of inspiration and expiration are to animal life. It is, however, to analysis that the preëminence is due, if to either; for though it be only a commencement, yet it is the preferable, inasmuch as it lays the foundation for synthesis; whereas synthesis without analysis is radically void.

As regards, therefore, the first end of philosophy—the discovery of causes—there is only one possible method, of which analysis is the foundation, and synthesis the completion.

Considering philosophy in relation to its second end—the resolution of our knowledge into unity—the same doctrine is equally apparent. Everything presented to our consideration in the external or internal word—whether through the medium of sense, or of self-consciousness—is presented in complexity. The senses present objects in multitudes, in each of which there is a congeries of many various qualities; and the same holds true of the presentations of self-consciousness, since every modification of mind is a complex state, and the different elements of each state manifest themselves in and through each other. Thus there is nothing but multiplicity presented to us. And our faculties are so limited, that they are able to take in only one object or combination, and that the very simplest, at a time. It is therefore only by analysis and synthesis that multiplicity can be brought into unity. In fact, the search for a cause, and the search for unity in cases where the notion of cause does not enter, are both governed by the same regulative principle—the principle or law of identity in its empirical application—as we shall show presently.

We see, then, that in any actual investigation, analysis and synthesis are necessarily used interdependently and interchangeably. They cannot be separated; and the two together make up the one method of philosophy. This method, according to Bacon, is observation and induction. As, then, analysis and synthesis constitute the one method, and observation and induction constitute it also, it behooves us to correlate analysis and synthesis with observation and induction. Before, however, we do this, let us give an articulate discrimination between observation and induction.

There are two ways by which we may become acquainted with things. In the first place, we may know a thing as simply existing. This is the knowledge of what simply is—of facts known in our own experience or that of others—and is called empirical or historical knowledge; for history is properly only the narration of a consecutive series of phenomena in time. It comprises all that information which we obtain from the physical world by sense, and from the mental world by self-consciousness. The process by which this degree or sort of knowledge is obtained, is what Bacon means by observation; and it manifestly involves both analysis and synthesis. The knowledge obtained in this way is, however, not philosophy. It requires another process to elevate it to that dignity.

Let us, then, consider the second way by which we may know things. The mind is so constituted, that it cannot perceive the existence of anything without referring it to something else as its cause, and without which it could not have existed. Things do not occur isolated from each other. There is no phenomenon but is the effect of some cause. Thus, when we see a rainbow, we may, in a certain sense, be said to know it; but with such know-

ledge, the mind does not rest satisfied; and it is only when we discover that the phenomenon depends on the reflection and refraction of light, by the rain falling from a cloud opposite the sun, that we can be said fully to know it. This is done by inferring from the analogies that the reflection and refraction of light is the cause, and then by mathematical reasoning deducing from the known laws of reflection and refraction, the breadth of the coloured arch, the diameter of the circle of which it is part, and the relation of the latter to the place of the spectator and of the sun, and finding all these to come out of the calculus just as they are observed in nature. This knowledge of the cause of a phenomenon is something more than that phenomenon considered simply as a fact, and constitutes the second way in which we may be said to know anything, and is called philosophical, scientific, or rational knowledge—the knowledge of effects, as dependent on their causes. Now, into the procedure of acquiring this sort or degree of knowledge, induction as well as observation enters. The process by which the reflection and refraction of light are inferred or assigned as the cause of the rainbow, is induction, and is synthetic; for it brings the phenomenon of the rainbow under the laws of light—binds it with other phenomena of the same sort—is an illation from an individual or particular to a class, from a singular to a universal. It is seen, and we selected it for that reason, that in the instance given, induction is aided by mathematical deduction, but only *aided* by it; for the illation is purely inductive, and is assumed as true in the mathematical deduction, and only verified or confirmed by it; for mathematics does not take the physical sciences out of the pale of induction, but only aids it. That induction is synthetic, all the discoveries in science show. From our limited experience that some bodies gravitate, we infer that all bodies gravitate. Here the mind binds up the several facts of observation into a whole—as it were, reconstructs an analysis; this is certainly synthetic. Induction is therefore clearly synthetic, and not analytic, as it has sometimes been said to be. It has sometimes been called both analytic and synthetic, especially by the mathematical physicists. When the procedure is from effects to causes it is called analytic, but when the procedure is from an ascertained cause to the explanation, by it, of analogous or resembling phenomena or effects, it is called synthetic. These procedures correspond with Bacon's, or rather are Bacon's ascending and descending scales of induction. This nomenclature is adopted, because the last procedure, which is also called deductive, is apparently the reverse of the first—the mere retracing of the same steps from the cause back to the same effects from which it was inferred; whereas they see other effects, only analogous to those from which the cause has been inferred, which are attempted to be brought within the same cause and explained by it. As the

first process is called analytic, this is called synthetic. But at bottom both are synthetic, as they are both induction viewed from opposite points.*

It is seen, then, that method, in its universality, consists of two processes, analysis and synthesis, which are relative to, and complementary of, each other.

As philosophy has only one possible method, so the history of philosophy only shows the more or less imperfect application of this one method. It presents many aberrations *in* the method, but none *from* it. There never has been an attempt at philosophy where analysis and synthesis were not both used. But sometimes the one, and sometimes the other, has predominated; they have not been kept in due correlation in their employment. The ancient philosophy is especially defective, by the meagre employment of analysis. The analysis of phenomena were partial, and the synthesis consequently one-sided, and erroneous. The analysis of the early Greek physical philosophers, of whom we have spoken, who, fixing upon one or more elements as superior to all others, such as water or air, was partial; and consequently the synthesis, that it was the principle of all things, was one-sided and erroneous. Bacon has exhibited the deficiency of the physics of Aristotle in analysis, when he says: "Nor is much stress to be laid on his frequent recourse to experiment, in his books on animals, his problems and other treatises; for he had already decided, *without having properly consulted experience as the basis of decisions and axioms*; and, after having so decided, he drags experiment along as a captive constrained to accommodate herself to his decisions." And of the empiric school, as he calls it, he says, their dogmas are founded "in the confined obscurity of a few experiments." We have, in our review of ancient philosophy, shown that it was founded on the crude analysis contained in the language of the people. The great precept of the Baconian method is: *Do not hurry to a synthetic induction from an imperfect analysis, a narrow observation; but let your analysis be complete.*

Here emerges the question, *how are we to observe?* In order to scientific knowledge, as we have described it, observation must become or turn into inquiry. We must question nature; but a question implies some knowledge of the thing inquired about. How, then, are we to inquire of nature, unless we have some intimation of her secrets—the human mind having no *a priori* clue to them? The questions put to nature must, too, be particular or leading questions.

* It should be remarked, that the terms analysis and synthesis, which have been derived from the mathematicians, are sometimes reversed; the first being applied, by some, to the process to which the latter is applied by others; and *vice versa*. But this is not the occasion to explain this confusion.

The questioning of nature springs out of observation, by nature herself disclosing to us some clue to the secret. When we observe a certain correspondence among a number of objects or phenomena, we are determined by a principle of our intellectual nature to suppose the existence of a more extensive correspondence than experience has disclosed, or perhaps may ever disclose. This judgment, that where much is found accordant, all will be found accordant, is the result of an original tendency of our nature. It is the inventive principle by which we generalise our knowledge. This judgment is first only hypothetical—merely an *inventive principle*, which prompts us to put questions to nature, based upon the supposed truth of the judgment, and is called hypothesis. The actual procedure of philosophising, therefore, consists of: 1. Observation; 2. Hypothesis; 3. Questioning; 4. Induction. This questioning is sometimes only the observation of the ordinary course of nature. Sometimes it is experiment; for, says Bacon, “the secrets of nature betray themselves more readily when tormented by art, than when left to their own course.” If the answers accord with the first inference—the hypothesis which prompted us to put the questions—it is then assumed as verified, and the induction is complete. How many answers concurring to the same point amount to proof in any case, is beyond the determination of any rule. In some cases, a few instances warrant an induction; in others, an immense number are required to warrant the judgment. This difference results from the fact, that where the character inquired about is an essential one, like the lungs in a terrestrial animal, a few instances will suffice; but when the character is a contingent one, like the colour of things, hardly any number of instances will suffice. And whether a character is an essential or a contingent one, is itself a question of science, and must be determined before it can be used as a principle of evidence in induction.

The presumption, that where much is found accordant, all will be found accordant, has been considered by philosophers to be of two kinds—to be either induction or analogy. This seems to us to be erroneous. Though induction and analogy are to be distinguished, they are not to be distinguished as only relatives of one kind; they are not to be considered as two processes of reasoning; but induction is to be considered as the process, and analogy as the objective law warranting the process. In this view of the subject, induction may be defined *a material illation of the universal from the singular, warranted either by the general analogies of nature, or by the special analogies of the object-matter of any real science*. The synthetic inference is not necessitated by a law of thought, but only warranted by the observed analogies which merely incline the judgment. It seems to us, therefore, more accurate to make induction signify the *process*, and analogy or similarity signify the

evidence on which it is founded ; for such is the true account of the process, as the definition just given indicates.

In the inductive process, the conclusion is always wider than the premises. Whereas, in strict demonstration, no conclusion can contain more than the premises. In the inductive process, experience says, *this, that*, and the *other* body gravitate, and the conclusion says, *all bodies* gravitate. In explanation of this, it has been said, that the mind adds something of its own, warranting us to draw the conclusion. That the affirmation, *this, that*, and the *other* bodies gravitate, is connected to the conclusion, *all* bodies gravitate, by inserting between the two another proposition, to wit : *the supposition of the uniformity of nature*. And that as this supposition is not the product of induction, it must be interpolated into all inductive reasoning by the mind. And that, therefore, where the reasoning in induction is fully expressed, it will stand thus : *this, that*, and the *other* body gravitate ; but as nature is uniform in all her operations, *this, that*, and the *other* body represent all bodies : therefore, all bodies gravitate.

Though this is the most scientific explanation which has yet been given by any philosopher, we feel constrained to demur to it ; as, to us, it involves a concealed error. The affirmation of the uniformity of nature, which seems to be interpolated in inductive reasoning, can be resolved into something simpler, which makes the process accord with the great mental law, *that thought is always under the antithesis of subject and object ; and that in the products or conclusions of thought, nothing is contained as objective which was not objective in the process of thinking*. In other words, the laws of intelligence never warrant an illusive interpolation of the objective for the subjective, as it must do if the uniformity of nature is predicated in the inductive illation. The veracity of human consciousness would certainly seem to require this—otherwise the mind practises illusions upon itself, under the truest conformity to its own laws. We think this supposed uniformity of nature may be resolved into identity objectively perceived in nature. Thus, the principle of philosophical presumption, which prompts the supposed uniformity, will thereby be resolved into the law of identity. This we will now show.

There are but three ultimate laws of intelligence : 1. The law of Identity ; 2. The law of Contradiction ; 3. The law of Excluded Middle ; and a corollary from these, the law of reason and consequent. Now, reason, whether exerted in deductive or inductive (in apodictic or hypothetical) judgments, must always be regulated by the same laws. In other words, the laws of thought are the same in the deductive and the inductive processes ; only that in the deductive (apodictic) they are absolute, and in the inductive (hypothetical) they are modified by empirical circumstances. The

laws of thought alone determine the deductive process, necessitating the conclusion; but the laws of thought, modified by the analogies of nature, determine the inductive process inclining the judgment. In the inductive process, the laws of thought have an empirical application. And the law of identity is the special one which is gratified in the synthetic illation by which the analogies are unified into identity. Objects which determine undistinguishable impressions upon us, are perceived and represented in the same mental modification, and are subjectively to us precisely as if they were objectively identical. When, therefore, a number of objects or phenomena are found to possess absolute similarity, and their difference is for the time lost sight of, their similarity is converted into identity, and they are thereby reduced into the unity of thought. By the same regulative law, similar phenomena are referred to an identical cause. Analogies or similarities are the footprints of identity. And what has been supposed to be the assumption of the uniformity of nature in every induction, is but identity, which the mind affirms upon viewing the analogies or similarities; for whatever is identical to consciousness, is so uniformly or universally. There is, therefore, no special intellectual regulative, called the principle of philosophical presumption: but it is merely the law of identity in its empirical application. It is not, therefore, necessary to a theoretical explanation of induction, to assume, as a superficial analysis seems to warrant, that the uniformity of nature is affirmed as the major premise, which the mind, from the necessity of so thinking, interpolates in the reasoning. The mind considers no such principle. It affirms only what it perceives objectively—identity in similarity. Some water-fowl have web-feet—not by the assumption of the uniformity of nature, but by the law of identity—leads the mind to affirm, that all water-fowl have web-feet. It is as though the mind had viewed all water-fowl. The inductive inference is, in fact, a sort of reëffirmation of what has been actually observed. If such were not the result of the guidance of the law of identity on viewing analogies or similarities, the mind would contradict itself—not think at all. For affirmation and negation are the ultimate alternatives of thought. Therefore, the law of contradiction combines with the law of identity, of which, in fact, it is a phase, in leading to the inductive synthesis or totalizing result. The laws of excluded middle, and of reason and consequent, are never elicited in inductive reasoning; because, in induction, reason or intelligence never stands in such an attitude to itself as to come under the guidance of these two laws, they being exclusively concerned about deductive reasoning.

The error which we have thus endeavoured to expose by a more thorough analysis, results from the covert assumption, that syllogistic is the only reasoning; and that every general assumption

which can be found, by reflective analysis, to be the condition of a product of the mind, must have been realised in consciousness as connate with the product at the time of the genesis of such product. For example: as the notion of space is found by reflective analysis to be the condition of the notion of body, it is supposed that the notion was natively latent in the mind, and was elicited into consciousness in the process of cognizing an external object; whereas, space or extension is cognized objectively as a necessary element of body, and must be realised in the cognition, as contributed by the object and not by the subject. The human mind is still fettered in philosophical thinking, by the ancient doctrine of universals, and that all knowledge is through previous knowledge, and based on generals, which it was the great purpose of Bacon's philosophy to overthrow, and to emancipate the human mind to the full freedom of a philosophy of observation of individual phenomena.

As hypothesis is the great inventive principle of induction, by which, as we have already indicated, the questioning of nature is conducted, it demands articulate exposition. It is in the form of hypothesis that the grand heresy of commuting the subjective with the objective creeps into philosophy and science. Hypothesis is the initial ball, which is rolled through the field of observation, accumulating only what accords with it, so that the whole aggregation will be of the same character with the nucleus; and if what is first set in motion be erroneous, so will all that is accumulated. In order, then, to prevent the commutation of the subjective with the objective, it is necessary that the hypothetical supposition shall be an inference from phenomena, as it always is, in that which we have described as the normal procedure of induction. The supposition or provisional judgment arises upon the observation of phenomena, and guides our questioning of similar phenomena. But the great danger is, that our provisional judgment be the mere application of a pre-conception, like the vortices of Des Cartes in explanation of the motions of the heavenly bodies. When a phenomena is presented to us which we can explain by no causes within the sphere of our experience, we endeavour to recall the outstanding phenomena to unity, by ascribing it to some cause or class to which there is a probability of its belonging. The great maxim, regulative of this procedure, is called the Law of Parsimony, and is adequately expressed by Sir William Hamilton in these words: "Neither more nor more onerous causes are to be assumed than are necessary to account for the phenomena." In commenting on this rule, which had been enounced by Newton, Sir William says, it is almost certain that Newton, when he says we are to admit no causes but such as are true (*veræ*), he meant "to denounce the postulation of hypothetical facts as media of hypothetical explanation." Now, it is not only *almost* but abso-

lutely certain, that this was Newton's meaning: because he explicitly says so in the general scholium at the end of his *Principia*: "I have not been able (says he) to discover the cause of these properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from phenomena is called hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy, particular propositions are inferred from phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction." Here Newton makes *cause* the opposite of hypothesis, and restricts hypothesis to mere assumptions, not deduced from phenomena. He therefore means by *true causes* *real causes*—the opposite of supposititious causes. And the *Principia* is an exemplification of it; for amidst all the intricacies of mathematical demonstration, Newton, with the most marvellous caution and sagacity, never for a moment loses sight of phenomena and known causes. Induction is the centre and the circumference around and within which the mathematical demonstrations revolve. Newton's rule about true causes does not, as Dr. Whewell and others suppose, reject the inquiry into new causes. In the questions which Newton was considering, the true cause was the first term, the one which should be known, and not the second, the one unknown, as it always is, in a search for new causes. It would be illegitimate, according to Newton, to assign a subtle ether as the cause of the retardation of the planetary motions, as its existence is not known; but it would be perfectly legitimate as a *provisional judgment*, to infer the existence of a subtle ether from the retardation of the planets in their orbits. It was legitimate, to infer the existence of Leverrier's planet, as the cause of the perturbations in Uranus, as a *provisional judgment*, to be verified by subsequent observation, as was done; but to account for the perturbations by the existence of the planet, would be reversing the order, placing the unknown term first in the inquiry, and accounting for the known by the unknown.

Such is the comprehensive and profound method—sweeping as it does through all the intricacies of the heights and depths of nature—which Bacon proclaimed in his *Novum Organum*. "Although (says Newton, in his *Optics*), the arguing from experiments and observations, by induction, be no demonstration of general conclusions, yet it is the best way of arguing which the nature of things admits of." And the marvels accomplished by this method in unravelling the secrets of nature, have long since vindicated it from the objections of the ancient Greek skeptics, which we noticed in treating of ancient philosophy.

Des Cartes comes next in the history of philosophy. He was contemporary with Bacon, but thirty years younger. The influence for truth of no philosopher has, in our opinion, been more

overrated. It is, therefore, time that his philosophy should be weighed in the scales of criticism, and its true value fixed on the pages of the history of thought.

From the manner in which our opinions are formed, amidst the circumstances of life, our supposed knowledge cannot but be a medley of truths and errors. It is therefore important to institute a critical examination of the constituents of this knowledge. Des Cartes proposed that we should commence the examination by doubting all our opinions. Now, this initial or preliminary doubt of Des Cartes has always seemed to us, as a practical rule, extremely idle. For, let it be observed, this preliminary doubt is to be the forerunner of any system of truth. The whole contents of the mind are to be condemned until their truth is established. But how are we to begin the examination of our judgments? Not at random, of course, but by selecting them according to some principle, and arranging them in some order and dependence. But the distribution of things into their classes is one of the most difficult tasks of philosophy, as well as one of the last that are accomplished. Amongst our opinions there are many which can only be tested by profound investigation and extensive knowledge. This precept of Des Cartes, which is intended to show how we are to begin to be a philosopher, requires us to be one before we begin. The true precept, therefore, is not the unconditional one of absolute preliminary doubt, as Des Cartes teaches, but a gradual and progressive reprehension of prejudice. We should examine all our opinions with the circumspection which merely supposes that they contain some truth combined with much error. All, therefore, of value in the preliminary doubt of Des Cartes is, that it ignores authority. It implies that the judgments bequeathed to us shall not be decided by authority, but by a principle superior to authority within the sphere of truth—the principle of free thought acting within the limits prescribed by its own laws, and not subordinated to authority, and by it astricted to deduce conclusions from such principles as authority has admitted or ordained. But all this had before been articulately proclaimed by Bacon in the *Novum Organum*, in his masterly criticisms of the previous systems of philosophy, which he closes in these words: “Here, too, we should close the demolishing branch of our Instauration, which is comprised in three confutations: 1. The confutation of natural human reason left to itself; 2. The confutation of demonstration; 3. The confutation of theories or received systems of philosophy and doctrines.” So that, at most, the preliminary doubt of Des Cartes is but a crumb dropped from the critical doctrines of Bacon.

This doubt of Des Cartes was a preliminary to the establishment of a system of positive doctrine; for Des Cartes was anything than a skeptic. Indeed, he hastened to his conclusions; and, as

D'Alembert said, "began with doubting everything, and ended in believing that he had left nothing unexplained."

How, then, did Des Cartes essay to lay the foundation of knowledge? By reflection, he finds a basis for certainty in the fact of thought itself; in the fact of the very doubt that perplexes him. For, to doubt is to exist; therefore, the doubt reveals in consciousness both thinking and existence. This fundamental truth Des Cartes thus expressed: *Cogito, ergo sum*. Thus far, his philosophy is purely subjective. As yet, the operations of his mind—his mere thinking implying his existence—is all that he can hold true. Like all modern philosophers prior to Reid, he held that the mind possesses no immediate knowledge of anything but its own modifications, which the mind mistakes for external reality. How then, inquires Des Cartes, can it be known that external things exist, when the mind has no immediate knowledge of their existence? Des Cartes must, *ex hypothesi*, find in the mind itself some media of proof for external existence. Searching, therefore, in his mind, he finds the idea of God—a perfect intelligence, eternal, infinite—necessary. This idea, he argues, must have an adequate cause, which can only be a corresponding being; for it cannot be the product of the finite mind. Having thus established the existence of God, he deduces therefrom the existence of the outward world. If God be veracious, he argues, it follows that he who is the author of the sensible existences, is the author of the appearances which induce us to believe their existence, and that he would not exhibit these appearances as a snare and illusion; consequently what appears to exist does exist, and God himself is the guarantor that it is no illusion.

Now, this argument is wholly invalid. Indeed, it proves that God is the author of illusion. It cannot be denied, that we believe that the very objects which we perceive exist; and not that there is something representative of them which alone is perceived, and suggests their existence. We believe in the existence of things because we believe that we know them as existing. Now, Des Cartes, by his own theory, was deceived in the belief that we see things existing. God, therefore, is the author of illusion; and if the author of this deception, the conclusion is the very reverse of that drawn by Des Cartes. But his reasoning involves a further fallacy. It assumes, that God is veracious. How is this known? It can only be known by our faculties of knowing. But the argument assumes that our faculties are not trustworthy, because we believe that we see things existing, and it is not so. Therefore, we are not sure of the existence of God; for it rests upon our mendacious faculties.

Des Cartes, therefore, never got beyond his *cogito, ergo sum*. This is both the beginning and the end of his philosophy. The only important truth which he signalized is, *That the ultimate organ*

of science consists in an appeal to the facts of consciousness. But this truth he arbitrarily limits to self-consciousness, and as arbitrarily applies it to the outward world, through the false assumption of an innate idea of God; thus creating or assuming a chasm where none exists, and bridging it over with a figment of his imagination. His denial of the contemporaneousness of the knowledge of one's self and of the outward world, at once ignored the possibility of any knowledge at all of external nature, and put the mind on that track of preposterous speculation of endeavouring to bridge the imaginary chasm between the subjective and the objective, which could only, from such a starting-point, end in the identification of the last with the first; and thus commute the subjective with the objective, to a degree of extravagance that would make Bacon smile at the smallness of the same error in the ancient philosophy, which his whole method was designed to counteract. In the philosophy of Des Cartes, in fact, begun that exaltation of human reason, which, in the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, ended in the dethronement of God and the inauguration of man to the sceptre of omniscience.

The extraordinary influence which the philosophy of Des Cartes has exerted on modern speculation is, therefore, in our judgment, to be attributed, rather to its ministering to a cardinal weakness of the human mind, *the tendency to a priori speculation*, than to any force of truth in its doctrines or of forecast in its regulative principle of method. This method is an arbitrary formula, as inapplicable in the hunting-ground of investigation as the stereotyped forms of the schoolmen. The provisional doubt, the *assumed* conviction that truth is possible, and the *cogito, ergo sum*, as a direction to the inquirer, are but a beggarly account of empty boxes. It must lead to *a priori* speculation disjoined from the *a posteriori* elements of thought, to an unmitigated Idealism or Rationalism. Nothing can show more clearly the bias of Des Cartes towards a demonstrative or rationalistic philosophy, than the fact that, in his attempt to express the simultaneity and identity of *the knowing that we think, and the knowing that we exist, that they are but one indivisible deliverance of consciousness*, he enunciates it in a form of expression which indicates a relation of subordination and sequence; *cogito, ergo sum*. The external expression is certainly an enthymeme with a suppressed major, whatever the internal thought of the thinker was. The expression is certainly not a simple affirmation of the identity of thought and being in the sphere of consciousness, but indicates both the priority of self in consciousness, and that the notion of self and the notion of being are found apart and are conjoined through the higher principle—*what thinks, is*. This bias at the starting-point is impressed on the whole Cartesian philosophy.

In estimating the value of the Cartesian philosophy, two things

have been confounded, which, if not distinguished, must involve us in the most perplexing confusions. By no one have these two things been more signally confounded than by Cousin, the learned and brilliant editor of the works of Des Cartes. Speaking of two little tracts by Des Cartes, he says: "We see in these more unequivocally the main object of Des Cartes, and the spirit of the revolution which has created modern philosophy, and placed in the understanding itself the principle of all certainty, the point of departure for all legitimate inquiry." The great error in this passage is the making "the principle of all certainty, *the point of departure* for all legitimate inquiry." This is the germinal vice of the Cartesian philosophy. In the regressive analysis, by which we pass backwards to the basis of certainty, we arrive at consciousness as the ultimate arbiter, the last oracle. But, to make this the *point of departure*, as Des Cartes did, for inquiry into philosophy, is erroneous, and was the great blunder in the Cartesian method. From facts of consciousness, "seeds of truth in the mind," as he called them, Des Cartes even essayed to project the system of the physical universe, and thereby make the physical sciences mere educts of the understanding. He restored the ancient method of reasoning *a priori*, from causes to effects. Facts of observation must be the starting-point in all philosophy, whether mental or physical. Des Cartes reversed the scholastic proposition, and made it read, *Nihil est in sensu, quod non fuit prius in intellectu*.

The philosophy of Des Cartes had produced upon the thinking of the succeeding age an impression adverse to the whole Baconian method. It had given an extreme subjective turn to thought. This subjective character would be the point of attack by any one taking the Baconian view of philosophising. Therefore it was that Locke, in the very beginning of his Essay on the Human Understanding, enters upon the question of the origin of our ideas or knowledge. This question involves the problem of the objectivity and subjectivity of knowledge. We think, therefore, that the criticism of Cousin and others, that Locke's method is entirely wrong, because of his entering upon this question before determining what are the actual products of thought in the maturely developed consciousness, is entirely futile. The origin of our knowledge was the problem lying at the threshold of the issue between the objective method of Bacon and the subjective method of Des Cartes. If all science could be excogitated *a priori*, out of human reason, with some little resort to external observation, as Des Cartes maintained, then the Baconian method, which placed the possibility of science exclusively in the observation of the invariable coëxistence, and the invariable antecedence and sequence of the phenomena of nature, was a grovelling puerility. How, therefore, could this antagonism between the subjective and the objective methods be

determined, but by considering how far thought is objective, and how far subjective? It is in fact a discussion of method in its ultimate analysis. The discussion of the origin of knowledge was demanded by the polemical conditions of thought at that day. Progress was impossible until the problem was laid open. And however weak Locke's discussion of the doctrine of innate ideas may be, when viewed under the higher light of the present times, it did great good in its day. It gave insight into the problem of subjectivity, in a form that would be appreciated by the largest number of minds, and make them ignore the subjective method. It matters not, therefore, so far as the fortunes of philosophy are concerned, whether Des Cartes or any other philosopher ever held the doctrine of innate ideas in the form in which Locke exhibits it. He chose to exhibit the error of subjectivity in such a form as that in which—according to his judgment, and in this we believe he was right—it presented itself to most thinkers of those times. Indeed, after the most careful consideration of the subject in all its bearings, we cannot but believe that Des Cartes *assumed*, at least in his philosophy, a doctrine of innate ideas almost precisely such as Locke presents it. It is true, that when Gassendi charged upon him the doctrine, much as Locke afterwards exhibited it, he swallowed half that he had written, and said he only meant by innate ideas, innate faculties. This, however, avails, we confess, nothing with us; for, in those parts of his method, where he maintains that from a few *a priori* principles *assumed as facts of consciousness*, he could evolve by logical deduction what was the mode in which suns, planets, water, light, minerals, plants, animals—the last, however, he admits, require ample experiments—must have been, or at least *may* have been successively constituted, he certainly assumes a psychological basis of thought substantially the same with Locke's doctrine of innate ideas. “The order (says Des Cartes) I pursued, was this: First, I endeavoured to discover, in general, the principles or first causes of everything which is or can be in the world, *without considering anything for this purpose, except God alone, who has created it, nor deducing these principles from aught else than from certain seeds of truth which exist naturally in our souls.* After that, I examined what would be the first and most ordinary effects which might be deduced from these causes; and it seems to me that I could hence discover heavens, stars, and earth, and even upon that earth, water, air, fire, minerals, and some other things which are the most easy to be known.” This is but the general doctrine of method expounded in the writings of Des Cartes. The “seeds of truth,” existing naturally in the soul, are spoken of by Leibnitz and by Cudworth, both of whom are Idealists, the first much the same as Des Cartes, the latter a little more Platonic; but both maintaining, or at least assuming, a doctrine in its logical import much like the doctrine

of innate ideas presented by Locke, which, however, be it remembered, Locke ascribes to no one in particular.

We, therefore, dissent from those who think Locke's discussion of innate ideas of little importance in the progress of philosophy; but, with the qualifications which we have stated, we are ready to admit that Locke's philosophy is weak on its negative side; its hostile discussion of the *a priori* element of human thought. But on its positive side, its account of the origin of our ideas or knowledge, it is all that could have been expected in his time.

From the fact, that Locke opposed with so much earnestness the doctrine of innate ideas, he has been represented, by many, as a pure Sensationalist, one who believes that all our knowledge is derived from or through the senses. A more erroneous interpretation of an author was never recorded in the pages of criticism. The blunder is a marvel of misapprehension. However far Locke's account of the origin of our ideas may fall short of the whole truth, as we readily admit it does, it certainly, in the most explicit manner, maintains that our ideas are derived from two sources, sensation or sensitive perception, and reflection or self-consciousness. "External objects (says Locke) furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities; and the mind furnishes the understanding with the ideas of its own operations. The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two sources." How criticism has brought itself to interpret this and numberless other passages, in which Locke distinctly and carefully affirms that there are two different sources of our ideas, sensation and reflection, so as to make Locke resolve them into one, is strange enough, and but evinces the perversity of human judgment. And Cousin, with all the light to the contrary, which Dugald Stewart, in his Preliminary Dissertation, had shed upon the question, pronounces Locke a Sensationalist. Enslaved by the spirit of a system which required him to find in Locke the root of the Sensationalism of the eighteenth century, he says: "Locke is the father of the whole Sensualistic school of the eighteenth century. He is incontestably, in time as well as genius, the first metaphysician of this school." The vile Sensualism or Sensationalism of Condillac and Cabanis is thus made a justifiable extension of Locke's philosophy—fruit springing legitimately from the germ which Locke planted in the fields of thought. And prone, with a pre-disposition, increased by the heat of progress, to exaggerate every indication of Sensationalism in the writings of Locke, he maintains that Locke makes an interval between the time of acquiring the ideas of sensation and those of reflection; and thus opens the way for the theory of "transformed sensations"—of sensation as the sole principle of all the operations of the soul. This is a shallow criticism. The purpose of Locke was to rescue philosophy from subjectivity, and turn

observation upon the objective. Whether by *innate ideas* Des Cartes meant something coëval in its existence with the mind to which it belongs, and illuminating the understanding before the external senses begin to operate, or not, as Locke supposed, certainly the great tendency of his philosophy was to commute the subjective with the objective—to lead to a high *a priori* philosophy and science—to turn back the Baconian movement by reversing its method. The task, therefore, of Locke's philosophy was to restore the Baconian method by developing its psychological basis. Therefore, repudiating all knowledges prior to experience beginning in the senses, Locke says: "If it be demanded when a man begins to have any ideas, I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coëval with sensation." Locke then enounces two sources of ideas, in the passage which we have already quoted; and, in accordance with the principle that sensation is prior to all ideas in the understanding, he treats of the ideas of sensation first, and of reflection second; being induced to do this by the great purpose of his philosophy—to throw observation upon external nature. But that Locke meant to assert that there is an interval of time between our knowledge of matter and of mind, cannot be maintained; and least of all, that *the knowledge of matter has the priority*. It really mortifies us that these stale criticisms, which make Locke a mere Sensationalist, should be written anew in the history of philosophy by a countryman of Locke's at this late day. Mr. Morell has, as it were, permitted Cousin to hold his hand while he writes the history of philosophy. He has, therefore, divided all philosophers into two classes, Sensationalists and Idealists. This division is based upon the supposition, that Eclecticism is the true account of the development of philosophy. This view of the development of philosophy, taught him by Cousin, led him to follow that philosopher in his strictures upon Locke, and class him amongst Sensationalists. Eclecticism assumes that no one man, from the very necessary order of philosophical development, can lay open the foundations of philosophy broad enough to bear the superstructure—can lay open sufficiently sensation and self-consciousness as sources of knowledge. It postulates, that every philosopher and his age has developed either the one or the other of these sources of knowledge, but never both. And that, in the order of things, a great mind, endowed with a universal genius of criticism, and possessed of all learning in philosophy, must discover a higher method than had thus far been pursued—the method of Eclecticism, a method assumed to be as far above induction and reflective analysis, as the eclectic philosopher is above those one-idea philosophers who, given up to either Sensationalism or Idealism, are his necessary forerunners in the development of philosophy. But this boasted Eclecticism, when searched to the bottom, is discovered to be a mere scheme of compilation, a universal plagiarism.

As we can know things only in so far as we have a faculty of knowing in general, it is necessary, in order to a true theory of knowledge, that we determine the scope of this faculty. This Locke endeavoured to do. He maintained that all our knowledge is obtained through observation. He further maintained that the faculties of observation are two: 1. Sense, or external perception; 2. Self-consciousness, or internal perception. The fundamental problem, therefore, of Locke's philosophy, was to determine the conditions of our faculties of knowing. But Locke did not see this problem very definitely, if at all.

All knowledge is divisible into two great branches: 1. *The objects of knowledge*; 2. *The mode of knowing*. The objects of knowledge Locke properly divided into two great classes, external and internal, corresponding to his two faculties of *sense* and *reflection*, or self-consciousness. The mode of knowing is also divisible into two parts: 1. *The possibility of knowing from the nature of thought*; 2. *The possibility of knowing from the nature of existence*. This last discrimination Locke had no notion of. The problem of the conditions of knowledge, therefore, never presented itself distinctly to Locke. It is true, that occasionally he is constrained by the exigencies of thought to utter truths which properly fall under the problem of the conditions of thought. He says, for instance: "He would be thought void of *common sense* who, asked on the one hand or on the other, were to give a reason why it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be." Here is a distinct recognition of the principle of contradiction, which, of course, has its origin and guarantee in the intellect or common sense. Locke, too, believed in necessary and universal truths, as distinguished from contingent; which, of course, can only find their guarantee in the intellect, being in no way derivable from or through sensitive cognition. And in his criterion of certainty he was extremely subjective, maintaining that the subjective in knowledge is much more certain than the objective; thereby erroneously ignoring the simultaneity of the subjective and objective in the fundamental antithesis of consciousness, and the consequent equal certainty of each. "Our existence (says Locke) is known to us by a certainty yet higher than our senses can give us of the existence of things, and that is internal perception, or self-consciousness, or intuition, from whence may be drawn, by a train of ideas, the surest and most incontestible proof of the existence of God." This, surely, is not the doctrine of a mere Sensationalist. If Locke had been called by the polemical necessities of his times to consider the *conditions of thought* as a special problem, he would doubtless have evolved other principles similar to those we have just mentioned; and, while he would have denied that they are innate, as articulate propositions, he would have admitted that they are silent in laws necessitating thought to its judgments. For

it should be observed that Locke's essay was not the mere theory of a recluse student, but had a polemical birth in the midst of an age in which the discussion of great fundamental doctrines were stirring, in an extraordinary degree, the practical activities of life. Locke was a mighty champion in the universal strife; and his essay was written to counteract the subjective tendency of the Cartesian philosophy. Hence the great stress laid on sensation as a source of knowledge or ideas, to the comparative neglect of the other source, termed by him reflection. But it is only a *comparative* neglect; for, in the first place, he purges, as we have seen, the source of reflection from the doctrine of innate ideas, which, in a logical point of view, are substantially the idols of Bacon. Then, after carefully affirming the existence of two sources of ideas, he proceeds, in accordance with the demands of philosophy in that age, to develop the source of sensation. Locke's philosophy is, therefore, not a one-sided philosophy. Like Bacon, Locke was a labourer in the great field of practical activity. Not only was he a physician skilled in the practice, and well read in the theory of medicine, but he was a powerful writer on government and legislation, and not only these, but a polemic, strong in theological discussion. To estimate, therefore, the mental theory of Locke's essay, it is necessary to view it through the medium of the times, and of the part he took in the strifes of thought. But what is chiefly to be praised in Locke's writings, is the love of truth which everywhere prevails. "Whatever I write (says he), as soon as I shall discover it not to be *truth*, my hand shall be forwardest to throw it into the fire."

Locke had enounced the doctrine that all our knowledge is founded on experience, meaning by experience the whole sphere of conscious mental activity, thereby embracing in it reflection as well as sensation. Hume, seizing upon this doctrine, and narrowing experience to sensation, resolved all our universal necessary judgments into mere factitious habits of mind, and subverted the foundations of theoretical truth, and laid the basis of a scheme of absolute skepticism. For, if our fundamental primary judgments are not necessary, but are mere habits of mind formed from the observation of the contingent, coëxistent, and antecedent, and consequent phenomena of external nature, then is human opinion but waves of thought moved by the accidents of the shifting winds of ever-changing phenomena; and what seems true this moment may seem false the next. This chaos of thought was brought into order and certainty by Reid. He it was who evolved out of the contents of human consciousness those fundamental, necessary, primary beliefs, which constitute both the basis and the criterion of human knowledge. In Locke's time, the vice of philosophy was too great subjectivity. In Reid's time, it was a total abnegation of all certain knowledge, but especially of those fundamental judgments which alone fix certainty in thought—a vice which sprung out of

the extravagant objectivity to which Locke's philosophy had been carried by Hume, confining all thought to the elements furnished by sensation. If Hobbes and Gassendi had obtained in Britain as great ascendancy in Locke's time as Hume did in Reid's, Locke would perhaps have dwelt as much more on reflection as he did on sensation, and the philosophy of Reid would have been anticipated. But, in the conditions of the development of human thought, it was perhaps necessary that the development by Locke should take place, so that its apparent one-sidedness should appear in Hume, and thus a necessity be produced for a reëxamination of human thought to its ultimate basis in the primary facts of consciousness. Reid, therefore, in fact, took up philosophy where Locke left it, and continued the Baconian movement, with a fuller development of the subjective than there was in Locke, but still guided by the fundamental doctrine of Bacon, that truth consists in the correspondence or agreement between thought and its object; and that, in order to secure the truth, observation of phenomena is the indispensable condition. The movement was still towards a fuller outward observation of external nature. And the Baconian method received a fuller theoretical development in the psychological doctrine of Reid, that we perceive external objects themselves, as consciousness testifies, and not merely representations of them, as all previous philosophers had taught. And by his doctrine of the simultaneity and consequent equal certainty of the knowledge of the objective and the subjective, Reid overthrew the doctrine of Des Cartes, that our knowledge of external things must be referred by a secondary act of thought to consciousness for verification. And in this doctrine of Reid, for the first time in philosophy, the subjective and the objective obtained their equilibrium. In his philosophy neither preponderates over the other. While, therefore, in the philosophy of Reid, the subjective is prevented from being commuted with the objective, the certainty of the objective is equalized with the subjective.

But it came to pass, that the doctrines of Reid were misrepresented and perverted by Brown, and the Sensationalism of Destutt Tracy of France; and kindred doctrines of Hume, diluted with rhetoric, were proclaimed by him in their stead. Brown made consciousness convertible with feeling; and the thought, that *the whole is greater than its part*, is considered by him as a feeling. Thus the most extravagant Sensationalism again prevailed in Britain. And though the proud boast of Bacon—that, so potent was his induction as a method of investigation, that it would put common minds on a level with the most powerful—has not been realized, yet it has brought into the fields of physical science the merest empirics in company with true scientists. Thus the downward tendency of physical inquiry needs to be counteracted by a discipline of higher studies. Human reason needs to be rescued from the dirt of a gross Sensationalism.

While this downward tendency of the objective method of Bacon has been realized in Britain, the subjective method of Des Cartes has been realizing its results on the continent of Europe. In the philosophy of Spinoza, it tended to Pantheism. In that of Leibnitz, from its opposite pole, it made man a mere machine, and the physical world his counterpart, moving in harmony, not by interdependent cog-wheels, but by an unseen spiritual agency; which doctrine, when sifted to the kernel, is also of Pantheistic tendency. But under the influence of the Cartesian method, enlarged in its scope to suit the necessities of its condition, human reason, at last, in the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel, consummated the grand apotheosis of error, by throwing aside the many idols of the ancient philosophy pointed out by Bacon, and substituting for them one supreme idol, impiously called the Absolute or Infinite.

But the greatest degradation of philosophy remains to be told. The prejudice against the Aristotelian logic, which begun in Bacon, was augmented by Locke; so that logic was almost ignored in Britain. The marvels accomplished in physics, by coöperation, through the method of induction, gave importance to men whose moderate abilities would ever exclude them from the higher study of our intellectual nature; while the patient attention to details, which physical inquiries demand, caused an almost exclusive cultivation of the powers of observation, to the neglect of the higher faculties of the mind. Logic, therefore, as well as metaphysics, sunk to the lowest level, in the almost exclusive cultivation of physics.

In this state of philosophy, Archbishop Whately revived logic, in a work not displaying much ability, but, at all events, attracting the attention of thinkers. The work did not, however, place logic on that elevation which the indications of its history in the mediæval and the succeeding ages would have pointed out to any one well read in its literature. Nevertheless, it was an omen of the beginning of the cultivation of the higher faculties of the mind in an age of intellectual decadence. But, as low as the level of Whately's logic was, it was too high for the empiric spirit of a Sensational philosophy. Mr. John S. Mill, in his *Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive*, dragged down logic into the very mire of empiricism. Taking Brown, who, we have seen, makes consciousness convertible with feeling, as his guide in the philosophy of the mind, he constructed a system of logic in which the higher faculties of the mind are ignored. While Whately, with some show of reason, resolved induction into deduction or syllogism proper, Mill most preposterously resolved all deduction into induction; and thereby consummated the degradation of logic. Mr. Mill repudiates entirely all necessary truths; consequently ignores the formal laws of thought, of which pure logic is the science, and reduces

all thought to the uncertainty of the empirical conditions of observation. He ignores all distinction between the apodictic and the hypothetical exercise of the understanding. He seems never to consider, that the determinations of the understanding are often effected solely by the relation in which intelligence stands to itself in thought. He maintains that deduction is but an extension of induction, and from the beginning to the end of his exposition confounds *inference* with *deduction*. The intrusion of matter between the premises and the conclusion of a syllogism, which is the cardinal error to be guarded against in logic, is the very thing which Mr. Mill strives to effect as the great end and consummation of correct reasoning. The syllogism is founded upon matter which it passively receives. It does not even develope potential knowledge into actual, but merely evolves implicit knowledge into explicit. The conclusion is already known before the syllogism is formed. Ratiocination is determined by the relations into which intelligence puts itself to itself in regard to some object-matter. Such being the nature of ratiocination, its very form in the syllogism excludes everything intrusive between the premises and the conclusion. In a word, Mr. Mill does not discriminate pure logic, wherein the mental determinations are effected by the formal laws of thought, from concrete or modified logic, wherein the mental determinations are effected under the laws of thought, modified by the empirical circumstances under which we exert our faculties. But even in concrete or modified logic, thought is not considered as applied to any particular matter, but the necessary are considered in conjunction with the contingent conditions under which thought is actually exerted. Mr. Mill does not even discriminate pure from applied logic, formal from material illation, but confounds even these.

It may be said, in answer to these strictures, that Mr. Mill defines in the beginning of his treatise what scope he intends to give it, and that the objection we make is one merely of the meaning of words. This mode of answering our objection, while it has the air of looking at the subject from a more comprehensive point of view, is a sheer evasion. Mr. Mill has not the right to confuse the boundaries of a science. Logic is found by reflective analysis as well as by the indications of its history to be confined to the formal laws of thought as its adequate object-matter; else all the material sciences must be intruded into it. Mr. Mill, therefore, by taking into logic so much foreign matter, is like a geographer who should take into the map of America, the continent of Europe. But Mr. Mill's is not merely an error of boundary: it is a blunder in all the fundamental doctrines of logic, leading him to repeat, with emphasis, the stale misapprehension, that Bacon's method is one-sided, excluding deduction altogether as a process of investigation. Playfair, in his celebrated *Disser-*

tation on the Progress of the Mathematical and Physical Sciences, pronounced the same judgment, and disparaged Bacon's method as Mr. Mill does, by saying that it ignored the process which in the advanced stage of the sciences becomes the most important and effective. Whereas, what Mr. Mill and his forerunners in the error call deduction, is not deduction, a demonstrative process, at all, but is what Bacon means by the descending scale of induction, being in fact a hypothetical and not an apodictic process, and is sometimes, as we have already shown, called the synthetical process of induction. The blunder of Mr. Mill is thus a double one; first, in supposing the process to be deduction when it is not; secondly, in supposing that Bacon excluded it from his method. The truth is, Bacon strode with such colossal steps along the paths of philosophy, that but few have been able to step in his exact footprints, and of these few Mr. Mill is not one, as his numerous misapprehensions of Bacon's method show.

But the most mischievous error which derationalizes Mr. Mill's logic, is the notion, that "Deduction is the great scientific work of the present and future ages;" and that "a revolution is peaceably and progressively effecting itself in philosophy, the reverse of that to which Bacon has attached his name." This doctrine, assuming as it does, that the highest generalities have been reached, evinces a narrowness of comprehension, which of itself would put Mr. Mill below any very high elevation as a thinker; but when it is also a broad contradiction of the fundamental doctrine of his system of logic, which resolves deduction into induction, Mr. Mill stands revealed as a thinker who does not understand himself, but crosses his own path in his exposition of doctrines; and the best refutation is to leave him in the entanglement of his own contradictions.

Induction has been also signally corrupted by Dr. Whewell, in his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*. The inductive process, according to Dr. Whewell, consists in selecting conceptions which exist in the mind anterior to all experience, and by these binding together the objects of observation, in conformity with certain relations subsisting between the percepts derived from the objects, and the conceptions or ideas of colligation. The operation proceeds by trying, first, one conception, or idea of colligation, and then another, until the right one is found. Now, if the process of induction were that of binding phenomena together by certain innate ideas or conceptions, as Whewell contends, it would be just as easy to find the proper idea of colligation on seeing a few phenomena, as on seeing many. Because it seems sufficiently manifest, that a number of instances outside of the mind could in no way enable us any more readily to find the idea of colligation amidst the multitude of such, which, *ex hypothesi*, exist in the mind, to bind together the given instances, than the given instances

themselves would. For, in the given instances themselves, the fitness of the idea of colligation must appear; and yet, the inductive inference or idea of colligation is only suggested by many instances. In this truth alone, is found a sufficient refutation of Whewell's theory of the idea of colligation.

The tendency of this doctrine of Dr. Whewell's, is to set up in the mind a physical standard of things, and thus commute the subjective with the objective. The doctrine springs out of a misunderstanding of the manner in which the mind comes by concepts, or, as Dr. Whewell improperly calls them, conceptions. The mind cannot embrace many objects at once; it must single out one, and, when this is done, all others are excluded. The product of the mind, when attention is thus given to one object only, is a percept. But the mind strives to comprehend many objects also. It, therefore, by comparing objects, discovers similarities between them, and it dwells upon the characters which constitute their similarity to the exclusion of the characters which constitute their dissimilarity, and identifies the similarities, and expresses the identification by a general term. The product of the mind, in such identification of similarities, is a concept. Now, Dr. Whewell's ideas of colligation are only these concepts empirically formed from observation; and the colligation of which he speaks is done in the very act of conception—is, in fact, the concept itself. The concept thus formed may then be used in binding together similar objects or phenomena. His doctrine of ideas of colligation is, therefore, a gross absurdity, which vitiates his whole philosophy, and, together with other similar errors, degrades him to a low level as an expounder of logical philosophy. In truth, Dr. Whewell is as crude and confused a thinker as ever aspired with such laborious ambition to be a philosopher.

The philosophy of the Absolute and Infinite, has, too, its own pretended method, called the ontological method. In this philosophy, logic, in any proper sense, is done away with. Assuming a faculty of intellectual intuition, by which the absolute and the infinite are immediately perceived, it repudiates altogether as beneath the high purposes of philosophy, the grovelling method of induction. Its method of investigation, if it can be called so, is not a process of inference founded upon evidence, but is an immediate intuition, where reasoning becomes only tracing, intellectually, the order of creation as it proceeded by evolution from its primordial element of absolute being. This method claims to evolve all human knowledge, and all that is knowable, out of one fundamental entity, in which subject and object, God and man, Creator and creature, are identified. Its process of evolution is identical with the process of creation. As creation is the process of Almighty thought, resulting in all that exists, so human thought, in the ontological method, is the similar process of a finite mind,

resulting in the knowledge of all that exists—the same process of the finite mind being subordinated to result only in knowledge, while that of the infinite results in creation.

Such is as articulate a statement as we are able to give of the method of a philosophy which commutes the nescience of man with the omniscience of God ; and which, when sifted to the bottom, is found to be an antithesis of the broadest contradictions. True to the spirit of this philosophy, Schwegeler has, in his history, altogether ignored logic, and does not even name it in his account of the philosophy of Aristotle.

Such is the state of philosophy, resulting from both the Baconian and Cartesian movements. The great Scotch philosopher, Sir William Hamilton, who lately died, had begun a reclamation of philosophy, which will, in time, raise it to a higher elevation than it has yet attained. We hail the auspicious influence destined to be exerted by his labours. But this is not the occasion to consider his philosophy.

We have said nothing of philosophy in America ; because, as yet, the various European systems are struggling for a foothold here. We are somewhat in the condition of ancient Alexandria, where all doctrines of the world commingled ; but we believe that America is destined to achieve great glory in the high argument of philosophy.

We hope that this article will furnish a vantage ground, from which the reader can see that the progress of philosophy consists of a consecutive series of discussions, elicited more or less by the circumstances of successive epochs ; and that no analysis of human thought can afford any clue to a necessary course of development of the doctrines, and consequently of the history of philosophy, as Idealism contends.

KETTLEWELL'S

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The following letter from an eminent planter, near Beaufort, S. C., will no doubt be read with interest by planters and farmers generally.

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John Kettlewell, Esq.: Dear Sir,—The season has come round once more for providing for another crop, and I therefore write to inform you what quantity of Renovator I would like to get for next season. I applied all of the 300 barrels of it on this plantation and the adjoining one belonging to the estate of E. N. Chisolm, and mostly to Long Stapled Cotton. Circumstances prevented me from making any quantity of our plantation manures last year; therefore most of the cotton was manured with the Renovator—one barrel per acre as usual, and up to the late gale of the 8th September, the prospect was very promising indeed, and my crop was, I think, never more so; but the tide rose so high that all of my cotton fields were covered by it, cutting down my crop to about one-fourth part only of what I would have made otherwise. On the adjoining plantation, the lands being higher, only a small part was covered by the tide, so that the loss is much less, but still only about half a crop will be made. I can see very plainly, on that plantation, the effect of the Renovator that was applied the year before the last, although the whole field has this year been manured with the Renovator, and that only; thus convincing me that for cotton it has proved both a quick and also a durable manure. On my own crop, one line across two fields that were heavily manured last year with unusually good compost manure, were this year planted in cotton again without any manure, while all the rest of the fields had one barrel per acre of the Renovator applied, and the result was that the lines left unmanured were very perceptibly inferior to the rest of the fields, thus proving that it is a good manure for cotton. I made this experiment for the purpose of satisfying some friends who thought, as the land was very good, the good crop last year might be owing to the strength of the land, and not to the effect of the manure. I think, also, that I can distinctly perceive a very improved growth of grass and weeds on lands manured last year with the Renovator and planted, but rested this year, thus showing that it is good for the land as well as for the crops.

Further observations of experiments with Guano tend to confirm me in my previous impression that guano causes growth of the cotton plant without anything like proportionate increase of fruit, while the Renovator gives increased growth with increased fruit, and I cannot think that adding Guano to the Renovator has any other effect than to increase the cost. I know that I differ from others who think much better of Guano than I do, but I am conscious of no prejudice, and speak only the truth in this matter.

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JOHN KETTLEWELL.

A FINAL APPEAL.

We have been placed under great obligations to our brethren of the Press for the frequent and favourable Editorials they have penned in behalf of the SOUTHERN QUARTERLY REVIEW.

But, as the pecuniary condition of the work is by no means such as we anticipated, and in view of contingencies that may occur, we regard it proper to deal candidly and openly with its patrons.

We took possession of the title of the REVIEW last winter, and secured for its Editorial management the talent and services of one of the ripest scholars of the present age (the Rev. Dr. THORNWELL), who has spared no effort to procure the coöperation of many master minds, and the two numbers which have appeared under his direction have been assigned a character second to no other periodical now published.

Our correspondents are paid \$3.00 per page, for every page of matter published in the REVIEW, and we have laboured to make it all that its friends would have it. *But* (and we regret to state the fact), *we have not realised over \$600 upon the present volume, barely sufficient to pay for the paper upon which the REVIEW is printed.*

We have distributed 1,300 copies of each number of the REVIEW to subscribers, which ought to have realised for us \$6,500, and thus place the work on a firm basis.

The present number is submitted as a specimen, and if it should unfortunately turn out that the friends of the enterprise have determined not to sustain it, by continuing to withhold the subscription price, we will be forced to yield to the pressure, and abandon the work as soon as the volume is completed.

If those who have received the REVIEW the present year, could be induced to forward us one-half the subscription price, we would be encouraged to go on; but when it is known that our receipts have amounted only to about \$600, and that we have paid to authors, printers, and others engaged upon the work, \$1,450, the reader will easily discover that it is worse than folly for us to continue the publication.

THIS IS THE LAST APPEAL WE INTEND TO MAKE FOR THE REVIEW. If its friends are determined that it shall die, we must submit, and close its pages before we become seriously involved.

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